Opinion
No. 4-12-0448WC
07-08-2013
ANNETTE WYATT, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al., (Master Brand Cabinets, Inc., Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Coles County
No. 11 MR 171
Honorable
Mitchell K. Shick,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hudson, Harris, and Stewart concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the claimant failed to establish a causal link between her condition of ill-being and her workplace injury for any time after August 20, 2008, is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the circuit court did not err in declining to remand the matter to the Commission for presentation of further medical evidence. ¶ 2 The claimant, Annette Wyatt, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Coles County confirming a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), which awarded her only 10 1/7 weeks of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), for a right-arm repetitive trauma injury she allegedly suffered while in the employ of Master Brand Cabinets, Inc. (Master Brand). On appeal, she argues that (1) the Commission erred in finding that she established a causal connection between her accident and her injury only for the period between October 12, 2007, and August 20, 2008; and (2) the circuit court erred in declining to remand the matter to the Commission for the presentation of further evidence regarding her condition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's judgment and remand the matter to the Commission pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 399 N.E.2d 1322 (1980). ¶ 3 The following factual recitation is taken from the record on appeal, including the record of the arbitration hearing conducted on December 20, 2009. ¶ 4 The claimant, who had been employed by Master Brand for approximately one year before her accident, testified that, in the six months before her injury, she worked as a cabinet finisher. She described that job as requiring her to make repetitive movements with her right hand to hold cabinet doors, and she said that she noticed hand pain and swelling within one month of starting as a cabinet finisher. The claimant testified that she visited her company's nurse in August 2007, and eight more times in the ensuing two months, but got no relief from those treatments. As time went on, the claimant said, she began to feel symptoms up her right arm. She testified that Master Brand had asked her to wait and continue to work before seeing a company doctor, but she eventually elected to see her family doctor, Dr. Tracey Davenport. ¶ 5 Dr. Davenport referred the claimant to Dr. Christopher Hogg, an orthopedic doctor, who examined her on October 12, 2007. After noting her history of right wrist, arm, and elbow pain; reviewing x-rays; and conducting an examination, Dr. Hogg diagnosed "[r]ight medial epicondylitis greater than lateral epicondylitis" as well as tendonitis and "mild basilar arthritis." He recommended that the claimant wear a splint and take medication, and he wrote that he might later consider cortisone injections or an arm cast. After the claimant reported no improvement at a November 2, 2007, follow-up visit, Dr. Hogg administered a cortisone injection, recommended she not work for three weeks, and recommended physical therapy. The claimant testified that the cortisone injection provided her no relief. ¶ 6 The claimant testified that, on November 2, 2007, Master Brand allowed her to limit herself to light-duty work. She said that, when that work began to require that she sweep using two hands on a broom, she told a supervisor that she was unable, and she was taken off of work duty. ¶ 7 In a December 28, 2007, treatment note, Dr. Hogg wrote that the claimant reported decreased, yet continuing, pain following her time off of work. Dr. Hogg concluded that a return to full-duty work would exacerbate the claimant's condition, and he released her for light-duty work as of January 2, 2008. ¶ 8 In a January 7, 2008, treatment note, Dr. Patrick Hartman wrote that the claimant had continued right elbow, wrist, and thumb pain that was not improving with treatment. He recommended that the claimant undergo an EMG, which was performed on January 21, 2008. The report of the EMG stated that the claimant had a "normal" study that showed no evidence of neuropathy or radiculopathy in the right upper extremity. After a January 25, 2008, treatment visit, Dr. Hogg wrote that the claimant's condition appeared to be unchanged from her last visit, and he administered additional cortisone injections, which the claimant testified provided her no relief. A January 24, 2008, x-ray report indicated that the claimant had not broken a bone in her right arm. ¶ 9 The claimant was referred to Dr. Nash Naam, who examined her on February 5, 2008, and noted her complaints of pain as well as her January 2008 EMG results. After a physical examination, Dr. Naam wrote that he could not identify the etiology of her complaints and recommended that she undergo a bone scan. ¶ 10 On February 6, 2008, the claimant underwent a bone scan, and a report of that scan indicated "[f]indings most suggestive of mild reflex sympathetic dystrophy [(RSD)] in the right forearm and hand." The scan further stated that "[m]ild foci of delayed increased uptake in the bilateral wrists suggest chronic trauma versus degenerative change." An addendum to that report, filed following consultation with Dr. Naam, stated that the claimant had no history of repetitive trauma, and it concluded that "findings are thought not likely to be related to [RSD]." In his February 26 treatment note, Dr. Naan wrote that he saw the initial RSD finding and called the reporting radiologist to discuss the finding, with which he "strongly disagree[d]." He