Opinion
Case No. 2017-00453JD
04-11-2019
HARRY WOODBRIDGE Plaintiff v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION Defendant
Magistrate Gary Peterson
DECISION
{¶1} Plaintiff filed this action against defendant Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), alleging violations of plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and negligence. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated, and the case went to trial before the magistrate on the issue of liability. On December 17, 2018, the magistrate filed a decision recommending judgment in favor of defendant. After obtaining an extension of the deadline to file objections to the magistrate's decision, plaintiff timely filed objections on March 14, 2019. Plaintiff's objections are now before the court for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the court overrules plaintiff's objections and adopts the magistrate's decision as its own.
Factual Background
{¶2} Plaintiff filed this action against ODRC after falling in a bathroom at Marion Correctional Institution (MCI). Plaintiff has been an inmate in the custody and control of ODRC since 2010. He has a history of lymph node cancer and underwent a neck bisection at least two years before his incarceration. Plaintiff complains of limited movement in his right shoulder due to the operation. He also complains of varicose veins, and of arthritis in his right knee, right hip, and his knuckles. An ODRC medical reclassification form completed when plaintiff was incarcerated at Ross Correctional Institution (RCI) in 2013 documents plaintiff's history of cancer, neck bisection, osteoarthritis, and hypothyroidism. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)
{¶3} ODRC transferred plaintiff to MCI on October 24, 2016. Upon his arrival at MCI, plaintiff underwent a medical examination. Medical staff placed plaintiff on a bottom bunk restriction and bottom range restriction, and gave plaintiff a cane to assist with walking. They did not give him an "ADA accommodation" restriction. Plaintiff believed he would be assigned to dorm seven but was instead assigned to dorm six. MCI health and safety coordinator Steven Harford testified that dorm seven houses MCI inmates who are disabled or wheelchair-bound, and the dormitory has an "ADA approved" restroom. Plaintiff complained that he needed to be moved to dorm seven, and MCI staff placed him on a waiting list for transfer. Harford testified that dorm seven is a coveted housing assignment, and placement on the waiting list is the procedure for inmates who want to live in dorm seven but do not have a documented ADA restriction.
{¶4} A series of MCI work order requests and the trial testimony of plaintiff and MCI correctional officer Lisa Oswald indicate that the bathroom in dorm six had multiple issues with condensation and leaking plumbing fixtures, which caused water to accumulate on the floor. MCI put a fan outside the bathroom door to keep the floor dry. Both Oswald and MCI inmate Lance Brandyberry testified that inmate porters regularly mopped the bathroom floor, and Oswald testified that orange cones were generally used to warn of wet floors. Oswald did not say whether there were warning cones on the bathroom floor on the date of plaintiff's fall. On cross-examination, Brandyberry agreed that the porters did a "pretty good" job of keeping the floors dry. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22.) Former MCI inmate Nicholas Lacourse testified that one of the urinals in dorm six was "messed up" and "broken" during the time he was incarcerated at MCI. Lacourse did not know which urinal was broken, and did not describe the condition of the urinal in detail. Lacourse did not live in dorm six at the time of plaintiff's fall.
{¶5} On January 4, 2017, plaintiff fell while using the bathroom in dorm six. Plaintiff was trying to flush a urinal when a pipe attached to the urinal jerked, putting plaintiff off balance. Plaintiff attempted to grab the pipe as he fell, but the pipe was not fastened to the wall and came loose. The pipe cut plaintiff's arm as he fell, and plaintiff also suffered injuries from the fall itself.
