Opinion
No. H030087
5-4-2007
ANDREA WOOD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Andrea Wood claimed that in August 2002, she was sexually assaulted by Hector Luna, a deputy sheriff employed by the County of Santa Clara (County). After the superior court relieved Wood of the claim-presentation requirement of suits against governmental entities under Government Code section 945.4, she filed suit in federal court against County and Luna. That federal case was ultimately dismissed.
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
Wood thereafter filed the instant superior court action. County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the action was barred by section 946.6, subdivision (f) (section 946.6(f)). Under that code section, a plaintiff who is relieved of the claim-presentations requirement under section 945.4 must file suit within 30 days. County argued that Woods action was untimely because (1) she filed the federal suit 17 days after the order allowing her to proceed without presenting a claim; (2) once the federal suit was dismissed, she was required to file the state court suit within 43 days after the dismissal (i.e., 13 days remaining under section 946.6(f), plus 30 days provided by a federal tolling statute); and (3) the state suit was filed 56 days after dismissal of the federal action. The court agreed and granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On appeal, Wood contends that her action was not time-barred because the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to relieve her of any technical default under section 946.6(f). We conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable to the circumstances presented here. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment entered on the order granting Countys motion for judgment on the pleadings.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Of course, this court accepts as true the material facts properly alleged in the challenged pleading for purposes of evaluating the trial courts ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 670, fn. 1)
Wood filed her original complaint on March 8, 2005. Countys demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. Wood filed a first amended complaint. County again demurred, and the court overruled the demurrer.
The demurrer to the first amended complaint concerned legal issues such as whether County could be liable for negligent supervision and hiring of Luna. The demurrer did not tender the issue of whether the action was time-barred.
Wood alleged in the first amended complaint that Luna was at all relevant times a correctional officer or deputy sheriff employed by County. It was alleged that "Lunas conduct was as a matter of law within the course and scope of employment to invoke vicarious liability upon [County] for his conduct." In the early morning hours of August 25, 2002, Wood sought emergency assistance to enforce a domestic violence restraining order. As a result, Luna responded, told Wood that "he wanted to be her friend," and gave her his cell phone and pager numbers. (Original underscore omitted.) After leaving the residence, Luna called Wood several times over the next few hours. He suggested meeting at a restaurant that morning in Gilroy. They ultimately met the same morning, Wood got into Lunas vehicle, he drove her to an isolated location, and he sexually assaulted her. He then drove to a motel and commanded Wood to go into a room, where he raped her.
The parties filed various pleadings in the court below under seal. Wood filed a redacted version of the first amended complaint and later filed under seal an unredacted version of that pleading. Because the matters filed under seal are not germane to our disposition of the case, we refer only to the redacted version of the first amended complaint.
County filed its answer to the first amended complaint on November 7, 2005. Its answer included, as the 26th affirmative defense, the allegation that the first amended complaint was barred by the applicable "statute[s] of limitations[,] including but not limited to California Government Code section[s] 945.8 and 946.6(f)."
Luna answered the first amended complaint. He is not a party to the instant appeal.
The court thereafter granted Woods application for leave to file an amendment to the first amended complaint. Wood filed the amendment, alleging facts upon which she contended that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled.
On or about January 3, 2006, County filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438. County asserted that the action was barred under section 946.6(f), because Wood failed to file the complaint within 30 days of the courts order granting relief from the failure to timely present a public entity claim. Wood opposed the motion. The superior court granted the motion. The court expressly found that Woods action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 946.6(f), and that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply to save the time-barred action. Judgment was entered on the order granting the motion on March 17, 2006. Wood filed a timely notice of appeal.
"A party may move for judgment on the pleadings." (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) "The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) If the moving party is a defendant that . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1).)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
As our high court has explained: "A trial courts determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings accepts as true the factual allegations that the plaintiff makes. [Citations.] In addition, it gives them a liberal construction." (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516.) "A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. [Citations.]" (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Thus, since such a motion serves the same function as a demurrer, judgment on the pleadings may be properly granted on the ground that the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Firemans Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Const., Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150.) The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether the plaintiff has met his or her burden of showing a reasonable possibility that the complaint may be amended to cure the defect exposed by the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.)
