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holding that in such circumstances, there is "no longer a viable charge pending before the EEOC that is capable of amendment."
Summary of this case from Capozzelli v. Allstate Ins. Co.Opinion
Civ. NO. 99-3156 SECTION "N"
April 7, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Federal Warranty Service Corporation's ("Federal Warranty") Unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Federal Warranty's Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of claims against Federal Warranty for employment discrimination on the basis of race. Federal Warranty employed Hazeur as a customer service/sales representative from May 21, 1996 through December 18, 1996, when Hazeur voluntarily resigned. Hazeur filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in August, 1997, alleging that she suffered discrimination on the basis of race with regard to promotion. In this charge, Hazeur named Campo as her employer. In her Charge Questionnaire, however, dated April 23, 1997, Hazeur named her employer as Campo/Federal Warranty. After receiving a Right to Sue Notice from the EEOC, Hazeur filed suit against defendants Federal Warranty and Campo on August 27, 1998 (C.A. No. 98-2568). This Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Federal Warranty on August 11, 1999, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims. Because plaintiff had dismissed voluntarily her claims against Campo prior to the Court's ruling, Judgment in favor of Federal Warranty was entered on that same date, Plaintiff did not appeal this Court's ruling.
Plaintiff's complaint states that she was an employee of Federal Warranty beginning in March, 1996. The evidence submitted, however, reveals that her employment with Federal Warranty began in May, 1996.
The Court assumes the reference to Campo is an identification of Campo Electronics, Appliances and Computers, Inc. ("Campo"). Campo was a client of Federal Warranty.
After dismissal of her first suit, on August 25, 1999, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, naming Federal Warranty as her employer. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue Notice on that same date, which noted that the EEOC was terminating its processing of plaintiff's charge. Plaintiff then filed the suit now before the Court against Federal Warranty on October 15, 1999. Her complaint asserts three claims for relief under federal law: (1) a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Defendant Federal Warranty now moves for dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claim on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against Federal Warranty in a timely manner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In addition, defendant argues that plaintiff's second and third federal claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Federal Warranty noticed its Motion for hearing on February 9, 2000. Plaintiffs counsel withdrew as counsel of record, however, on January 31, 2000. In response, this Court renoticed defendant's motion for hearing on March 22, 2000, allowing plaintiff additional time to file a memorandum in opposition by March 14, 2000. To date, defendant's Motion remains unopposed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not submit evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party's case.See Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth specific facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and cannot merely rest on allegations and denials.See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 5. Ct. at 2552. Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Court grants defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on alternative grounds. First, in accordance with local rules, the Court grants the Motion as unopposed. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.5 of the Eastern District of Louisiana, a non-moving party must file memoranda in opposition to a motion at least eight days prior to the motion's noticed hearing date. See id. Here, plaintiff has yet to file a Memorandum in Opposition. Second, the Court accepts as undisputed Federal Warranty's statement of uncontested material facts and finds that defendant's motion is not without merit. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.2E, opposition memoranda are to be submitted with a concise statement of material facts to which there exist genuine issues for trial. See id. In the absence of such opposition, "[a]ll material facts set forth [by the movant] will be deemed admitted." Id. With this in mind, the Court finds that Federal Warranty, as movant, has established the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.
See Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988).
Federal Warranty moves this Court to enter summary judgment in its favor on the grounds that plaintiffs amended charge of discrimination is untimely, and further, in the absence of timely exhaustion of administrative remedies, plaintiffs claims against Federal Warranty must be dismissed. The Court agrees that while federal regulations allow parties to amend technical defects contained in a charge of discrimination such that the amendment relates back to the original charge, plaintiffs amendment in the case at hand does not relate back to her original charge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b); Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Where, as here, the EEOC issued previously a Right to Sue Notice, a suit was initiated, and the EEOC terminated its processing of plaintiffs charge, there is no longer a viable charge pending before the EEOC that is capable of amendment.See Balazs, 32 F.3d at 157; Danley v. Book-of-the-Month Club. Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1352, 1353-54 (M.D. Pa. 1996),aff'd, 107 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, because plaintiffs attempt to amend her charge of discrimination cannot, as a matter of law, relate back to her original charge and thus plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies, the Court finds that defendant Federal Warranty cannot be held liable for plaintiffs Title VII claims. In the absence of being named or being placed on notice by a Charge of Discrimination, Federal Warranty was not given the opportunity to preserve evidence relevant to plaintiff's charge. Nor was Federal Warranty given the opportunity to facilitate voluntary conciliation with any EEOC proceedings. Allowing plaintiff to proceed against Federal Warranty at this late date would unduly prejudice Federal Warranty because of plaintiff's untimely charge, and thus dismissal of plaintiff's claim is appropriate.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) provides:
A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.Id.
Federal Warranty also moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining claims under federal law, asserting that plaintiffs Section 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Court agrees. In its Order and Reasons dated August 11, 1999, this Court found that plaintiff's Section 1981 claim was barred as untimely. This Court also found that plaintiff's Thirteenth Amendment claim was barred as a matter of law, because there is no private right of action available under this Amendment. Thus, summary judgment is also proper on plaintiff's second and third federal claims. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7 day of April, 2000.