Opinion
No. 1D18-4084
06-01-2022
Kquame Riquan RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Regina L. Wright, The Regina Wright Law Firm, Jacksonville, and H. Kate Bedell, Bedell & Kuritz and Associates, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Regina L. Wright, The Regina Wright Law Firm, Jacksonville, and H. Kate Bedell, Bedell & Kuritz and Associates, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Nordby, J. During a gang-related drive-by shooting, three bullets fatally struck a young child. The State charged Kquame Riquan Richardson as one of the shooters and tried him alongside his co-defendant, Henry Lee Hayes IV. The jury convicted Richardson of one count of first-degree murder as a criminal gang member; two counts of attempted second-degree murder as a criminal gang member; and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle as a criminal gang member. Richardson now challenges his convictions and argues that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting multiple rap videos; (2) admitting multiple Facebook photographs over authentication objections; (3) admitting evidence of prior shootings; and (4) denying Richardson's motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm on all issues.
See Hayes v. State , No. 1D18-3876, 338 So.3d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA June 1, 2022).
I.
A violent feud between two rival gangs is at the heart of this case. "Problem Child Entertainment" (PCE) and "187" are local Jacksonville gangs. Richardson and his co-defendant are PCE members. Traditionally, the two gangs were amicable towards one another. But a fight at a Kodak Black concert in November 2015 spawned an all-out street war between the two groups. The conflict, which spanned several months, was marked by shootouts, drive-by shootings, retaliatory violence, and at least one gang member's death. The escalating tension was documented by the gang members themselves—in rap songs, in videos, in photographs, and in many social media posts. The conflict came to a head on January 29, 2016, when the 22-month-old Victim was killed.
That evening, the Victim was in his carseat in the back seat of his mother's car. They had just pulled up outside his great-grandmother's house. As his mother chatted with a relative through her car window, another car pulled up behind them. The occupants quickly unleashed a hail of gunfire. Both the Victim's mother and great-grandmother (who was also in the car) were unharmed. But three bullets struck the Victim, causing fatal injuries. The child was an unintended casualty of the shooting. Reginald "Ducci" Williams and several other 187 associates, who were outside the house at the time of the shooting, were the targets.
The State charged Richardson and the co-defendant each with one count of first-degree murder as a criminal gang member; two counts of attempted first-degree murder as a criminal gang member; and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle as a criminal gang member. Richardson and the co-defendant were tried together before two separate juries in June 2018. At trial, the State presented multiple witnesses, as well as rap songs, videos, phone recordings, and photographs. A. The Escalating Tension Between 187 and PCE.
Both were juveniles at the time of the shooting.
One of the State's key witnesses was Sanquan "Rondo" Bradford. Mr. Bradford was a longtime friend of Richardson, a current associate of PCE, and a former member of 187. Mr. Bradford testified to both defendants’ involvement in PCE, and he identified both defendants as PCE members.
According to Mr. Bradford, Richardson and the co-defendant were best friends. He explained that the co-defendant was called "Cracka Jack," and Richardson was called "JB," which means "Just Blow," like "blowing on a gun." Kameron "Killer Kam" Thomas, a member of 187, attested that Richardson and the co-defendant were both known "shooters" within PCE. Over Richardson's objection, Mr. Bradford testified at length to many photographs depicting Richardson donning what Mr. Bradford called PCE paraphernalia and making gestures with his hands that Mr. Bradford identified as PCE gang signs.
The State's evidence at trial highlighted the evolution of the dispute between PCE and 187 that preceded the January 29, 2016 drive-by shooting of the Victim. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Bradford testified in detail about the gangs. Both testified that PCE and 187 were amicable towards one another until the fall of 2015, when Breon "D Rose" Mason, a 187 member, stole firearms from the co-defendant, a member of PCE.
According to both witnesses, this incident set in motion an escalating series of violent interactions between the two gangs:
• November 14, 2015: a physical altercation occurred between members of 187 and PCE at a Kodak Black concert. Avery "Shug" McKnight, a revered member of 187, was involved in the incident.
• December 3, 2015: Avery McKnight was shot and killed on Odessa Street or "O Block."
