Opinion
No. 1:03-CV-00282-SEB-JPG.
September 28, 2004
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a discrimination case brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff Elizabeth Zurawska ("Ms. Zurawska") claims that Defendant Gannett Fleming, Inc. ("GFI") discriminated against her because of her sex (female) and/or national origin (Polish) in: (1) terminating her employment on February 17, 1992; (2) certain conditions of her employment; and (3) her compensation. GFI moves for summary judgment on the grounds that it has been materially prejudiced by Ms. Zurawska's unreasonable and inexcusable delay in bringing this lawsuit and that Plaintiff's laches bar this lawsuit. For the reasons set out in detail below, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Factual Background
The following facts are either undisputed or reflect the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Zurawska. Ms. Zurawska is a Polish emigre who came to the United States with her family in 1984 for political reasons. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. ¶¶ 1-2. A trained civil engineer, she went to work for the Indianapolis office of GFI, a Pennsylvania engineering firm, on October 8, 1990. She was hired by then vice-president of GFI in charge of the Indianapolis office, Henry Rhee. Her employment was terminated effective February 7, 1992. Def.'s Br. ¶¶ 1, 4.
On April 23, 1992, Ms. Zurawska filed a Complaint of Discrimination against GFI with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"). In the complaint, she charged GFI with discriminating against her as a female, Polish engineer for terminating her, not paying her as much as a newly-hired, non-Polish male engineer with less work experience, and treating her differently on the job. Def.'s Br.; App. A, Ex. A; ICRC Complaint. Although Ms. Zurawska did not personally file a Charge of Discrimination with the federal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), she was notified by the EEOC on June 16, 1994 her that her charge had been filed with both agencies and that it was the EEOC's intent for the charge to be processed by the ICRC. Pl.'s Evidence, Ex. 1; Zurawska Aff. ¶ 5; Def.'s Ev., App. C.
Ms. Zurawska alleges she routinely called the ICRC to check on the status of her case and met with various staff to discuss the case. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. ¶¶ 6-7. After three years in which there was no resolution, she wrote the executive director, Sandra Leek, on February 1, 1995 to inquire as to the status of her case. Pl.'s Evidence, Ex. 1. On March 15, 1995, Ms. Leek responded with a "Notice of Finding" in which she states that "[e]vidence supports Complainant's allegation of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex." She further informed Ms. Zurawska that the next step would be a formal conciliation, and if no settlement is reached, a public hearing would be set. Pl.'s Evidence, Ex. 2; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. ¶¶ 9-10.
On May 24, 1995, Erin McQueen — a staff attorney for the ICRC — was appointed to represent the plaintiff. From that point on, Ms. Zurawska appears to have been represented fairly continuously by ICRC staff attorneys: in March 1999, ICRC staff attorney Fred Bremer was substituted for Ms. McQueen, and he, in turn, was replaced by Mr. Stowers. Pl.'s Ev., Ex. 3; Def.'s Ev., App. B; Zurawska Dep. p 17.
On June 24, 1994, Plaintiff and Ms. McQueen prepared calculations of the financial losses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of her termination from GFI. In a letter on July 12, 1995, McQueen proposed a calculation of lost back pay ($23,982.00) and reiterated that the ICRC had no authority to award damages for mental and emotional distress losses, credit denial or future losses. In the same letter, McQueen stated that in order to obtain that sort of relief, Plaintiff would have to go to federal court and, if she chose that course, she would need to hire a private attorney and request a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Def.'s Ev., App. B; Zurawska Dep. pp. 26-27; App. C letter. Ms. Zurawska claims that she did not choose to pursue her federal rights on the advice of Ms. McQueen, who allegedly told her that if she went to federal court she would have to start all over again and her case would be resolved faster if she stayed with the ICRC. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. ¶ 15; Pl.'s Evidence, Ex. 2; Zurawska Dep. pp. 27-28, 44, 49; Ex. 1, Zurawska Aff. ¶ 16.
Ms. Zurawska did not initiate any contact with the EEOC between April 23, 1992 and December, 2002. She did, however, hear from the federal agency. On June 16, 1994 and June 19, 1995, the EEOC wrote Plaintiff and in both letters stated that the EEOC intended the ICRC to process her charge of discrimination unless she specifically requested otherwise. Def.'s Br. ¶¶ 9-10; Def.'s Ev. App. C letters.
In a July 24, 1995 letter to McQueen, Ms. Zurawska debated the settlement figure proposed by her attorney and urged a much higher figure, concluding that "[i]n case Respondent sees the matter differently and does not want to agree with me we will still have two options as you explained to me earlier. Either I can continue to seek justice under authority and judgement [sic] of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission or to take my case to federal court." Def.'s Ev. App. B, Zurawska Dep. pp. 30-31; App. C letter.
After attempts at settlement failed, Attorney McQueen wrote Ms. Zurawska on August 4, 1995 and urged her to make the decision either to proceed before the ICRC or get a right to sue letter from the EEOC and file a complaint in federal court. Def.'s Ev. App. B, Zurawska Dep. p. 40. Plaintiff admits that, at this point, she decided to stay with the ICRC rather than ask the EEOC for a right to sue letter and sue in federal court. Id. p. 43.
GFI's Motion for Summary Judgment in the ICRC case was fully briefed on April 16, 1996 and the ALJ issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order on June 10, 2002, granting GFI's motion and dismissing Ms. Zurawska's complaint with prejudice. Def.'s Ev.; App. A; ICRC Order, Ex. A-2. In the six years between the final briefing and the ALJ's decision, the plaintiff wrote a second letter to ICRC's executive director on December 8, 1999, complaining about the lack of progress in her case. Pl.'s Ev., Ex. 3. Following a hearing at which Ms. Zurawska was represented by ICRC staff counsel, the ICRC overruled her formal objection to the ALJ's order on October 18, 2002. Def.'s Ev.; App. A; ICRC Order, Ex. A. On the same day, Ms. Zurawska initiated contact with the EEOC for the first time and requested a notice of right to sue. Id.; App. A; Pl.'s Response to Def.'s Req. for Admis. ¶¶ 1-7. The EEOC dismissed her case two months later, on December 3, 2002, adopting the ICRC findings and order dismissing the complaint. At the same time, the EEOC informed the plaintiff of her right to sue in federal or state court. Id.; App. A, Ex. C. Ms. Zurawska filed this lawsuit in February 2003.
Since Ms. Zurawska's initial filing with the ICRC, GFI closed its Indianapolis office in October 1994 and has not re-opened an Indiana office. Neither Mr. Rhee nor other individuals who worked with Ms. Zurawska between 1990 and 1992 remain employed by GFI. Def.'s Br. ¶ 3; Ev. App. E, Rhee Aff. Mr. Rhee is 68 years old and has retired to Florida. He claims he does not recall the specific reasons for his decision to terminate the plaintiff. In addition, GFI claims it does not have any documents that explain Mr. Rhee's reasons. Mr. Rhee's supervisor in personnel matters, Walter Buehler, worked for GFI from 1975 to 1995 and is now retired in Pennsylvania. While serving as GFI's Personnel Director, he was actively involved in handling Ms. Zurawska's claim but now cannot recall much more than the fact that she made a discrimination claim and it involved Rhee and the Indianapolis office. Def.'s Br. ¶¶ 20-23, 25-28; Ev. App. F. Buehler Aff. In the 1999 letter to ICRC Director Sandra Leek, Ms. Zurawska expressed her own concerns that the Indianapolis branch of GFI had been closed for several years, that Mr. Rhee had left GFI and subsequently retired, and that people who would have been able to recall the situation "created by Mr. Rhee" would no longer have clear memories. Pl.'s Ev., Ex. 3. Finally, Roderick Savidge, current GFI Human Resources Director, states that the only information in the plaintiff's personnel file regarding her termination is the January 24, 1992 letter from Rhee stating the reasons for her termination. Def.'s Ev., App. G, Savidge Aff.
GFI defends by asserting that the plaintiff's laches bars this claim because she has inexcusably delayed asserting it and GFI has been materially prejudiced by her delay.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23. "If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against her."Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52).
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 290. Therefore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1997). If genuine doubts remain, and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
Legal Analysis
Plaintiff has brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically alleging discrimination in the conditions and compensation of her employment and discriminatory termination. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground of laches, i.e., that it has been prejudiced by Plaintiff's unreasonable delay in pursuing her federal claim. Plaintiff argues that her delay in asserting her federal rights was reasonable. Although she was well aware that the ICRC was slow and even after being prompted by the EEOC to decide on bringing her complaint there, she failed to seek a right to sue letter from the EEOC and did so based on the advice of counsel who allegedly led her to believe that her case would be resolved faster with the ICRC than if she started all over again in the federal system. Pl.'s Opp'n. at 7.
The Doctrine of Laches
Laches, unlike a statute of limitations, is principally a question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced and is based upon changes of conditions or relationships involved with the claim rather than merely the passing of time.Lingenfelter v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 691 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1982). In order to support a defense of laches, there must be a showing of both a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and prejudice to the defending party.Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961). In order for laches to bar Ms. Zurawska's claims against her former employer, there must be a showing of both inexcusable delay in asserting her rights and material prejudice to the defendants. Miller v. City of Indianapolis 281 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2002); Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Authority, 770 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1985); Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 710 F.2d 351, 359 (7th Cir. 1983).
Unreasonable and Inexcusable Delay
In order for laches to apply, the plaintiff must have unreasonably and inexcusably delayed bringing suit. Obviously the length of the delay in filing suit stands at the core of that issue. Lingenfelter, 691 F.2d at 341. Ms. Zurawska argues that her ten-year delay in filing suit is excusable because she "routinely called" the ICRC to monitor her case and she wrote twice to the Director, Sandra Leek to complain about the slow progress of her case. In addition, she was unrepresented by counsel the first three years and, more to the point, she relied on staff attorney McQueen's "poor advice" that her case would be resolved faster if she stayed with the ICRC. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5-6. Finally, Ms. Zurawska claims that as a Polish emigre living in the United States for nine (9) years prior to filing her claim with the ICRC, she was "totally unfamiliar with the American court system" and so was unable to question the advice she received from her ICRC attorney.
The evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Ms. Zurawska was, at the very latest, aware of her federal rights by 1994. As noted above, while Ms. Zurawska did not personally initiate any contact with the EEOC between April 23, 1992 and December, 2002, she was informed twice by the EEOC — on June 16, 1994 and June 19, 1995 — that the EEOC intended the ICRC to process her charge of discrimination unless she specifically requested otherwise. Def.'s Br. ¶¶ 9-10; Def.'s Ev. App. C letters.
Ms. Zurawska also appears to be have been fully informed as to what the EEOC meant by "specifically requested otherwise." In two letters from ICRC attorney McQueen — July 12, 1995 and August 4, 1995 — McQueen reminded Ms. Zurawska of her federal court option and that it entailed requesting a right to sue letter from the EEOC. In a letter to McQueen on July 24, 1995, Ms. Zurawska makes explicit reference to her two options if settlement negotiations proved unfruitful: "[E]ither I can continue to seek justice under authority and judgement of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission or to take my case to federal court."
Thus, fully aware of her federal rights, Plaintiff asks the Court to excuse her delay in exercising those rights because her ICRC attorney allegedly gave her poor advice when she told her it would be a slow process to start over again in the federal system and all would be resolved more quickly if she stayed with ICRC. McQueen also advised Ms. Zurawska that she would need to hire a private attorney if she chose to exercise her federal rights sue GFI in federal court. This conduct on the part of Plaintiff's appointed counsel is in no way fraudulent. It is Plaintiff who continued to be reminded that she had a choice to sue in federal court and Plaintiff who deliberately chose to stay with the ICRC.
Plaintiff argues that her delay should be viewed as reasonable in light of the standard expressed in Jeffries v. Chicago Transity Authority. In Jeffries, an applicant who was rejected for a position as a train conductor filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in 1974, filed with the state agency in 1975, was issued an EEOC right to sue letter in 1984 and timely filed in federal court in the same year. The Seventh Circuit found his ten-year delay manifestly unreasonable and inexcusable. Mr. Jeffries claimed he had no knowledge of the option to request a right to sue letter and reasonably relied on the administrative process. The Seventh Circuit found that even though Title VII is somewhat unclear, a lay person could either figure out the filing requirements, or at the very least, contact the agency for more information. Moreover, to rely on the administrative process cannot excuse a decade's delay, nor could the inability to pay counsel, given the attorney's fee provision in Title VII.Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 680-681. The only material distinction between Ms. Zurawska's case and Mr. Jeffries' is that she had more and better information about her federal rights as well as the benefit of counsel, whereas Mr. Jeffries had none. Ms. Zurawska admits that she knew the ICRC was slow but says that she reasonably believed, on the advice of counsel, that sticking with the ICRC was faster than the alternative of seeking a right to sue letter. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7. The facts recited above are undisputed. There is no case law to support a finding that a ten-year delay is reasonable because one's lawyer suggests that administrative processes are slow. Simply because Plaintiff offers excuses for her delay in filing in federal court does not make the delay excusable. In light of the Jeffries standard for unreasonable delay, we find Defendant has carried its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff's ten-year delay was both unreasonable and inexcusable.
Material Prejudice to the Defendant
The defendant also has carried its burden with regard to showing that Plaintiff's delay has resulted in prejudice to GFI. Defendant submits the affidavits of retired GFI mangers Henry Rhee and Walter Buehler, as well as the affidavit of current GFI Human Resources Vice President Roderick Savidge, to demonstrate that no supplemental or explanatory records exist beyond the termination letter in Ms. Zurawska's file and that Rhee and Buehler have no recollections of the plaintiff's complaints beyond the fact of her termination. The plaintiff herself admitted in a 1999 letter to ICRC Director Sandra Leek that she was concerned because the Indianapolis branch of GFI had been closed for several years, and because Mr. Rhee had left GFI and subsequently retired, and other people who would have been able to recall the situation "created by Mr. Rhee" would no longer have clear memories. Pl.'s Ev., Ex. 3. The testimony of former GFI employees who were involved in Ms. Zurawska's termination, salary determinations and work conditions is clearly important to GFI's possible defense of the discrimination charge. The key people are retired, no longer residing in Indiana, and also claim they have no memory beyond the fact that Ms. Zurawska filed a complaint alleging discrimination in the workplace. The loss of testimony and evidence for trial as a result of a ten-year delay has materially prejudiced GFI's defense of this lawsuit. We conclude that GFI has established the second prong of the laches defense as well.
Conclusion
Because Plaintiff's ten-year delay in exercising her right to file a Title VII lawsuit in this Court is both unreasonable and inexcusable and Defendant has been materially prejudiced by the delay, we hold that this action is barred by laches and GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is so ORDERED.