Opinion
Case Number: 01-10094-BC
November 19, 2002.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Ardra Young, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that challenges several aspects of his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, and two counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony (felony firearm), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. The grounds advanced for relief lack merit, and the Court will therefore deny the petition.
I.
The petitioner's conviction arose out of the shooting death of his wife, Terri Young, and son, Michael Young. The evidence at trial indicated that on February 8, 1997, police officers Tracey Elledge and Kimree Chandler responded to a call regarding a parked car located on Outer Drive in Rouge River Park in Detroit, Michigan. When Officers Elledge and Chandler arrived at the vehicle, a black Toyota, they found a man and a woman, later identified as Terri and Michael Young, each of whom had been shot in the head. The female was not breathing, the male's breathing was labored. Terri Young was pronounced dead at the scene, and Michael Young died after being removed from life support at the direction of the petitioner.
Police Officer Isaiah Smith was the officer in charge of investigating the shootings of Terri and Michael Young. He testified that on February 9, 1997, at approximately 12:30 p.m., the petitioner came to the police station, at which time he was informed of his Miranda rights. The petitioner gave a statement to Officer Young at that time, denying that he was involved in the shooting deaths of his wife or son. The petitioner stated that he had been in Bollingbrook, Illinois, from the evening of Friday, February 7, 1997, until he returned home to Detroit, at approximately 10:00 a.m., on Sunday, February 9, 1997.
Officer Young further testified that at approximately 3:05 p.m., on that same day, he again advised the petitioner of his constitutional rights. Officer Young testified that the petitioner then made a statement in which he admitted killing his wife and son. In the statement, the petitioner stated that he actually returned to Detroit on Saturday night at approximately 9:30 p.m. He called his wife from a phone booth and told her to meet him at West Outer Drive and Milford. He stated that, about ten minutes later, Terri and Michael arrived at the designated location. The petitioner stated that he told Michael to get out of Terri's car and go sit in his car, which Michael did. The petitioner then sat in the back seat, passenger side of Terri's car. He took a .38 caliber gun out of his pocket and shot Terri in the back of the head. The petitioner then got out of the car and called for Michael to return to his mother's car. The petitioner told Michael to get in the back seat of the car and get something from underneath the front seat. As Michael was leaning down, the petitioner shot him in the head. The petitioner testified that, after shooting his wife and son, he got in his car and drove back to Bollingbrook.
Floride Brown testified for the defense. She testified that, on February 8, 1997, she left her home at approximately 8:02 p.m. to pick up a takeout order at a local restaurant. She left the restaurant at approximately 8:20 p.m., and took Outer Drive home. Ms. Brown testified that, as she was driving along Outer Drive, she saw a blue car on the side of the road and a black car behind it. She testified that she saw three white men standing around the black car, two by the driver's side, and one in front of the car. She drove a little further, then turned around. Ms. Brown testified that when she came back, the blue car was gone and the trunk of the black car was open.
The petitioner testified in his own defense. He stated that on February 7, 1997, at approximately 6:00 p.m., he left Detroit for Bollingbrook, Illinois, where he planned to inspect some trucks for his employer. He checked into his hotel at approximately 11:30 p.m., Detroit time. The following day, he inspected the trucks from approximately 9:00 a.m., until 1:00 p.m., when he and a colleague, John Malone, went out for lunch. He testified that Malone dropped him off at the hotel at approximately 3:30 p.m. The petitioner stated that he had intended to drive back to Detroit that evening, but was not feeling well, so he decided to stay in Bollingbrook for another night. The petitioner was awakened at approximately 2:00 a.m., by his pager. His parents' number was on his pager. He testified that he called his parents' home, and spoke to his brother Mark, a police officer, who informed him that he should return home and that he needed to talk to the Detroit police, homicide division.
The petitioner testified that, after returning home, he went to his home, then his neighbor's house, then his parents' house, and then the hospital. He testified that when he was at the hospital he authorized taking his son off life support. The petitioner testified that he authorized his son to be taken off life support because his wife and son had been practicing Jehovah's Witnesses and did not approve of life support. He also testified that he did not wish to endure two funerals, one for his wife, then one for his son a few weeks later. He further testified that he did not visit his son's room because he could not bear to see his son in that condition. After visiting the hospital, the petitioner went to the police station.
