Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-6825
February 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Pro se Plaintiff Gregory Alex Demeter has brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Bethlehem, and certain employees thereof, for declaratory relief and monetary damages arising from Defendants' alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons which follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was walking in his neighborhood on May 14, 2003 at approximately 11:00 PM when Officers James Smith and Lou Czasar of the Bethlehem Police Department, for no apparent reason, called him over to their police car. (Compl. ¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff did not wish to speak to Smith and Czasar. (Id. ¶ 4.) Smith and Czasar then exited their vehicle and advised Plaintiff that "you are not under arrest, we just need to search you for weapons." (Id. ¶ 5.) The officers both began to search each of Plaintiff's pockets. (Id.) Smith and Czasar removed several items from Plaintiff's pockets, none of which were weapons. (Id. ¶ 6.) As Smith and Czasar removed the items from Plaintiff's pockets, they questioned him about, inter alia, where he had obtained the items. (Id.) At no time during the course of the search did Smith and Czasar inform Plaintiff as to why they had stopped him or what they were looking for, and a search warrant was never produced by the officers. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.) Smith and Czasar ultimately found a set of keys to a Jeep in Plaintiff's pocket, at which point they advised Plaintiff that he was under arrest. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was charged with car theft and transferred him to a correctional facility in Easton, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 10.) In the police reports subsequently prepared by Smith and Czasar, the officers fabricated knowledge of Plaintiff being a prior car thief, as Plaintiff has no prior car theft charges on his criminal history record. (Id. ¶ 11.) The only reason given in the police reports as to why Smith and Czasar suspected Plaintiff of car theft was that a Jeep had been reported stolen in the area after the keys had been left in the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.)
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Smith and Czasar, in their official and individual capacities, violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and concomitant state constitutional rights, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff also asserts a claim, purportedly under Pennsylvania law, for "official oppression" against Smith and Czasar. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts a municipal liability claim against the City of Bethlehem ("City") based on its failure to properly screen, train, and supervise its employees. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) In addition to declaratory relief and compensatory damages, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Defendants in the amount of $500,000. (Id. ¶ 40.)
The Complaint also asserted a state law claim for false imprisonment. Plaintiff has since withdrawn this claim.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When determining a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must accept as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Anqelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1980) (citingHaines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted when a Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts, consistent with the complaint, which would entitle him or her to relief. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim and the "official oppression" claim against Smith and Czasar, the municipal liability claim against the City, and the claim for punitive damages asserted against all of the Defendants. Alternatively, Defendants move for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).
A. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure against Defendants Smith and Czasar. The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. In order to establish a claim under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must show that the actions of Defendants Smith and Czasar (1) constituted a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) were unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-600 (1989).
The officers' warrantless stop of Plaintiff, as alleged in the Complaint, clearly constituted a "search" and "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. While the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement that permits police officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officers have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), the facts alleged in the Complaint do not justify a Terry stop. When Defendants Smith and Czasar stopped Plaintiff, they allegedly knew only that a Jeep had been stolen in the area and that Plaintiff had a prior history of stealing automobiles. The Complaint makes clear, however, that Plaintiff was walking in his neighborhood, rather than driving in the allegedly stolen Jeep, when the officers stopped him. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that the officers fabricated knowledge of Plaintiff's prior history of car theft, as his criminal record contains no such charges. Viewing the facts of the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the Complaint states a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar is denied.
Defendants next argue that even if the Complaint states a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creiahton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). In order to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, the Complaint must allege that the official violated a "clearly established" right.McLauqhlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2001) (citingAnderson, 483 U.S. at 635). The Court must first determine whether a plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right, and if so, then examine whether the right was "clearly established." Id. at 571. For a constitutional right to be clearly established, "there must be sufficient precedent at the time of the action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited." Id. at 572. "The essential inquiry is whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that [his or her] conduct comported with established legal standards." Id. at 571.
As discussed above, the allegations in the Complaint, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, sufficiently state a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment claim that he alleges was "clearly established" as of May 14, 2003, when the violation allegedly occurred. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot violates Fourth Amendment). At this stage of the litigation, therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the doctrine of qualified immunity is applicable. See Kevin M. v. Bristol Township Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 00-6030, 2002 WL 73233, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002)("Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which can only be grounds for dismissal if the defense is evident from the complaint; plaintiff is not required to anticipate that the defense will be raised and respond to it in the complaint."). Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Smith and Csazar on qualified immunity grounds is denied without prejudice to Defendants to renew this defense at a later stage of the litigation.
