Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-CV-832.
February 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before this Court are the following Motions: (1) Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant United States (Doc. No. 4); (2) Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Arthur Alan Wolk (Doc. No. 5); and (3) Plaintiff Wolk's Motion for In Camera Inspection (Doc. No. 5). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be granted and Plaintiff's Motions will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Litigation Before the Honorable Julie E. Carnes
Plaintiff is an attorney who practices in the field of air crash litigation. (Doc. No. 5 Ex. 1 ("Wolk Decl.") ¶ 1.) He served as plaintiff's counsel in an aircraft accident case which was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ("N.D. Ga. Action") and was assigned to the Honorable Judge Julie E. Carnes. ( Id. ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. C.) While Wolk is listed as counsel of record for the plaintiff in that case ( id. Ex. C), he did not actually handle the matter on a day to day basis. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Discovery, which involved numerous parties, including Teledyne Technologies, Inc. ("Teledyne"), was contentious. ( Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, Ex. C.) For instance, in February, 2002, Wolk filed an emergency motion seeking to impose sanctions on Teledyne for alleged discovery abuses. (N.D. Ga. Action, Doc. No. 94.) Wolk contends that Judge Carnes demonstrated bias in favor of defendants and that she used her authority as a federal judge to accuse him of misconduct. (Wolk Decl. ¶¶ 10-13.) In May, 2003, Wolk filed a motion, which he later withdrew, asking Judge Carnes to recuse herself. (N.D. Ga. Action, Doc. Nos. 153, 158.)
Judge Carnes was appointed to the Northern District of Georgia in 1992 by President George H.W. Bush. (Wolk Decl. ¶ 3.)
The litigation was removed from state court in July, 2000. (N.D. Ga. Action, Doc. No. 1.)
In addition to believing that Judge Carnes is biased against him, Plaintiff believes that others have engaged in an orchestrated campaign to undermine his ability to practice law. In June, 2001, he pursued litigation in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against thirty-one (31) defendants, including Teledyne. In September, 2003, after Plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, the case was removed to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and is presently pending before the Honorable Norma L. Shapiro. Wolk v. Williams, Civ. A. No. 03-CV-5693 (E.D. Pa. removed Oct. 13, 2003) ("E.D. Pa. Action"). In his amended complaint, he asserts that certain defendants conspired against him "to hold [him] up to false light, to destroy his credibility with the courts, to extort settlement in cases that should go to trial, to interfere with his relations with clients, to prevent his getting new clients, and to avoid, at all costs, a decision on the merits of cases the plaintiff brought." (E.D. Pa. Action, Doc. No. 2 ¶ 2.)
In November, 2003, Teledyne filed an application in the Northern District of Georgia action for an order to show cause why Wolk should not be held in contempt. (N.D. Ga. Action Doc. No. 175.) Wolk then filed a motion to transfer venue and another motion seeking Judge Carnes's recusal. ( Id. Doc. No. 199.) Judge Carnes denied Wolk's motions for transfer and recusal. ( Id. Doc. No. 214.) During the contempt proceedings, Wolk moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ( id. Doc. No. 232), which the court denied. ( Id. Doc. No. 273.) Even though the court refused to hold Wolk in contempt ( id.), Wolk alleges that the Judge continued to demonstrate a bias against him during the contempt proceedings. (Wolk Decl. ¶¶ 28-31.)
In the wake of his perceived mistreatment by Judge Carnes, plaintiff undertook several measures to raise questions about her conduct. He filed a confidential proceeding against the Judge with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and asked the court to review her conduct. (Wolk Decl. ¶ 17.) When the circuit court denied his complaint, he appealed the decision to the circuit court's judicial council, which affirmed the denial. ( Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also seeks the impeachment of Judge Carnes and has encouraged Congress to pass legislation, dubbed "The Carnes Bill," which would create certain procedures to review the conduct of federal judges. ( Id. ¶ 20, Ex. B.) Wolk has conducted an independent investigation to review Judge Carnes's potential conflicts of interest ( id. ¶ 21), and to assess the Judge's fairness in dealing with other matters pending before her. ( Id. ¶¶ 23-25.) He is also writing a book entitled "The Judge," which is "about the corruption of power that is possible for a federal judge and how the system is designed to overlook the predilection to engage in such conduct, the subject being the litany of personal attacks by Judge Carnes on a man even she admits apparently was not the lawyer handling the case." ( Id. ¶ 43.)
B. Plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act Request
On December 4, 2003, Plaintiff Wolk submitted a request for information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. In that request, he asked for "copies of any and all files and documents associated with the investigation of Julie E. Carnes pertinent to her nomination and confirmation to the Federal Judiciary in the United States District Court for the District of Georgia." (Doc. No. 5 Ex. 2.) In response to Plaintiff's request, David M. Hardy, Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division at the FBI, sent a letter to Plaintiff on December 9, 2003, and asked for a privacy waiver from Judge Carnes. Hardy explained that "[w]ithout a privacy waiver, the disclosure of law enforcement records or information about another person is considered an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." ( Id. Ex. 3.) Plaintiff construed the Hardy letter as a denial of his FOIA request. On December 23, 2003, he appealed the decision to the Office of Information and Privacy at the United States Department of Justice. Plaintiff then filed his Complaint with this Court on February 24, 2004. (Doc. No. 1.) The Complaint seeks an order directing the FBI "to produce all files concerning or relating to the investigation of United States District Judge Julie E. Carnes." ( Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff informed Judge Carnes that "he had been pursuing his own investigation of the Court, through the Freedom of Information Act, by requesting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Senate Judiciary Committee files compiled during these groups' background investigations of [her] during the judicial nomination process." Taylor v. Teledyne Techs., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1335-36 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no facts supporting the non-moving party's legal position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). Once the moving party carries this initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (explaining that the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts"). "The nonmoving party . . . `cannot rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions' to support its claim." Townes v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 00-CV-138, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2001) (quoting Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DeFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982)). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment must go beyond the pleadings and present evidence through affidavits, depositions, or admissions on file to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995). The court does not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations. Siegel Transfer, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1127.
In FOIA cases, the government bears the burden of showing that it properly withheld the information requested. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). Since the government controls access to the documents at issue, the person requesting the information and the court must rely on the agency's representations in order to understand why the material was withheld. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, we may only grant summary judgment to the agency if its "explanation was full and specific enough to afford the FOIA requester a meaningful opportunity to contest, and the district court an adequate foundation to review, the soundness of the withholding.'" Id. at 1242 (citing King, 830 F.2d at 217-18). "When an agency seeks to protect material which, even on the agency's version of the facts, falls outside the proffered exemption, summary judgment in favor of the FOIA plaintiff is appropriate." Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Congress enacted FOIA "to facilitate public access to Government documents." U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). Under FOIA, a governmental agency is required to produce information unless it is subject to one of the Act's nine exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). In withholding this information, the Government relies on the exemptions found in § 552(b)(6) and § 552(b)(7)(C). We conclude that the information may be properly withheld under § 552(b)(7)(C). Accordingly, there is no necessity for a detailed discussion of the potential application of § 552(b)(6). U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 n. 12 (1989).
Section 552(b)(7)(C) exempts "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
A. Law Enforcement Purposes
As a threshold matter, the agency seeking to invoke the protections of Exemption 7(C) must show that the information was "compiled for law enforcement purposes." Id. The Third Circuit has adopted a rational nexus test to determine whether an agency obtained information pursuant to a valid law enforcement purpose. Davin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1056 (3d Cir. 1995). Under this analysis, the FBI must: (1) detail the connection between the individual under investigation and a potential violation of law or security risk; and (2) show "that this relationship is based upon information `sufficient to support at least a colorable claim of its rationality.'" Id. (quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). In applying this rational nexus test, "an assertion by the FBI that the records are for a law enforcement purpose is entitled to deference because the FBI is a law enforcement agency." Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 790 F. Supp. 17, 20 (D.D.C. 1992). Furthermore, the "prevailing trend" is to conclude that background checks are conducted for law enforcement purposes. Id.