• December 25, 2015 (Christmas Day): a drive-by shooting occurred near Odessa Street during a memorial gathering for Avery McKnight. Mr. Thomas testified that, during the memorial, several 187 members were on Facebook taunting PCE and inviting PCE members to "pull up, that we lacking on the block, pull up, that we on the block." "We on Shug Drive, pull up." He explained this was another way to say, "come over where we at ... we don't have no protection." According to Mr. Thomas, within ten minutes of posting the message, unknown individuals drove by and shot at the residence, injuring several people (including a child).
• January 6, 2016: several 187 members conducted a drive-by shooting at the home of Cynthia Hayes, the co-defendant's sister. Those present at the home included Mr. Bradford, Richardson, and the co-defendant.
• January 16, 2016: a drive-by shooting occurred at Mr. Thomas's residence, a well-known 187 hangout. Mr. Thomas identified "Cracka Jack" as the driver and "JB" as the shooter. The State entered a video of the incident into evidence.
• January 24, 2016: PCE member, Monteco "Teco" Brown, shot at Mr. Breon Mason, a 187 member, as he was walking down the street. The State entered a video of the incident into evidence.
The State also introduced multiple rap songs and videos produced by 187 and PCE. In them, the gang members rap about committing acts of violence against the opposition. One such music video produced by PCE was "T on Top of T," in which Richardson is holding a Glock 26 that Mr. Bradford gave him. The co-defendant is also in the video holding a MAK-90 firearm called "Lil Kendre," named after a fallen gang member. The song was created in response to an earlier video by 187, in which 187 threatened to retaliate against the gang that shot Avery McKnight. Mr. Bradford explained that the video was PCE's way of taking responsibility for McKnight's murder. In another song, titled "Make it Black," Richardson, the co-defendant, and several other PCE members rap about committing acts of violence against 187. The song mentions "JB" and the Christmas Day shooting.
The State also presented multiple videos taken from the co-defendant's cellphone. Richardson had objected to this evidence via a motion in limine. Exhibit 404 contained three videos of the co-defendant rapping. These videos were all created on January 16, 2016, around 9:45 a.m., just thirty minutes before the drive-by shooting at Mr. Thomas’ residence. In the videos, the co-defendant sits in the driver's seat of a vehicle flashing a handgun and expresses a desire to shoot opposition gang members.
Exhibit 405 contained one video recorded later in the afternoon on January 16, 2016. Multiple individuals, including Richardson, are seen in the video walking down the street as the co-defendant taunts an opposing gang.
Exhibit 411 consisted of a short video recorded on January 23, 2016, that showed several firearms spread across a bed. Mr. Bradford attested that the video was recorded at the co-defendant's sister's residence. He identified the guns on the bed and their owners. He specifically stated that Richardson owned the Glock 26 and that firearm was used to kill the Victim. Exhibit 407, which was not addressed by the motion in limine, consisted of a video of Richardson and the co-defendant riding in a vehicle on January 18, 2016. Richardson is shown brandishing a handgun. The two individuals are heard singing, "[h]e disrespect Lil Kendre so we spraying him. Where your house? Bitch we coming there. (Inaudible). Riding on the hunt. (Inaudible)."
B. The Drive-By Shooting on January 29, 2016.
Tomeshia Brown, the Victim's mother, testified that she picked up her grandmother from work and drove to the grandmother's home on Spearing Street. Her grandmother sat in the back seat with the Victim. When Ms. Brown pulled into the front yard of the house, she was greeted by her cousin, Reginald Williams, and her brother, Thomas Brown. Soon after, a white vehicle pulled in behind her and the occupants began to fire a series of gunshots. Several shots struck Ms. Brown's vehicle.
Ms. Brown saw a darker-complexioned black male with a gun in the front seat of the white vehicle, wearing a mask. A young, lighter-complexioned black male was leaning out of the rear passenger side shooting a handgun. Ms. Brown could not identify the masked shooter, but she identified Hayes as the shooter in the rear passenger side. Ms. Brown drove away quickly to escape the gunfire. Realizing the Victim had been shot, she immediately took him to the hospital. Later that evening, doctors pronounced the Victim dead.
Jordan Harris (a 187 associate) and Mr. Brown were both present when the shooting occurred. Both testified that, after Ms. Brown pulled up, a white Toyota Corolla pulled in and the occupants started shooting. Mr. Harris was on Facebook Live at the time. He could not identify the shooters, but he heard "at least 30" shots. Mr. Harris also briefly discussed the tension between 187 and PCE, and he identified Mr. Williams as a member of 187.