B. Municipal Liability
Defendants next argue that the Complaint fails to state a municipal liability claim against the City. A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when the municipality itself causes a constitutional violation pursuant to an official policy or governmental custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). To establish municipal liability, Plaintiff must "identify the challenged policy [or custom,] attribute it to the [municipality] itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy [or custom] and the injury suffered." Losch v. Borough of Parkesburq, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). "Policy is made when a 'decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). Customs are "'practices of state officials . . . so permanent and well settled' as to virtually constitute law." Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480). Where the claimed constitutional violation was caused by the failure of the municipality to properly train or supervise its employees, a plaintiff must additionally show that the failure "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of [the] person with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
Plaintiff merely alleges that the City failed to properly screen, train and supervise the police officers of the Bethlehem Police Department, and that these failures directly caused the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by Defendants Smith and Czasar. While Plaintiff neither pleads the multiple incidents of constitutional violation necessary to establish the existence of an official policy or custom and causation, nor specifically details how the City acted with deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, the allegations contained in the Complaint are sufficient to provide the City with notice of the nature of the claim against it and the grounds on which it rests. See, e.g., Lesher v. Colwyn Borough, Civ. A. No. 02-1333, 2002 WL 31012959, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2002) (noting that complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983 are to be judged by the liberal, notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8). Furthermore, it does not appear beyond doubt that Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts, consistent with the pro se Complaint, which would entitle him to relief on the municipal liability claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the municipal liability claim against the City is denied.
C. Official Oppression
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's claim for "official oppression" should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Pennsylvania law. Pennsylvania's official oppression statute provides, in pertinent part: "A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing his conduct is illegal, he: (1) subjects another to arrest . . . search, [or] seizure . . ." 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5301. In D'Errico v. Defazio, 763 A.2d 424 (Pa.Super. 2000), the Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to imply a private cause of action from the official oppression statute.Id. at 430. As Pennsylvania law does not recognize a private cause of action for official oppression, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the official oppression claim set forth in the Complaint is granted.
D. Punitive Damages
Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiff's various requests for punitive damages. The United States Supreme Court has held that punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality in a § 1983 suit. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Nor can punitive damages be recovered from individual defendants in their official capacities, as such claims are, in effect, against the government entity itself. Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the punitive damages claims against the City and Defendants Smith and Czasar in their official capacities is granted.
However, an individual defendant may be held liable in his individual capacity for punitive damages if his actions are motivated by "evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F. Supp.2d 504, 508 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Smith and Czasar acted "knowingly, intentionally, and with reckless disregard" for Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Broadly read, these allegations support a claim for punitive damages against Defendants Smith and Czasar in their individual capacities. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the punitive damages claims against Defendants Smith and Czasar in their individual capacities is denied.
E. Motion for More Definite Statement
Defendants alternatively move for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). "Rule 12(e) motions are not favored and are granted only where the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to frame a response."Magner v. Lynn, Civ. A. No. 90-7936, 1991 WL 102978, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1991); see also Maremont Corp. v. Classic Distrib. Inc., Civ. A. No. 97-5137, 1999 WL 391487, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 1999)("As long as the defendant is able to respond, even if only with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice, the complaint is deemed sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(e)") (citations omitted). The Court concludes that the Complaint is not so vague or ambiguous that Defendants cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. Accordingly, Defendants motion for a more definite statement is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 3), and Plaintiff's Response thereto (Doc. No. 4), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is DENIED.
2. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar on qualified immunity grounds is DENIED without prejudice to Defendants to renew this defense at a later stage of the litigation.
3. Defendants' motion to dismiss the municipal liability claim against the City of Bethlehem is DENIED.
4. Defendants' motion to dismiss the official oppression claim against Defendants Smith and Czasar is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5. Defendants' motion to dismiss the punitive damages claims against the City of Bethlehem and Defendants Smith and Czasar in their official capacities is GRANTED, and the claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
6. Defendants' motion to dismiss the punitive damages claims against Defendants Smith and Czasar in their individual capacities is DENIED.
7. Defendants' alternative motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.