Summary
applying Civ.R. 60(B) to a judgment sustaining the validity of a will
Summary of this case from In re Estate of HortonOpinion
No. 74-34
Decided December 18, 1974.
Judgments — Relief from judgment — Civ. R. 60(B)(4) — Motion for relief — Denial, abuse of discretion, when — Determination whether to vacate judgment — Will contest — Validity of will sustained — Prospective application of judgment inequitable, when.
1. Although the primary concern in ruling upon a motion for relief filed pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B)(4) should be the effect that the prospective application of a judgment will have upon the movant, a determination of whether further adherence to the judgment would be inequitable also involves the effect of a vacation of the judgment upon other persons and upon the court. (Civ. R. 60 [B][4], construed.)
2. Where subsequent events have rendered it no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a proper motion for relief from that judgment. (Civ. R. 60 [B][4], applied.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County.
On May 19, 1970, appellant Mary Wurzelbacher filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Madison County to contest the will of the decedent, Edward Kroeger. Decedent's heirs-at-law, next-of-kin and beneficiaries under the will were made parties to the action.
During a recess in the subsequent trial, the parties orally agreed to a good faith settlement. No evidence was introduced by either side, and the judge, being aware of the settlement, directed the jury to return a verdict finding the will to be valid. Judgment was entered upon the verdict.
Thereafter, the terms and conditions of the settlement were set down in writing. Distribution of decedent's assets was specified, and it was set forth that the approval of the Probate Court would be required. Subsequently, the executor of the estate of the deceased filed an application for instructions with the Probate Court, requesting a determination of his authority to enter into the agreement. That court directed the executor not to enter into the settlement, stating, in part, that there was no approval by a guardian ad litem acting for the minor beneficiaries of a trust created by the will.
On January 19, 1972, pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B), appellants, all the heirs-at-law and next-of-kin of the decedent, filed a motion for relief from the judgment sustaining the validity of the will. This was denied and appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the judgment upholding the will was no longer equitable. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, stating that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing relief from the judgment.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Bauer, Morelli Heyd and Mr. Charles G. Heyd, for appellants.
Mr. John W. Tanner, Mr. George R. Bridgman, Mr. Maurice E. Beathard, Mr. Elmer R. Grossheim, Mr. David Jackman, Mr. William H. Grubbs and Messrs. Kelley Grossheim Bavely, for appellees.
The question presented herein is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief from the judgment sustaining the validity of the will.
Civ. R. 60(B) provides, in pertinent part:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (4) * * * it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application * * *."
This is the first case in which this court has considered the scope of the pertinent language of Civ. R. 60(B) (4). However, F.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) contains language identical to Civ. R. 60(B)(4), and courts interpreting the federal rule have applied a liberal construction in favor of avoiding the continued enforcement of inequitable judgments. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. (1965), 341 F.2d 351; Michigan Surety Co. v. Service Machinery Corp. (1960), 277 F.2d 531.
In determining when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application," the federal courts have emphasized factors which occur after the rendering of the judgment in question. Thus, in Schildhaus v. Moe (1964), 335 F.2d 529, 530, the court stated that "[T]he rule is not to be read without emphasis on the important words `no longer' * * * it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable." Likewise, the pertinent part of Civ. R. 60(B)(4) should be construed to provide relief from a judgment which has clearly become inequitable due to subsequent events.
An example of a change in conditions occurring after the judgment, which resulted in the allowance of relief under F.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), is found in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright (1961), 364 U.S. 642. The Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to refuse to modify a consent decree prospectively enjoining parties from entering into a union shop agreement, after such agreements became valid by an amendment of the applicable law. See, also, Sierra Club v. Mason (1973), 365 F. Supp. 47; Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Barrett (1954), 213 F.2d 776.
In the case at bar, a judgment validating the will was entered pursuant to an oral agreement between all parties at the trial, entered into by them in good faith. It was mutually understood that if the agreement was not approved by the Probate Court, the parties would seek vacation of that judgment. In reliance upon the settlement, no evidence was offered concerning the validity or invalidity of the will.
The above considerations are central to an inquiry concerning the inequity of the prospective enforcement of this judgment, since they point directly to the inequity as it would work against the movant. However, we deem it prudent to also inquire as to what effect the vacation of this judgment would have upon others who might have relied upon it to their detriment, and upon the orderly and efficient conduct of the business of the trial court. We do so with the recognition that equity has long concerned itself with more than just the immediate result at hand. In implementing this broader view, we find nothing in the instant record to suggest that the vacation of the judgment would work a hardship upon any other person, or create any significant problem with regard to the administration of justice.
The evidence before the trial court established that events occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment in this case rendered it "no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application," as that phrase is employed in Civ. R. 60(B)(4). Hence, the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the motion for relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.