On appeal, a trial courts order granting judgment on the pleadings is subject to independent review. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 515.) An appellate court will affirm the granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings if it was correct on any legal basis, irrespective of the correctness of the trial courts rationale. (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1220.)
II. The Granting Of Judgment On The Pleadings
Our analysis of Woods appeal commences with a brief overview of the California Tort Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) and the particular statute of limitations at issue here. We then determine whether Woods state court action was commenced within the limitations period prescribed by section 946.6(f). Lastly, after concluding that the action was not timely filed, we address Woods argument that she should be excused from the limitations period of section 946.6(f), based upon the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
A. Whether State Court Suit Was Timely Filed
1. The California Tort Claims Act
Under section 911.2, subdivision (a) of the California Tort Claims Act, a party asserting a personal injury claim against a public entity must present a claim with the entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. Compliance with the claim-presentation requirement must be affirmatively alleged in a subsequent suit against the entity, and a complaint failing to make this essential allegation is subject to general demurrer. (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)
"A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2, subd. (a).)
While the submission of a timely claim " `is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action " (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 708), sections 911.4 and 946.6 provide "escape hatches" for a noncomplying claimant. Under section 911.4, subdivision (a), a party who fails to present a timely claim may apply to the entity for leave to present a late claim, provided that the application is filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the cause of actions accrual. If the entity denies the late claim application, the claimant—pursuant to section 946.6, subdivision (a) —may file a petition (within six months of the denial) to obtain a court order relieving him or her of the claim-presentation requirement. If the court grants the petition, "suit on the cause of action to which the claim relates shall be filed with the court within 30 days thereafter." (§ 946.6(f).) Compliance with the 30-day statute of limitations under section 946.6(f)—as the word "shall" suggests—is mandatory. (Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1498 (Mandjik).)
"When a claim that is required by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim." (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) "The application shall be presented to the public entity as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action and shall state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim. . . ." (§ 911.4, subd. (b).)
"If an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6, a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4. The proper court for filing the petition is a superior court that would be a proper court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to which the claim relates. . . ." (§ 946.6, subd. (a).)
2. Relevant chronology
There is no dispute between the parties concerning the procedural events relevant to the statute of limitations issue presented. To facilitate our discussion, we present a chronology of those relevant events here:
August 25, 2002— Date of alleged incident giving rise to Woods claims.
February 25, 2003— Deadline for presenting claim to County.
March 6, 2003— Wood files application with County for permission to file late claim pursuant to section 911.4.
March 14, 2003— County rejects application to file late claim.
June 10, 2003— Wood files petition with the superior court for an order relieving her of the claim-presentation requirement.
August 5, 2003— Court grants petition for order relieving Wood of the claim-presentation requirement.
August 22, 2003— Wood files federal court action against County and Luna.
January 11, 2005— Federal court action dismissed.
March 8, 2005— State court action filed against County and Luna.
3. Application of statute of limitations in this case
It is plain that Wood did not follow the "normal" path—i.e., the timely presentation of governmental claim, and the timely filing of suit after rejection of the claim—in pursuing her claim against County and Luna. Wood indisputably presented her claim to County late, but was relieved of the claim-presentation requirement after petitioning the court pursuant to section 946.6. Her suit was governed by the 30-day statute of limitations under section 946.6(f). She filed the federal suit 17 days after the order; that filing tolled the statute of limitations with 13 days remaining.
Woods federal action was dismissed on January 11, 2005. Once it was dismissed, she could not wait indefinitely to bring her state court suit. Under section 946.6(f), therefore, she had until January 24 to file an action in state court. But federal law provides a grace period of 30 days where, as was the case here, a plaintiffs federal suit that contained federal as well as pendent claims is dismissed. "The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) [conferring supplemental jurisdiction over state claims related to federal claims] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." (28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see also Jinks v. Richland County (2003) 538 U.S. 456 [rejecting challenge to constitutionality of tolling statute].) Thus, Wood was required to file her state action on or before February 23, 2005 (i.e., 43 days after dismissal of the federal suit). Her complaint, filed March 8, 2005, was 13 days late.
Wood argues that she complied with section 946.6(f) by filing the federal action within 30 days of the order granting her petition relieving her of the claim-presentation requirement of the California Tort Claims Act. While this filing in federal court satisfied her obligation to file a timely suit, once the federal case was dismissed, Wood was still obliged to comply with section 946.6(f). Her prior federal court filing was not a substitute to filing a timely state court action after the federal case was dismissed. To hold otherwise would permit a plaintiff under the circumstances presented here to wait months or even years to file a second action after dismissal of the first suit (that did comply with the time requirements of section 946.6(f)) Such a conclusion would eviscerate section 946.6(f)s requirement that once a court relieves a party of presenting a claim, "suit on the cause of action to which the claim relates shall be filed with the court within 30 days." (Italics added.)
B. Equitable Tolling
Wood invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling in an effort to prevent application of section 946.6(f) that would be otherwise fatal to her action. She makes two essential points in support of her argument that she should not be bound by the 30-day statute of limitations: (1) the relief from default provisions of section 946.6 are to be applied liberally to promote a claimants right to have her claim decided on the merits; and (2) the 30-day statute was equitably tolled because Wood acted in good faith, County had timely notice of her claim, and it was not prejudiced by the filing of the state court action 13 days beyond the statute. We reject both of these contentions.
1. Liberal application of Government Code section 946.6
Wood argues that she should be granted relief from section 946.6(f)s 30-day statute of limitations because section 946.6 generally is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed in favor of the claimants substantive rights. This argument is without merit.
It is well established that the 30-day limitations period of section 946.6(f) "is `mandatory and must be strictly complied with. [Citations.]" (Mandjik, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498; see also Todd v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 664 (Todd).) Thus, numerous cases have distinguished between the liberal treatment, on the one hand, that should be accorded claimants seeking relief under subdivision (a) of section 946.6 from claim-presentation requirement, and the strict application of the statute of limitations under subdivision (f), on the other hand. "While the procedure for granting relief from the claims statutes is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of the claimant, such liberality does not extend to the statute of limitations. [Citation.]" (Rivera v. City of Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726; accord, Ard v. County of Contra Costa (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 339, 346; Mandjik, supra, at p. 1498; Tuolumne Air Service, Inc. v. Turlock Irrigation Dist. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 248, 252 (Tuolumne Air ).)
One authority has noted that the "rather unusual shortness" of the 30-day limitations period of section 946.6(f) "is apparently designed to balance the liberal 6-month period to file a petition for judicial relief after the entity has denied an application for leave to present a late claim. [Citations.]" (1 Coates et al., Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2007) § 7.61, p. 395.)
Thus, courts in a number of instances have strictly applied section 946.6(f) to bar plaintiffs suits against public entities. For instance, in Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, the court concluded that the plaintiffs suit, filed 31 days after a minute order granting a petition under section 946.6 for relief, was barred by section 946.6(f), notwithstanding that (1) the filing was only one day late, and (2) the plaintiff argued that it was timely because it was filed within 30 days of receipt of the minute order. Similarly, in Rivera v. City of Carson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 718, the action filed three days beyond the 30-day statute was held time-barred, even though the plaintiffs were minors. And in Todd, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 661, the court strictly applied section 946.6(f) to defeat an action filed 97 days after the order granting relief from the claim-presentation requirement, even though the plaintiff was a minor, and he claimed that the late filing was due to excusable neglect of his counsel.
In short, "[t]he Tort Claims Act indulges late claimants; not late suitors." (Fritts v. County of Kern, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 306.) There is no legal basis for Woods assertion here that the time requirement of section 946.6(f) is an elastic one for which the law favors a resolution of a claimants dispute on the merits over compliance with the 30-day period prescribed for filing suit.
2. Equitable tolling doctrine
Wood seeks a broad application of the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid the consequences of the statute of limitations to her case here. That broad application urged is unwarranted; the cases relied upon by Wood are distinguishable and do not support her position.