A jury in the Wayne County Circuit Court found the petitioner guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, and two counts of felony firearm. On November 20, 1997, the petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the murder convictions and to two consecutive two-year terms of imprisonment for the felony firearm convictions.
The petitioner filed an appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the following issues either through counsel or in a supplemental pro se brief:
I. The trial court clearly erred and denied defendant due process of law by denying his motion to suppress his confession.
II. The trial court erred reversibly by denying appellate counsel's motion for new trial.
III. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel and his due process right to a fair trial, where counsel failed to impeach one of the key witnesses with prior inconsistent statements to police that would have proven that there were three white men in a blue car at the scene of the crime, and where the prosecutor failed to reveal this to the jury as well.
IV. The trial court abused its discretion and denied defendant a fair trial by refusing a request from the jury to re-hear testimony.
V. Where the credibility of defendant's key alibi witness, John Malone, was crucial to the defense of Ardra Young and the circuit judge reversibly erred in disparaging the witness during voir dire by commenting that the witness' profession was the most dishonest.
VI. Defendant-appellant was denied his state and federal constitutional right to a fair trial where the prosecutor repeatedly engaged in blatant and intentional misconduct.
VII. The police did not have probable cause to warrant a detention and custodial interrogation of defendant and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for the suppression of evidence from the illegalities of the police.
VIII. The prosecutor made repeated and improper inquiries into the religious beliefs and opinions of a witness and the defendant through this witness and impeached the defendant extrinsically and intrinsically through his religious beliefs and opinions.
IX. The trial court erred reversibly by allowing the admission of improper rebuttal testimony.
X. The improper cross-examination of critical non-alibi defense witness Ms. Floride Brown created incalculable prejudice incurable by an objection.
XI. The prosecutor's misleading arguments in closing argument mandates reversal.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's convictions. People v. Young, No. 208788, 2000 WL 33521874 (Mich.Ct.App. March 14, 2000) (unpublished opinion).
The petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the following claims:
I. The trial court committed reversible error by allowing admission of the improper rebuttal testimony over defense counsel objection.
II. Defendant counsel was ineffective for the failure to object when the prosecutor made repeated and improper inquiries into the religious beliefs and opinions of defendant and a state witness, explored the religious beliefs of defendant through this witness, and impeached defendant extrinsically and intrinsically through his religious beliefs and opinions, thereby denying defendant of his First, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution and Const. 1963, Article 1, §§ 17, 18.
III. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper cross-examination of a critical non-alibi witness when it was clearly designed to create incalculable prejudice and this prejudice was so severe as to be incurable by an objection thereby denying defendant of a fair trial and due process.
IV. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation when the police did not have probable cause to place defendant into custody and conduct an interrogation, and the trial court erred in finding that defendant was "not in custody" and that the alleged "confession" was voluntary, denying defendant of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.
V. Defendant was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process when the prosecution deliberately argued the effect of testimony that was not entered into evidence, injected its personal opinion about the veracity of a police witness' credibility, and vouched for the truthfulness of said witness.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Young, No. 116925 (Mich. Oct. 30, 2000).
Thereafter, the petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. Petitioner was denied his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the Detroit Police subjected him to a custodial interrogation without probable cause, used the illegal detention to extract a "confession," defense counsel failed to move for suppression on the basis of an illegal arrest, and the trial court erred in its adjudication of the ultimate "in custody" determination.
II. Petitioner was denied his First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial forays into the religious beliefs of a state witness, explored petitioner's religious beliefs and opinions through this witness, disparaged petitioner's religious beliefs and opinions, engaged in religious-based closing arguments, and defense counsel failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection.
III. Petitioner was denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the trial court's abuse of discretion in admitting improper rebuttal testimony concerning a collateral issue injected into the case by the prosecutor during re-cross examination of petitioner over the objection of defense counsel, and the Michigan Court of Appeals failed to address this issue on petitioner's appeal of right.
IV. Petitioner was denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the prosecutor improperly cross-examined a critical defense witness, argued the effect of evidence not entered into the record, vouched for a police witness, bolstered the testimony of a police witness, and defense counsel failed to object thereto.
II.
The petitioner's claims are reviewed against the standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). This Act altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Because the petitioner's application was filed after that date, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 406 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 409, 410, 411. See also Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2002).