Jamari Brooks, an associate of Mr. Brown, testified that several hours after the shooting, he drove by a nearby gas station and saw two individuals—"Cracka" and "JB"—pumping fuel into a white car.
C. The Investigation and Other Evidence.
Detective Shannon Pfister of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Crime Scene Unit responded to the scene on Spearing Street and collected eight 9mm casings and numerous projectiles. She also collected a 7.62x39mm casing and multiple 9mm casings inside the white Corolla (which was eventually recovered after the shooting). The 7.62x39mm casing found in the Corolla matched a MAK-90 rifle found at a known PCE drug house. Several projectiles discovered at the scene matched that same MAK-90 rifle. And the 9mm casings found on Spearing Street and inside the Corolla matched a Glock 26 found during a traffic stop involving Richardson and the co-defendant.
In February 2016, law enforcement stopped the co-defendant as he left a restaurant in his father's SUV. Also in the vehicle were Richardson, the co-defendant's sister, Cynthia Hayes, Rashon Jackson, and Ms. Hayes's child. The co-defendant was driving, and Richardson was seated behind him. The Glock 26 was in a bucket directly behind the passenger bench in the cargo area of the vehicle. Cynthia Hayes attested at trial that when law enforcement discovered the Glock 26, Richardson shook his head at her and told her not to say anything. The State presented evidence that Richardson contributed to the DNA profile obtained from the Glock 26.
The Corolla used to carry out the drive-by shooting belonged to Shatoya Williams. Ms. Williams was carjacked the morning of January 28, 2016, by two African-American individuals, one of whom was Mr. Bradford. Mr. Bradford testified that he provided PCE gang members with stolen guns and stolen cars. He admitted to the January 28 carjacking and alleged he conveyed the Corolla to Richardson soon after. When Richardson picked up the stolen vehicle, he told Mr. Bradford he was going to "slide this ride," which means he is going "to go shoot at somebody."
The State also presented evidence that the interior driver's door of the Corolla contained DNA, and the major contributor DNA profile matched Richardson's DNA profile. According to FDLE analyst Jeannelyn Adona, the frequency of occurrence was "greater than 700 billion." In other words, the observed DNA profile was greater than 700 billion times more likely to occur if the sample originated from Richardson than from anyone else.
Law enforcement eventually arrested the co-defendant for the murder of the Victim. Ms. Hayes claimed that when she notified Richardson of the arrest, "he threw his phone down, and he was like, I'm just going to turn myself in." Henry Hayes III, the co-defendant's father, claimed at trial he heard Richardson tell Ms. Hayes that "I've got to let them know that was my gun."
After the State rested, Richardson called one defense witness: Ashley Clark. Ms. Clark was a friend of Mr. Bradford for several years. They started dating in January 2016. She testified that her daughter was shot during the drive-by shooting at the Christmas Day memorial. At some point, she was notified that Reginald Williams accidentally shot her daughter. After Ms. Clark's daughter was released from the hospital, Mr. Bradford allegedly inquired into killing "Ducci's baby" or "somebody in Ducci's family" in retaliation for the shooting. Ms. Clark declined the offer. When Ms. Clark notified Mr. Bradford that the Victim had been shot, Mr. Bradford smiled and replied, "I told you I would handle that for you." Mr. Bradford, during trial, denied making those statements and denied any involvement in the January 29 shooting.
The jury found Richardson guilty of one count of first-degree murder; two counts of attempted second-degree murder; and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle. For each count, the jury also found that Richardson was a criminal gang member and that the offenses were for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interest of a criminal gang. The trial court sentenced Richardson to life imprisonment for the count of first-degree murder (with eligibility for review after twenty-five years), and concurrently to thirty years’ imprisonment for each remaining count (with eligibility for review after twenty years).
II.
A. The Admission of Rap Videos.
In his initial brief, Richardson challenges the admission of "rap videos purported to be produced by gang members and published on Facebook." Yet of all the videos introduced at trial, Richardson challenged only the videos obtained from the co-defendant's phone through a motion in limine. Accordingly, we address Richardson's only preserved claim relating to Exhibits 404, 405, and 411, which contain five videos obtained from the co-defendant's phone.