It is of course true that our state courts recognize the doctrine of equitable tolling in certain instances to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences of the applicable statute of limitations. (See Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 317, 319 (Addison); Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399, 410 (Bollinger).) "Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine `which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness." (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (Lantzy ).) It has been applied "in carefully considered situations to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action, where the defendant would suffer no prejudice." (Ibid. ; see also Bollinger, supra, at p. 410 [purpose of rule is "to serve the ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably prevent a trial on the merits"].)
But contrary to Woods claim, the doctrine is sparingly applied; it is found as an exception to the statute of limitations otherwise applicable "occasionally and in special situations." (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 316.) Thus, although the Supreme Court has articulated that three elements must be satisfied under the doctrine—namely, timely notice to the defendant of the claim, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and the plaintiffs good-faith conduct (id. at p. 319)—it has not held that any case that is otherwise time-barred will survive simply because it meets these three criteria.
The three principal cases relied on by Wood concerned the application of equitable tolling under very different circumstances than presented here. In Bollinger, supra, 25 Cal.2d 399, a case (filed within the limitations period specified in the insurance policy) against an insurer was ultimately dismissed after nonsuit as having been premature. The Supreme Court concluded that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled during the pendency of that action, so that the insureds later suit concerning the same loss was not time-barred. Similarly, in Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d 313, the high court held that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled while a timely-filed federal suit against public entities was pending, thereby preventing the statute from having run when the plaintiff, after dismissal of the federal suit, filed a similar state court suit more than six months after rejection of his claims. And in Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, the court held that the statute of limitations for bringing a personal injury suit was tolled during the pendency of a timely-filed workers compensation proceeding that was ultimately dismissed because of the determination that the plaintiff was not an employee at the time of the incident.
Thus, in Bollinger, Addison, and Elkins, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled while the first action in each of the cases was pending. (See also Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 269 [statute equitably tolled where timely filed petition for writ of mandate was filed in Court of Appeal rather than superior court].) This is precisely what was accomplished here when the court below properly applied title 28 United States Code section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations under section 946.6(f) while Woods federal suit was pending. And the three cases were decided long before the enactment in 1990 of that federal tolling statute.
Moreover, the doctrines typical application is to suspend or toll the applicable statute of limitations during the pendency—but not after the dismissal or other disposition of—a prior proceeding. Thus, in Bollinger, supra, 25 Cal.2d 399, the court did not toll the statute for any period after the first case had concluded. Likewise, in Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d 313, while the statute of limitations was equitably tolled during the pendency of the federal suit, the court did not hold that the statute was tolled after its dismissal. And in Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d 410, tolling did not continue after the dismissal of the first proceeding, i.e., the workers compensation case.
Wood argues that she acted in good faith by timely filing the federal case and because her "counsel was unaware that the 30[-]day statute complied with in August 2003, could be invoked [two] years later to dismiss the State Court proceeding." She contends that her counsel acted reasonably by filing the state case within 60 days of the dismissal of the federal action and that she should not be penalized for any lack of compliance with "[t]he `esoteric nature of the 30[-]day statute." But Wood points to no cases that have applied the doctrine to equitably toll the running of the statute of limitations for an indeterminate period after the conclusion of a prior suit and before initiation of a subsequent one on the basis of neglect of the party or her counsel. To the contrary, there is authority for the proposition that the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable to "save" an untimely action where the statute of limitations has run due to attorney neglect.
