Opinion
Case No: 02-60881-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra
September 30, 2003
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon various pending motions. The Court carefully considered the Motions, the response and reply memoranda, and applicable law. The Court also heard oral argument at the Pretrial Conference held on September 12, 2003. Being fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant, Gill Hotels, Inc.'s Motion for Final Summary Judgment, filed on June 10, 2003 ( D.E. 27), is DENIED. A preponderance of the evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff has established a prima face case of discriminatory discharge based on race because (1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected class (he is African-American); (2) he was qualified for the position in question (this is undisputed); (3) he suffered an adverse employment action (he was discharged); and (4) a similarly situated employee (identified as "Francisco"), who is not a member of Plaintiff's protected class (Francisco is Caucasian) and who was also caught stealing (by eating a baked potato without paying for it first in violation of Gill Hotels' rules), was not discharged. See e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 711 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (noting that these are the four elements of a prima facie case for racial discrimination based on circumstantial evidence); Hall, et al. v. Alabama Assoc. of School Boards, et al., 326 F.3d 1157, 1165-66 (11th Cir. 2003) (same; adopting district court's opinion rendering judgment on bench trial). Plaintiff has also presented evidence that Francisco was the employee that replaced Plaintiff.
Having found that Plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the undersigned next turns to the question of whether Gill Hotel's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs employment because he was caught stealing is pretextual. Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext; thus precluding summary judgment in favor of Gill Hotels. It is well established that on motions for judgment as a matter of law if there is: "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. . . . It is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses." Watts v. Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co., 842 F.2d 307, 309-10 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a genuine issue of material fact precludes the granting of summary judgment,
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, if plaintiff employee establishes a prima face case of discrimination, defendant employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action taken against plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Hall, 326 F.3d at 1166. Once the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Hall, 326 F.3d at 1166. "The employee may satisfy this burden either directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more than likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by persuading the court that the proffered reason for the employment decision is not worthy of belief. By so persuading the court, the employee satisfies his ultimate burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been the victim of unlawful discrimination." Hall, 326 F.3d at 1166 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
2. Defendant, Gill Hotels, Inc,'s Motion for an Order in Limine Excluding Scott Knapp's Testimony, filed on August 13, 2003 (D.E. 66), is GRANTED in part. Based on the parties' agreement, Scott Knapp's testimony regarding comments made to him by Gerry Condito are excluded and shall not be admissible at trial; however, Mr. Knapp's testimony regarding racial comments made to him by April Mazza, e.g., the statement that "Scott, you know how Mr. Gill is about hiring black people in the front of the house, " may be presented at trial. The evidence in the record suggests that April Mazza may have been involved in the decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment, and her alleged comments are relevant to the extent that they show that the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination stated by Gill Hotels may be pretextual. April Mazza's statements to Mr. Knapp were made only one year prior to Plaintiffs termination. The probative value of April Mazza's alleged comments outweighs any prejudicial effect on Gill Hotels. Moreover, the hearsay objection is cured because Ms. Mazza is an agent of Gill Hotels acting within the scope of her employment, and thus, her statements are admissions.
3. Defendant, Gill Hotels, Inc.'s Motion for an Order in Limine Excluding Testimony and Documents Regarding Plaintiffs Claim for Unemployment Compensation, filed on August 13, 2003 (D.E. 67), is GRANTED based on the parties' agreement.
4. Defendant, Gill Hotels, Inc.'s Motion for an Order in Limine Excluding Matel Datiste's Testimony, filed on September 9, 2003 (D.E. 80), is DENIED. Matel Datiste's testimony regarding a statement made by Alyson Smith, i.e., that she "hates niggers and hates working with them, " is admissible at trial for the same reasons April Mazza's statements are admissible. Alyson Smith, like April Mazza, may have participated in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. The statement made by Ms. Smith was allegedly made approximately one year after Plaintiffs termination, and is relevant to show pretext.
5. Calendar call is set for Tuesday, October 28, 2003, at the United States Courthouse, 301 North Miami Avenue, Fourth Floor Courtroom, Miami, Florida. Trial is set for the two-week trial period commencing November 3, 2003.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this day of September, 2003.