Opinion
Civil No. 1:20-CV-2240
12-02-2020
DONALD MILES, Plaintiff v. HON. MARGARET MOYLE, et al., Defendants
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1). The plaintiff, Donald Miles, is an inmate in the Lackawanna County Prison. Miles' complaint, which was dated November 19, 2020 and was lodged with this court on November 30, 2020, involves matters that occurred more than two years ago.
According to Miles, in December of 2017, he was serving a state parole or probation sentence that was not due to expire until September of 2018. (Id.) On December 13, 2017, Miles alleges that probation officer Robert Rachilla lodged a detainer against him while he was being held in the county jail. Miles further alleges that Judge Moyle and another probation officer, Richard Clifford, prepared and issued an order and capias detaining him as a parole violator on December 18, 2017. (Id.) Miles appears to be of the view that the issuance of this capias and lodging of this detainer was an illicit act that has extended his confinement beyond his original parole release date of September 2018. (Id.) According to Miles, he brought this continued detention to the attention of the probation office in October of 2018 but was informed by the probation officer that the judge overseeing his parole violation proceedings had directed that a final probation violation hearing would be deferred pending the outcome of the underlying drug charges that led to the violation petition and as we have noted, that criminal case I still pending against Miles.
While Miles' complaint does not explain why he was incarcerated in December of 2017, state court records reflect that Miles was charged with, and is awaiting trial on, state drug trafficking offenses. These records also indicate that the date of his arrest was December 13, 2017. Commonwealth v. Miles, CP-35-CR-0000078-2018.
Informed of these facts in October of 2018, Miles then waited more than two years before filing this lawsuit. In his lawsuit, Miles names Judge Moyle and Probation Officers Clifford and Rachilla as defendants. He then alleges that the December 2017 issuance of this probation violation capias and detainer following his state drug arrest constituted a false arrest and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The apparent premise of these false arrest and imprisonment claims is that the state is powerless to hold him to answer these parole or probation violations once his original term of supervision expired in September of 2018. Miles then demands $4,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants along with his immediate release from custody.
We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) However, for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.' "Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment"). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed.
B. Miles' Claims Which Pre-Date November 2018 are Time-Barred.
When conducting a screening review of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As the Third Circuit has explained when it affirmed the screening dismissal of a pro se complaint on statute of limitations grounds:
Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256 Fed. Appx. 563, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2007). Although we have not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (finding that a district court's screening authority under § 1915(e) "differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not be raised and considered sua sponte.").Smith v. Delaware County Court 260 F. App'x. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Jackson v. Fernandez, No. 08-5694, 2009 WL 233559 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2009); Hurst v. City of Dover, No. 04-83, 2008 WL 2421468 (D. Del. June 16, 2008).
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself of this ground for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the "continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy." Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an "equitable exception to the timely filing requirement." West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, "when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing
the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred." Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts." West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)). The consideration of "degree of permanence" is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
Judged by these standards, Miles' complaint is untimely and is barred by the statute of limitations. The factual averments in the complaint begin in December of 2017, nearly three years ago, and conclude in October of 2018, more than two years ago. Thus, all of these matters alleged by Miles fall beyond the two-year statute of limitations prescribed for federal civil rights violations. Moreover, when we consider the most important factor for any statute of limitations analysis—whether the acts had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his rights—it is evident that Miles believed this detention to be improper at least as early as October of 2018, when he lodged complaints with the probation office. Thus, Miles' own pleadings reflect that these events had a degree of permanence in his mind in October of 2018, which triggered his duty to timely file this complaint. Miles then delayed more than two years before pursuing this claim, a delay which takes his complaint beyond the statute of limitations and compels dismissal of the complaint.
C. Miles Errs When He Suggests that He Had a Right to Release on His Initial Probation Expiration Date.
Moreover, it appears that Miles' complaint rests upon a fundamentally flawed legal premise—the notion that he had some sort of absolute entitlement to have his state supervision end on this initial supervision expiration date, in September of 2018. To the extent that Miles, a state supervisee who was charged with new criminal conduct while on supervision, believes that he had a vested entitlement to his original supervision expiration date, he is simply wrong. Quite the contrary, Section 6138 of the Pennsylvania Prisons and Parole Code ("Parole Code") provides that a parolee may be recommitted as a convicted parole violator if the parolee commits any crime punishable by imprisonment, while on parole, for which he is convicted or found guilty. 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6138(a)(1). That statute further provides, in unmistakably clear terms, that a convicted parole violator "shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole." Id., at § 6138(a)(2). Accordingly, the law is straightforward that unless the Board, in its discretion, decides to award credit in such a situation, the parolee is obligated to serve the remainder of the term that he would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled, with no credit given for street time. Id.; see also Stepoli v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 525 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
Moreover, there is no constitutional right to receive credit for time spent on parole in the calculation of a parolee's maximum sentence. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Furthermore, it is well established that the provision of the parole statute calling for the forfeiture of time spent on parole by criminal recidivists like Miles who violate their parole supervision is constitutional. See United States ex rel. Lawson v. Cavell, 425 F.2d 1350, 1352 (3d Cir. 1970) (rejecting Eighth Amendment and due process claims). Indeed, federal courts have expressly considered this provision of state law, which permits the recalculation and extension of maximum release dates for offenders who commit new crimes and violate the terms of their parole, and have held that "[n]o [federal] constitutional question is involved in the Parole Board's failure to give relator credit for time on parole and its adjustment of the expiration date of his new maximum." See United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966).
