Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090

As amended through March 26, 2024
Rule 8.090 - SPEEDY TRIAL
(a)Time. If a petition has been filed alleging a child to have committed a delinquent act, the child shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing without demand within 90 days of the earlier of the following:
(1) the date the child was taken into custody; or
(2) the date of service of the summons that is issued when the petition is filed.
(b)Motion to Discharge. If an adjudicatory hearing has not commenced within 90 days, upon motion timely filed with the court and served upon the prosecuting attorney, the child shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (m). Before granting such motion, the court shall make the required inquiry under subdivision (d).
(c) Commencement. A child shall be considered to have been brought to trial if the adjudicatory hearing begins within the time provided. The adjudicatory hearing is considered to have commenced when the first witness is sworn before the judge.
(d)Discharge Exceptions. If the adjudicatory hearing is not commenced within the periods of time established, the child shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (m) unless any of the following situations exist:
(1) The child has voluntarily waived the right to speedy trial.
(2) An extension of time has been ordered under subdivision (f).
(3) The failure to hold an adjudicatory hearing is attributable to the child, or his or her counsel, or to accommodate a co-defendant when the state shows the necessity of trying the cases together.
(4) The child was unavailable for the adjudicatory hearing. A child is unavailable if:
(A) the child or the child's counsel fails to attend a proceeding when their presence is required; or
(B) the child or the child's counsel is not ready for the adjudicatory hearing on the date it is scheduled.

No presumption of nonavailability attaches, but if the state objects to discharge and presents evidence of nonavailability, the child must, by competent proof, establish availability during the term.

(5) The demand referred to in subdivision (g) is invalid.
(6) If the court finds discharge is not appropriate, the pending motion to discharge shall be denied, and an adjudicatory hearing shall commence within 90 days of a written or recorded order of denial.
(e)Incompetency of Child. Upon the filing of a motion suggesting that the child may be incompetent, the speedy trial period shall be tolled until a subsequent finding of the court that the child is competent to proceed.
(f)Extension of Time. The period of time established by subdivision (a) may be extended as follows:
(1) Upon stipulation, announced to the court or signed by the child or the child's counsel and the state.
(2) By written or recorded order of the court on the court's own motion or motion by either party in exceptional circumstances. The order extending the period shall recite the reasons for the extension and the length of the extension. Exceptional circumstances are those which require an extension as a matter of substantial justice to the child or the state or both. Such circumstances include:
(A) unexpected illness or unexpected incapacity or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial;
(B) a showing by the state that the case is so unusual and so complex, due to the number of child co-defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation within the periods of time established by this rule;
(C) a showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available, despite diligent efforts to secure it, but will become available at a later time;
(D) a showing by the child or the state of necessity for delay grounded on developments which could not have been anticipated and which will materially affect the trial;
(E) a showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a co-defendant, when there is a reason not to sever the cases in order to proceed promptly with the trial of the child; or
(F) a showing by the state that the child has caused major delay or disruption of preparation or proceedings, such as by preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise.

Exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court's docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays.

(3) By written or recorded order of the court for a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from proceedings including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability of the child to stand trial for hearings or pretrial motions, for appeals by the state, and for adjudicatory hearings of other pending charges against the child.
(g)Speedy Trial Upon Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this rule and subject to the limitations imposed by subdivision (h), the child shall have the right to demand a trial within 60 days, by filing a pleading titled "Demand for Speedy Trial" with the court and serving it upon the prosecuting attorney.
(1) No later than 5 days from the filing of a demand for speedy trial, the court shall set the matter for report, with notice to all parties, for the express purposes of announcing in open court receipt of the demand and of setting the case for trial.
(2) At the report the court shall set the case for trial to commence at a date no less than 5 days nor more than 45 days from the date of the report.
(3) The failure of the court to hold such a report date on a demand which has been properly filed shall not interrupt the running of any time periods under this subdivision (g).
(4) In the event that the child shall not have been brought to trial within 50 days of the filing of the demand, the child shall have the right to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (m).
(h)Demand for Speedy Trial; Effect. A demand for speedy trial shall be deemed a pleading by the child that he or she is available for the adjudicatory hearing, has diligently investigated the case, and is prepared or will be prepared for the adjudicatory hearing within 5 days. A demand may not be withdrawn by the child except on order of the court, with consent of the state, or on good cause shown. Good cause for continuance or delay on behalf of the child shall not thereafter include nonreadiness for the adjudicatory hearing, except as to matters that may arise after the demand for the adjudicatory hearing is filed and that could not reasonably have been anticipated by the child or defense counsel.
(i)Discharge After Demand. If an adjudicatory hearing has not commenced within 50 days after a demand for speedy trial, upon motion timely filed with the court having jurisdiction and served upon the prosecuting attorney, the child shall have the right to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (m), provided the court has made the required inquiry under subdivision (d).
(j)Effect of Mistrial, Appeal, or Order of New Adjudicatory Hearing. A child who is to be tried again or whose adjudicatory hearing has been delayed by an appeal by the state or the child shall be brought to trial within 90 days from the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the trial court granting a new adjudicatory hearing, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice of whatever form from an appellate or other reviewing court which makes possible a new adjudicatory hearing for the child, whichever is last. If the child is not brought to an adjudicatory hearing within the prescribed time periods, the child shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (m).
(k)Discharge From Delinquent Act or Violation of Law; Effect. Discharge from a delinquent act or violation of law under this rule shall operate to bar prosecution of the delinquent act or violation of law charged and all other offenses on which an adjudicatory hearing has not begun or adjudication obtained or withheld and that were, or might have been, charged as a lesser degree or lesser included offense.
(l)Nolle Prosequi; Effect. The intent and effect of this rule shall not be avoided by the state entering a nolle prosequi to a delinquent act or violation of law charged and by prosecuting a new delinquent act or violation of law grounded on the same conduct or episode or otherwise by prosecuting new and different charges based on the same delinquent conduct or episode, whether or not the pending charge is suspended, continued, or the subject of the entry of a nolle prosequi.
(m)Remedy for Failure to Try Child Within the Specified Time.
(1) No remedy shall be granted to any child under this rule until the court shall have made the required inquiry under subdivision (d).
(2) The child may, at any time after the expiration of the prescribed time period, file a motion for discharge. Upon filing the motion the child shall simultaneously file a notice of hearing. The motion for discharge and its notice of hearing shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney.
(3) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a motion for discharge, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion and, unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (d) exists, shall order that the child be brought to trial within 10 days. If the child is not brought to trial within the 10-day period through no fault of the child, the child shall be forever discharged from the delinquent act or violation of law.

FL. R. Juv. P. 8.090

Amended effective 7/1/2023; amended by 258 So.3d 1254, effective 1/1/2019; amended by 939 So.2d 74, effective 1/1/2007; amended by 649 So.2d 1370, effective 1/26/1995; amended by 648 So.2d 115, effective 12/22/1994; amended by 589 So.2d 818, effective 7/1/1991; amended by 530 So.2d 920, effective 1/1/1989.

Committee Notes

1991 Amendment. (m)(2) This rule requires a notice of hearing at the time of filing the motion for discharge to ensure that the child's motion is heard in a timely manner. A dissenting opinion in the committee was that this change does not protect the child's rights but merely ensures that the case is not dismissed because of clerical error.