Opinion
No. 02-CV-70895-DT
April 8, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER of SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Walter Alvin Young, ("petitioner"), presently confined at the Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his sentence on one count of larceny from a person, M.C.L.A. 750.357; M.S.A. 28.589. For the reasons stated below, petitioners application for writ of habeas corpus is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the above charge in the St. Clair County Circuit Court in exchange for dismissal of a charge of unarmed robbery and was sentenced to thirty eight months to ten years in prison. Petitioners conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. People v. Young, 234597 (Mich.Ct.App. July 18, 2001); lv. den. ___ Mich. ___; 639 N.W.2d 814 (2002). Petitioner now seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
I. Defendant was deprived of his state and federal constitutional rights [where the] sentencing guidelines were misscored.
II. Whether the sentence violates the principle of proportionality.
II. DISCUSSION
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must set forth facts that give rise to a cause of action under federal law or it may summarily be dismissed. Perez v. Hemingway, 157 F. Supp.2d 790, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Federal courts are authorized to dismiss any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (citing to Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254); See also Smith v. Stegall, 141 F. Supp.2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Because petitioner's claims are not cognizable in federal habeas review, the instant petition is subject to dismissal.This Court first notes that petitioners sentence of thirty eight months to ten years was within the statutory maximum set under Michigan's larceny from a person statute. A sentence imposed within the statutory limits is not generally subject to habeas review. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp.2d 788, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1999). A sentence within the statutory maximum set by statute does not normally constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000). Generally, federal habeas review of a state court sentence ends once the court makes a determination that the sentence is within the limitation set by statute. Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000); See also Allen v. Stovall, 156 F. Supp.2d 791, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Claims which arise out of a state trial court's sentencing decision are not normally cognizable on federal habeas review, unless the habeas petitioner can show that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly unauthorized by law. Lucey v. Lavigne, 185 F. Supp.2d 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing to Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1987)).
In his first claim, petitioner alleges that the sentencing court improperly scored his sentencing guidelines range under the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines. A Michigan trial court's allegedly improper interpretation of the state's sentencing guidelines is not a cognizable claim for federal habeas review. Whitfield v. Martin, 157 F. Supp.2d 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 797. Petitioner has no state created liberty interest in having the Michigan sentencing guidelines applied rigidly in determining his sentence. Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F. Supp. 105, 106-107 (E.D. Mich. 1987). To the extent that petitioner is claiming that his sentence violates the Michigan state sentencing guidelines, his claim is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding because it is a state law claim. Id.; See also Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp.2d 802, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Because petitioners claim that the sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored does not allege a violation of the federal constitution, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
In his second claim, petitioner contends that the sentence imposed in this case violated the principle of proportionality, because the trial court failed to individualize his sentence to the particular circumstances of his case by taking into account certain mitigating circumstances on his behalf.
The U.S. Constitution does not require that sentences be proportionate. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a requirement of strict proportionality between the crime and sentence. The Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001.
Successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence in non-capital cases like this one are "exceedingly rare". Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). Federal courts will therefore not engage in a proportionality analysis except where the sentence imposed is death or life imprisonment without parole. See Seeger v. Straub, 29 F. Supp.2d 385, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1998). A claim that a sentence is imposed in violation of Michigan's sentencing law does not state a claim for relief in a habeas proceeding where there is no claim that the sentence violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hanks v. Jackson, 123 F. Supp.2d 1061, 1075 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Petitioner's claim that his sentence is disproportionate under Michigan law thus would not state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted. Whitfield v. Martin, 157 F. Supp.2d at 761; Atkins v. Overton, 843 F. Supp. 258, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
Petitioner's related claim that the trial court failed to indivualize his sentence by considering mitigating factors on his behalf also fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has refused to extend the doctrine of individualized sentencing to noncapital cases. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 995-996. In Harmelln, the U.S. Supreme Court held that imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole without any consideration of any mitigating factors, such as the defendant's work history, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 994-995. Petitioners argument that his sentence was disproportionate because the trial court failed to afford him individualized consideration of mitigating evidence on his behalf fails because the U.S. Supreme Court has limited its holding concerning mitigating evidence to capital cases. Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) ( citing to Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996). Because petitioner had no constitutional right to an individualized sentence, no constitutional error would occur if the state trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence on his behalf at sentencing. See Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995); Hastings v. Yukins, ___ F. Supp.2d ___; 2002 WL 485189, * 12 (E.D. Mich. March 8, 2002).
III. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.