The FBI has demonstrated a rational nexus between its investigation of Judge Carnes and a possible violation of the law or the existence of a security risk. The FBI conducts background investigations of federal judicial nominees pursuant to the authority conferred on it by 5 U.S.C. § 1304 and Executive Order 10,450. (Doc. No. 4 Ex. 1 ("Hardy Decl.") ¶ 13); 5 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000); 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) ("The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation."). In conducting a background investigation, the FBI seeks "to ensure that a prospective federal employee has not broken the law or engaged in other conduct making them ineligible for the position." (Hardy Decl. ¶ 13.) The role of the FBI is as follows:
The FBI is charged with determining whether the judicial candidate has broken any laws or has provided false information in support of their application for judicial appointment and the FBI must follow up on any allegations of criminal wrongdoing by the judicial candidate uncovered during the background investigation. The person being investigated is subject to criminal and civil penalties for falsifying information provided to the FBI.Id. Acting under the aegis of its authority, the FBI conducted a security background check of Judge Carnes as a result of her pending judicial nomination and created a file entitled "Background Investigation — Presidential Appointment With Senate Confirmation." ( Id. ¶ 14.) Thus, its investigation was conducted pursuant to a valid law enforcement purpose. Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 1995); Assassination Archives Research Ctr. v. CIA, 903 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D.D.C. 1995) ("[B]ackground investigations do produce law enforcement records that fall under Exemption 7."); Koch v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974).
Plaintiff suggests that there was no law enforcement purpose here because "defendant fails to identify a specific possible security risk or violation of federal law that it had reason to associate with Judge Carnes." (Doc. No. 5 at 5.) We reject Plaintiff's interpretation of Exemption 7(C). An effective judicial nomination process relies on the proper vetting of nominees to ensure that they are fit to serve. It is impossible, ex ante, to determine whether an FBI investigation will reveal troubling information about a specific nominee. Even though FOIA does not define the term "law enforcement purposes," "`enforcement' of the law fairly includes not merely the detection and punishment of violations of law but their prevention." Miller v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Doe, 790 F. Supp. at 20. We construe the term "enforcement" to encompass the conducting of a security background check of a federal judicial nominee.
An in camera review of the documents at issue here is unnecessary because the FBI's supporting affidavit provides information that is sufficient to place the documents within the ambit of Exemption 7(C), the information is not contradicted in the record, and there is no record evidence of agency bad faith. Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Hayden v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
B. Privacy Interest
If the government shows that information was compiled for law enforcement purposes, it may withhold the information if it "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). A person's right to privacy includes their "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. . . ." Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)). In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court broadly defined the scope of a person's right to privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C) to include "the individual's control of information concerning his or her person," even if some of that information is or was at one time available in the public domain. Id. at 763-64, 767. The Court "also recognized the privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye." Id. at 769. Clearly, an FBI security background investigation of a judicial nominee contains highly sensitive personal information about the nominee. See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the Judicial Selection Process, 11 Geo. Mason L.Rev. 467, 474, 474 n. 31 (2003).
While a government official has a diminished privacy interest as compared to a private citizen, officials do not surrender all of their rights to personal privacy when they accept a public appointment. Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to accept "that government officials, by virtue of their positions, forfeit their personal privacy for FOIA purposes"). In Koch v. United States Department of Justice, for example, plaintiff requested four separate FBI background files for a Member of Congress. These files were compiled during investigations to determine whether a congressman was eligible for various senior government positions. The Department of Justice declined to produce any of these files. The court recognized that there was a keen interest in preserving the confidential information provided by the person being investigated, Koch, 376 F. Supp. at 315, and concluded that the government appropriately withheld the background file pursuant to FOIA.
In addition to protecting the privacy of the individual being investigated, courts have recognized that law enforcement officers and interviewees who participate in FBI background investigations have a substantial privacy interest "because disclosure may result in embarrassment and harassment." Davin, 60 F.3d at 1058 (citing Landano v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 508 U.S. 165 (1993)); see also Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255 (1993)).