{¶6} The magistrate found that plaintiff failed to prove either his ADA claim or his negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence. With respect to the ADA claim, the magistrate determined that plaintiff failed to prove he was a "qualified individual with a disability" subject to the ADA. (Magistrate's Decision at 7-8.) Furthermore, the magistrate found that plaintiff presented no evidence he was denied participation in or benefit from a service, program, or activity, or was otherwise discriminated against by reason of disability. (Magistrate's Decision at 8.) With respect to the negligence claim, the magistrate determined plaintiff failed to prove that ODRC breached its duty of care to plaintiff, or that the alleged breach of duty—the accumulation of water on the bathroom floor—was a proximate cause of plaintiff's fall. Plaintiff raises four objections to the magistrate's decision.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) provides, "A party may file written objections to a magistrate's decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i)." "Whether or not objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without modification." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). Objections "shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection." Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). They must be supported "by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if the transcript is not available." Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). The court granted plaintiff leave to support his objections with an affidavit of evidence instead of the transcript. (Entry, February 4, 2019.)
{¶8} The court "shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues, and appropriately applied the law." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In reviewing the objections, the court does not act as an appellate court but rather conducts "a de novo review of the facts and conclusions in the magistrate's decision." Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶¶ 16-17. (Internal citations omitted.)
Plaintiff's First Objection
{¶9} In his first objection, plaintiff asserts the magistrate "erred when he ruled Plaintiff did not prove that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more life activities." The magistrate concluded, "While plaintiff identified several medical issues from which he suffers, he did not prove that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." (Magistrate's Decision at 7.) The court agrees with this conclusion.
{¶10} Proving that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is an essential element of plaintiff's ADA claim. In order to prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is subject to the ADA; and (3) the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendant's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendant by reason of the plaintiff's disability." Wolfe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-346, 2011-Ohio-6825, ¶ 16, citing Franks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 195 Ohio App.3d 114, 2011-Ohio-2048, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). There is no dispute that ODRC is subject to the ADA under Title II, which applies to state governmental entities. 42 U.S.C. 12132.
The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.Franks at ¶ 19. (Internal citations omitted.) The term "disability" means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. 12102(1)(A). Major life activities "include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). "The determination of whether a particular plaintiff's impairment substantially limits a major life activity is an individualized inquiry." Camp v. Star Leasing Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-977, 2012-Ohio-3650, ¶ 55. The inquiry focuses on the following factors: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact, of or resulting from the impairment. Id.
In his objections, plaintiff argues that Congress amended the ADA in 2009 to broaden the meaning of the term "disability." (Plaintiff's Objections at 7). This is not entirely accurate. Rather, Congress mandated that the term disability be construed "in favor of broad coverage." 42 U.S.C. 1202(4)(A). In 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) amended its regulations concerning the application of the ADA to reflect this Congressional mandate. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2; 76 Fed.Reg. 16978. However, the court notes that neither the Congressional amendments nor the EEOC amendments fundamentally altered the three-factor individualized inquiry Ohio courts use in analyzing ADA claims. See Camp at ¶ 55 (restating the individualized inquiry while acknowledging the change in federal regulations).
{¶11} In his objection to the magistrate's determination, plaintiff does not specifically pinpoint which of his major life activities were substantially limited by a physical or mental impairment at the time his claim arose. Rather, plaintiff throughout his objection lists several impairments and corresponding effects. At one point, plaintiff states, "[Plaintiff] could not raise his arms above his shoulder. He had arthritis in his right knee. He had problems with polyps in his colon, and he was 73 years old." (Plaintiff's Objections at 5.) Elsewhere, plaintiff notes, "[Plaintiff] had a cane. He had a bottom bunk restriction. He had difficulty getting to chow to get medication and difficulty going to commissary." (Plaintiff's Objections at 5.) Plaintiff further claims that ODRC documented plaintiff's disabilities as:
Plaintiff was 71 years old, not 73, at the time of the events giving rise to this claim. (Plaintiff's Affidavit of Evidence at ¶¶ 1, 6). Furthermore, age is not a "disability" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1202.