In Bonifield v. County of Nevada (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 298, 301 (Bonifield), the plaintiffs filed a timely federal court suit against a governmental entity, which action the parties stipulated to dismiss nearly three years later. The plaintiffs filed suit in state court nearly five months later, which the trial court dismissed as untimely. (Id. at p. 302.) The appellate court applied title 28 United States Code section 1367(d) to conclude that, because there were 77 days left on the six-month statute of limitations under section 945.6 when the federal suit was filed, the plaintiffs were required to have filed the state court action 107 days after the federal case was dismissed (i.e., 77 days plus the 30-day grace period under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)). (Bonifield, supra, at pp. 302-304.) Because the state court complaint was filed over one month beyond the 107-day period, the court concluded that the action was barred. (Id. at p. 304.) The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled because of attorney neglect: "[T]his case does not present such a special circumstance because plaintiffs cannot meet the third requirement for application of the equitable tolling doctrine, i.e., that they acted reasonably [citation] in not filing their state action within 77 days after [title 28 United States Code] section 1367(d)s tolling of the statute of limitations ceased. Plaintiffs have cited no cases, and we have found none, holding that delay due to attorney neglect qualifies as `reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff within the meaning of the equitable tolling doctrine. [Citation.] Indeed, the opposite is true. [Citations.] [¶] There were no special circumstances alleged to justify the delay because the late filing of plaintiffs state action was attributable to their attorneys failure to appreciate that the filing of the stipulation for dismissal constituted a dismissal of the federal action as a matter of law. As we have noted, attorney neglect does not satisfy the standard of reasonableness and special circumstances required by Californias equitable tolling doctrine." (Id. at p. 306; cf Castro v. Sacramento County Fire Protection Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 927 [relief from dismissal due to excusable neglect under Code Civ. Proc., § 473 unavailable to avoid dismissal based upon statute of limitations].)
Likewise, in Todd, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 661, a minors suit after the granting of his section 946.6 petition was filed approximately two months after the 30-day statute of limitations under section 946.6(f) had run. He argued, inter alia, that he should be excused from section 946.6(f)s time requirements because of excusable neglect. (Todd, supra, at p. 666.) The appellate court rejected the contention: "Plaintiffs may not rely upon `excusable neglect to avoid the statutory bar. In response to the demurrer, they asserted counsels negligence in failing to file their complaint within the statutory time. That negligence does not excuse timely filing of the lawsuit." (Ibid.; see also Tuolumne Air, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at 253: "[W]e do not consider the trial courts order [granting relief under section 946.6 that commenced the 30-day statute of limitations] to have resulted in a trap. This is not a case of a layman unlearned in the law.")
Woods reliance upon Mojica v. 4311 Wilshire, LLC (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1069 (Mojica), is misplaced. There, the primary issue was whether the plaintiff, who had filed a diversity-jurisdiction suit for personal injuries that was timely (by eight days) under the then-existing one-year statute of limitations (former Code Civ. Proc., § 340), could receive the benefit of a statutory amendment that changed the limitations period to two years (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1) that became effective while the federal suit was pending. (Mojica, supra, at p. 1071.) Because the plaintiff, after her federal suit was dismissed, filed suit in state court 17 days later, the defendants argued successfully at the trial level that the case was barred by the one-year statute. (Id. at pp. 1071-1072.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that "[w]hile [the plaintiffs] federal complaints were pending, she was entitled to catch the windfall of any liberalization of the statute of limitations." (Id. at p. 1072.) Thus, Mojica involved an entirely different legal issue, and did not even concern the statute of limitations under section 946.6(f).
After initiating a federal suit in California eight days before the one-year statute had run, the plaintiff filed a second federal suit in Utah. (Mojica, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.)
Mojica contains some discussion about the equitable tolling doctrine. (Mojica, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1073-1074.) But the defendants argument there was that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled while the federal complaints were pending because the plaintiffs decision to file in federal court was assertedly unreasonable. (Ibid.) Here, there is no question (and the trial court correctly held) that the statute of limitations was tolled while Woods federal suit was pending. Mojica does not stand for the proposition—advanced here by Wood—that the equitable tolling doctrine may apply to a time period after the dismissal of a federal suit due to a partys misapprehension of the application of a statute of limitations.
The doctrine of equitable tolling will be applied "occasionally and in special situations." (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 316.) Equitable tolling does not apply in this instance to save Woods case from the application of the 30-day statute of limitations. Neglect of counsel cannot serve as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations (Bonifield, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 306), and, in any event, tolling after dismissal of the initial (federal) action is inappropriate. Accordingly, the court below properly granted Countys motion for judgment on the pleadings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment entered on the order granting judgment on the pleadings is affirmed.
We concur:
Mihara, Acting P.J.
McAdams, J.