Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-357
03-25-2020
CURTIS L. GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. SETH ERICKSON, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 69) of Defendants Seth Erickson and Mark Capozza be granted. It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as to any other party named by Plaintiff, including "SCI Fayette Prison Officials," and that Plaintiff's Motion to Submit Exculpatory Evidence (ECF No. 88) be denied as moot.
II. Report
Plaintiff, Curtis L. Gibson, who is currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Fayette, Pennsylvania ("SCI Fayette"), brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Seth Erickson, a Unit Manager at SCI Fayette, Mark Capozza, the Warden of SCI Fayette, and unidentified "SCI Fayette Prison Officials." Although Plaintiff's allegations are difficult to discern, he appears to be complaining about interference with his legal mail, citing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to which Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 75).
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on March 8, 2019 by submitting a complaint without filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1). He subsequently filed a motion to proceed IFP, but on April 1, 2019, the case was transferred to this Court without resolution of that motion. Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP was subsequently granted (ECF No. 37) and the Complaint was docketed on July 19, 2019 (ECF No. 40). On August 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54). The Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the civil rights claims asserted.
B. Facts
Plaintiff alleges that his legal mail was opened prior to being delivered to him in violation of official policy DC-ADM 803. (Am. Compl. at 2.) His complaint arises out of an incident that occurred on October 3, 2018, when he asserts that he was given a piece of mail from United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that was already opened. Included as an exhibit in Plaintiff's "Presentation of Plaintiff's Evidence/Exhibits" is the envelope itself, which includes a sticker that reads: "This mail was misbarcoded, missent and/or opened by electronic devices. Please accept our apologies." (ECF No. 11 at 5.)
Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 762959 on October 3, 2018 complaining of this issue. (ECF No. 11 at 4.) Defendant Erickson, a Unit Manager at SCI Fayette, responded to his grievance by stating that:
I am in receipt of your grievance and have been assigned to investigate it. You state that on 10/3/18 you received legal mail that was opened. You state that you refused to sign for said legal mail. You are seeking compensatory relief in an adequate amount deemed reasonable by a court/judge.
I have investigated your grievance and my answer is as follows. Per the yellow sticker, this was attached by the post office due to the mail being opened prior to SCI Fayette handling it. As for if any documents were missing that is unknown due to you not accepting the legal mail. Due to these findings your grievance is denied.(ECF No. 11 at 6.) On November 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed an appeal of this grievance. (Id. at 7-8.) Subsequently, Defendant Capozza, in his capacity as the Facility Manager, submitted a response denying the appeal for the same reasons provided in the initial denial. (Id. at 9.) He filed a further appeal and on December 14, 2018, the final level of grievance appeal was denied. (ECF No. 13 at 9.)
C. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has issued two decisions that pertain to the standard of review for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court held that a complaint must include factual allegations that "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, a court must reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements;" "labels and conclusions;" and "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). Mere "possibilities" of misconduct are insufficient. Id. at 679. The Court of Appeals has summarized the inquiry as follows:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps.
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Third, "whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id. This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Court of Appeals has explained that: "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court may examine the Amended Complaint and the exhibits Plaintiff submitted in support of the original Complaint (ECF Nos. 11, 13), which include the grievance he filed concerning the incident that forms the basis of his claim.
D. Discussion
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint relies upon the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as bases for his claims. However, as his claim relates to the allegedly improper opening of his legal mail, his claim instead arises under the First Amendment. See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006).
A civil rights complaint is adequate when it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). A defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants Erickson and Capozza denied his grievance concerning alleged interference with his mail as well as his appeal from the denial. Plaintiff does not allege, however, that either of the defendants committed the acts that form the basis for his Complaint, that is, improperly opening his mail. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim against them. See Simonton v. Tennis, 437 F. App'x 60, 62 (3d Cir. July 13, 2011) (allegation that defendants mishandled grievances did not establish their involvement in the underlying action); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 923, 925 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2006).
Moreover, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, "any attempt by Plaintiff to pursue a claim against a prison official based upon the handling of an administrative grievance or complaint does not support a constitutional claim." Miller v. Spaulding, 2015 WL 2357115, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2015) (citations omitted).
Finally, even if Plaintiff had brought a claim against a party who allegedly opened his mail, the single incident he has cited is insufficient to represent a First Amendment violation. As noted by the Court of Appeals, "a single, isolated interference with [plaintiff's] personal mail was insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation." Nixon v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 501 F. App'x 176, 178 (3d Cir. Oct. 12, 2012); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
Plaintiff also cites a number of criminal statutes in his Amended Complaint, including 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 903 (criminal conspiracy), 4104 (tampering with records), 5301 (official oppression), 8550 (willful misconduct), and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (perjury). As Defendants note, there is no private right of action under these criminal statutes and therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under them. See, e.g., Brothers v. Lawrence Cty. Prison Bd., 2008 WL 146828, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2008); D'Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. Super. 2000); See also Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987) Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994).
