Opinion
CA. No. 19019-NC
Submitted: November 14, 2002
Decided: February 20, 2003
John Bialecki, Esquire of BILALECKI BRAGG, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Scott G. Wilcox, Esquire of NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, New Castle, Delaware; Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs are New Castle County ("County") employees who challenge the constitutionality of a County ordinance that credits the pension eligibility of County employees for their prior work experience with other governmental entities — except the federal government. The ordinance is challenged on equal protection grounds, specifically, that it improperly discriminates against all County employees who are former federal employees and military veterans. The plaintiffs seek a declaration invalidating the ordinance, and an injunction that would retroactively credit the plaintiffs for their prior federal government service. For the reasons discussed below, the Court determines that the ordinance is constitutional. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I. FACTS
The material facts are undisputed. In October 1997, the County adopted Ordinance 97-114 Substitute No. 1 (the "Ordinance"), modifying Section 26-594 of New Castle County Code, which deals with the County's "Contributory Pension Program. The Ordinance allowed County employees to purchase pension time earned from their former service with state governments, political subdivisions of the state, or municipalities. That "purchased" pension time would then be credited towards the employees' County pension eligibility. Excluded from the eligible categories of prior experience was employment with the federal government.
The employees were given a one year window — until October 1998 — to purchase the pension time. Before the Ordinance was modified, only people with prior work experience in state government were permitted to "buy in" that time for credit towards their pension eligibility.
After the Ordinance was adopted, several New Castle County employees, who are U.S. military veterans, protested the exclusion of their military experience from the pension eligibility program. In response to their complaints, the New Castle County Executive reportedly told those persons that the exclusion of a veteran's military time from the pension program was a mistake that would be corrected. Later, however, the County formally notified those persons (including the plaintiffs) that the Ordinance would not be amended to eliminate the federal employment exclusion.
One plaintiff; George H. Williamson, avers that on several occasions between October 1997 and March 2000 (including specific instances in February and March 2000), the County Executive advised him that the exclusion of military experience from the categories of work eligible for pension credit was a mistake that would be corrected Williamson Aff ¶¶ 6-7. The plaintiffs cite this evidence because they brought their lawsuit two years after the statute of limitations had run on their claims. Proof of the County's continuous assurance that the error would be corrected, would estop the defendants from contending that the claim was time barred by either the statute of limitations or laches. Williamson v. New Castle County, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31. at 18 n. 24.
In their Answering Brief, the plaintiffs make a short and oblique suggestion that the characterization of the Ordinance as "a mistake" constitutes an admission going to the merits of the claim. I disagree. Absent a showing that the County Executive's statement was binding on the County government (a showing not made here), the suggestion does not rise to the level of a judicial admission.
In March 2000, the plaintiffs filed this action against the County, the County Council, and the County Executive. In an Opinion issued in March 2002, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs' Delaware statutory law claims, but allowed the Federal Civil Rights Act claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, to proceed. The County thereafter moved for summary judgment on that claim.
In addition to New Castle County, the named defendants are the County Council of New Castle County; Thomas P. Gordon, County Executive of New Castle County; Christopher A. Coons, County Council President; and Richard L, Abbott, J. Robert Woods, Robert S. Weiner, Penrose buns, Karen Venezky and J. Christopher Roberts, Members of the County Council of New Castle County.
The Court dismissed Counts I, II, IV, and V, but not Count III, which alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williamson.
II. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS AND THE GOVERNING LAW
To grant a motion for summary judgment the Court must determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party opposing the motion has the burden of establishing disputed issues of material fact generated by the evidence of record. All inferences will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but the inferences must be drawn from evidence, not suppositions.
Ch. Ct. R. 56; Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1996).
Ch. Ct. R. 56(e).
Liboff v. Allen, 1975 Del. Ch. LEXIS 255, at *14 (Del.Ch. Jan. 14, 1975).
The plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amnendment of the United States Constitution, because the Ordinance arbitrarily discriminates against a class of County employees — i.e., those having prior federal government service who are similarly situated to the class of employees the Ordinance benefits — i.e., those with prior governmental service other than with the federal government. The plaintiffs argue that that distinction, based solely on the identity of the workers' former employers, bears no "substantial relation to the stated objective of the legislation."
