Opinion
4:22-CV-00071-CDL-MSH
10-17-2022
JAYVON R. HATCHETT, Plaintiff v. JOHN DOE, et al., Defendants
PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 BEFORE THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case is currently before the United States Magistrate Judge for screening as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pro se Plaintiff Jayvon Hatchett, an inmate at the Muscogee County Jail in Columbus, Georgia has filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has filed a motion for an appointed attorney (ECF No. 6) which is DENIED for the reasons set forth below. Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) which was granted with the provision that the Plaintiff pay a partial initial filing fee (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff has paid that fee. This complaint is now ripe for preliminary review. On preliminary review, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
MOTION TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint an attorney. ECF No. 6. The Court advises Plaintiff that “[a]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right.” Wahl v McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1986). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances. Id. In deciding whether legal counsel should be provided, the Court considers, among other factors, the merits of Plaintiff's claim and the complexity of the issues presented. Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989).
The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes courts to “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The statute does not, however, provide any funding to pay attorneys for their representation or authorize courts to compel attorneys to represent an indigent party in a civil case. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
In accordance with Holt, and upon a review of the record in this case, the Court notes that Plaintiff, despite his mental illness, has logically set forth his factual allegations underlying his claims and that the applicable legal doctrines are readily apparent. Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge has determined that Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As such, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 6) is DENIED. Should it later become apparent that legal assistance is required in order to avoid prejudice to Plaintiff's rights, the Court, on its own motion, will consider assisting him in securing legal counsel at that time. Consequently, there is no need for Plaintiff to file additional requests for counsel.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the district courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “‘held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.'” Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “‘indisputably meritless legal'” theories and “‘claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'” Id. (citation omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “‘merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff has been incarcerated at the Muscogee County Jail since August 26, 2020. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff divides his complaint into two separate claims. In his first claim, Plaintiff states that he “came to Muscogee County Jail for aggravated assault extremely mentally unstable and investigators said [he] committed a hate crime.” Id. He complains that the “officer who worked the classifications part of the jail placed [him] in the cell with a white male” and also “a white satanist was also placed in the cell” which caused him fear “and an attempt to protect [himself].” Id. Plaintiff contends he would like to sue the John Doe classifications officer because he “did not follow their S.O.P. or policies” and as a result the Plaintiff got “another charge that may cause [him] to go to prison for a long time.” Id. Plaintiff also wants “to sue the mental health personel [sic] Mrs. White and Mrs. Pattilo for not properly evaluating [him] within 10 days, which would have prevented the incident.” Id. Plaintiff complains “[t]hey also didn't follow their S.O.P. or policies which is evaluating everybody with serious crimes who come to the jail.” Id. Plaintiff requests two million dollars from these defendants. Id.
Plaintiff states he also wants “to press charges on that John/Jane Doe officer for involuntary manslaughter for reckless endangerment and having something to do with the incident.” Id. However, the United States District Courts have no authority to order state or federal law enforcement agencies or prosecutors to initiate investigations or prosecutions. Otero v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff also has no power to originate criminal pleadings on his own initiative because “a private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.” Otero, 832 F.2d at 141.
Plaintiff's second claim arises from events that occurred in October or November 2021. Id. at 7. Plaintiff states that he attempted suicide by placing a plastic bag over his head. Id. Plaintiff feels he may have “gave himself potential permanent brain damage.” Id. He complains that he should not have had the bag and that Corp. Spivey was “not following his S.O.P.” when the bag was given to him. Id. Plaintiff seeks a million dollars from Spivey for not abiding by S.O.P.s which caused the Plaintiff pain and suffering. Id.
Plaintiff further avers that “Officer Peeples is the officer [Plaintiff] tried to get help from” and Peeples “only put [Plaintiff] on suicide watch.” Id. Plaintiff wants “to sue Officer Peeples for not following his S.O.P. or policy by not taking [Plaintiff] to the infirmary to be checked.” Id. Plaintiff complains that he “was placed in a room with a suicide smock for a week and was without a blanket, on bare concrete” and that he was playing with his own feces and eating it in a room that already had feces on the wall. Id.
Plaintiff also complains that when he was moved to the annex part of the jail, he was still eating and playing with feces. Id. After he threw feces on an officer, he was moved again “to the 4G part of the jail still playing in [his] feces and eating it.” Id. Plaintiff avers that “[a]fter a month of this, [he] regained [his] memory and remembered suffering a lot.” Id. He complains that another inmate “alerted them they should get [Plaintiff] a brain or C.A.T. scan and etc. which they never came to see [Plaintiff] about.” Id. Plaintiff never identifies who “they” are in his complaint
III. Plaintiff's Claims
To the extent Plaintiff simply seeks to bring claims against unidentified jail staff listed as “John Doe” or “John/ Jane Doe” or even “they” in his complaint, Plaintiff has not provided enough detail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As a general rule, “fictitious party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The one exception to this rule is when the plaintiff's description of the defendant is so specific that the party may be identified for service even though his actual name is unknown. See id. (citing Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1201, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992)). Therefore, to proceed against an unnamed defendant, a plaintiff must provide a “description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the person involved so that process can be served.” Dean, 951 F.2d at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff does not provide any description whatsoever of these John Doe officers. Thus, Plaintiff's claims as to the John Doe Defendants are subject to dismissal. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal of defendants appropriate where plaintiff failed to allege facts associating defendants with a particular constitutional violation); Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738 (dismissal of claim appropriate where “the description in [plaintiff's] complaint was insufficient to identify the defendant among the many guards employed at [the prison]”). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against the John Doe Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not specifically tie any unidentified John Doe officers to any specific violation of his constitutional rights. He merely complains that these John Doe officers failed to follow policies and procedures by placing him in a cell with white men. He then complains that his additional serious criminal charges are thus the fault of this John Doe Defendant's failure to abide by the “S.O.P.” Plaintiff's claims as to Defendants Officer Peeples, Corp. Spivey, Mrs. White, and Mrs. Patilla are also based upon allegations that they failed to follow jail policy and procedure.
