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finding cruise line knew or should have known that ATV excursion was unreasonably dangerous based on prior similar incidents
Summary of this case from Gammons v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.Opinion
Case No. 1:18-cv-23033-UU
2019-09-19
Taryn SERRA-CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORP., Defendant.
Jacqueline Garcell, Jason Robert Margulies, Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina, Winkleman, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff Jeffrey Eric Foreman, Noah Daniel Silverman, Miami, FL, for Defendant
Jacqueline Garcell, Jason Robert Margulies, Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina, Winkleman, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff
Jeffrey Eric Foreman, Noah Daniel Silverman, Miami, FL, for Defendant
ORDER GRANTING IN PART CARNIVAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
URSULA UNGARO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Carnival Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (D.E. 36) (the "Motion").
The Court has considered the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
I. Factual Background
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. D.E. 31.
A. The Parties
Plaintiff, Taryn Serra-Cruz, is a citizen of New York. D.E. 31 ¶ 1. Defendant Carnival is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Id. ¶ 2. Carnival owns, operates, manages and controls the vessel, Carnival Splendor (the "Ship"). Id. ¶ 14. Wild Play Adventure ("WIPAD") is an entity based in the Dominican Republic. Id. ¶ 3. On or about August 17, 2017, Plaintiff was aboard the Ship as a cruise passenger. Id. ¶ 16. WIPAD owned and operated the excursion: "ATV Adventure and Beach" (the "Excursion"), which was offered, arranged for, sponsored, recommended, marketed, sold, co-operated and managed by Carnival. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.
On September 18, 2019, the Court granted former Defendant WIPAD's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. D.E. 58.
B. Promotional Materials and Advertising of the Excursion
1) Carnival's Website
On or about August 5, 2017, Plaintiff visited Carnival's website. Id. ¶ 24. Carnival's website contained additional information regarding shore excursions, including the Excursion, and sold tickets for excursions. Id. ¶ 18. Carnival's website described the excursions as "our excursions," and represented that it "take[s] care of all the details and wait[s] for all Carnival excursions to return before departing," informed visitors that Carnival "hand selected the best local providers at every port of call," and recommended that passengers not engage in non-Carnival excursions or tours, particularly as Carnival's excursion providers are "required to carry insurance," although no details as to the adequacy or limits of such insurance were provided. Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). Carnival's website also contained passenger reviews for each excursion, but Carnival controlled the content of these reviews by deleting or altering reviews that contain complaints or mention safety concerns. Id. ¶ 22. With respect to the Excursion, Carnival's website did not mention any required level of experience to participate and described it as "[m]oderate" with an "easy-to-handle" all-terrain vehicle ("ATV"). Id. ¶ 23. In contrast, Carnival classified other similar ATV excursions as extreme or difficult. Id. Unlike Plaintiff's amended complaint, D.E. 7, the Second Amended Complaint includes screenshots of Carnival's website containing these quoted phrases. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.
2) Onboard Promotional and Informational Material
After Plaintiff booked her cruise, Carnival sent her promotional material, providing information on various shore excursions, including the Excursion. Id. ¶ 17. Once aboard the Ship, Carnival informed passengers about the excursions available, including the Excursion, in a live presentation. Id. ¶ 19. In addition, Carnival's shore excursion desk onboard the Ship sold tickets and provided information about the various excursions, including the Excursion. Id. ¶ 20. In the promotional material and on Carnival's website, Carnival represented that the excursion providers were "reliable and reputable," that all shore excursions were "guided," and that Carnival selects its excursion providers because they have the "best reputation" in their respective ports. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff reviewed the promotional material shortly after boarding the Ship on August 13, 2017. Id. ¶ 24. All of the information Carnival provided was based on information provided to Carnival by WIPAD and based on Carnival's inspection and approval of the Excursion and WIPAD as an excursion operator. Id. ¶ 25.
C. The Incident
Plaintiff purchased a ticket for the Excursion directly from Carnival and made all reservations through Carnival. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff understood from the promotional material that Carnival regularly inspected the facilities, the equipment (including the ATVs), and the operators to ensure that they were reasonably safe. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff also believed the Excursion was operated by Carnival as part of Plaintiff's Cruise aboard the Ship. Id. ¶ 29. However, the Excursion was actually operated by WIPAD. Id.
On or about August 17, 2017, Plaintiff participated in the Excursion in the Dominican Republic. Id. The Excursion consisted of participants navigating over rough, uneven, and/or steep terrain on ATVs for extended periods of time. Id. ¶ 30. At the beginning of the Excursion, and when passengers began navigating the trails, the tour guides did not provide sufficient instructions or supervision to participants concerning how to properly operate an ATV. Id. Plaintiff had difficulty maneuvering the ATV, and while attempting to navigate over the rough and uneven terrain, Plaintiff crashed, was thrown off the ATV, and the ATV landed on top of her. Id. As a result, Plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Id.