Plaintiffs' Answering Br. at § I. B.
The defendants respond that the Ordinance is constitutional, because it serves the legitimate governmental interest of attracting and retaining employees with experience at jobs similar to those then being performed by County employees. The County urges that its primary goal in adopting the Ordinance was to attract employees with experience in their respective fields so that the County could better serve its constituents. Specifically, the County argues that it expanded the categories of qualified experience eligible for the pension benefit, because the job functions at the state and local government levels most closely resembled those that County employees were performing. The County also argues that to credit its employees for prior federal and military experience would not further that goal. For that reason, the County claims, former federal employees are not similarly situated to employees covered by the Ordinance and, therefore, the Ordinance does not improperly discriminate against County employees with prior federal employment experience.
Two issues, both legal, are presented here. The first issue is what constitutional standard of review applies to the Ordinance. The second issue is whether, viewed in light of the applicable standard, the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons next discussed, the Court concludes that the Ordinance is subject to "rational basis" scrutiny, and given that perspective, it is constitutional.
III. ANALYSIS
The claim that is the subject of this motion arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause, which provides that no state shall deny equal protection under the law to any person within its jurisdiction, has been construed to guarantee that the government must treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Section 1983 is a federal statute frequently used to remedy claimed violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that whenever an act by a state or local government deprives a person of rights or privileges secured by the United States Constitution, the injured party may sue that governmental entity to obtain redress.
The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to acts of state and local governments, not to acts of the federal government. The Supreme Court has applied the concept of equal protection with respect to federal laws through its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 3 Ronald D. Rotunda John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.1 at 4 (2d ed. 1992).
Id.; See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 US. 562, 564 (2000).
Rotunda Nowak, supra note 9, § 19.13 at 568.
A. The Governing Constitutional Standard of Review
Turning first to the standard of review, whenever a governmental act is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court must first determine the level of scrutiny under which the act will be evaluated. In the case of laws that regulate social and economic welfare, the "rational basis test" is applied to determine their validity. Under that test, the governmental action must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest or goal. A governmental action will be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could establish a rational relationship between the challenged regulation and a legitimate government end. Under this form of scrutiny, the party that challenges the law shoulders the burden of establishing that no rational relationship exists.
"Rational basis" scrutiny has been applied in cases involving a variety of economic and social welfare legislation, including the Social Security Act. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (applying the rational basis test to a provision that drew a distinction between those who are mentally ill and those who were not with respect to the receipt of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)); Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying the rational basis test to a law that denied benefits to a class of children); and mandatory retirement provisions of government legislation and to commercial regulations. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (applying the rational basis test to a retirement provision of the Foreign Service Act); Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (applying the rational basis test to a state statute that banned the use of plastic milk containers as a means of promoting the use of environmentally desirable alternatives).
Freedman v. Longo, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, *16 (Del.Ch. 1994) (Allen, C.) ("Under [the rational basis test), government action must be rationally related to some legitimate governmental interest, and will be upheld "unless no reasonably conceivable set of facts could establish a rational relationship between the challenged regulation and a legitimate end of government' Any conceivable reason for the legislation, even one conjured up by the court itself, will suffice to provide a rational basis for the regulation.").
NY. State Club Ass'n v. city of N.Y., 478 U.S. 1, 17 (1988).
As a general matter, courts will not second-guess the judgment of a legislative body when it enacts economic or social regulations that create statutory classifications. Under the Equal Protection Clause, states and municipalities are afforded wide latitude to enact such legislation, under the theory that unwise laws should (and eventually will) be fixed by democratic processes, rather than by judicial intervention. The United States Supreme Court has determined that under rational basis scrutiny, such statutes need not be perfectly drawn to be found constitutional, and that a statute can be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both yet still be found to pass Equal Protection muster.
Freedman at *16.
Id. at 16-17.
Vance at 108.
The County contends that the Ordinance should be analyzed under the rational basis test. The plaintiffs' response to that argument is, at best, confused. At first glance, the plaintiffs appear to agree that the Ordinance should be evaluated under rational basis scrutiny. Confusion arises, however, because elsewhere in their brief, the plaintiffs articulate a standard of review that seemingly is a hybrid of the rational basis and intermediate review standards. That is, the plaintiffs argue that the County must establish a substantial relationship between the classification and a legitimate government interest.