wrote instead that "there [were] no objective findings to support any specific diagnosis," and he recommended that the claimant return to work without restrictions. ¶ 11 On February 19, 2008, Dr. Donald Johnston, who took over the claimant's care from Dr. Hogg, noted the claimant's continued wrist pain and ordered that she have work restrictions. On March 14, 2008, another treating physician, Dr. Tammy Munch, wrote that the claimant reported improving right wrist and elbow pain. After an April 11, 2008, visit, Dr. Johnston noted the claimant's continued improvement, and he released her to full-duty work. The claimant testified that she asked Dr. Johnston to release her to full work because she "was going to lose [her] job if [she] didn't go back to work." ¶ 12 The claimant testified that, once she returned to full-duty work, her arm "started hurting more," so she again sought treatment. On July 3, 2008, she visited Dr. Louis Mendella, who reported right wrist pain and some numbness in her right hand. Dr. Mendella recommended that the claimant undergo therapy for her wrist and that she be restricted to light-duty work. He wrote that he might recommend another steroid injection, and perhaps surgery, if the claimant's condition persisted. In an August 1, 2008, treatment note, Dr. Mendella wrote that the claimant reported continued elbow and wrist pain. He administered an injection to her right upper extremity, continued her work restrictions, and recommended that she undergo a nerve conduction study. The "Impression" section of the ensuing August 20, 2008, EMG study stated that the study was "normal" and that "[t]here is no evidence of mononeuropathy or polyneuropathy to account for [the claimant's] symptoms." The EMG report also stated that the claimant reported "similar, but less intense symptoms" in her left wrist, as well as pain and numbness in her legs. ¶ 13 On August 29, 2008, the claimant saw Dr. Mendella with the intention of arranging her surgery, but she testified that he told her he could not perform the surgery because her bone scan revealed that she had RSD. In his report, Dr. Mendella noted the RSD diagnosis and added that "the patient has had significant pain and discomfort with relatively trivial injuries." He also wrote that RSD "would be a *** contraindication for any type of surgical procedure." ¶ 14 The claimant thereafter treated with Dr. Davenport, who noted that the claimant had pain in her right wrist. Following an October 28, 2008, treatment visit, Dr. Davenport noted conflicting opinions as to whether the claimant suffered from RSD and referred the claimant to Dr. Gregory Dumanian for another opinion. ¶ 15 In his evidence deposition, Dr. Dumanian testified that he saw the claimant on November 19, when she again complained of right elbow and wrist pain. He testified that, "for numerous reasons," he did not believe that the claimant had RSD. He believed instead that she suffered from tendinitis and radial tunnel syndrome. Dr. Dumanian said that, on December 2, he administered cortisone injections to treat both afflictions, directed her to undergo further physical therapy, and restricted her to light-duty work. He recalled that, by January 7, 2009, the claimant was reporting no relief from the cortisone shots, and he believed that she suffered from radial nerve irritation, which is "strongly associated with tennis elbow" and is linked to the wrist area. On that date, and again on May 27, he recommended that the claimant undergo a radial nerve release surgery. ¶ 16 Based on the claimant's job description, medical records, and the fact that her symptoms exacerbated when she worked, Dr. Dumanian opined that the claimant's condition of ill-being was an aggravation causally related to her work. On cross-examination, Dr. Dumanian explained that radial tunnel syndrome was not "testable by nerve studies" or associated with weakness. He also agreed that tennis elbow generally improves with rest, but he added that tennis elbow associated with a radial tunnel problem may not improve with rest. Dr. Dumanian's medical records do not appear in the record of proceedings before the Commission. ¶ 17 On February 5, 2009, the claimant was examined by Dr. Lawrence Li at Master Brand's request. Based on his examination and a review of the claimant's medical records, Dr. Li concluded that the claimant suffered from right lateral epicondylitis and right radial tunnel syndrome. Based on the fact that the claimant's symptoms had not abated despite her stopping work in August 2008, Dr. Li opined that the claimant's condition was not work-related. He further opined that the claimant could fully recover through therapy or a tunnel release surgery, and he insisted that the claimant did not suffer from RSD. During his evidence deposition, Dr. Li clarified that he would expect a "noticeable difference within a week" of rest from work if a person had a repetitive stress injury from work. ¶ 18 In her testimony, the claimant said that she now feels sharp pains up to her right elbow when she does house work or lifts her arm over her head, and that she has decreased right-hand grip strength. ¶ 19 On March 1, 2010, following a hearing, the arbitrator found that the claimant was not entitled to benefits under the Act because she had failed to establish that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment or was causally related to her employment. ¶ 20 The claimant sought review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. On July 19, 2011, the Commission, with one commissioner dissenting, reversed the arbitrator's decision and found that the claimant had established a causal connection between her work and her injury through August 20, 2008. The Commission awarded the claimant TTD benefits for 10 1/7 weeks as well as medical