While the co-defendant preserved a claim through pretrial motions concerning the music videos and songs introduced at trial, Richardson never separately raised this issue in the trial court. See Looney v. State , 803 So. 2d 656, 675 n.23 (Fla. 2001) (noting that the co-defendant did not preserve the issue because, unlike the defendant, he did not properly raise the claim at trial); Eagleman v. Korzeniowski , 924 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("For an issue to be preserved by a defendant in a case involving co-defendants, that defendant must object or that defendant must join in the objection of the other defendant.").
Richardson argues (as he did below) that the videos obtained from the co-defendant's phone constitute hearsay and do not qualify for admission under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.
While the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal, the question of whether a statement constitutes hearsay is a matter of law subject to de novo review. Paul v. State , 277 So. 3d 232, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Section 90.803 sets out several hearsay exceptions, including the co-conspirator exception. See § 90.803(18)(e), Fla. Stat. This exception provides that "[a] statement by a person who was a coconspirator of the party [made] during the course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy" is admissible. Id. ; Brooks v. State , 787 So. 2d 765, 778 (Fla. 2001). This allows a statement to be admitted if substantial evidence, independent of the statement itself, is presented showing: "(1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the declarant/coconspirator and the defendant against whom the statements are offered were members of the conspiracy; and (3) that the statements were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." State v. Edwards , 536 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The threshold requirement for admissibility of a co-conspirator's statement, no matter if a conspiracy is charged, is whether evidence exists independent of the statement that the defendant and declarant participated together in a conspiracy. Brown v. State , 648 So. 2d 268, 270–71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ; Tresvant v. State , 396 So. 2d 733, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied , 408 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1981). "[T]he existence of the conspiracy must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and independent of the hearsay statements." Foster v. State , 778 So. 2d 906, 915 (Fla. 2000).
As for Exhibits 405 and 411, the trial court was correct that the videos did not constitute hearsay. Exhibit 405 (which shows Richardson and others walking down a street as the co-defendant taunts an opposing gang) was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, as the taunts constituted no more than verbal acts. Harden v. State , 87 So. 3d 1243, 1249 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that messages sent in response to threats were not hearsay); State v. Holland , 76 So. 3d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("Verbal acts are not hearsay because they are admitted to show they were actually made and not to prove the truth of what was asserted therein."); see also 2 McCormick on Evidence, § 250 (8th ed.). Likewise, Exhibit 411 (a short video showing firearms spread across a bed) is not hearsay as it contains no oral or written assertions, nor does it show any nonverbal conduct by a person intended to be an assertion. See § 90.801(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
As to Exhibit 404 (the trio of videos showing the co-defendant rapping alone in a vehicle), assuming the videos constituted hearsay, they were admissible under the co-conspirator exception. The record contains enough independent evidence to establish an illegal joint venture between many of the PCE members—including Richardson and the co-defendant—to perform acts of violence against 187 members, particularly through drive-by shootings. Not only was there sufficient evidence to establish that Richardson and the co-defendant specifically conspired to shoot at members of PCE on January 16, 2016, but also that the two conspired, at least for purposes of section 90.803(18)(e), to conduct the drive-by shooting which resulted in the death of the Victim.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Richardson's motion in limine to allow the admission of Exhibits 404, 405, and 411.
B. Facebook Photographs
Next, Richardson argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting various unauthenticated Facebook photographs depicting PCE members, including Richardson, displaying gang signs and donning garments with gang insignia. We disagree.
Evidence must be authenticated before it is admitted. § 90.901, Fla. Stat. This means there must be enough evidence "to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Id. "[A]uthentication for the purpose of admission is a relatively low threshold that only requires a prima facie showing that the proffered evidence is authentic; the ultimate determination of the authenticity of the evidence is a question for the fact-finder." Mullens v. State , 197 So. 3d 16, 25 (Fla. 2016).
There are two ways to authenticate photos. City of Miami v. Kho , 290 So. 3d 942, 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing Dolan v. State , 743 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ); see also Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach , 419 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982). The "pictorial testimony" method requires testimony to establish that, based on personal knowledge, the photographs fairly and accurately reflect the events or scene. Dolan , 743 So. 2d at 545. The "silent witness" method provides that "the evidence may be admitted upon proof of the reliability of the process which produced the tape or photo[graph]." Id . ; see also Wagner v. State , 707 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (enumerating factors to consider when determining whether the "silent witness" method applies).
