Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-CV-1493.
June 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Pro se plaintiff David Yi is a federal inmate currently imprisoned at FCI Petersburg, Virginia. He seeks a writ of mandamus to force defendants, Federal Bureau of Prisons, M.E. Ray, and Thomas Washburn to grant a transfer to a minimum security prison camp in Fort Dix, New Jersey so that he can be closer to family and community ties in New York City. Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection afforded under the Fifth Amendment by arbitrarily denying his requests for a transfer in violation of prison regulations and policies. Additionally, plaintiff contends that defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), 4081. Presently before me is defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, transfer venue. Because I will dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, I will not consider the alternative motion.
The Court of Appeals has recognized: "Although the Fifth Amendment contains no Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. . . . . Accordingly, the Court has construed the Fifth Amendment to contain an equal protection guarantee." Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) ( en banc opinion) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Equal protection claims asserted under Fifth Amendment are examined under the same principles that apply to such claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 317.
On April 17, 1996, plaintiff was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to a term of 151 months of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release for conspiring to participate in an Organized Criminal Enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c). Specifically, plaintiff's presentence report indicated that he was involved in violent gang activities which included murders, robberies, extortions, and drug trafficking.
On November 13, 1997, plaintiff was assigned to FCI Elkton, Ohio. While at FCI Elkton, plaintiff appears to have been a model prisoner. On September 30, 2002, plaintiff's Unit Team at FCI Elkton submitted a minimum security transfer referral to the Northeast Region based on plaintiff's excellent behavior. The Northeast Regional Office, however, denied the transfer referral because it believed that the seriousness of the offenses for which plaintiff was convicted did not support transfer to a minimum security facility. Plaintiff exhausted all administrative remedies without success and filed the present action.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss examines the sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). In determining the sufficiency of the complaint I must accept all the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. "Thus, a court should not grant a motion to dismiss `unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Graves, 117 F.3d at 726,quoting, Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Moreover, because plaintiff is acting pro se, I have a special obligation to construe his complaint liberally. See Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992).
In the present case, it appears that plaintiff cannot successfully assert that defendants violated any of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends that defendants violated Bureau of Prisons regulations and his constitutional rights by arbitrarily determining that he could not be transferred to the minimum security facility in New Jersey solely based on the seriousness of the crimes for which he was convicted.
Plaintiff cites to Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that defendants cannot arbitrarily violate the prison's regulations. However, theHerron Court specifically dealt with the unique circumstances of a First Amendment retaliation claim, which is not alleged here. See id.
However, the Supreme Court has explained that any liberty interests under the Due Process Clause created by prison regulations are limited to instances where violation of those regulations impose "atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Moreover, the Court has determined that an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within any particular State. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1983) ("[A]n interstate prison transfer, including one from Hawaii to California, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in and of itself."). Therefore, plaintiff cannot maintain that being housed in a prison that is distant from family and his community constitutes an atypical and sufficient hardship violative of the Due Process Clause. Moreover, there appears to be no discernable basis for asserting an equal protection violation from plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff has failed to alleged that he is a member of a protected class or describe how defendants discriminated against him. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) ("[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving `the existence of purposeful discrimination.'"); Herron, 203 F.3d at 417 ("To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class."),quoting Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990).
In addition to his constitutional arguments, plaintiff seems to suggest that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and 4081 by failing to consider various factors other than the nature of a prisoner's offense. Section 3621(b) provides in relevant part:
Place of imprisonment. — The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering —
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence —
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.Id.
The Court of Appeals, however, has recognized that "[The statutory] history states that the listing of factors in § 3621(b) was not intended `to restrict or limit the Bureau in the exercise of its existing discretion so long as the facility meets the minimum standards of health and habitability of the Bureau, but intends simply to set forth the appropriate factors that the Bureau should consider in making the designations.'"Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1991), quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 3182, 3325. Similarly, § 4081 offers broad discretion to prisoner officials. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 (1976) ("Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control these conditions of confinement. . . ."), citing 18 U.S.C. § 4081. Therefore, plaintiff may not assert a claim under this statute for refusing to relocate him.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of June 2003, after considering defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's response thereto, the motion is GRANTED and plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED.