Opinion
No. 2019-KP-01330
11-24-2020
STATE of Louisiana v. Cardell Demond ROBINSON
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. In 2011, Defendant, Cardell Robinson, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of La. R.S. 40:966. He was subsequently adjudicated a four-time habitual offender and given the then mandatory sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. Counsel for Mr. Robinson filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. It is at this stage that Mr. Robinson could have asked the trial court to declare his sentence excessive under Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution even though it fell within the statutory limits provided by the Legislature. State v. Johnson , 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676 ; State v. Sepulvado , 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). In State v. Dorthey , we held that this power extends to the minimum sentences mandated by the Habitual Offender Law and that the trial court must reduce a defendant's sentence to one not constitutionally excessive if the trial court finds that the sentence mandated by the Habitual Offender Law "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or is nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and "is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993). However, when he argued the motion to reconsider the sentence, Mr. Robinson's counsel was unaware of our holding in Dorthey , and, therefore, did not seek a downward departure on the basis that a life sentence would be excessive. Due to counsel's error, the trial court did not consider whether a downward departure was warranted, and the trial record was not fully developed with regard to this question. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider.
In 2017, the Louisiana Legislature passed ameliorative amendments to the Habitual Offender Law, such that, if he were convicted today, Mr. Robinson would not be subject to a mandatory minimum life sentence, but rather a minimum 20-year sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).
The undeveloped trial record prevented the appellate court from performing a meaningful Dorthey analysis. Thus, the court of appeal upheld the sentence after performing a review much like that when a bare claim of excessiveness is before an appellate court. State v. Robinson , 12-1731, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13) (unpub'd), available at 2013 WL 1791051, writ denied , 13-1234 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 480.
In 2018, Mr. Robinson subsequently challenged the life sentence in a motion to correct illegal sentence. At that time, Mr. Robinson was barred from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel on collateral review pursuant to our earlier holdings in State ex rel. Melinie v. State , 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172 and State v. Cotton , 09-2397 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030. The trial court granted the motion to correct illegal sentence on April 22, 2019, and the court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling on July 22, 2019. These proceedings occurred before our recent decision in State v. Harris , where we held that an "ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim is cognizable on collateral review." 18-1012, p. 1 (La. 7/9/20), ––– So.3d ––––, available at 2020 WL 3867207. Accordingly, because this case has never been evaluated by any court in light of our decision in Harris , and because Mr. Robinson has presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing meriting an evidentiary hearing, we grant Mr. Robinson's writ application. The ruling of the court of appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district court to reconsider its ruling in light of Harris and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Weimer, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Weimer, J. , concurs for the reasons assigned in State v. Harris , 18-1012 (La. 7/9/20), ––– So.3d ––––, available at 2020 WL 3867207.
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
Defendant asserts—for the second time to this court—his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutionally excessive, warranting a downward departure under State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276. On direct appeal this contention was thoroughly analyzed and rejected by the court of appeal, which found defendant failed to show he is "exceptional," meaning he is not a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. See State v. Robinson , 12-1731 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 2013 WL 1791051, at *2. Defendant's writ application to this court, based solely on his excessive-sentence argument, was unanimously denied. See State v. Robinson , 13-1234 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So. 3d 480.
Seven years later defendant is back, now repackaging his claim as a "motion to correct an illegal sentence." But, his argument that his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutionally excessive and requires a downward departure under Dorthey does not support his claim that the sentence is "illegal." In fact, the sentence is not illegal. It is expressly authorized by the version of Louisiana Revised Statute 15:529.1A(4)(b) in effect on the date of his offense. See Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 726, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (defining an illegal sentence as one where "the term of the prisoner's sentence is not authorized by the [applicable] statute.") The trial court recognized the sentence is not illegal but found it—the same sentence imposed by the trial court and upheld on appeal—is not "a just one" and is "constitutionally excessive."
The trial court concluded that 2017 ameliorative amendments to the habitual offender law "signal[ ] to this Court a shift in legislative intent regarding punishment, and indeed perhaps a shift in societal values and ideals regarding habitual offender status and punishment." The problem is the trial court also acknowledged that those 2017 amendments, by express legislative declaration, do not apply to the defendant's sentence. See La. Acts 2017, Nos. 257 § 2 and 282 § 2. For this defendant, the legislature spoke clearly, directly, and unequivocally: the appropriate sentence is mandatory life. See La. R.S. 15:529.1A(4)(b) (eff. 2011). Because defendant's life sentence is legal, the trial court erred granting his motion, and the court of appeal correctly reversed.
Treating the defendant's illegal-sentence motion as a petition for postconviction relief, the majority now reverses the court of appeal. There is no explanation why this repetitive claim, fully litigated on direct appeal, is not precluded by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.3. In fact, the majority's action is unexplained other than a cite to State v. Harris , 18-1012 (La. 7/9/20), ––– So. 3d –––– (2020 WL 3867207). In Harris a majority of this court allowed collateral review of a sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing where the defendant arguably never had the opportunity to challenge his sentence at the trial court or on direct appeal. Harris departed from over twenty years of settled law holding Article 930.3 does not authorize collateral review of sentences. See State ex rel. Melinie v. State , 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So. 2d 1172 (per curiam ); see also Harris , 2020 WL 3867207 at *15 (Crain, J., dissenting). Although the Harris majority characterized its holding as an "exception to Melinie ," that opinion is now being used as authority in this case to vacate a sentence on collateral review where (1) the sentence was legally imposed, (2) the constitutionality of the sentence was judicially reviewed and upheld on direct appeal, (3) defendant makes no express claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, (4) the relief granted defendant was based on statutory amendments not applicable to the sentence, and (5) the mandatory sentence is declared unconstitutional without any determination that defendant is "exceptional" under Dorthey . If any remnant of Melinie survived Harris , today it is buried. Collateral review of sentences is no longer the exception; it is the rule. In fact, by ignoring the repetitive nature of this claim, one can reasonably question whether there are any procedural bars to reviewing any sentence at any time.
Eviscerating Melinie and ignoring Dorthey , our court is now simply reviewing sentences to determine if we think they are fair. This violates the separation of powers and undermines our constitutional framework. I disagree with the judicial expansion of Article 930.3 and the lack of deference afforded a completely legal sentence. The court of appeal was correct. I would affirm.