As to the "pictorial testimony" method, any witness with knowledge that the photograph is a fair and accurate representation may testify to the foundational facts. Bryant v. State , 810 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ; Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 401.2, at 170 (2016 ed.). Testimony from the photographer is not required. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Lovelace , 673 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Nor is there any requirement that the person testifying about the photograph have been present when the photograph was taken (or even know who took the photograph). City of Miami v. McCorkle , 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575, 577 (1940).
Richardson argues the State did not properly authenticate the Facebook photographs under the "silent witness" theory, as the photographs were taken from an unnamed Facebook page and no testifying witness directly participated in taking the photographs or in the incidents which the photographs depicted.
Yet the record reflects the State introduced the photographs using the "pictorial testimony" theory, not the "silent witness" theory. While the State did not use the standard predicate, "Does the photograph fairly and accurately depict [the subject of the photograph]?," the State met the low threshold required to authenticate the photographs. Mr. Bradford, a person with knowledge due to his involvement with PCE and lengthy association with Richardson and the co-defendant, testified in detail about each photograph. He described the individuals in the photographs, the locations where the photographs were taken, the esoteric meanings of the different hand gestures displayed in the photographs, and the clothing worn by the members in the photographs.
Richardson also argues the State provided no proof of the time and date of the photographs. In actuality, the State provided ample proof that many photographs were taken during the relevant timeframe. Detective Matt Bolan testified that most of these photographs were posted on Facebook during the relevant timeframe. Furthermore, according to Mr. Bradford, many photographs depict PCE members, including Richardson, paying respect to a fellow deceased gang member who died in 2015. It stands to reason that the photographs were taken some time in 2015 or early 2016, the relevant timeframe.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to introduce the photographs over Richardson's authentication objection.
C. Prior Shootings
Richardson next challenges the admission of testimony about prior shootings between members of 187 and PCE—the Avery "Shug" McKnight shooting, the Christmas Day 2015 shooting, the January 16th shooting, and the shooting involving Monteco Brown. Richardson maintains this was impermissible Williams rule evidence, as the prior shootings were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. We find no error in the admission of this evidence of prior shootings between the two gangs.
We review the trial court's admission of collateral crime evidence for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State , 166 So. 3d 195, 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). As a general rule, collateral crime evidence "is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. But it is not admissible "when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." Pitts v. State , 263 So. 3d 834, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (quoting section 90.404(2)(a) ).
There are two types of collateral crimes evidence: similar fact evidence and dissimilar fact evidence. Truehill v. State , 211 So. 3d 930, 945 (Fla. 2017). The former (also known as Williams rule evidence) is governed by section 90.404, Florida Statutes, while the latter is subject to section 90.402, Florida Statutes. Id. "The admissibility of both categories—similar fact evidence and dissimilar fact evidence—is determined by its relevancy and, of course, subject to exclusion under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2010)." Id .
In establishing its case, the State "is entitled to present evidence which paints an accurate picture of the events surrounding the crimes charged," Griffin , 639 So. 2d at 970, but cannot "make the evidence of other crimes the feature of the trial or ... introduce the evidence solely for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity." Smith v. State , 866 So. 2d 51, 61 (Fla. 2004).
Id.
Collateral crime evidence, regardless of its status as similar or dissimilar fact evidence, is admissible if it is inextricably intertwined with the charged crime. See Macomber v. State , 254 So. 3d 1098, 1100–01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Collateral crime evidence is inextricably intertwined if it is "necessary to (1) ‘adequately describe the deed’; (2) provide an intelligent account of the crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged crime(s) arose; or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crime(s)." Id . (quoting Dorsett v. State , 944 So. 2d 1207, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ).
The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence. The prior shootings between 187 and PCE members were inextricably intertwined with the January 29 shooting. The January 29 shooting was a continuation and consequence of preceding events, which were violent and retaliatory. These violent interactions, including the shootings, are central to this case and indispensable to explaining the January 29 shooting. Stated another way, the shootings were necessary to establish the entire context out of which the charged crimes arose and adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crimes. Victorino v. State , 23 So. 3d 87, 99 (Fla. 2009). "[T]o prove its case, the State is entitled to present evidence which paints an accurate picture of the events surrounding the crimes charged." Griffin v. State , 639 So. 2d 966, 970 (Fla. 1994).
