Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-P125-TBR
09-18-2018
ZACHREY DONYELLE WINTERS PLAINTIFF v. STEVEN WILLIAMS et al. DEFENDANTS
cc: Plaintiff, pro se Defendants Fulton County Attorney
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Zachrey Donyelle Winters filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint. This case is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, some claims will be dismissed, and Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Fulton County Detention Center (FCDC). He names as Defendants Jailer Steven Williams in his official capacity and Dr. Chris Weatherspoon in his individual and official capacities. He alleges that his high blood pressure has not been properly treated in violation of the Constitution's Cruel-and-Unusual-Punishments Clause and state law. He states that after numerous requests, he was finally seen by a nurse, and, at that time, his blood pressure was 179 over 119. He alleges that due to his high blood pressure he has had a severe headache for months.
Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A. Official-capacity claims
Naming Defendants, employees of Fulton County, in their official capaciteies is the same as suing the county itself. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants are actually brought against the Fulton County government. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, like Fulton County, a court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
"[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). "[T]he touchstone of 'official policy' is designed 'to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.'" City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in Pembaur).
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, the plaintiff must "identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy." Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom "must be 'the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983." Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (indicating that plaintiff must demonstrate "deliberate conduct").
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged that a Fulton County custom or policy was the moving force behind any of the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff's official-capacity claims will be dismissed.
B. Individual-capacity claim against Defendant Weatherspoon
Plaintiff makes no mention of any specific action or inaction on the part of Defendant Weatherspoon in his complaint. Plaintiff does allege that his constitutional rights have been violated "by the entire medical staff (nurses and doctors) and the jailer himself by not treating me and allowing me to lay here hurting with a severe head ache all this time and not to overlook the fact that by not treating my high blood pressure, they've jeopardized my health."
In order to survive initial review, the complaint must explain how each Defendant is personally responsible for the alleged injuries. Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 1985). Where a complaint fails to do so, the claim must be dismissed for a failure to state a claim. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that personal involvement by the defendant is an essential element in a § 1983 cause of action asserting a constitutional deprivation). Because Plaintiff fails to describe any personal involvement by Defendant Weatherspoon, the individual-capacity claim against him is subject to dismissal.
However, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the individual(s) who is/are responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation involving denial of medical treatment and to describe the facts surrounding how each individual allegedly violated his rights. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the [Prison Litigation Reform Act].").
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may amend the complaint with respect to the denial-of-medical-treatment claim. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the case number and word "Amended" on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the complaint. Should Plaintiff file no amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this action for the reasons stated herein. Date: September 18, 2018
/s/
Thomas B. Russell, Senior Judge
United States District Court cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Fulton County Attorney
4413.009