As this Court observed over four decades ago when it disposed of a similar inmate complaint:
Petitioner contends that in taking away his "street time" the Board unlawfully extended his maximum sentence in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [The Pennsylvania State parole statute], directing the Pennsylvania Board of Parole to give a recommitted, convicted parole violator no credit for time spent on liberty while on parole, has withstood numerous constitutional challenges in the federal courts. [This statute] has been held not to violate the due process and equal protection guarantees of the federal constitution, and not to violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, bills of attainder, cruel and unusual punishment or ex post facto laws. See also United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd per curiam 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 925, 87 S. Ct. 900, 17 L.Ed.2d 797 (1967); United States ex rel. Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole, 309 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Gomori v. Maroney, 196 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1962). In view of the foregoing authorities, the Court finds petitioner's contention without merit.Choice v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 448 F. Supp. 294, 298 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1977) (footnotes and citations omitted). Therefore, by virtue of his pending criminal charges involving conduct that allegedly took place while on state supervision, Miles is not entitled to have all aspects of his state supervision terminate on what might have been his original supervision expiration date. To the extent that Miles claims otherwise in this lawsuit, his claims are without merit and should be dismissed.
D. Miles May Not Bring a Civil Rights Action for Malicious Prosecution Until the State Case Has Been Resolved in a Fashion That is Favorable to the Plaintiff.
In addition, this complaint fails because it rests on a yet another fatally flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff seeks to bring a civil rights action premised on claims of malicious prosecution without showing that his state criminal case, and related probation violation petition, has been resolved in a fashion that was favorable to the plaintiff.
This he cannot do.
Quite the contrary, it is well settled that an essential element of a civil rights malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim in a setting where he has not achieved a favorable outcome in the underlying state case, the plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the common law of torts, "defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point for inquiry under § 1983 as well." Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's § 1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure, and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked what common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate's claim and concluded that "malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy ... because unlike the related cause of action for false
arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process." Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the elements of malicious prosecution, the court held that the inmate's claim could not proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal conviction. Id.Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-156 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, "our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for which they were prosecuted." Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App'x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156). Therefore, "a plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case." Steele v. City of Erie, 113 F. App'x 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, it is evident that this state criminal prosecution did not terminate favorably for the plaintiff since record records reveal that this case remains pending. In the absence of such a favorable termination of the state criminal case, this federal civil rights malicious prosecution lawsuit cannot proceed. In short, this complaint is based upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, this complaint fails as a matter of law. See Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL 3953112, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).
E. Judge Moyle is Immune from Liability.
Finally, Miles' complaint against Judge Moyle runs afoul of longstanding immunities conferred upon judicial officers. To the extent that Miles seeks in his complaint to hold a state judge personally liable for civil rights violations, it is well settled that such an official is individually cloaked with immunity from liability. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir.1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities for judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial officials are applicable here and prevent Miles from maintaining this civil action against Judge Moyle. As the Third Circuit explained when it rejected a similar effort to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge in a state case, this immunity is both broad and absolute:
A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' " Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App'x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007).
This judicial immunity applies to Section 1983 actions like the lawsuit brought here by Miles, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980), and embraces both requests for damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees. See Corliss v. O'Brien, No. 3:05-CV-0347, 2005 WL 2334792 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2005), aff'd, 200 F. App'x. 80 (3d Cir. 2006). This judicial immunity also specifically applies to judicial actions ruling on bail requests, making probable cause determinations, and presiding over preliminary hearings in state criminal cases. See, e.g., Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 1991); Fox v. Castle, 441 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Pa. March 7, 1977).
Nor can Miles vitiate this immunity by claiming that Judge Moyle erred in issuing a capias. Even if Judge Moyle's decisions were in error, those rulings still may not give rise to civil liability since judicial immunity applies to all of a judge's rulings, even those that are later determined to be mistaken. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Walker v. Zook, No. 4:10-CV-0467, 2010 WL 3896193, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:10-CV-0467, 2010 WL 3893836 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). Accordingly, the claims against Judge Moyle should also be dismissed.
We recognize that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the plaintiff's complaint is, on its face, fundamentally flawed in multiple and profound ways which cannot be remedied. Since these pro se pleadings do not contain sufficient factual recitals to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, these allegations should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, since the factual and legal grounds proffered in support of the complaint make it clear that the plaintiff has no right to relief, granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, (Doc. 2), but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 2nd day of December 2020.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge