Opinion
Civil Action No: 01-3167, Section: "J" (5)
August 12, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are four motions for summary judgment:
(1) plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 40);
(2) Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 29);
(3) Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 35); and
(4) Citicorp's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 36).
The motions were taken under advisement by Judge Berrigan following oral argument on June 19, 2002. Subsequently, this matter was re-allotted to this Court. Having considered the various memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court hereby concludes, for the reasons that follow, that Plaintiff's motion should be DENIED; Hartford's motion GRANTED; Federal's motion GRANTED, and Citicorp's motion GRANTED.
The Court has listened to the audio tape of the June 19, 2002, oral argument on these motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Gregory, Michael, and Victoria Wood, are the children of the deceased Electa Wood. Electa Wood, a Louisiana resident, was killed on September 4, 1999, in an automobile accident that occurred in Florida. Ms. Wood was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an acquaintance, John Dowling, who had volunteered to pick Ms. Wood and another friend up from the Jacksonville airport and then take them back to the airport a week later, for Ms. Wood's return flight to New Orleans. According to Plaintiffs, the accident resulted when a tow truck hit an 18-wheeler and forced the 18-wheeler to collide with the vehicle in which Ms. Wood was riding.Plaintiffs allege that their mother had charged her plane ticket to her AT T Platinum Universal MasterCard and that the credit card provides travel accident insurance benefits pursuant to two policies, one issued by Federal Insurance Company ("Federal") on January 1, 1994, and another issued by Hartford Life Insurance Company ("Hartford") on January 1, 1999. Federal's policy was issued to Citizens Saving/Citizens Trust Company, Trustee for the G.A.R.D. Trust for the account of AT T Universal Card Services Corporation in Jacksonville, Florida. Hartford's policy was issued to the Trustees of the Hartford Financial Institution Trust, of which Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. was a participating financial institution. Both policies provided accidental death benefits under certain circumstances to AT T Universal Platinum MasterCard holders.
Plaintiffs originally named AT T as a Defendant; however, on June 4, 2002, Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. ("Citicorp"), AT T's successor in interest, was substituted for AT T as the proper party defendant.
Plaintiffs allege that both policies were in effect at the time of their mother's death and that the accident was covered by both policies' provisions. All three defendants dispute that the accident was of the type covered under the policies, and Federal additionally argues that, regardless of whether the accident would otherwise have been covered, its policy had been cancelled prior to the date of the accident.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c)). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992). Once the movant meets that burden, the non-moving party must produce evidence sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Id. However, the mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, a factual controversy exists when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. On summary judgment, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
II. Conflict of Law
A preliminary issue in this case is which state's law should be applied to interpret the policies at issue. Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the conflict of law provisions of the forum state. Louisiana's conflict of law provisions are set forth in Civil Code arts. 3515 and 3537.
Article 3515 provides the general rule that Louisiana courts are to apply the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law was not applied and instructs courts to consider "(1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state." Article 3537 provides the more specific rule with respect to conventional obligations:
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states in the light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and (3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.
Even more specifically, in cases involving the interpretation of insurance policies, courts have generally found that Louisiana's choice of law principles support the application of the law of the state in which the insurance policy was issued. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 1999). This is because states have a substantial interest in regulating their insurance industries and in the uniform application of their laws governing insurance policies. Id. at 361.
A. Federal's Policy
Federal is an Indiana corporation and is a member of Chubb Group Insurance Companies, located in New Jersey. CitiBank obtained the insurance policy in dispute on behalf of Universal Card Services Corp., whose principal place of business is in Florida. According to Federal, the policy was delivered to Universal in Florida. The accident occurred in Florida and a Florida-licensed driver, John Dowling, was driving the vehicle in which Ms. Wood was a passenger. As noted above, Ms. Wood was a Louisiana resident.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact.
Considering these facts, the Court agrees with Federal that Florida law should apply to issues related to the interpretation of Federal's insurance policy. While Louisiana has some interest in that the deceased was a Louisiana resident, Florida has greater contacts with the parties and the accident and a greater interest in regulating insurance policies delivered within its borders.
The Court likewise agrees with Federal that, even if it determined that Louisiana law would govern, Louisiana and Florida's general rules regarding interpretation of insurance policies vary little and the application of Louisiana law would not change the outcome of the dispute.
B. Hartford's Policy
Hartford is a Connecticut corporation. Hartford asserts that it issued and delivered the insurance policy in dispute in Washington D.C. to the Trustees of the Hartford Financial Institution Trust. As detailed above, Universal is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, and Electa Wood was a Louisiana resident. Again, the accident occurred in Florida.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact and provide little conflict of law analysis in their memoranda to the Court.
Given that the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Washington, D.C., the Court concludes that D.C. law should apply to interpretation of the policy. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not opposed Hartford's argument that D.C. law should apply.
Again, the Court notes that, regardless of which state's law applies, the outcome would be the same as the law on interpretation of contracts is very similar in D.C., Florida, and Louisiana.
III. Federal's Notion for Summary Judgment
Federal has moved for summary judgment, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that its policy did not provide coverage for Ms. Wood's accident. According to Federal, the policy had been cancelled as of the date of the accident. Moreover, Federal asserts that, even if the policy had been in effect on September 4, 1999, the accident was not the type of hazard covered by the policy's terms.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the accident was covered by the terms of the policy and that Federal's policy was not properly cancelled. Plaintiffs assert that there is insufficient evidence demonstrating that either the individual who allegedly cancelled the policy or the individual who accepted such cancellation had the authority to do so. Plaintiffs further assert that the procedure for cancellation provided in the policy was not followed. Alternatively, if the Court finds that the policy was cancelled, Plaintiffs argue that, because Federal failed to give notice of cancellation to Ms. Wood individually, the policy remained in effect as to her.
1. Was the Policy in Fact Terminated?
Federal's policy (Policy 6360-93-36) was issued on January 1, 1994, to the policyholder Citizens Savings/Citizens Trust Company, Trustee for the G.A.R.D. Trust, for the account of AT T Universal Card Services Corp. Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. D. The policyholder name was amended on October 1, 1998, to reflect the name of the policyholder, Citizens Bank of Rhode Island. The policy provided AT T Universal Platinum cardholders with common carrier travel accident insurance. The policy provided the following procedure for cancellation by the policyholder:
Federal's exhibit D is the affidavit of Yolanda Yepez, a 36- year-long employee of Chubb Son, a division of Federal, whose statements are based on her personal experience and the tiles and records of Federal. Plaintiffs objected to the use of this affidavit and any others by witnesses who were not identified to Plaintiffs during initial discovery and moved the Court to strike those affidavits. In a separate minute entry, issued on this same date, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to strike.
After this policy has been in force for at least 1 year, the policyholder may cancel at any time. To cancel the policy, the policyholder must give written notice to the Company or to any agent of the Company. The Company will cancel the policy on receipt of notice or at a specified later date. . . .
Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. D, exh. c, at p. 9.
CitiBank, whom Federal asserts actually purchased the policy, cancelled the policy by written notice from a Mr. Geoffrey Steel, sent on December 28, 1998. Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. F. Federal asserts that CitiBank, through Steel had the authority to cancel the policy. In support of that assertion, Federal has submitted the affidavit of Ann Dimond, a current Assistant Vice President of CitiBank, who states that various Citi entities undertook to service different functions for the AT T Universal Card program, and that in December 1998, Steel, as the manager for CitiBank's Base Benefits programs, had authority to send the notice of cancellation. Rec. Doc. 50, Exh. E.
The notice was sent to Judith Zankowski, Vice President of Thompson Company, an authorized agent of Federal. Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. F. Ms. Zankowski accepted the notice of cancellation, and the policy was cancelled as of January 1, 1999, as directed by CitiBank. Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. D.
An Agency Agreement entered into by Federal and Thompson specifically provided that Thompson could cancel any policies issued through it, as was the policy in dispute in this case. Rec. Doc. 35, Exhs. D and F.
Additionally, Federal has submitted a second affidavit by Yolanda Yepez, in which she states that Federal's records demonstrate that premium payments were made on the policy through December 1998, and that, thereafter, no premium payments were made by any entity. Rec. Doc. 50, Exh. C. Because the policy term was one year and was to begin on the first day of each year and to end on the last day of the same year, when no premium was paid after January 1, 1999, the policy automatically terminated under its own terms. Id.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is insufficient evidence that Geoffrey Steel had authority to make any request for cancellation on behalf of the original named policyholder, which was "Citizens Savings/Citizens Trust Company, Trust Company Trustee for the G.A.R.D. Trust for the Account of AT T Universal Card Services Corporation," or the amended named policyholder, "Citizens Bank of Rhode Island." Plaintiffs further assert that there is inadequate evidence establishing what relationship existed among these various entities, including AT T, Citicorp, CitiBank, and Citizens Bank of Rhode Island. Plaintiffs additionally note that they have been unable to locate Mr. Steel. Plaintiffs argue that there is no evidence that the named policyholder ever requested cancellation of the policy.
Regarding Thompson's acceptance of the notice of cancellation from Mr. Steel, Plaintiffs assert that there is also insufficient evidence demonstrating whether Thompson had authority to accept a notice of cancellation under the circumstances alleged in this case. Plaintiffs additionally argue that there is no evidence as to what action Thompson took relative to cancellation of the policy and whether it complied with the agency agreement's provision that, upon cancellation of a policy, Thompson comply with applicable notification requirements. Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. F. Ultimately, Plaintiffs argue that Federal has not sustained its burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether its policy was actually cancelled on January 1, 1999.
Upon reviewing the evidence submitted by Federal on this issue, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs as to some points. First, it is not entirely clear how the different entities involved were related to one another. Second, the Court notes that there is some discrepancy concerning what position Geoffrey Steel held. While Federal initially alleged he was a former Assistant Vice President of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., and he apparently signed the notice of cancellation to that effect, Federal has also submitted an affidavit from Ms. Dimond, stating that he was the manager of CitiBank's Base Benefits program at the time he requested Federal's policy be cancelled. Rec. Doc. 50, Exh. E. Finally, there is a lack of documentation from Federal specifically demonstrating Thompson's cancellation of the policy.
However, on the other hand, Federal has submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating that, regardless of how it came about and who was involved, the policy was, in fact, terminated as of January 1, 1999. Federal has submitted a copy of the letter requesting cancellation and the affidavit of Yolanda Yepez, who states that Federal's records "affirm that Policy 6360-93-36 was in fact cancelled as directed on January 1, 1999," and that the policy "was not in effect on or about September 4, 1999." Rec. Doc. 35, Exh. D. She further states that no premiums were paid by an entity on the subject policy after December 1998. Rec. Doc. 50, Exhs. C and D. The policy provides that coverage ends automatically "on the expiration of the policy term for which premium has been paid." Rec. Doc. 50, Exh. B.
Plaintiffs submit no evidence to rebut the fact that the policy was terminated, but simply argue that the evidence presented by Federal is defective or insufficient to establish the fact. Even accepting Plaintiffs' arguments as having some merit, the Court finds most persuasive the fact that there is absolutely no evidence suggesting that any of the named policyholders or other entities involved in the purchase, management, issuance, or cancellation of the policy dispute that the policy was, in fact, cancelled. Quite to the contrary, the two principal parties with an interest in the policy, Citicorp, AT T's successor in interest, on whose behalf the policy was originally purchased, and Federal, the insurer, both assert that the policy was terminated as of January 1, 1999, and apparently have never disputed that fact. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Federal's policy, No. 6360-93-36, was, in fact, not in effect on the date of the accident involving Ms. Wood.
2. Was Federal Required to Send Notice of the Cancellation to Electa Wood?
Federal additionally moves for summary judgment that the lack of notice of cancellation to Ms. Wood does not defeat Federal's defense that the policy had been terminated on the date of her death. Plaintiffs argue that Louisiana law should apply to this question and that, under Louisiana law, the fact that Federal did not give notice to Electa Wood of the policy's cancellation results in the policy remaining in full force and effect as to her.
The Court has already determined that Florida law should apply to questions of policy interpretation, which encompasses issues regarding cancellation of the policy. However, the Court first turns to the notice requirements as provided by AT T to its card holder in the Guide to Coverage and Cardmember Services (Rec. Doc. 36, Exh. 1). The Guide provided by AT T to Electa Wood in conjunction with the Federal policy provides:
We can cancel or non-renew the insurance coverages for all AT T Universal Platinum MasterCard Members, and, if we do, we will notify you at least 60 days in advance. . . . Such notices need not be given if substantially similar replacement coverage takes effect without interruption.
Under the Guide, it is clear that AT T, not Federal, is to provide notice to its cardmembers of cancellation of the policy. However, notice is only required if there is a lapse in coverage, not when substantially similar replacement coverage is provided. In this case, Hartford issued a substantially similar policy, providing nearly identical travel accident coverage for AT T Universal Platinum MasterCard members, which went into effect on January 1, 1999, the date Federal's policy was terminated.
While Plaintiffs argue that the policies are "entirely different and are written on a different basis for different insureds," the Court finds those arguments unpersuasive and tenuous. Both policies provided automatic common carrier travel accident insurance, free of charge, for AT T Universal Platinum MasterCard members who charged their airline ticket to their credit card. A comparison of the policies' provisions reveals that there is little difference in the terms of the coverage provided. Clearly, the fact that one policy was cancelled effective January 1, 1999, and another similar policy went into effect on that same date evidences the intent that the one policy replace the other. Finally, in the Guide to coverage provided by AT T, relative to the Hartford policy, it clearly states that "[e]ffective January 1, 1999, this Guide replaces all prior Guides, program descriptions, advertising and/or brochures by any party." Rec. Doc. 57, Exh. 5, at 15. It is obvious to the Court that the Hartford policy was intended to replace the Federal policy, and, therefore, under the Guide issued in conjunction with Federal's policy, neither Federal nor AT T had an obligation to send notice to the credit card members.
Furthermore, turning to Florida law on cancellation of insurance policies, the Court concludes that Federal was not bound to send individual notice of the cancellation to Ms. Wood. No party has pointed out, nor has the Court found, a Florida statute or case specifically addressing the situation herein, where the policyholder of a group policy, not the insurer, cancels the policy. The statutes noted by Plaintiffs are concerned with proper notice when the insurer decides to cancel the policy, not the policyholder. Moreover, as Plaintiffs concede, Florida courts have explained that the purpose of notice requirements when an insurer cancels a policy is to enable the insured to obtain insurance elsewhere before being subjected to risk without protection. See Frazier v. Standard Guaranty Ins., 382, So.2d 392, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In this case, as discussed above, a replacement policy went into effect on the date Federal's policy was terminated, so that the insured cardmembers were never without protection.
For all the reasons given herein, the Court finds that Federal had no duty to send notice to Electa Wood regarding the cancellation of its policy. Even if it did have some duty under Florida law, the Court concludes that its failure to send such notice in this case would not result in the policy still being in effect as to Ms. Wood, given that Ms. Wood was never subjected to any risk without similar coverage in place, so that Florida's public policy concerns regarding notice were met herein. In light of the Court's conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists that Federal's policy was terminated on January 1, 1999, the Court hereby GRANTS Federal's motion for summary judgment and dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against Federal with prejudice.
As noted, Plaintiffs argue that Louisiana law should apply to the issues of cancellation and notice. The Court points out that it does not appear that the application of Louisiana law would change its analysis, as under La. Rev. Stat. § 22:215(A)(d), a policyholder and insurer who have contracted for a group accident insurance policy "may agree to modify, amend, or cancel the group policy, and such agreement shall be binding upon the employee or member insured under the group policy, provided that the modification, amendment, or cancellation shall be without prejudice to any claim for benefits accrued . . . prior to such modification, amendment, or cancellation." Regarding notice of cancellation, the statute only provides that cancellation must comply with La. Rev. Stat. § 22:636(F), which is concerned with an insurer giving notice to the policyholder when the insurer cancels that policy. As with Florida law, the Court did not locate a Louisiana statute or case dealing specifically with the situation herein.
IV. Hartford and Plaintiffs' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Hartford and Plaintiffs have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether Hartford's policy provided coverage for the accident in which Ms. Wood died. The parties do not dispute that Hartford's policy, No. ADD-9600, was in effect on September 4, 1999, the date of the accident. Nor do the parties dispute that Electa Wood was a covered person under the policy. However, the parties do dispute that the accident was of the type covered by the policy.
Accidental death benefits are payable under Hartford's policy "[ilf the Covered Person sustains Injury while on a Covered Trip and such Injury results in [loss of life] within 365 days after the date of the accident. . . ." Rec. Doc. 29, Exh. 5, at p. 17. The policy defines "Covered Trip" as a trip:
a) while the Covered Person is riding On a Common Carrier as a passenger and not as a pilot, operator or crewmember; and;
b) where the entire fare is charged to the Insured Person's Credit Card Account; that begins and ends at the places designated on the ticket purchased for the trip.Id. at p. 12. "Covered Trip" also includes "travel On a Common Carrier, hotel or airport shuttle, directly to, from or at any Common Carrier terminal, which immediately:
a) precedes departure to; or
b) follows arrival at;
the destination designated on the ticket purchased for the Covered Trip."Id. Under the policy, "Common Carrier" is defined in relevant part as:
[A}ny Scheduled Aircraft, land or water conveyance licensed for the transportation of passengers for hire. Common Carrier will not mean any such conveyance which is hired or used for a sport, gamesmanship, contest, sightseeing, observatory and/or recreational activity, regardless of whether such conveyance is licensed.
As detailed previously, Electa Wood was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an acquaintance John Dowling on her way to the Jacksonville, Florida airport to catch a return flight to New Orleans when the accident occurred. The primary question in dispute is whether the vehicle driven by Dowling was a "common carrier" or an "airport or hotel shuttle" under the policy.
In cases involving contract interpretation, summary judgment is appropriate if the contract in question is unambiguous and can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation. D.E.W., Inc. v. Local 93, Laborers' Int'l Union, 957 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1992). Where a contract "admits of only one reasonable interpretation," it is unambiguous. United Mine Workers of America v. Pittston, 984 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
The Court previously discussed that D.C. law governs the issues of contract construction with respect to Hartford's policy.
However, where a contract permits of two reasonable constructions, the contract is deemed ambiguous and summary judgment is inappropriate because the proper interpretation becomes a question of fact. D.E.W., Inc., 957 F.2d at 199. In interpreting an ambiguous contract, a court may consider affidavits and other extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties. Pittston, 984 F.2d at 473. Finally, it is a well-established principle of contract interpretation that ambiguous provisions of an agreement be construed against the drafter. Affordable Elegance Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan, L.P., 774 A.2d 320, 327 (D.C.Ct.App. 2001).
A. Common Carrier
First, Plaintiffs argue that the vehicle driven by Dowling was a "land conveyance licensed for transportation of passengers for hire," and, therefore, qualifies as a common carrier under Hartford's policy. Plaintiffs assert that under Florida law, all vehicles are licensed to transport passengers for hire as there is no special license required with respect to the vehicle itself. Plaintiffs assert that the Dowling vehicle, by its registration alone, was "licensed for transportation of passengers for hire," and that, under the express terms of the policy, it does not matter whether Dowling, as the driver, was licensed to transport passengers for hire. Hartford responds that Dowling's vehicle was not licensed for transport of passengers for hire and that, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Florida law clearly requires that motor vehicles which transport passengers for hire be specifically registered and licensed for that purpose.
Upon reviewing Florida's statutory law concerning the registration and licensing of motor vehicles and the evidence submitted in connection with these motions, the Court agrees with Hartford that Electa Wood was not riding in a common carrier as defined under the policy. Under Florida law, a motor vehicle used for "private use" is clearly distinguished from one used as a "for-hire vehicle":
(14) "Private use" means the use of any vehicle which is not properly classified as a for-hire vehicle.
(15) (a) "For-hire vehicle" means any motor vehicle, when used for transporting persons or goods for compensation; advertised in a newspaper or generally held out as being for rent or hire; used in connection with a travel bureau; or offered or used to provide transportation for persons solicited through personal contact or advertised on a "share-expense" basis. When goods or passengers are transported for compensation in a motor vehicle outside a municipal corporation of this state, or when goods are transported in a motor vehicle not owned by the person owning the goods, such transportation is "for hire." The carriage of goods and other personal property in a motor vehicle by a corporation or association for its stockholders, shareholders, and members, cooperative or otherwise, is transportation "for hire."
Fla. Stat. § 320.01(14)-(15). Florida Stat. § 320.08 specifies that a motor vehicle for hire must be registered as such and that it will be taxed at a different rate than an automobile for private use.
Mr. Dowling, who was driving the vehicle in which Ms. Wood was a passenger, testified by deposition that he possessed a Florida Class E driver's license, a non-commercial license, at the time of the accident and that the vehicle he was driving was licensed as a "regular passenger" private-use vehicle. Rec. Doc. 29, Exh. 6, at 18-19. Mr. Bowling further testified that he was not compensated in any way for transporting Ms. Wood either to or from the Jacksonville Airport. Id. at 12-14, 16-17, 27-28. Furthermore, he was never in the business of transporting passengers for hire and was not licensed to do so. Id. at 20-26. Rather, he was doing a friend a favor by giving Ms. Wood a ride from and back to the Jacksonville airport. Id. at 10-12, 31-33.
Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the vehicle was not licensed or registered as a "for-hire vehicle." Instead, Plaintiffs assert that, because under Florida law, any personal motor vehicle may potentially be used as a vehicle for hire, the vehicle at issue here qualifies as a common carrier. Plaintiffs' argument fails, first, because as noted above, Florida law does in fact require that a "for-hire vehicle" be registered and licensed as such. See Fla. Stat. § 320.08(6). Second, to accept Plaintiffs argument leads to the absurd result that any and all vehicles driven in Florida qualify as "common carriers" under Hartford's policy, which clearly contradicts the obvious intent of the policy's terms.
Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum on July 14, 2002, in conjunction with a motion requesting an extension of time for discovery, arguing that there is some new evidence that Mr. Dowling did not actually own the vehicle, but apparently leased it. Plaintiffs also point out that under Florida law, within a year of Mr. Dowling having registered the vehicle as a private use vehicle, he could have begun to use it as a vehicle for hire without having to change the registration. The Court has considered these arguments and is persuaded that additional discovery in this matter is not warranted and that these arguments still do not rebut Mr. Dowling's unequivocal testimony that neither he, nor the vehicle registered by him, were licensed or registered to transport passengers for hire.
Accordingly, considering the evidence presented by Hartford and Plaintiffs' failure to rebut Mr. Dowling's testimony that the vehicle he was driving was a private use vehicle and that he was not in the business of transporting passengers for hire, the Court concludes that the vehicle driven by Mr. Dowling at the time of the accident was not a "land conveyance licensed for transportation of passengers for hire," and, hence, not a "common carrier" under Hartford' s policy.
B. Hotel or Airport Shuttle
Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that Electa Wood was on a "Covered Trip" under Hartford's policy, because the policy extends coverage to "travel on a . . . hotel or airport shuttle, directly to, from or at any Common Carrier terminal, which immediately precedes departure to . . . the destination designated on the ticket purchased for the Covered Trip." Rec. Doc. 29, Exh. 5, at 12.
Plaintiffs assert that the policy does not require that a hotel or airport shuttle be a common carrier and that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Dowling was performing the service of an airport or hotel shuttle at the time of the accident. According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Dowling had no relationship with Electa Wood; his only contact with her was to pick her up at the airport, bring her to her destination, and then return her to the airport a week later. Plaintiffs further argue that it is a common practice to use private vehicles as shuttles, such as done here. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that there is no ordinary meaning to the terms "airport or hotel shuttle" and that the word "shuttle" is very broad and susceptible of any number of meanings, including, here, to transport back and forth between Ms. Wood's hotel and the Jacksonville airport in the same vehicle.
Hartford admits that the terms "airport or hotel shuttle" are not defined in its policy, so that the Court must "look to the meaning of the terms which common speech imports." In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1242 (D.C. 1998). Moreover, Hartford agrees with Plaintiffs that it is appropriate to consider the dictionary definition of a policy term to determine the ordinary meaning. Both parties point to definitions of "shuttle" as transporting back and forth over a specified path or route at regular intervals or as a vehicle used in such regular back and forth routes. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971); American Heritage Dictionary (3d Ed. 1992). However, Hartford contends that, considering these definitions, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the vehicle driven by Mr. Dowling does not fall within the meaning of "airport or hotel shuttle." The Court agrees.
As already noted, Mr. Dowling testified in his deposition that he was not in the business of transporting passengers to and from airports or hotels and that he was simply doing a friend a favor. Rec. Doc. 29, Exh. 6, at 8-10, 19-23, 31-34. Mr. Dowling further stated that he has never been employed by the Jacksonville Airport or the property where he dropped Ms. Wood off and from where he picked her back up. Id. at 12-14. Again, he also testified that he was not compensated by anyone for giving Ms. Wood and another friend a ride to the airport. Id. Finally, the Court agrees with Hartford that Mr. Dowling's driving of Ms. Wood from the airport and back to it once was not regular travel back and forth over an established route by a vehicle or "a going back and forth over a specified route or path at regular intervals."
In conclusion, the Court fully agrees with Hartford that "[t]o characterize the Dowling vehicle as an `airport shuttle' under the Policy merely because Mr. Dowling was bringing friends to the airport as a favor does not comport with the ordinary meaning of the term `airport shuttle,'" and that "[s]uch an interpretation is absurd, unreasonable, and would extend coverage under the Hartford Policy well beyond that contemplated by the clear provisions of the Policy as construed as a whole." For all of these reasons, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that: (1) the vehicle driven by Mr. Dowling was not a "common carrier" under the policy; (2) Ms. Wood was not on an "airport or hotel shuttle" at the time of the accident; and (3) accordingly, Ms. Wood was not on a "Covered Trip" as defined by the policy. Hartford's motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED and Plaintiffs' motion DENIED.
V. Citicorp's Motion for Summary Judgment
Citicorp, successor in interest to AT T Universal Card Service Corp., also moves for summary judgment in its favor that there was no coverage under the policy provided by Federal for the benefit of Citicorp's card holders, as the policy had been properly cancelled on the date of Ms. Wood's death. Plaintiffs respond that summary judgment should be denied based on their claim that, even if Federal's policy did not provide coverage on the date of the accident, AT T breached its contract with Electa Wood to provide her the precise coverage it described in the Guide provided her. Citicorp asserts that the Guide is not an insurance policy and that Plaintiffs may not rely on the Guide to expand coverage under the Policy.
The Guide issued in conjunction with Federal's policy stated that there was coverage not only when the covered person was riding in a common carrier, but also if a covered person was struck by a common carrier. Plaintiffs argue that the other vehicles involved in the accident, which caused the collision with Mr. Dowling's vehicle, were common carriers and that they struck Mr. Dowling's vehicle. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert that, pursuant to the Guide, which was the only statement of coverage provided Ms. Wood, the accident was covered.
The Court has already discussed that Federal's policy was, in fact, cancelled effective January 1, 1999, and, therefore, was not in effect on the date of Ms. Wood's accident. Moreover, the Court already concluded that under the Guide issued in conjunction with Federal's policy, AT T did not have an obligation to send individual notice to Ms. Wood of the cancellation in light of the fact a substantially similar policy, issued by Hartford, went into effect on January 1, 1999, so that Ms. Wood was never left without coverage. Finally, Plaintiffs have submitted a copy of the Guide to coverage provided with respect to Hartford's policy, which, as quoted above, clearly states that it replaces all previous Guides and program descriptions. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Citicorp's motion should be GRANTED, as there is no genuine issue of material fact that it did not breach its contract with Ms. Wood.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing discussion,
IT IS ORDERED that Federal Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 35) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against Federal are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hartford Life Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 29) is also GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Hartford is hereby DENIED. Plaintiffs' claims against Hartford are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims against Citicorp are DISMISSED with prejudice.
As these motions are dispositive of all of Plaintiffs' claims in this case, Plaintiffs' action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.