expenses, and it remanded the cause to the arbitrator pursuant to Thomas, 78 Ill. 2d 327. In finding that the claimant established a causal connection between her condition of ill-being and her work, the Commission stated that it found the causation opinions of Drs. Dumanian and Li to be unpersuasive because neither understood the claimant's job duties. Instead, the Commission relied on the claimant's testimony to find a causal connection between the repetitive right-arm work she described and her condition of ill-being. ¶ 21 However, the Commission found that the claimant had failed to establish a causal connection for her condition at any time after August 20, 2008. In so finding, the Commission cited the claimant's complaints of pain after she stopped working as a cabinet finisher; her August 20, 2008, EMG report stating that she suffered similar but less intense symptoms in her left arm as well as her right; medical reports thereafter indicating that she had new complaints of left-wrist and leg pain; and her initial January 21, 2008, EMG finding no abnormalities. The Commission also added that it "would have liked to have seen" additional medical records that the claimant failed to submit, including additional records from Dr. Davenport and Dr. Dumanian. ¶ 22 The claimant filed a petition for review in the circuit court of Coles County to argue that the Commission erred in finding that she established a causal connection only through August 20, 2008. Although the record on appeal contains no transcript of any circuit court proceedings predating the circuit court's order, the parties imply that the court invited their responses to a proposed order that would remand the matter to the Commission to hear further medical evidence regarding the August 20, 2008, EMG. On April 20, 2012, after the parties submitted briefs, the circuit court entered an order confirming the Commission's decision. That order began by stating that the court lacked authority to remand the matter for consideration of further evidence, then went on to state that it was bound by the standard of review to confirm the Commission's decision. On May 16, 2012, the claimant filed a timely notice of appeal of the circuit court's decision. ¶ 23 Before addressing the claimant's arguments on appeal, we must address a jurisdictional issue raised by Master Brand. In her briefs, the claimant argues both that the Commission's limitation on her recovery was erroneous and that the circuit court erred in concluding that it lacked authority to remand the cause to the Commission for consideration of new evidence. However, in her notice of appeal, the claimant asks that "a portion" of the circuit court's order be reversed, and she identifies that portion as the circuit court's "decision that he lacked the to [sic] remand this matter to the [Commission] for the purpose of a new hearing to submit medical evidence on the significance of the negative EMG performed on August 20th, 2008." According to Master Brand, this language limits our jurisdiction to the legal question of the propriety of remand, and confers us no jurisdiction to consider her challenge to the Commission's causation finding. ¶ 24 The filing of a notice of appeal is the jurisdictional step that initiates appellate review. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 176, 950 N.E.2d 1136 (2010). "Unless there is a properly filed notice of appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and is obliged to dismiss the appeal." General Motors Corp., 242 Ill. 2d at 176. Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. June 4, 2008) requires that a notice of appeal "specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court." Courts invoking this rule have explained that it is " 'well established that an appellate court has jurisdiction only of those matters which are raised in the notice of appeal.' " Steinberg v. System Software Associates, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 157, 166, 713 N.E.2d 709 (1999) (quoting Lewanski v. Lewanski, 59 Ill. App. 3d 805, 815, 375 N.E.2d 961 (1978)). ¶ 25 Courts applying these rules will construe notices of appeal liberally. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433, 394 N.E.2d 380 (1979). "Unless the appellee is prejudiced thereby, the absence of strict technical compliance with the form of the notice is not fatal, and where the deficiency in the notice is one of form only, and not of substance, the appellate court is not deprived of jurisdiction." Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 434. However, even so, a notice of appeal must serve its function to " 'fairly and adequately set[] out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.' " General Motors Corp., 242 Ill. 2d at 176 (quoting People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 105, 885 N.E.2d 1053 (2008) (quoting Lang v. Consumers Insurance Service, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 226, 229, 583 N.E.2d 1147 (1991))). Thus, under the above rules, "[w]hen an appeal is taken from a specified judgment, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts of the judgments not specified or fairly inferred from the notice." In re Interest of J.P. and T.