Defendants' Opening Br. § I. A4 B.
Indeed, an argument heading in the plaintiffs' brief claims that the Ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Plaintiffs' Answering Br. § L B.
Id.
That argument is misconceived. None of the classification schemes that have triggered the intermediate standard of review is present here. The intermediate standard of constitutional review requires that a classification be substantially related to an important government interest, whereas the rational basis test requires that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Nor do the Ordinance's classifications implicate any fundamental rights, or involve "suspect classes" that would require a "strict scrutiny" mode of analysis. In this case, the challenge to the Ordinance concerns an alleged economic injury to certain governmental employees that results from a decision not to extend certain pension-related benefits to them. Thus, this Ordinance, like statutes that apportion Social Security benefits, falls within the category of laws that address social and economic welfare — laws whose constitutionality is traditionally evaluated under rational basis scrutiny.
Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) with Clover Leaf at 460-.63.
The strict scrutiny standard of review requires that classifications with respect to fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and travel, and suspect classes, such as those based on race and alienage, must be necessary to achieve a compelling actual purpose. See eg., Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a statutory prohibition preventing marriages between persons solely on the basis of race was unconstitutional); see also, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that durational residency requirements with respect to voting rights are unconstitutional).
See supra note 12.
B. The Constitutionality Of The Ordinance
The second issue is whether the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause. Application of the rational basis form of scrutiny to the Ordinance establishes that it does not. According to the County, the pension plan was modified to attract and retain employees having prior experience at jobs similar to those that they were performing at the County level, because such employees would more likely better and more efficiently serve the public interest. Clearly, it would have been rational for the County Council to conclude that hiring persons with prior state and local government experience would accomplish that goal. Improving the level of County government service is a legitimate government interest, and the Ordinance was rationally drawn to accomplish that purpose.
The plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance arbitrarily classifies employees, because the classification is based solely on the identity of their former employers. That classification is illogical, they claim, because employees who formerly had either marginally related or totally unrelated jobs in state or local government would receive pension credit for their past employment, while employees who had truly relevant experience in the military and federal government would not be. As an example, the plaintiffs point out that if the County were hiring law enforcement employees, the Ordinance would benefit former state clerical workers, but not military veterans having directly relevant experience.
Essentially, what the plaintiffs essentially suggest is that the Ordinance should be more sharply drafted to apportion pension benefits based upon an employees' actual relevant expertise rather than upon the identity of their past employer. In that way the overinclusion of employees with irrelevant work experience and the underinclusion of employees with relevant experience would be avoided.
Indeed, the defendants concede that employment time outside of the eligible qualified time may provide some workers with the relevant experience that the County seeks.
Perhaps it would have been wiser for the County to enact such an Ordinance. But, while a retailored Ordinance might result in a more appropriate distribution of benefits, under rational basis scrutiny it is not for a court to rewrite or strike down imperfect laws. Were this Court to grant the plaintiffs the relief they seek, locating the appropriate limiting principle would become highly problematic. What would prevent different groups, such as former private employees, from claiming that they too are constitutionally entitled to the same pension benefits? For example, County employees who were formerly employed as security guards in a private firm might have performed the same tasks as employees previously employed in that capacity by the state or federal government. Indeed, a private bank security guard may arguably have more relevant experience at security work than a former military veteran.
Given the nature of rational basis review, however, the Court need not address these concerns. All the Court need consider is whether the County government's line-drawing legislative enactment is rationally related to achieving a legitimate conceivable purpose. Here, it is. The County Council could rationally have determined that prior work experience at the state and local governmental levels is more relevant to County employment (and therefore more worthy of pension credit) than former federal (including military) experience. For this purpose a local government, such as the County, may validly distinguish between prior work experience at the federal level on the one hand, and at the state and local levels, on the other.
Because the purpose of the Ordinance is legitimate, and the Ordinance is rationally aimed at achieving that purpose, the Court need not inquire further. Because the distinction created by the Ordinance is not arbitrary, the Ordinance does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim for relief under § 1983.
It is rare that courts find that a law does not pass the low hurdle of rational basis analysis. One example of where a law failed the test was City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). There, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a law requiring a permit to build homes for mentally retarded people was irrationally discriminatory.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.