Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-055-C.
July 2, 2003.
ORDER
On this day the Court considered Defendant David Gutierrez's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 22, 2003. Plaintiff, Mary Zambrano, filed a Response to Defendant's Motion on June 11, 2003. Defendant filed no reply to Plaintiff's Response. After considering all relevant arguments and evidence, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant David Gutierrez's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on March 11, 2001, while incarcerated at the Lubbock County Jail, she slipped and fell because of the slick floors. Plaintiff alleges that the slick floors in her jail cell were a result of structural renovations that the jail facility was undergoing while she was incarcerated. Plaintiff also states that during the time of her incarceration, the floors in her jail cell were consistently covered with puddles of water from the renovations. After her fall, Plaintiff was examined at the University Medical Center emergency room and thereafter released and returned to the jail.On March 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to unsafe conditions and that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. That is, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
In cases where the defense of qualified immunity is raised, the moving party is not required to put forth evidence to meet its summary judgment burden for a claim of immunity. Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000). "It is sufficient that the movant in good faith pleads that it is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity." Id.
Finally, in reviewing the summary judgment evidence, "Rule 56 does not impose upon this Court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Rather, the Court need rely only on those portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs the Court's attention. Id. See also Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1536-37 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that two volumes of summary judgment evidence was insufficient to preclude summary judgment when plaintiffs failed to identify specific portions which supported their claims). Moreover, Local Rule 56.5(c) expressly requires that a party filing an appendix "must include in its brief citations to each page of the appendix that supports each assertion that the party makes concerning the summary judgment evidence." To the extent Defendant asks this Court to search through documents to find evidence to support his summary judgment arguments, this Court refuses to do so. Rather, this Court will only consider the admissible summary judgment evidence discussed and specifically identified in the parties' motions and responses.
III. DISCUSSION
Civil Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). "Section 1983 `is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method of vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1984) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)).
The law was enacted to prevent "[a governmental official's] misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the [official] is clothed with authority of state law." Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp.2d 431, 451 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (alterations in original). To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the conduct in question was committed by a person acting under the color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1992); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1984).
Because § 1983 is to be read "in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976), officials sued in their individual capacity may assert a defense of qualified immunity. See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1998). The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government official as "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The affirmative defense should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation, Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156, and should protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1986).
In analyzing whether an individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must ask a threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. "[I]f a [constitutional] violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Id. (alterations added). In other words, the Court should examine "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct is unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). If the plaintiff is unable to show a constitutional violation or that such a right was clearly established at the time, the inquiry ceases and the defendant is entitled to judgment on the issue.
To the extent that the plaintiff is able to show that a violation of a clearly established constitutional right occurred (or at least that the evidence gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding actions that would constitute a violation of a clearly established right if proved to be true, Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1999)), the Court must then make a third inquiry and determine whether the defendant official's alleged conduct was objectively r reasonable in light of the constitutional right allegedly violated. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998). Although this third inquiry (called the "qualified immunity inquiry") appears to be very similar to the determination of whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was "clearly established," the United States Supreme Court recently held that the analysis remains distinct. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2158. This is because
[officers] might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.Id. Determination of objective reasonableness is a question of law for the courts to decide.
Kipps, 197 F.3d at 769.
Conditions of Confinement 1. "Clearly Established" Right
Plaintiff claims that the conditions of her confinement in the Lubbock County Jail were such that they violated her Eighth Amendment constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of slipping on the wet floor in her jail cell. Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation.
In reviewing the case law, the Fifth Circuit suggests that unsafe and unsanitary conditions of confinement might violate the constitutional rights of inmates. See Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1982). The conditions in the jails in these two cases were found to be dangerous and shocking to the conscience. Such conditions included failure to remove electrical, fire, safety, and health hazards at the prisons; violations of state health laws and regulations; and unsanitary conditions constituting extreme maltreatment.