Similarly, Plaintiff cannot base his claim on the alleged violation of a DOC procedure, namely, opening his legal mail outside of his presence in contravention of DC-ADM 803. See Lee v. Schrader, 2014 WL 2112833, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (no claim based on failure to follow a DOC procedure). Nor is there any support for a claim that the Defendants violated the DOC Code of Ethics.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Defendants have raised other arguments in their motion to dismiss. Given the fatal deficiencies in Plaintiff's claims that are discussed herein, however, it is not necessary to reach these arguments.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also appears to name as defendants "SCI Fayette Prison Officials." It is not clear whether he intended to refer to individuals other than Defendants Erickson and Capozza, but the Amended Complaint cites no specific acts taken by anyone other than these two individuals with respect to his claim for interference with his legal mail.
Counsel for Defendants Erickson and Capozza indicates that he entered his appearance only on their behalf because Plaintiff has failed to identify any other individual and no one else was served. (ECF No. 70 at 2 n.1.)
Nevertheless, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to name other defendants in this case, the same reasoning and conclusions apply equally to them. The facts alleged by Plaintiff do not support a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. He has also failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the First Amendment. Plaintiff's own exhibit undermines his claim that the mail was opened by prison personnel as opposed to postal officials; he cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based on his or her handling of a grievance; and even if prison officials did open his mail on one occasion, a single, isolated interference with a prisoner's personal mail is insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation. Simply put, there are no facts in the Amended Complaint that support a civil rights claim against any prison official. Therefore, any claim that has been asserted against "SCI Fayette Prison Officials" should be dismissed as well.
In his motion to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff also refers to an event that occurred during the proceedings in this case. Specifically, when he was ordered to send in his authorization for the case to proceed and for the prison to withdraw payments from his prison account, the prison failed to do so. He then filed a grievance (No. 807743) and was notified on July 11, 2019 that his grievance was upheld in part and denied in part.
Specifically, the Grievance Officer stated that Plaintiff's request was received by "Inmate Accounting" on April 15, 2019 and "without realizing it," the court case was entered into the system but the authorization was not mailed out. He sent another request on May 1, 2019 and Inmate Accounting responded on May 6, 2019 that the authorization form had been mailed out. On June 19, 2019, he sent another request and was notified on June 24, 2019 that the authorization form had been resent. On July 11, 2019, Inmate Accounting called the Clerk's Office and was notified that the authorization form had been received and docketed on June 25, 2019. (ECF No. 42-1.) See ECF No. 31 (docketing of his authorization form on June 25, 2019).
Plaintiff focuses on the response he received on May 6, 2019, which inaccurately informed him that the authorization had been sent to the Court on that date. (ECF No. 36-1.) This response was signed by "S. Calloway" (of Inmate Accounting). In his response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff refers to Calloway's statement as an "admission of guilt," contends that Defendants Erickson and Capozza "failed to train" Calloway and describes the incident as proof of Defendants' deliberate attempt to have his case dismissed. (ECF No. 75.)
Plaintiff does not state that he intended to add S. Calloway as a defendant in this case. He did not include Calloway in the caption to his Amended Complaint and in the motion to amend, he states only that: "In this particular case, Plaintiff need only add the prison official S. Calloway's actions, in this circumstance." (ECF No. 52 at 2.) (emphasis supplied.) --------
Defendants do not directly address these allegations, but cite to page 11 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, where they contend that he admitted that he did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies at the time he filed his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff argues that it would be "moot" for him to appeal it further because Calloway "admitted his guilt" and the grievance regarding this matter was partially upheld in his favor.
The Court need not resolve this issue. Regardless of whether Plaintiff fully exhausted his administrative remedies concerning the authorization form or even whether he was required to do so when the initial grievance review agreed that the form was not sent in May 2019 as S. Calloway had stated, the delay in its transmission to the Court does not state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff's rights. The authorization form was sent and received, additional time was granted and Plaintiff's case was not dismissed. Therefore, he suffered no actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (prisoner bringing a civil rights claim must suffer "actual injury" such as the dismissal of his claim for failure to meet a technical requirement that he was unaware of because of deficiencies in the prison's law library); Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (prisoner claimed denial of access to the courts and cited interference with his legal mail, but his papers addressed to the New Jersey Superior Court did arrive and his appeal was not denied based on the late arrival of the papers, so he suffered no actual injury).
Finally, Plaintiff has filed a motion titled "Motion to Submit Exculpatory Evidence" (ECF No. 88). Plaintiff does not identify the exculpatory evidence he wishes to submit, and his motion appears to again assert that Defendants violated DC-ADM 803. However, since this case is at the motion to dismiss stage and Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the admission of evidence is neither appropriate nor warranted.
The Court of Appeals has held that "district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a [pro se civil rights] case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile." Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once and given the fatal deficiencies of his claims, any further amendment would be futile.
For these reasons, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 69) of Defendants Seth Erickson and Mark Capozza be granted. It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as to any other party named by Plaintiff, including "SCI Fayette Prison Officials," and that Plaintiff's Motion to Submit Exculpatory Evidence (ECF No. 88) be denied as moot.
Litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by April 13, 2020. Any party opposing the objections shall file a response by April 26, 2020. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal. Dated: March 25, 2020
/s/Patricia L. Dodge
Patricia L. Dodge
United States Magistrate Judge cc: Curtis L. Gibson
BI 5077
SCI Fayette
48 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450-0999