A.
The petitioner's first claim for habeas corpus relief incorporates three issues relating to the validity of his confession: (1) that his statements to police should have been suppressed because police lacked probable cause to arrest him; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress the statements on the grounds that they were the product of an illegal arrest; and (3) the trial court erred in its ruling regarding whether the petitioner was in custody at the time he made his statements to police.
1.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of the petitioner's statements to police. However, the bases for suppression which the petitioner advanced at that hearing were first, whether the petitioner received his Miranda warnings, and, second, whether his statement to police was voluntary. It was not until his direct appeal that the petitioner raised the claim presented herein, that the statements should have been suppressed because they were the result of an illegal arrest. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the police had probable cause to arrest the petitioner:
There is no merit to defendant's claim in propria persona that the police lacked probable cause to conduct a custodial interrogation. An arrest must be made upon probable cause at the time of the arrest. Probable cause is established by showing the probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. Even if a suspect is detained illegally, his subsequent confession need not be suppressed unless the unlawful detention was used to directly procure evidence from the detainee. Intervening circumstances, such as new information learned by the police, can break the causal connection between an unlawful arrest and an inculpatory statement, so that the statement is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest. Here, there was ample evidence of defendant's involvement in the shootings to justify his custodial interrogation prior to his making a confession. There was no plain error in admission of his statement, . . . and defendant's claim of ineffective assistance on this basis is also without merit.People v. Young, 2000 WL 33521874, at *2 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in state court:
First, the court must determine whether the state procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment claim. Second, the court must determine whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism.Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
The petitioner does not dispute that the Michigan courts provided him with a procedural mechanism to present his Fourth Amendment claim. He instead simply argues that the claim was incorrectly decided. The petitioner was provided with a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, despite the fact that he raised it for the first time on appeal. Therefore, his claim is not cognizable on habeas corpus review.
2.
The petitioner argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of his statements on the basis that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for determining whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient, which "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner may establish prejudice by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id.
The Supreme Court emphasized that, when assessing counsel's performance, the reviewing court should afford counsel a great deal of deference:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.Id. at 689 (internal quotes and citations omitted). The Court explained that to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id.
To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The Sixth Circuit, applying the Strickland standard, has held that a reviewing court therefore must focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996).
In this case, even assuming that the petitioner's attorney was ineffective in failing to raise illegal arrest as a basis for suppressing the petitioner's statement to police, the petitioner has failed to establish prejudice. The state court of appeals reviewed the issue and held that the petitioner's arrest was based upon probable cause. Thus, even if the petitioner's counsel had presented this claim, the statement would not have been suppressed on that basis. The petitioner therefore has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to this claim. See Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a habeas petitioner cannot establish cause and prejudice when the underlying claim not raised by counsel lacks merit).
3.
Next, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in holding that he was not in custody at the time he gave his first statement to police and, therefore, police were not required to advise him of his Miranda rights. The petitioner's argument, when read in conjunction with the record before the Court, is contradictory. In his petition, the petitioner repeatedly states that he was advised of his Miranda rights. Officer Smith's testimony also supports a finding that the petitioner was advised of his constitutional rights. Thus, even if the state courts were incorrect in finding that the petitioner was not in custody at the time that he gave his first statement to police, the petitioner admits that he, nonetheless, was given Miranda warnings. Therefore, with respect to this claim, the petitioner has failed to show a constitutional violation which would entitle him to habeas corpus relief.
B.
In his next claim for relief, the petitioner argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's misconduct. The petitioner alleges that the prosecutor improperly explored the petitioner's religious beliefs and opinions, engaged in religion-based arguments, and explored the religious beliefs of state witnesses. In addition, the petitioner argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined witness Floride Brown, vouched for and bolstered the testimony of Police Officer Brian Watson by referring to facts not in evidence, and that the prosecutor argued numerous other facts not in evidence.
The respondent argues that the petitioner's claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct regarding religion-based comments has not been exhausted because the petitioner failed to present this claim to state courts as a federal constitutional claim. Even if true, however, a federal court may deny a habeas petition on the merits despite a petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies for all his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); see also Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the doctrine of exhaustion raises only federal-state comity concerns and is not a jurisdictional limitation of the power of the court).