68 year old with a history lymph node cancer s/p neck dissection, HLD, hypothyroid, and osteoarthritis of the hip, has difficulty ambulating to chow, states feels weak and tired, pt tearful, says he "can't make it here." Pt also has difficulty eating fast enough in chow hall to finish his meals. Has lost about 10 lbs in three months. Pt also complaining of dizziness and "passing out" but no witnessed episodes or ER visits. Work-up so far is negative. Pt. reports being harassed by younger inmates also.(Plaintiff's Objections at 5-6; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff further notes "difficulty walking and with half of his neck, cannot defend himself" and states that his disabilities include an arthritic knee, arthritic hip, partial resection of the neck, and "cardiac risk factors." (Plaintiff's Objections at 6.) Finally, plaintiff summarizes his ailments as "severe problems walking, eating, defending himself, using a top bunk, and lifting because of his shoulder" with "a colonoscopy that was positive, showing material like boils." (Plaintiff's Objections at 6.)
{¶12} To the extent plaintiff merely identifies medical issues or impairments, he does not identify a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. "Not every physical or mental impairment constitutes a 'disability' within the meaning of the ADA, even though the person may have an impairment that involves one or more of his major life activities." Sheridan v. Jackson Twp. Div. of Fire, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-771, 2009-Ohio-1267, ¶ 6. See also MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 337 (6th Cir.2003) ("[I]t is not enough that someone presents evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment."). Thus, to the extent plaintiff lists medical conditions such as arthritis, a history of cancer, hypothyroidism, and colon polyps, the court cannot consider plaintiff's conditions "disabilities" under the ADA. However, to the extent that plaintiff claims his impairments made it difficult to perform such activities as defending himself, raising his right arm, using a top bunk, lifting, eating, and walking, the court must consider whether plaintiff has proven that any of these difficulties constitute impairment of a major life activity and therefore qualify as a disability.
{¶13} Some of the activities with which plaintiff claims he had difficulty are not "major life activities" as defined by the ADA. While sleeping is a major life activity, using a top bunk is not. Furthermore, defending oneself and raising one's arm do not fit within the definition of major life activity. Those activities may be related to the performance of manual tasks, which is a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. 1202(2)(A). Yet plaintiff failed to prove he was substantially impaired in performing manual tasks. Other than generally asserting difficulty in lifting his right arm, plaintiff did not produce any evidence regarding the performance of manual tasks. Similarly, plaintiff presented no additional evidence regarding his ability to lift items. Therefore, plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his impairments substantially limited the major life activities of performing manual tasks or lifting.
{¶14} The only evidence in the record concerning plaintiff's ability to eat is plaintiff's testimony that he had difficulty walking to "chow" and a 2013 medical report documenting plaintiff's complaint that he did not have enough time to eat and lost ten pounds in three months. (Plaintiff's Affidavit of Evidence at ¶ 4; Exhibit 1). These complaints actually concern plaintiff's ability to walk, not his ability to eat or digest food. Moreover, plaintiff's complaint about having insufficient time to eat was made more than three years prior to the events giving rise to plaintiff's claim, when plaintiff was at a different correctional institution. Plaintiff presented no evidence that he continued to have difficulty eating quickly or continued to experience weight loss. Consequently, plaintiff did not prove that he was substantially limited in his ability to eat.
{¶15} Finally, plaintiff has not shown that his difficulty walking was so severe as to qualify as a disability under the ADA at the time of his fall. There is no doubt that plaintiff had an impairment that affected his ability to walk normally. Plaintiff's medical history indicates a sustained difficulty walking long distances without tiring. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) After examining plaintiff upon his arrival at MCI, medical staff gave plaintiff a bottom bunk restriction, bottom level restriction, and a cane restriction, reflecting some difficulty with mobility. However, the medical staff did not give plaintiff an "ADA restriction" that would have resulted in plaintiff's assignment to dorm seven.
In the affidavit supporting his objections, plaintiff states, "Exhibits 16, 17, and 20 indicated [plaintiff] was to be considered an ADA inmate." (Plaintiff's Affidavit of Evidence at ¶ 23.) This is not accurate. Exhibit 16 is an email from MCI corrections specialist Teresa Edjola stating that plaintiff "needs an ADA bathroom accommodation in 7-dorm." However, Exhibit 17 is a copy of emails from Harford and MCI chief of unit management Michael Dunkle responding to Edjola by indicating that plaintiff did not have an ADA restriction on record and would need such restriction approved by medical staff. Exhibit 20 is a transfer list that does not address plaintiff's ADA status.
