Opinion
2:21-CV-01242
04-07-2022
BART M. YAGLA, JR., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FAYETTE, et al, Defendants.
Colville, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF No. 13
Lisa Pupo Lenihan, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff in this pro se civil rights action has filed a Motion for Injunction. ECF No. 13. For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion be denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff, Bart M. Yagla, Jr., filed his complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as violations of title 95 of the Pa. Code. 37 Pa. Code § 95.240(2)(i)(d). He filed this Motion for Preliminary Injunction with his Complaint. His Complaint alleges that he should have been issued a prison misconduct prior to being criminally charged with conspiring to smuggle drugs into the prison. He alleges that the allegations against him were fabricated and argues that if he had been given an opportunity to be heard first within the prison grievance system prior to formal charges being lodged.
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction asks the court to stop the criminal proceedings from proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County. The Complaint was only recently served, and the Court ordered Defendants to respond to the Injunction. A Response was filed on March 30, 2022. ECF No. 27.
Applicable Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, measures that the Supreme Court has described as “extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Because he is seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success in the litigation; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)) The court in Reilly clarified that the burden rests on the moving party to prove the first two “most critical” factors. If this burden is carried, the court must then balance those two factors against whether there will be irreparable injury to the opposing party if the injunction is granted and whether public interest favors an injunction. Id. at 179.
In establishing a likelihood of success on the merits, the moving party must make “a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.” Id. As to the second element of irreparable harm, the moving party must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction, ” not just that irreparable injury is possible. Winter, 555 U.S.at 22.
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, ‘”the grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.”' American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979). The Court is not aware of any case that mandates that the prison make copies of his complaint.
II. Analysis
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted in this case. While an inmate has due process rights in the context of jail misconduct proceedings (Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475-6 (1995), there is no right to be given a misconduct by the prison system prior to being criminally prosecuted for criminal conduct that allegedly occurred while incarcerated. In addition, there is no evidence that a misconduct proceeding would have prevented Plaintiff from being criminally charged.
In his Injunction Motion, Plaintiff is asking this court to “halt the criminal prosecution.” ECF No. 13 at 2. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court “established a principle of abstention when federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding.” Yi Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Younger, supra). Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger abstention will apply when the following three requirements are met: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”
Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). See also Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 Fed.Appx. 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff is basically asserting a denial of his due process rights to his day in court. He apparently wanted that day to be within the prison system. He will, however, have an opportunity to be heard in the state criminal proceeding. The Court finds that all three requirements of the Younger abstention apply in this case. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a less than likely chance of success on the merits.
In addition, Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied as he will have an opportunity to be heard in the state criminal proceedings and also has counsel in that matter. The Court further agrees with Defendants that granting the injunction would result in greater harm to Defendants in interfering with their right to run their facility in the manner they see fit. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, (1979). Finally, the public interest definitely does not favor the requested relief. The criminal prosecution should run its natural course and the federal courts should not be interfering with that process.
III. Recommendation
Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to the extraordinary relief of an injunction and recommends that this Motion be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.