Opinion
Case No. 02-2146-JWL
May 23, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is presently before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 4) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
On April 9, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 6.1(e)(2), a party has 20 days to respond to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.4, "[i]f a respondent fails to file a response within the time required by Rule [6.1(e)], the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further notice."
On May 9, 2002, after plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss, this court issued an order directing plaintiff to show cause in writing to the court, on or before May 20, 2002, why it failed to respond to defendant's motion within the period of time dictated by Rule 6.1 and directing plaintiff to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss on or before May 20, 2002. In that order, the court cautioned plaintiff that if it failed to respond to the motion to dismiss on or before May 20, 2002, then the motion would be considered and decided as uncontested, and ordinarily would be granted without further notice pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.4.
Plaintiff failed to file a response to the court's show cause order and defendant's motion to dismiss on or before May 20, 2002. Thus, the court considers defendant's motion to dismiss as uncontested and, accordingly, grants the motion. In so holding, the court specifically concludes that certain aggravating factors present in this case outweigh the judicial system's strong predisposition to resolve cases on their merits. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1998) (prior to outright dismissal for failure to comply with local court rules, court must consider the degree of actual prejudice to the respondent; the amount of interference with the judicial process; and the culpability of the litigant).
Specifically, the court notes that plaintiff, as of the date of this order, has still not responded to defendant's motion to dismiss nor has it contacted the court in any way regarding this case. Plaintiff's failure to respond to defendant's motion in any way and its failure to contact the court in any way demonstrates that its culpability is quite high. Compare id. (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where petitioner mailed his response more than three days prior to the deadline, demonstrating "little or no culpability on his part in causing the delay") and Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir. 1988) (petitioner herself was not guilty of any dereliction where petitioner's counsel overlooked motion and, therefore, failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly). Moreover, in such circumstances, denying defendant's motion would prejudice defendant in terms of continued time spent and expenses incurred on a case in which the plaintiff has shown no interest even after ample notice from the court. Similarly, denying defendant's motion would interfere with the judicial process in terms of docket management and the need for a finality to litigation. In other words, the court should not have to continue to manage this case on its docket when plaintiff itself has taken no initiative to keep the case on the court's docket. Compare Murray, 132 F.3d at 611 (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where petitioner's response to motion was received one day after the 15-day deadline and no prejudice to respondents could have resulted from this delay, nor could it have caused interference with the judicial process) and Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (where petitioner's counsel overlooked motion and, therefore, failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly, respondent would not have been prejudiced in any legal or equitable sense by court's consideration of response and any inconvenience to the court was not so severe a burden as to justify dismissal).
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss. If plaintiff feels aggrieved by this ruling, it may file a motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60. See D. Kan. Rule 7.3(a); Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration following dismissal as uncontested motion).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 4) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.