Opinion
Civil Action 3:24-CV-00054
01-17-2024
SEAN FAIRWEATHER, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS MCDONALD, Defendant.
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(MUNLEY, J.)
This action brought by pro se Plaintiff Sean (“Fairweather”) was commenced by the filing of a complaint on January 12, 2024. (Doc. 1). Fairweather also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the same date. (Doc. 2). In his Complaint, Fairweather seeks compensation from Defendant Thomas McDonald (“McDonald”) due to an incident of during which Fairweather alleges McDonald arrested him under false pretenses. (Doc. 1, at 4). Having conducted the statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court finds that Fairweather's claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and respectfully recommends dismissal of the Complaint.
The Court grants Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) by separate order.
I. Background and Procedural History
On January 12, 2024, Fairweather, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against McDonald regarding an incident that occurred on May 12, 2017. (Doc. 1, at 4). Fairweather contends “[o]n May 12, 2017 McDonald arrested me under false pretense.” (Doc. 1, at 4). According to Fairweather, no crime had been committed and he possessed no drugs or “mark money” at the time of the arrest. (Doc. 1, at 4). As a result of his arrest, it appears from the Complaint that Fairweather was sentenced to time served, then resentenced to “Bootcamp,” from which he graduated in 2019. (Doc. 1, at 4-5). Meanwhile, McDonald was “under investigation,” and “was found guilty, fined, and sentence in July 2021.” (Doc. 1, at 5). According to Fairweather, as a result of McDonald's actions, he was falsely imprisoned, defamed, slandered, subjected to emotional distress, and suffered PTSD. (Doc. 1, at 6). He brings his claims against McDonald under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, at 1). As relief, he seeks reimbursement from McDonald for pain and suffering. (Doc. 1, at 6).
II. Section 1915(e)(2) Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is statutorily required to review the complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions...'” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is contextspecific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With these standards in mind, pro se documents must “be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the base pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. N.J. State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008). If a complaint fails to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
A. Statute of Limitations
“When conducting a screening review of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations.” Miles v. Moyle, No. 1:20-CV-2240, 2020 WL 7516666, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2020). A district court is permitted to “sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.” Smith v. Del. Cty. Ct., 260 Fed.Appx. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008). A civil rights claim is subject to the same statute of limitations as a personal injury claim in the state in which the claim is brought. SeeMiles, 2020 WL 7516666, at *4. In Pennsylvania, a personal injury claim is constrained by a two-year statute of limitations period. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524; see also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 369 (3d Cir. 2000); Smith, 260 Fed.Appx. at 455. Therefore, a civil rights claim is also bound by a two-year statutory period. See Miles, 2020 WL 7516666, at *4; Smith, 260 Fed.Appx. at 455. A cause of action begins, for statute of limitations purposes, “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
According to the Complaint, Fairweather's cause of action arises from an incident that occurred on May 12, 2017. (Doc. 1, at 4). Fairweather filed the current action on January 12, 2024, over six years after the incident leading to the Complaint. (Doc. 1). Accordingly, the statute of limitations has run on Fairweather's § 1983 claim and the Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint. See Miles, 2020 WL 7516666, at *4; Sameric, 142 F.3d, at 599.
B. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.'” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Products Liab. Litig., 564 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Fairweather's entire cause of action arises from an incident that occurred more than six years ago. (Doc. 1). He identifies no grounds for this Court to toll the statute of limitations or any facts that have occurred within the past two years. His action is simply untimely. See Miles, 2020 WL 7516666, at *5. For these reasons, it would be futile to grant Fairweather leave to amend his Complaint. See Miles, 2020 WL 7516666, at *8.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Fairweather's claims are time-barred. As such, it is respectfully recommended that Fairweather's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 17, 2024. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.