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the conditions in her jail cell were unsafe as a result of ongoing renovations taking place at the jail. Plaintiff alleges that the floors in her jail cell were consistently wet and slippery and that this condition was so dangerous that her safety was at risk. This Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.
2. Objectively Reasonable
The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis requires this Court to determine if Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law as it existed at the time of Plaintiff's alleged injuries. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001). Whether an individual's conduct is objectively unreasonable must be considered against the subjective deliberate indifference standard. Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff argues that keeping Plaintiff incarcerated in the jail during renovations subjected Plaintiff to dangerous conditions in her jail cell. Defendant claims that his conduct was objectively reasonable with regard to the Plaintiff's conditions of confinement. Plaintiff has alleged that there were puddles in the floor of the jail cell due to the renovations taking place at the jail. Plaintiff claims that these puddles made the floor slippery and this is the reason she slipped and fell in her jail cell. Defendant asserts that it was reasonable to continue to house the inmates in the jail during renovations. Defendant argues that the renovations did not so alter the conditions of the jail as to render the jail unsafe. Plaintiff has presented no credible summary judgment evidence establishing that the renovations of the jail rendered the jail so unsafe as to violate her constitutional rights. In fact, Plaintiff presented no evidence of any unsafe condition other than the puddles of water in her jail cell. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to prove that it was unreasonable for the inmates to be housed at the jail during the renovations. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as this Court finds that Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 1. "Clearly Established" Right
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners is the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983. Id. at 105.
See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974) (doctors choosing the "easier and less efficacious treatment" of throwing away the prisoner's ear and stitching the stump may be attributable to "deliberate indifference . . . rather than an exercise of professional judgment"); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic and refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970) (prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed painkiller and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon).
In her complaint, Plaintiff claims that she received no medical care after her fall. Plaintiff alleges that even though she complained daily about the severe pain she was enduring, her medical needs were not treated. This Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.
2. Objectively Reasonable
"Deliberate indifference" in the medical care context means that a prison official is liable "only if he knows that the inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); accord Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994).
The test for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs contains objective and subjective elements. The objective element requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently grave" as to raise a constitutional claim. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The court must consider whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough so as to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 303. Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, not merely cruel and unusual prison conditions, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a "serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition." Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993); White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 269 (4th Cir. 1993).
Under the subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference test, a plaintiff must show that the defendants possessed a culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). A prison official cannot be held liable "unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
Failure to treat serious medical needs would only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference which results in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996). "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Furthermore, negligent medical care, unsuccessful medical treatment, or erroneous judgment do not constitute a valid § 1983 claim. Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 195; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
Defendant argues that he did not deprive Plaintiff of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The Court agrees. Plaintiff argues that she did not receive adequate medical care after a fall in her jail cell. The evidence shows that after her fall, Plaintiff was seen by jail medical staff and then transported to the emergency room at University Medical Center where she was examined by a staff physician. The staff physician concluded that Plaintiff had a deep bruise and a muscle strain and prescribed ibuprofen. After her return to the jail, Plaintiff was seen by the jail medical staff on numerous occasions. On March 14, 2001, Plaintiff's medications were increased and she was given ice packs for her bruise. On March 17, 2001, Plaintiff's medications were changed to include Flexaril. Plaintiff continued taking the ibuprofen and Flexaril through April 15, 2001. On April 22, 2001, Plaintiff was prescribed Colace. On May 17, 2001, Plaintiff was examined and her medications were changed to include Soma and Naprosyn and a series of X-rays were ordered. On May 21, 2001, Plaintiff returned to University Medical Center for additional tests and X-rays. On May 22, 2001, Dr. Stanton Kremsky interpreted the x-rays and concluded Plaintiff had a "normal thoracic spine." On June 10, 2001, Plaintiff was again examined and her medications were continued.
In sum, Defendant's actions do not amount to "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant David Gutierrez and hereby dismisses with prejudice the claims brought against him in his individual capacity.