{¶16} Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff was able to move from place to place. The court notes that an inmate housed with plaintiff in dorm six perceived plaintiff's physical condition as "[f]ine, normal" and testified that he moved "about as an old man could move." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 at p. 6, 8.) Mere difficulty walking, or standing is not sufficient to establish a disability under the ADA. See Satterly v. Borden Chem., Inc. 24 Fed.Appx. 471, 472 (6th Cir.2001) (difficulty walking or walking at a slower pace does not establish a substantial limitation of the ability to walk). Nor does use of a cane conclusively establish a substantial limitation of the ability to walk. Curtis v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., 448 Fed.Appx. 578, 581-82 (6th Cir.2011) (plaintiff who used a cane and sometimes leaned on walls to maintain his balance was not substantially limited in his ability to walk). While the evidence in the record establishes plaintiff had difficulty walking, the court finds this difficulty did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation. The magistrate correctly determined plaintiff failed to prove that he had a physical impairment that substantially limited more than one major life activity. Consequently, plaintiff's first objection is not well taken.
{¶17} The court further finds that plaintiff's ADA claim would fail even if plaintiff's first objection were sustained. In addition to proving that he is a qualified individual with a disability, plaintiff had to show that he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a service, program, or activity or that ODRC otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability. Franks, supra at ¶ 17. The magistrate found that plaintiff failed to make such a showing. (Magistrate's Decision at 8.) Plaintiff did not specifically object to this finding, and the court agrees with the magistrate's conclusion.
{¶18} Title II of the ADA provides, "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. The term "services, programs, or activities" is broadly construed to capture "virtually everything that a public entity does." Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir.2016). (Internal quotation omitted.) Courts generally recognize two methods for proving discrimination under Title II: intentional discrimination and failure to make a reasonable accommodation. McPherson v. MHSAA, 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1997). Plaintiff does not allege ODRC discriminated against him. Rather, plaintiff alleges ODRC failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation by failing to assign him to dorm seven.
{¶19} The evidence does not support plaintiff's contention that ODRC was required to assign him to dorm seven. In determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, it is a "basic requirement that the need of a disabled person be evaluated on an individual basis." PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001). In the context of a correctional institution, a change in housing conditions may be an appropriate ADA accommodation. See Franks, supra at ¶ 20-21 (moving a disabled inmate to a first-floor cell may have been required by the ADA). However, even if the court accepted that plaintiff's difficulty in walking rose to the level of a disability—which it does not—the evidence in this case does not show that plaintiff's needs required transfer to dorm seven.
{¶20} The record is replete with evidence that ODRC made accommodations for plaintiff's individual mobility issues. ODRC transferred plaintiff to a different correctional institution when he had difficulty navigating the large campus at RCI. When plaintiff ultimately transferred to MCI in October 2016, he was placed on a bottom bunk restriction and bottom level restriction, with which MCI staff complied. He was also given a cane. Plaintiff presented no evidence that his condition required the further accommodation of placement in dorm seven. While plaintiff states that dorm seven had grab bars and an "ADA bathroom," he does not show why his condition necessitated such amenities. In fact, plaintiff explicitly states, "there were ways to accommodate [plaintiff] until a bed became available in 7-dorm." (Plaintiff's Objections at 4.) This undermines plaintiff's argument that the ADA required ODRC to move him to dorm seven. Ultimately, plaintiff failed to prove that ODRC denied him participation in or benefit of a service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability.
{¶21} Upon review of the evidence and the magistrate's decision, plaintiff's first objection is OVERRULED. The court finds that plaintiff failed to prove his claim under the ADA.