Plaintiff's FOIA request in this case asked for "copies of any and all files and documents associated with the investigation of Julie E. Carnes pertinent to her nomination and confirmation to the Federal Judiciary in the United States District Court for the District of Georgia." (Doc. No. 5 Ex. 2.) The FBI located Judge Carnes's security background file and avers that it contains the following information:
(a) biographical information concerning the subject, which includes personal information such as date of birth, social security number, and home address; (b) reports of third-party interviews; (c) the results of records searches that were conducted of FBI field office(s) and FBI Headquarters Office indices; (d) various routing and search slips; (e) incoming teletypes from numerous field offices reporting the results of indices searches conducted in each field office; (f) incoming and outgoing airtels, which are internal summaries of information, usually of the investigative activities of one of the field divisions of the FBI in a particular case, designed to alert other field divisions and/or FBIHQ of a pertinent development requiring expedited attention; (g) personal information concerning the subject's family members; (h) witness statements; (i) agency memoranda regarding the subject; (j) the results of various criminal records checks; (k) computer research regarding the subject's career.
(Hardy Decl. ¶ 15.) "[G]overnment officials have a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of matters that conceivably could subject them to annoyance or harassment in either their official or private lives." Baez v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because the information contained in Judge Carnes's security background file could subject her to annoyance or harassment in both her official and private lives, she has a clear privacy interest in ensuring that the contents of her security background file are not publicly disseminated.
C. Public Interest
In weighing the strength of the public interest proffered by the FOIA requester, a court must evaluate "the nature of the requested document and its relationship to `the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.'" Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)). Under Exemption 7(C), the only relevant public interest "focuses on `the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to.'" Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773)). As the District of Columbia Circuit explained in Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility v. United States Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1996), when "governmental misconduct is alleged as the justification for disclosure, the public interest is `insubstantial' unless the requester puts forward `compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity' and shows that the information sought `is necessary in order to confirm or refute the evidence.'" Id. at 905 (quoting Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282). Because plaintiff offered no evidence that the government agency engaged in improper activity, the court concluded that no public interest would be served by disclosure. Id.; see also Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1231 ("Disclosure of information that `reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct' does not further the public interest envisaged by FOIA." (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773)); Landano v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Only when the information requested reflects directly upon the way that the agency conducts business has the requester placed something on the public interest side of the balancing equation."), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 508 U.S. 165 (1993).
Given the focus on agency action, the critical public interest inquiry is whether the FBI has engaged in any wrongdoing. See, e.g., Landano, 956 F.2d at 430 (concluding that requester pointed to no public interest because the information requested "would shed no light on the way the FBI fulfills its responsibilities") ; see also Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1231; Perrone v. FBI, 908 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.D.C. 1995) (affirming FBI's decision to withhold information because plaintiff made no showing that the information would "shed any light on the FBI's conduct with respect to the investigation"). In Quinon, the plaintiffs asked the FBI to produce certain documents involving an FBI investigation, including any that detailed a federal judge's participation in improper conduct. According to plaintiffs, the public had a substantial interest in learning about the judge's role in any alleged wrongdoing. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that "the relevant question in determining whether there is a public interest in disclosure is whether the FBI, not [the federal judge], has engaged in wrongdoing." Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1231. The court noted that there was no evidence that the judge was involved in any misconduct, nor was there evidence to suggest that any misconduct explained the FBI's conduct. Id.
Plaintiff fails to assert that the FBI engaged in any illegality. Plaintiff indicates that he seeks disclosure of information about Judge Carnes to determine the adequacy of the FBI's investigation of her, which he believes is relevant to his proposed legislation regarding judicial accountability. (Doc. No. 5 at 9). He argues that divulging the requested information would "shed light on the extent to which the backgrounds of lifetime appointed federal judges are actually investigated." ( Id.) These averments are not sufficient to establish a cognizable public interest under Exemption 7(C). "A mere desire to review how an agency is doing its job, coupled with allegations that it is not, does not create a public interest sufficient to override the privacy interests protected by Exemption 7(C)." McCutchen v. U.S. Dep't of Health Human Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Plaintiff's request implicates no cognizable public interest under Exemption 7(C). Plaintiff does not even suggest that the FBI engaged in wrongdoing when it performed Judge Carnes's security background investigation.
Plaintiff discusses this purported public interest in the context of Exemption 6. Nevertheless, we will consider it in analyzing the FBI's withholding of information pursuant to Exemption 7(C).
In discussing Exemption 6, Wolk also points to two discrete public interests that would be advanced through disclosure of Judge Carnes's background file: (1) simply because Judge Carnes is a federal judge, "the public has a strong interest" in having access to the contents of her background file (Doc. No. 5 at 8); and (2) disclosure would "inform the public that there is a lack of any meaningful way in which to review the conduct of a few corrupt, or biased lifetime appointed federal judges, using Judge Carnes as an example." ( Id. at 9.) Neither of these public interests is cognizable under Exemption 7(C). They are not relevant to the determination of wrongdoing by the FBI.
Even if Wolk did specifically allege that the FBI conducted an improper investigation, he offers no evidence to support such an allegation. "Unsubstantiated allegations of official misconduct [are] insufficient to establish a public interest in disclosure" under Exemption 7(C). U.S. Dep't of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Guide Privacy Act Overview 463 (2002); see also Wichlacz v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 938 F. Supp. 325, 333 (E.D. Va. 1996) (explaining that plaintiff failed to show any valid public interest that would be served by disclosure under Exemption 7(C) because he did not advance any evidence "to buttress his bald allegations"), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (table). There is no evidence in this record that Plaintiff's FOIA request would serve a recognized public interest under Exemption 7(C).
D. Balancing Private and Public Interests
In carrying out its duty to conduct a de novo review, "a court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect." Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776; see also Davin, 60 F.3d at 1058. In order to convince a court that the public interest should trump the privacy interests at stake, the requester must show that the asserted public interest is "significant and compelling." Perrone, 908 F. Supp. at 27. "[A] requester's need, however significant, does not warrant disclosure in the face of a plainly applicable exemption." Burge v. Eastburn, 934 F.2d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1991). In applying Exemption 7(C), the Third Circuit has explained that, "[a]bsent proof of misconduct, which is needed to justify invading the demonstrable privacy interests involved here, we `need not linger over the balance' because `something . . . outweighs nothing every time.'" Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Wolk points to no valid public interest that would be served by disclosure. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Judge Carnes's privacy interests must prevail and that the FBI properly withheld her security background file from Plaintiff.
An appropriate Order follows.
We note that the information could also be properly withheld under § 552(b)(6). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) exempts "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). While Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) both protect similar privacy interests, "Exemption 7(C) is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6." U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 496 n. 6 (1994); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989).
Exemption 6 permits the government to withhold information when: (1) the information is contained in personnel files, medical files, or similar files; (2) the disclosure of the information would constitute an invasion of privacy; and (3) the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh the person's privacy interest. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Civ. A. No. 95-2243, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17469, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1995). Exemption 6 was "`intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.'" U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966)). The category of "similar files" applies to information that "is as highly personal or as intimate in nature as that at stake in personnel or medical records. . . ." Viacom Int'l, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17469, at *11. Judge Carnes's security background file constitutes a similar file within the meaning of Exemption 6.
Balancing the privacy and public interests at issue here, releasing the contents of Judge Carnes's security background file would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of her privacy. Judge Carnes has a clear privacy interest in ensuring that the contents of her security background file are not publicly disseminated. Moreover, Plaintiff has not asserted a public interest in disclosure that is cognizable under FOIA. U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1994); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1253 (3d Cir. 1993). The privacy interest of Judge Carnes in nondisclosure of her FBI security background file substantially outweighs the asserted public interest in disclosure. Therefore, releasing the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of Judge Carnes's privacy.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2005, upon consideration of the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Arthur Alan Wolk and Defendant United States and Plaintiff Wolk's Motion for In Camera Inspection, and all papers submitted in support thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that:(1) Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant United States (Doc. No. 4, 04-CV-832) is GRANTED;
(2) Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Wolk (Doc. No. 5, 04-CV-832) is DENIED;
(3) Motion for In Camera Inspection of Plaintiff Wolk (Doc. No. 5, 04-CV-832) is DENIED; and
(4) Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant United States of America and against Plaintiff Arthur Alan Wolk.
IT IS SO ORDERED.