"Prosecutorial misconduct may warrant habeas relief only if the relevant misstatements were so egregious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair to a degree tantamount to a due process deprivation." Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 1999). The determination whether the trial was fundamentally unfair is "made by evaluating the totality of the circumstances." Angel v. Overberg, 682 F.2d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 1982). The Court must examine "`the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.'" Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 4 F.3d 1348, 1355 (6th Cir. 1993)).
The Sixth Circuit has identified the factors a court should consider in weighing the extent of prosecutorial misconduct:
In every case, we consider the degree to which the remarks complained of have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; whether they are isolated or extensive; whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury, and the strength of the competent proof to establish the guilt of the accused.Id. at 964 (quoting Angel, 682 F.2d at 608).
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding the petitioner's claim that the prosecutor improperly remarked on the petitioner's religious beliefs, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held, in pertinent part:
There is no merit to defendant's issue in propria persona that the prosecutor improperly raised the issue of defendant's and witnesses' religious practices. Defendant first raised the issue, during cross-examination of defendant's brother-in-law, regarding defendant's involvement with Jehovah's Witnesses. Part of the defense in this case was that defendant removed his son so quickly from life support because of the family's involvement with Jehovah's Witnesses.People v. Young, 2000 WL 33521874, at *3.
A person's beliefs, superstitions, or affiliation with a religious group are properly admissible where probative of an issue in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996). The petitioner's religion was central to his justification for removing his son from life support so quickly. In addition, the petitioner, not the prosecutor, first introduced religion into the trial. Moreover, a review of the record reveals that the prosecutor's remarks regarding religion were not broad questions and statements on irrelevant religious issues; instead, they were limited in scope to address only the petitioner's defense on this point. The petitioner could not fairly have expected to introduce the religion issue as justification for his actions without the prosecutor having the opportunity to explore this defense. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to show that the prosecutor's comments deprived him of a fair trial.
Next, the petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by impermissibly cross-examining witness Floride Brown regarding her failure to come forward earlier with allegedly exculpatory information. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that "it was not improper for the prosecutor to delve into Brown's motive for volunteering an alibi for defendant a month before trial." People v. Young, 2000 WL 33521874, at *4. The petitioner has failed to show that the state court's finding was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or that the prosecutor's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.
The petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by improperly vouching for the credibility of Police Officer Brian Watson. The petitioner failed to exhaust this claim. However, because the Court determines that this claim lacks merit, the Court will address it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cain, 947 F.2d at 819. Officer Watson, the petitioner's next-door neighbor, testified that, on the morning of Sunday, February 9, 1997, the petitioner stopped by Officer Watson's house before going to the hospital. Officer Watson testified that the petitioner sat in his kitchen and talked. The petitioner did not appear to be in a hurry to get to the hospital. A review of the record indicates that the prosecutor questioned Officer Watson regarding his impression of the petitioner's demeanor and his motives for testifying. Based upon Officer Watson's responses, the prosecutor argued that Officer Watson had no motive to lie. Such statements do not amount to impermissible vouching.
Finally, the petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing several facts not in evidence and misrepresenting witnesses' testimony. The petitioner also failed to exhaust this claim, but once again, the Court will again address the claim in the interests of efficiency and justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cain, 947 F.2d at 819. A prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial as they relate to the prosecutor's case. See United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1999). A review of the record reveals that the prosecutor argued reasonable inferences based upon the evidence presented. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct.
C.
Finally, the petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting improper rebuttal testimony. Specifically, the petitioner complains that during re-cross-examination of the petitioner, the prosecutor improperly questioned him, and later witness Lenora Strohm, regarding financial disagreements between the petitioner and his wife.
Under Michigan law, evidence of marital discord is admissible to show motive. People v. Fisher, 449 Mich. 441, 453, 537 N.W.2d 577, 582-83 (1995). It is well established that "`federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Louis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). The Sixth Circuit has held that "[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding, it is not the province of a federal appellate court to review the decision of the state's highest court on purely state law." Long v. Smith, 663 F.2d 18, 22-23 (6th Cir. 1981). "Errors by a state court in the admission of evidence are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial." Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 1994).
The petitioner has failed to show that the admission of evidence regarding marital discord, relevant to motive, denied him his right to a fair trial. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
IV.
The decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals affirming the petitioner's conviction was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.