Additionally, without the evidence, the State could not have explained why the defendants attacked a woman, her baby, and an elderly grandmother. As the State points out in its brief, it would make no sense for the State to argue that the defendants conducted a drive-by shooting at that location on that evening without explaining what was going on between PCE and 187.
Assuming the prior shootings were not inextricably intertwined with the crimes here, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to reference the prior violent interactions between 187 and PCE members. The shootings were relevant to several material issues, including motive, intent, and identity. See Durousseau v. State , 55 So. 3d 543, 551–52 (Fla. 2010) ; see also Reyes v. State , 783 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) ("[I]n some contexts, evidence of gang membership may be admissible to explain such disputed or unclear issues in the case as premeditation, motive or intent.").
The prior violent interactions also are relevant to the gang enhancement of the penalties against Richardson. In this case, the State charged him with a gang enhancement under section 874.03, Florida Statutes. This meant the State had to prove Richardson was a criminal gang member or associate and committed the crime "with the intent to benefit, promote, or further the interests of a criminal gang." § 874.03(4)(a), Fla. Stat. The prior violent encounters established the gang feud as an aim and objective of PCE, and the encounters, particularly the January 16 drive-by shooting, established Richardson and the co-defendant's adoption and support of that aim. The January 16 shooting also established their ongoing participation in activities that advance that aim and objective.
Richardson also argues that the prejudicial nature of the shootings deemed them inadmissible. We are mindful that evidence of the prior shootings, particularly the January 16 shooting, is prejudicial to Richardson. That said, as a practical matter, all evidence introduced by the State during a criminal prosecution is prejudicial to a defendant. Wright v. State , 19 So. 3d 277, 296 (Fla. 2009). Relevant collateral crime evidence should be excluded only when the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Amoros v. State , 531 So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 1988). We conclude that, under the circumstances here, the evidence was relevant and its prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
We affirm the trial court's admission of evidence about prior shootings between the two gangs.
D. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Lastly, we consider whether the trial court erred in denying Richardson's motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the trial court's ruling on this issue de novo. Moran v. State , 278 So. 3d 905, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). All claims of legal sufficiency are reviewed to determine "whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict."See Bush v. State , 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020) ; Carter v. State , 303 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). When applying this standard, a reviewing court must "view the evidence in light most favorable to the State" and consider whether "a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Bush , 295 So. 3d at 200 (quoting Rogers v. State , 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019) ); Jones v. State , 297 So. 3d 685, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
The jury convicted Richardson of one count of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle. The jury further found that Richardson (1) actually possessed and discharged a firearm during the commission of the offenses, and (2) was a criminal gang member, or associate, and the crimes were for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang.
Richardson argues the trial court should have granted him a judgment of acquittal because there was not enough evidence to show he was a shooter. His theory is that Mr. Bradford was the second individual accompanying the co-defendant during the January 29 drive-by shooting.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the State presented evidence to establish that Richardson committed the crimes for which he was convicted. The evidence could be reasonably viewed as supporting the theory that Richardson was the shooter who killed the Victim or, at minimum, he played an integral part in the shooting, thereby qualifying as a principal to the crimes. See Chamberlain v. State , 881 So. 2d 1087, 1105 (Fla. 2004).
First, the State established through multiple videos, photographs, and witnesses that PCE and 187 were engaged in a violent and escalating gang feud. It began in November 2015 and culminated on January 29, when the Victim was shot and killed. The State also showed that both Richardson and the co-defendant were members of PCE and adopted PCE's objective of perpetrating violence against "ops" or rival gang members, particularly 187 members.
Second, the State established that Richardson was one of the shooters. The evidence, namely the witness testimony and DNA evidence, linked Richardson to the vehicle used to carry out the shooting and the Glock 26 handgun used in the shooting. The totality of the evidence also puts Richardson in the vehicle and with the Glock 26 during the relevant timeframe.
As to Richardson's theory that Mr. Bradford accompanied the co-defendant in the January 29 shooting, the above-referenced evidence sufficiently refutes that theory. And the State presented evidence through cell phone records that Mr. Bradford was not in the proximity where the shooting occurred.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Richardson was the shooter who shot the Victim or that he acted as a principal to the crimes. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
III.
Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm Richardson's judgment and sentence.
AFFIRMED .
Rowe, C.J., and Winokur, J., concur.