Plaintiff's Second and Third Objections
{¶22} In his second objection, plaintiff claims, "The Magistrate erred when he ruled plaintiff failed to prove Defendant was negligent." (Plaintiff's Objections at 1.) In his third objection, plaintiff alleges, "The Magistrate erred by failing to find the Defendant was negligent in not placing Plaintiff in a dormitory without the constant water problems in 6-dorm bathroom." (Plaintiff's Objections at 1.) The court addresses these objections jointly, as both ultimately concern the magistrate's finding that, "In short, plaintiff failed to prove his claim for negligence." (Magistrate's Decision at 9.) Again, the court agrees with the magistrate's conclusion.
{¶23} In order to recover on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) defendant breached that duty; and (3) defendant's breach proximately caused plaintiff's injury. Ford v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-357, 2006-Ohio-2531, ¶ 10, citing Chambers v. St. Mary's School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565 (1998). There is no question that ODRC owed a duty to plaintiff. "Ohio law imposes a duty of reasonable care upon the state to provide for its prisoners' health, care, or well-being." Ensman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-592, 2006-Ohio-6788, ¶ 5. However, the relationship between a correctional institution and an inmate "does not expand or heighten the duty of ordinary reasonable care." Franks, supra at ¶ 12, quoting Woods v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 130 Ohio App.3d 742, 745 (10th Dist.1998).
{¶24} The extent of the state's duty of care to an inmate may vary depending on the circumstances. If the state knows or should know that an inmate has physical limitations or medical conditions, those limitations or conditions are considered when determining the extent of the state's duty. See Bugh v. Grafton Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-454, 2006-Ohio-6641 (considering the state's duty of care to plaintiff in light of plaintiff's documented need for medically prescribed footwear). See also Franks, supra at ¶ 16 (considering state's duty of care to plaintiff in light of plaintiff's "obviously apparent" physical limitations and "well-documented" medical conditions). Additionally, the extent of the state's duty may be altered if the state knows of a dangerous condition. "Although the state is not an insurer of the safety of inmates, once it becomes aware of a dangerous condition it must take reasonable care to prevent injury to the inmate." Briscoe v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1109, 2003-Ohio-3533, ¶ 20.
{¶25} In this case, ODRC was aware that plaintiff had medical conditions that affected his mobility. Additionally, ODRC was aware that the bathroom in dorm six had recurring issues with water accumulating on the floor, a potentially dangerous condition. Between November 2016 and January 2017, Corrections Officer Oswald sent multiple work orders to MCI maintenance staff, requesting repairs of leaking fixtures, showers and sinks that would not turn off, and condensation. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 9-15). Although most of the work orders were completed prior to the date of plaintiff's fall, at least one was not completed until the day after. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14). However, the evidence in the record does not support a finding that ODRC was aware of a defect in the pipe connected to the urinal plaintiff was using when he fell. Oswald did place two work orders concerning a urinal pipe in the dorm six bathroom, one order on November 29, 2016 and one on December 20, 2016. However, those work orders indicate that maintenance staff performed the requested repair on December 21, 2016, two weeks before plaintiff's fall. There is no evidence that ODRC had notice of any additional or subsequent damage to the pipe. Therefore, the duty ODRC owed to plaintiff was that of reasonable care in light of plaintiff's mobility issues and the known issues with water accumulation in the dorm six bathroom.
All of the work orders have handwritten dates approximately halfway down the page on the righthand side. MCI building construction superintendent Keith Bietzel testified that these represent the dates the requested work was completed. --------
{¶26} Plaintiff did not show that ODRC breached this duty of reasonable care. To the contrary, the evidence in the record demonstrates that staff at MCI took proactive steps to address the conditions in the dorm six bathroom. They placed a fan in the doorway to keep the floors dry. Inmate porters mopped the floors on an hourly basis. See Briscoe at ¶ 24 (ODRC was not negligent, in part because inmate porters cleaned showers every other day). Cones were used to warn inmates when the floors were wet. MCI maintenance staff performed several repairs of leaking or spraying fixtures weeks prior to plaintiff's fall. This evidence does not suggest negligence by ODRC with respect to the water in the dorm six bathroom.
