Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-CV-00423
09-15-2023
CHRISTOPHER ZIEMBA, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE RUSSELL D. SHURTLEFF, Defendant.
Mannion Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN E. SCHWAB, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Christopher Ziemba (“Ziemba”) filed a complaint alleging that the defendant, Judge Russell D. Shurtleff (“Shurtleff”) violated his constitutional rights by denying his post-sentence motion. After screening Ziemba's complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), we conclude that it fails to allege a claim upon which relief can be granted. And, because giving leave to amend would be futile, we recommend that the court dismiss the complaint and close the case.
II. Background.
Ziemba commenced this action pro se by filing a form complaint on March 10, 2023. Doc. 1. Additionally, Ziemba filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 2), which we granted (doc. 6). The complaint identified one defendant, Judge Shurtleff. Doc. 1 at 1. In the section of the form complaint titled Statement of Claim, Ziemba lists five fragments of text. Doc. 1 at 2. We attempt to recreate the section in its entirety as follows:
commonwealthvsziemba.com
updated website with history
7/8/22 Motion to schedule a hearing .....
9/1/22 Denied without legal reason
2 original C.D.sId. (errors in original) (footnote added).
Ziemba included two DVDs along with his complaint. The first DVD consists of an approximately 7-minute black and white video of several parked cars in a residential neighborhood with an unidentifiable person moving around in the background. No data could be pulled from the second DVD.
Ziemba bases his complaint on events that occurred after the Wyoming County District Attorney brought criminal charges against him in 2013. Commonwealth v. Ziemba, No. CP-66-CR-0000324-2013, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Wyo. Cnty.), https://ujsportal.pacourts.us. Judge Shurtleff presided over Ziemba's jury trial and subsequent sentencing. Id. Ziemba later filed a Motion to Schedule a Hearing to Vacate All Charges Related to CR-324-2013 Based on Brady Material Violations by the Commonwealth (“Brady motion”) on July 8, 2022. Id.
For a more detailed background of the legal proceedings surrounding this complaint, see Commonwealth v. Ziemba, No. 910 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 1063255, (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2016).
Liberally construed, Ziemba's claim alleges that Judge Shurtleff denied his Brady motion “without legal reason” on September 1, 2022. Doc. 1 at 2. In his Brady motion, Ziemba claims that the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense resulted in a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Doc. 1-2. As relief, Ziemba seeks $3,001,000 in damages, a criminal investigation into all parties involved, and the dismissal of all criminal charges against him. Doc. 1 at 2.
Ziemba attached both his Brady motion (doc. 1-2), and Judge Shurtleff's order denying the Brady motion (doc. 1-3) to the complaint.
III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints-Standard of Review.
This court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. Specifically, the court must review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that- ...
(B) the action or appeal- ...
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted ....This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “[A] court must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of important rights due merely to their lack of legal training.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019). Thus, “[c]ourts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Id. Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
Ziemba purports to bring his claim under “Brady vs[sic] Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)[.]” Doc. 1 at 1, doc. 1-1. Liberally construing Ziemba's complaint, however, we conclude that his claim is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). We thus conclude that Ziemba is bringing this suit under § 1983 for a violation of his constitutional right to due process as defined by Brady. See 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process[.]”).
The entirety of Ziemba's claim is that Judge Shurtleff denied his Brady motion “without legal reason[.]” Doc. 1 at 2. Judge Shurtleff, the sole defendant in the complaint, is entitled to immunity. Additionally, Ziemba's request for relief is improper. Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Although Ziemba's complaint is a mere “conclusion” without any facts offered in support, because Judge Shurtleff is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, we need not dismiss his complaint solely for its lack of factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A. Immunity.
Ziemba fails to state whether he sues Judge Shurtleff in his official or individual capacity. Accordingly, we will evaluate the claims as if Ziemba brings them against Judge Shurtleff in both capacities. Ultimately, we conclude that Judge Shurtleff is entitled to immunity both in his official and individual capacities.
1. Eleventh Amendment.
“Our federalist system of government accords respect for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, including the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other States.” Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). It has been observed that “the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693, n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Therefore, unless Congress has ‘specifically abrogated' the states' sovereign immunity or a state has unequivocally consented to suit in federal court, we lack jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases.”); but see Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has not been entirely consistent in the view that the Eleventh Amendment restricts subject matter jurisdiction”).
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted ‘“to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.'” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless it consents. Id.
“Immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is designed to preserve the delicate and ‘proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.'” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999)). It “serves two fundamental imperatives: safeguarding the dignity of the states and ensuring their financial solvency.” Id. Thus, “the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). “The Eleventh Amendment's protection . . . is not limited to the States alone, but rather extends to entities that function as ‘arms of the State.'” Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 81.
A state, however, may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit, and Congress may abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it unequivocally intends to do so and it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 42 P.C.S.A.§ 8521(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, if the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County is an arm of the state, the Eleventh Amendment bars the claims against it.
The Third Circuit employs “a fact-intensive, three-step balancing test to ascertain whether a state-affiliated entity is an ‘arm of the State' that falls within the ambit of the Eleventh Amendment.” Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 83. In conducting that balancing test, it has identified a number of factors, known as the Fitchik factors, derived from Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989). “[T]he Fitchik factors are (1) the funding factor: whether the state treasury is legally responsible for an adverse judgment entered against the alleged arm of the State; (2) the status under state law factor: whether the entity is treated as an arm of the State under state case law and statutes; and (3) the autonomy factor: whether, based largely on the structure of its internal governance, the entity retains significant autonomy from state control.” Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 83.
“The Pennsylvania constitution provides for the vesting of the Commonwealth's judicial power in a “unified judicial system” which includes all of the courts in Pennsylvania.” Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, § 1.). “Moreover, the constitution provides that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will exercise ‘general supervisory and administrative authority' over the unified judicial system.” Id. (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 2, and 10.) “All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of ‘Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies.” Id. (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 6(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 301).
In Callahan, the Third Circuit addressed whether the First Judicial District was a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although addressing a question of statutory construction, rather than Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court applied the Fitchik factors. Id. at 670. As to the first Fitchik factor, the court recognized that both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia fund the First Judicial District. Id. at 672. It found that factor “of limited utility in determining whether the judicial defendants are persons under section 1983.” Id. It concluded, however, “[a]pplication of the second and third Fitchik factors conclusively demonstrates that the judicial defendants are not persons within section 1983.” Id. Concluding that the judicial defendants are “part of the unified judicial system subject to the control of the Supreme Court,” and that it is “perfectly clear that the judicial defendants are not independent of the Commonwealth and hardly can be regarded as having significant autonomy from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,” it held that “while it is true that the judicial defendants largely are funded locally, we hold that they are not persons within section 1983.” Id. at 673.
Building on Callahan's analysis of the structure of the unified judicial system of Pennsylvania and its analysis of the Fitchik factors, the Third Circuit later held that the courts of Pennsylvania are state entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Pennsylvania constitution envisions a unified state judicial system, of which the Judicial District is an integral component. From a holistic analysis of the Judicial District's relationship with the state, it is undeniable that Pennsylvania is the real party in interest in Benn's suit and would be subjected to both indignity and an impermissible risk of legal liability if the suit were allowed to proceed.”); see also Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that “as an arm of the State, an individual judicial district and its probation and parole department are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,” but holding that in that case, the Eleventh Amendment immunity was waived by acceptance of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act).
Based on the Third Circuit case law, Judge Shurtleff is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity. Official-capacity suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc., 730 F.3d at 318.
Because Judge Shurtleff is a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County, which is a Commonwealth entity, the claims against him in his official capacity are really claims against the Commonwealth and, as such, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. But claims against a state official in his or her individual or personal capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). Thus, we turn next to the claims against Judge Shurtleff in his individual capacity. Although those claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Judge Shurtleff is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from the § 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity.
2. Absolute Judicial Immunity.
“Although § 1983 purports to subject ‘[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to ‘abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'” Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Id. at 135. Although most public officials are entitled to only qualified immunity, public officials who perform “special functions” are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). “The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have .... [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27 (citations omitted).
A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, because immunity applies only to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, a determination must be made whether the challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The relevant factors “‘relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'” Id. at 768 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). “Our task is to ‘draw the line between truly judicial acts for which immunity is appropriate and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts.” Id. (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. In this regard, “we must distinguish between acts in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in ‘excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection.” Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.6). The Supreme Court has explained that distinction:
Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in
which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351-52 (1871)). “Generally, therefore, ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.'” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Gallas, 211 F.3d at 771 (holding that “a judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of her court even though a court rule or other procedural constraint required another judge to act in the matter”).
As to the first part of this inquiry, judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. “In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such ‘specifics' as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision.” Id.
Ziemba's claim centers on Judge Shurtleff's denial of his Brady motion. Doc. 1 at 2. Ruling on motions is a function normally performed by judicial officers and, as such, is a judicial act. Regarding the second part of the analysis, Judge Shurtleff had jurisdiction when he denied the Brady motion. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provides for a “unified” judicial system in which the Courts of Common Pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law.” Pa. Const. art. V §§ 1, 5. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[c]ontroversies arising out of violations of the Crimes Code are entrusted to the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas for resolution.” Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003). “Every jurist within that tier of the unified judicial system is competent to hear and decide a matter arising out of the Crimes Code.” Id. Given that the denial of the Brady motion was a judicial act and Judge Shurtleff was acting with jurisdiction over a criminal matter, Judge Shurtleff is entitled to absolute immunity. Because the only defendant to this complaint is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, Ziemba fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Relief.
Ziemba's complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he is not entitled to the requested relief. As relief, Ziemba seeks $3,001,000 in damages, a criminal investigation into all parties involved, and the dismissal of all criminal charges against him. Doc. 1 at 2. But, under § 1983, Ziemba does not have the right to be granted a dismissal of criminal charges nor does he have the right to a criminal investigation.
As discussed above, Judge Shurtleff is entitled to judicial immunity for any damages sought. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768 (“[J]udges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”).
First, Ziemba cannot seek the dismissal of criminal charges through a § 1983 action. Instead, such relief is available only via a habeas corpus action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”).
We are also unable to grant Ziemba relief in the form of the prosecution or investigation of others. A private citizen “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). See also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (“[T]he benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive' manifestations.”). And “[t]here is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.” Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007); See also Fuchs v. Mercer Cnty., 260 Fed.Appx. 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2008). Ziemba, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted insofar as he requests relief in the form of a criminal investigation of all parties.
Because Ziemba's requested relief is unavailable and improper due to the nature of his allegations, his complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
V. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under a screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Judge Shurtleff is the only defendant named in the complaint and he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, leave to amend the complaint would be futile.
VI. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the court dismiss Ziemba's complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and we recommend that the court close this case.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.