“In a § 1983 action, a federal court considers whether a constitutional right has been infringed, not whether bureaucratic procedures have been violated.” Jones v. Schofield, No. 1:08-CV-7 WLS, 2009 WL 902154, at 3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009)(citing Rineholtz. v. Campbell 64 F.Supp.2d 721, 731 (W.D.Tn.1999). “Prison regulations ... were never intended to confer rights on inmates or serve as a basis for constitutional claims.” Id. “Instead, [state prison] regulations, as well as the Unified Code [of Corrections], were designed to provide guidance to prison officials in the administration of prisons.” Id. “Prison regulations and Standard Operating Procedures do not confer federal rights to prisoners that may be enforced or redressed in a § 1983 action.” Id. Therefore, any claim raised by the Plaintiff regarding these Defendants violating jail policies or procedures is subject to dismissal. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants for failure to follow jail policy and procedure be DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous.
Lastly, Plaintiff complains that he was put on suicide watch after placing a plastic bag on his head and that while on that watch, he was housed in a stripped-down cell in a “suicide smock” and without a blanket. He also complains about being placed in different housing units within the jail for the month that he was eating, playing with, and throwing feces. Plaintiff's allegations can liberally be construed as an attempt to raise a conditions of confinement claim. However, it is not entirely clear whom Plaintiff is attempting to hold liable for these allegations. Even pro se Plaintiffs, for whom the Court is required to liberally construe their complaints, are required to associate specific defendants with specific claims so these defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. Douglas v. Yates , 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (stating there must be proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law' and the constitutional deprivation”). Because Plaintiff does not associate any Defendant with these allegations, his claims are subject to dismissal.
Even if Plaintiff had attributed his allegations to a Defendant, then his claims could still be subject to dismissal. To establish a cause of action based on conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must prove both an objective and subjective component: “an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious' to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' and a subjective showing that the official had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Regarding the objective component of a conditions of confinement claim, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] prison condition is unconstitutional only if it deprives the plaintiff of a human need, or otherwise poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Evans v. St. Lucie County Jail, 448 Fed.Appx. 971, 974 (11th Cir.2011) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, to satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, composed of “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.2003).
Inmates have no constitutional right to be classified at a specified security level or housed in a particular cell. See e.g. Kramer v. Donald, 286 Fed.Appx. 674, 676 (11th Cir. 2008); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976) (prison officials have full discretion to control prisoner classification) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4081)). Moreover, it is difficult for this Court to see a claim for the Plaintiff where he complains about being housed with other inmates who he physically harmed and also subjected to his unsanitary behavior with his feces. Compare Bracewell v. Lobmiller, 938 F.Supp. 1571, 1578 (M.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that other inmates were subjected to an objectively unconstitutional condition of confinement due to being housed with an inmate who threw feces and otherwise disrupted her cellmates with her outrageous behaviors).
Furthermore, while the conditions alleged may have been unpleasant to the Plaintiff, his temporary confinement in a “strip cell” and movement to other housing units during his time of mental unrest do not indicate the sort of extreme deprivation or serious risk to a prisoner's health or safety that a valid conditions of confinement claim demands especially when his confinement therein is due to suicidal and homicidal ideations. See O'Connor v. Kelley, 644 Fed.Appx. 928, 932 (11th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Hunter, 847 Fed.Appx. 694, 695 (11th Cir. 2021)(finding that inmates placed on suicide watch are often housed in stripped down cells and may be left in only their underwear). In fact, it has been repeatedly held that that short periods of confinement in a bare cell where the conditions are temporary and the inmate suffers no physical harm therefrom, do not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Fischer v. Ellegood, 238 Fed.Appx. 428, 433 (11th Cir. 2007) (requiring an inmate to sleep on the “bare cement floor” without a mattress for five days does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation); McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir.1978) (no constitutional violation when a pretrial detainee who had just attempted suicide was placed in a “strip cell” for 90 days without clothing, a mattress, sheets, or blankets); Turner v. Warden, GDCP, 650 Fed.Appx. 695, 701 (11th Cir. 2016) (prisoner failed to show that being left in strip cell with no property and in a paper gown for ten days without food for a 24-hour period created an unreasonable risk of harm to his health or safety). Following this precedent, and to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a conditions of confinement claim, it is RECOMMENDED for all the reasons set forth above, that they be DISMISSED without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with United States District Judge Clay D. Land, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.