II. Procedural Background
A. Amended Complaint
On July 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint against Defendants. D.E. 1. On August 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed her amended complaint against Defendants, alleging nine causes of action against Carnival relating to her incident on the ATV: (1) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) negligent selection and/or retention; (4) negligent failure to warn; (5) general negligence; and (6) breach of fiduciary duty. D.E. 7. In Count Six, Plaintiff brought a single claim for negligence against WIPAD. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff brought three causes of action against WIPAD and Carnival jointly: (7) negligence based on apparent agency or agency by estoppel; (8) negligence based on joint venture between carnival and WIPAD; and (9) breach of third-party beneficiary contract. D.E. 7. Carnival moved to dismiss the claims against it on August 29, 2018. D.E. 12.
Plaintiff also brought suit against "XYZ Corporation," an "excursion entity" whose legal identity could not be determined. D.E. 7. This Court struck all references to and dismissed without prejudice all causes of action against XYZ Corp. D.E. 30 at 6, 24. Plaintiff does not include XYZ Corp. as a defendant in her Second Amended Complaint.
On February 12, 2019, this Court granted in part Carnival's motion to dismiss and ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. D.E. 30. This Court found Plaintiff's amended complaint amounted to a shotgun pleading because Plaintiff failed to explain which facts supported her numerous causes of action. D.E. 30 at 6. This Court also dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Carnival. Id.
B. Second Amended Complaint
On March 1, 2019, Plaintiff timely filed her Second Amended Complaint. D.E. 31. Plaintiff alleges eight causes of action against Carnival: (1) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) negligent selection and/or retention; (4) negligent failure to warn; (5) general negligence; (6) negligence based on apparent agency or agency by estoppel; (7) negligence based on joint venture; and (8) breach of third-party beneficiary contract. D.E. 31 at 17–51. On March 15, 2019, Carnival moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). D.E. 36. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Carnival's Motion, except as to Count Nine.
III. Legal Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To state a claim for relief, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While a court, at this stage of the litigation, must consider the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint as true, this rule "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In addition, the complaint's allegations must include "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
In practice, to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific undertaking that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
IV. Analysis
A. Counts One and Two: Misleading Advertising and Negligent Misrepresentation
Plaintiff alleges that Carnival made and disseminated false or misleading materials regarding the safety and difficulty level of the Excursion. The elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim under Florida common law and Fla. Stat. § 871.41 are:
(1) misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) that the representor made the misrepresentation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity or under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity; (3) that the representor intended that the misrepresentation induce another to act on it; and (4) that injury resulted to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.
Ceithaml v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 207 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1352–53 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Holguin v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , No.10-20212-CIV, 2010 W L 1837808, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2010) ); see also Smith v. Mellon Bank , 957 F.2d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 1992) ("In order to prove a violation of section 817.41, Florida law requires the plaintiff to prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement.").
As an allegation of fraud, negligent misrepresentation is subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to establish "the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the fraud." Ceithaml , 207 F. Supp. 3d at 1353 (citing Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F. 3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006). Rule 9(b) requires that the complaint to "set forth ... precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral representations." Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc. , 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001). Carnival argues that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard because Plaintiff proffers conclusory allegations and she "does not plead with particularity the manner in which the alleged representations contained in Carnival's website, brochures, and promotional materials misled her." D.E. 36 at 3–4. Plaintiff responds that "paragraphs 46 and 54 specify how the particular statement was false and misled her, and each allegation is accompanied by factual allegations demonstrating falsity." D.E. 39 at 4. Although the Court previously found Plaintiff's allegations to be lacking specificity, the Second Amended Complaint now provides: (1) the exact statements that are alleged to be misleading or false; (2) the source of the allegedly misleading materials; and (3) where and when the allegedly misleading or false statements were made. See Doria v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , No. 19-cv-20179-KMW, 393 F.Supp.3d 1141, 1145, 2019 WL 4023556, at *3, 2019 LEXIS 147711, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2019). Plaintiff also better ties her factual claims to her legal claims. Compare D.E. 31 ¶ 46(a), with D.E. 7 ¶ 47(a). Consequently, the Second Amended Complaint provides Carnival with the respective sources of the representations and facts supporting Plaintiff's claim that negligent representations were actually made to her. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). The Motion is denied as to Counts One and Two.
However, while Plaintiff now includes screenshots of Carnival's website containing the quoted phrases to support her claim that certain statements were false and misleading, she still fails to identify "precisely what statements were made" with respect to the unspecified "brochures and promotional materials" that she references throughout the Second Amended Complaint.