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220, 234, 770 N.E.2d 1160 (2002). ¶ 26 Here, we conclude that both of the claimant's arguments on appeal-her challenge to the Commission's causation finding, and her challenge to the circuit court's conclusion that it could not remand the cause to the Commission to hear additional evidence-can be fairly inferred from her notice of appeal. It is quite true that the claimant's notice of appeal states only that she disputes the circuit court's conclusion that it could not remand the cause. That issue, however, is bound inexorably to the claimant's challenge to the Commission's finding, because the circuit court enjoys the authority to remand the case only if it does not confirm the Commission's decision. ¶ 27 Under section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2008)), which governs judicial review of Commission decisions, the circuit court "may confirm or set aside the decision of the Commission." If the circuit court chooses the latter, section 19(f) provides the circuit court two options: "If the decision is set aside and the facts found in the proceedings before the Commission are sufficient, the court may enter such decision as is justified by law, or may remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings and may state the questions requiring further hearing, and give such other instructions as may be proper." 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2008); see Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 289 Ill. 330, 334, 124 N.E.2d 603 (1919). The statute, however, limits those options to cases in which the circuit court chooses to set aside the Commission's decision; it does not state that the court may order a remand where it confirms the Commission's decision. Thus, this court and the supreme court have consistently allowed remand to the Commission where the Commission's decision is set aside or lacking findings necessary for review. Eg., Mid-American Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 47, 411 N.E.2d 254 (1980); University of Illinois v. Industrial Comm'n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 154, 596 N.E.2d 823 (1992). Further, the parties direct us to no case endorsing simultaneous confirmation of a Commission decision and remand for further findings or evidence. Accordingly, the circuit court here had authority to remand the cause for further findings only if it was not otherwise proper to confirm the Commission's decision. Cf. Mid-American Lines, 82 Ill. 2d at 51 (adopting the parties' agreement that "the circuit court's order of remandment *** was proper only if the Commission's original finding *** was against the manifest weight of the evidence"). This second question turns wholly on the viability of the claimant's challenge to the Commission's causation finding, which we now consider. ¶ 28 The claimant's primary argument on appeal is that the Commission erred in finding that she failed to establish a causal relationship between her work for Master Brand and her condition of ill-being after August 20, 2008. A prerequisite to the right to recover benefits under the Act is some causal relationship between the claimant's employment and the injury suffered. Schwartz v. Industrial Comm'n, 379 Ill. 139, 144-45, 39 N.E.2d 980 (1942). The claimant has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, some causal relationship between her employment and her injury. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 63, 541 N.E.2d 665 (1989). Whether a causal relationship exists between a claimant's employment and her injury is a question of fact to be resolved by the Commission. Certi-Serve, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Ill. 2d 236, 244, 461 N.E.2d 954 (1984). The Commission's determination on a question of fact will not be disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987). For a finding of fact to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly apparent. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 228 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 591 N.E.2d 894 (1992). ¶ 29 According to the claimant, the Commission's finding, that she failed to establish a causal connection for any time after August 20, 2008, is inconsistent with both the medical records and with its finding that she proved a causal connection for her condition of ill-being prior to that date. The claimant argues that, if her wrist pain was attributable initially to her work, then its continuation after August 20 should also be attributable to her work. However, in finding to the contrary, the Commission noted that the claimant's condition persisted after she discontinued the work that initially triggered it, as well as the fact that the claimant began to complain of left wrist and leg pain that she never alleged was caused by her work. Her report of that left wrist and leg pain occurred on August 20, the same date on which an EMG study revealed no abnormalities causing her right-wrist pain. As of that date, then, the Commission had medical evidence that the claimant's right-wrist injury had no identifiable etiology, that the wrist condition had not abated following an extended hiatus from the work that was alleged to have caused it, and that the claimant began to report similar problems in her other extremities. From that information, the Commission reasonably could have concluded that, as of that date, the medical evidence demonstrated that the claimant's condition was caused by some circumstance unrelated to her work. Given that evidence, we cannot say that the Commission's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 30 The claimant also argues that the circuit court erred in declining to remand the cause to the Commission for consideration of additional medical evidence regarding the significance of the August 20, 2008, EMG. However, as we explain above, remand is not appropriate where the court has confirmed the Commission's decision. Because we hold that the circuit court correctly confirmed the Commission's decision, we also hold that it correctly declined to remand the cause for consideration of further evidence. ¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which confirmed the Commission's decision, and remand the matter to the Commission pursuant to Thomas, 78 Ill. 2d 327. ¶ 32 Affirmed and remanded.