{¶27} To the extent that plaintiff's third objection suggests that ODRC was negligent in not moving plaintiff from dorm six to a dorm "without constant water problems" in the bathroom, the court finds insufficient evidence to support this claim. In his written requests for transfer to dorm seven, plaintiff expressed his desire for an "ADA bathroom" with "handy cap [sic] toilets and showers" but never mentioned any difficulty with water on the floor or with using the urinals in the dorm six bathroom. In fact, plaintiff regularly used the dorm six bathroom for more than two months without incident. Under the circumstances, ODRC's duty of care did not require transferring plaintiff to another dorm.
{¶28} In addition to failing to prove ODRC breached its duty of reasonable care, plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff's fall. The evidence does not establish that plaintiff's fall was caused by water on the floor. In fact, plaintiff did not credibly establish that there was water on the floor when he fell. Instead, the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall appears to be the loose pipe connected to the urinal. Plaintiff testified that the pipe "jerked" causing him to lose his balance. When plaintiff grabbed the pipe to try and regain his balance, the pipe gave way and plaintiff fell. This is consistent with the incident report documenting plaintiff's fall, which states, "[Plaintiff] fell grabbing the small pipe on the front of the urinal breaking it and pulling it and the hanger off the wall." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.) The report mentions the need for bloodspill cleanup but does not mention any water on the floor. As noted above, ODRC breached no duty of care with respect to the pipe because it did not have notice of the pipe's condition on the date of plaintiff's fall. Additionally, the court does not find it reasonably foreseeable that a loose urinal pipe would cause plaintiff to fall. "[I]n order to establish proximate cause, foreseeability must be found." Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 321 (1989). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause.
{¶29} Upon review of the evidence and the magistrate's decision, plaintiff's second and third objections are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff's Fourth Objection
{¶30} In his fourth and final objection, plaintiff alleges, "The Magistrate's decision is contrary to law and against the weight of the evidence." (Plaintiff's Objections at 1.) In the appellate context, challenges to the manifest weight of the evidence require the challenging party "to demonstrate that the evidence could lead to only one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to judgment." Galay v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-4113, 2006-Ohio-4113, ¶ 14. (Internal citation omitted.) "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." Skorvanek v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-222, 2018-Ohio-3870, ¶ 89. (Internal citation omitted.) As the court has previously noted, the court does not conduct an appellate review, but must instead conduct an independent, de novo review to determine whether the magistrate properly applied the law and determined the facts. Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2016-00883JD, 2019-Ohio-506, ¶ 16.
{¶31} Upon an independent, de novo review of the record and the magistrate's decision, the court finds that the magistrate properly applied the law and determined the facts. As discussed at length above, plaintiff failed to prove two essential elements of his ADA claim. Plaintiff did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a qualified individual with a disability. Nor did plaintiff show that ODRC denied him the benefit of a service, program, or activity by reason of disability or that he was otherwise discriminated against because he is disabled. While plaintiff had some difficulty walking, those difficulties did not rise to the level of a disability under the ADA. Furthermore, ODRC made several accommodations for plaintiff's mobility issues, and was not required to house him in dorm seven. Plaintiff also failed to prove two essential elements of his negligence claim. Plaintiff neither established that ODRC breached its duty of reasonable care nor proved that any breach proximately caused his injuries. Accordingly, plaintiff's fourth objection is OVERRULED.
Conclusion
{¶32} The court finds that the magistrate properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law in this case. Therefore, plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. The court shall adopt the magistrate's decision and recommendation as its own, including all findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant.
/s/_________
PATRICK M. MCGRATH
Judge
JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶33} Upon review of the record, the magistrate's decision, and the objections, the court finds that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Therefore, the objections are OVERRULED and the court adopts the magistrate's decision and recommendation as its own, including findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
/s/_________
PATRICK M. MCGRATH
Judge Filed April 11, 2019
Sent to S.C. Reporter 5/28/19