B. Counts Three, Four, and Five: Negligent Selection and/or Retention, Negligent Failure to Warn, and Negligence
Counts Three, Four, and Five allege that Carnival was negligent in hiring and retaining WIPAD as an excursion operator, failing to warn passengers of the alleged dangers involved in the Excursion, and promoting the Excursion. Carnival addresses these three Counts together and argues that they each "fail for the same reason: Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support the contention that Carnival knew or should have known of any of the alleged dangerous conditions with respect to the subject shore excursion." D.E. 36 at 6–7.
To state a claim for negligence against a shipowner, a plaintiff "must show: (1) that defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) that defendant breached that duty; (3) that this breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; and (4) that plaintiff suffered damages." Isbell v. Carnival Corp. , 462 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Hasenfus v. Secord , 962 F.2d 1556, 1559–60 (11th Cir. 1992) ); see also Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) ("In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law.").
Pursuant to federal maritime law, the duty of care that cruise operators owe passengers is ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, "which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition." See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc. , 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989). A facet of the duty of reasonable care is the cruise ship operator's duty to warn of known dangers beyond the point of debarkation in places where passengers are invited or reasonably expected to visit. Chaparro , 693 F.3d at 1336. The duty to warn only extends to dangers "which the carrier knows, or reasonably should have known" to exist. See id. (quoting Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises Inc. , 683 F. App'x 786, 794 (11th Cir. 2017) ).
First, Plaintiff alleges Carnival had a duty to reasonable select and retain excursion operators to ensure the safety of passengers. D.E. 31 ¶¶ 59–61. Plaintiff also alleges Carnival had a duty to warn passengers against the inherent dangers of the Excursion. Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiff argues Carnival's duty to warn was triggered when it received notice of the Excursion's allegedly unsafe conditions through its "initial approval process and/or its yearly inspections of the Excursion Entity" and "other cruise ship passengers being injured on ATV excursions and/or other excursions operated by the Excursion Entity." Id. ¶¶ 32, 63.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff provides sufficient factual detail regarding the alleged prior incidents that occurred with either Carnival and/or WIPAD involving ATV excursions and how these incidents put Carnival on actual or constructive notice. Compare id. ¶ 63(b), with D.E. 7 ¶ 66(b). Plaintiff cites to multiple cases involving similar incidents, which Plaintiff alleges should have put Carnival on notice that the ATV excursion was unreasonably dangerous. D.E. 31 ¶ 32. Plaintiff further alleges precisely what was or should have been revealed to Carnival through inspections and prior incidents. Id. ¶ 63. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts in the Second Amended Complaint alleging Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous conditions of the Excursion.
The Court also finds that the Second Amended Complaint now pleads facts sufficient to support the remaining elements of Plaintiff's negligence claims, including that Carnival breached its duty by, inter alia : failing to warn Plaintiff and other passengers of the dangers associated with the Excursion; offering an unreasonably dangerous excursion to passengers such as Plaintiff; and failing to have reasonably competent and/or trained and/or supervised individual(s) operating the Excursion. Id. ¶¶ 62, 69, 75. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also adequately pleads causation as to the negligence claims. Id. ¶¶ 70, 73 ("Plaintiff would not have purchased tickets for and/or participated in the subject excursion had Carnival adequately warned and/or communicated" to Plaintiff the Excursion's dangers, WIPAD's low insurance limits, and WIPAD's lack of personal jurisdiction.). See Lipkin v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. , 93 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ("Plaintiff must show that Norwegian's breach of the duty to warn was the proximate cause of his injuries. To meet this burden, Plaintiff must show that, had Norwegian adequately discharged its duty to warn of the danger of wheelchairs on walkways, Plaintiff would not have stepped onto the walkway behind the unknown elderly woman pushing the wheelchair."). Plaintiff's damages are also sufficiently pled. See id. ¶ 78. Carnival's Motion as to Counts Three, Four, and Five of the Second Amended Complaint is denied.
C. Count Seven: Negligence Based on Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel
Next, Plaintiff claims Carnival is vicariously liable for WIPAD's negligence under a theory of apparent agency or agency by estoppel. D.E. 31 ¶¶ 86–93. In its prior order on Carnival's first motion to dismiss, the Court agreed with Carnival that, because Plaintiff's underlying negligence claim was dismissed without prejudice, her claim for negligence based on apparent agency must also be dismissed without prejudice. Brown v. Carnival Corp. , 202 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (dismissing "apparent agency" claim where the court had already found that plaintiff failed to state a plausible negligence claim); D.E. 30 at 17 ("[A]ssuming Plaintiff amends her complaint to cure these [general negligence] deficiencies, she otherwise pleads a claim for apparent agency."). Carnival again argues that because general negligence is deficiently pled, Count Seven must also be dismissed. D.E. 36 at 8. To plead the existence of an agency relationship via apparent agency, a Plaintiff must allege:
(1) the alleged principal made some sort of manifestation causing a third party to believe that the alleged agent had authority to act for the benefit of the principal; (2) that such belief was reasonable; and (3) that the claimant reasonably acted on such belief to his detriment.
Zapata v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , No. 12-21897-CIV, 2013 WL 1296298, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013).
Allegations supporting Plaintiff's claim include: (1) "Carnival ma[king] all arrangements for the subject excursion without disclosing to Plaintiff that the subject excursion was being run by another entity"; (2) "market[ing] the subject excursion using [Carnival's] company logo on its website"; (3) "recommend[ing] that passengers not engage in excursions ... not sold through Carnival"; (4) maintaining a "shore excursion desk" where Carnival sold and provided information for excursions; (5) collecting Plaintiff's fee for the Excursion; and (6) issuing Plaintiff a receipt for his fee. D.E. 31 ¶¶ 20, 37. Other courts in this District have found similar factual allegations sufficient to support a negligence claim under an apparent agency theory of liability. See, e.g. , Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1396–97 (S.D. Fla. 2014) ; Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , No. 11-cv-23359-Scola, 2012 WL 2049431, at *8, 2012 LEXIS 77536, at *25–31 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012). Count Seven is sufficiently pled.
D. Count Eight: Negligent Joint Venture
In its prior order on Carnival's first motion to dismiss, the Court found that this claim was sufficiently pled, but dismissed it without prejudice because "the negligence claim that underlies Count Eight [was] deficiently pled as to causation and notice." D.E. 30 at 20. Having found that the underlying negligence claim is now sufficiently pled, Carnival's Motion as to Count Eight is denied.
E. Count Nine: Breach of Third-Party Beneficiary Contract
In Count Nine, Plaintiff asserts a claim as a third-party beneficiary to a contract between Carnival and WIPAD to provide excursions, including the subject Excursion, to Carnival's passengers. D.E. 31 ¶ 107. Plaintiff alleges that Carnival breached the contract by "failing to offer a reasonably safe excursion that satisfied the highest standards of quality in the industry" and by "offering and providing the prohibited ATV excursion." Id. ¶ 111. Carnival argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead the required elements of the claim, the factual allegations are conclusory, and the Second Amended Complaint is even more deficient than the amended complaint. D.E. 36 at 9–10. The Court agrees with Carnival.
To plead a breach of a third-party beneficiary contract, Plaintiff must allege:
(1) the existence of a contract to which Plaintiff is not a party; (2) an intent, either expressed by the parties, or in the provisions of the contract, that the contract primarily and directly benefit Plaintiff; (3) breach of that contract by one of the parties; and (4) damages to Plaintiff resulting from the breach.
Lapidus v. NCL Am. LLC , 924 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1360–61 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Plaintiff did not attach or quote the contract in her Second Amended Complaint or opposition to the Motion, and states that the issue of intent is not properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. D.E. 41 at 19. However, to survive a motion to dismiss, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Here, Plaintiff alleges:
the intent of Carnival and [WIPAD] to contract for the benefit of ... Plaintiff was demonstrated by provisions including: (a) the purpose of the agreement explicitly stating that it is for the Excursion Entity to provide shore excursions to guests on Carnival's vessels; (b) prohibiting ATV excursions from being offered to passengers; (c) Carnival having the right to charge its passengers the price that Carnival determines in its sole discretion; and (d) Carnival having the sole discretion to provide its passengers a full or partial reimbursement of the excursion ticket if a passenger is dissatisfied.
D.E. 31 ¶ 110. These allegations do not sufficiently plead that the contract was intended to primarily and directly benefit Plaintiff. See Heller v. Carnival Corp. , 191 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
Further, Plaintiff does not adequately plead the third element of breach. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that WIPAD and Carnival "contracted to ensure the safety of Carnival's passengers, this is far too generalized to support a third-party beneficiary claim." Aronson , 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379 at 1398 ; Lapidus , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 ; Gayou , 2012 WL 2049431, at *11, 2012 LEXIS 77536, at *31–35 (dismissing third party beneficiary claim where contract stated only that the excursion "will satisfy the highest standards in the industry"); Finkelstein v. Carnival Corp. , No. 1:14-CV-24005-UU, 2015 WL 12765434, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2015) (finding no third-party beneficiary claim because contract's requirement that excursion operators exercise reasonable care "fail[ed] to satisfy the pleading requirements because they do not clearly and specifically express Defendants' intent to primarily and directly benefit Plaintiffs"). The allegation that Carnival breached the contract by offering "prohibited ATV excursions" to passengers is conclusory, especially given other allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Id. ¶¶ 17, 23. Count Nine of the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Carnival's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (D.E. 36) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with this Order. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Count Nine of the Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 31) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Carnival shall file an ANSWER to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of this order. It is further
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 19th day of September, 2019.