Opinion
I.D. No. 1201000130
12-08-2015
GREGORY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.
Marc C. Petrucci, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State. Misty A. Seemans, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the Defendant.
OPINION
Marc C. Petrucci, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State. Misty A. Seemans, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the Defendant. Scott, J.
Introduction
Before the Court is Appellant Gregory Williams' ("Williams") appeal from the Court of Common Pleas denial of his Motion for Correction of Sentence under Del. Com. Pl. Crim. Pro. R. 35(a). The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions. For the following reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.
Background
On January 1, 2012, Williams was arrested for, inter alia, Driving by a Person Under the Age of 21 After Consumption of Alcohol ("DUI Under 21") and Reckless Driving Alcohol Related ("RAR"). The matter was accepted into the Court of Common Pleas on January 30, 2012. Williams was arraigned on February 17, 2012.
Williams had three case review dates, on March 14, 2012, April 18, 2012, and May 23, 2012. On May 23, 2012, Williams pleaded no contest to DUI Under 21 and RAR. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Williams was sentenced to a $200 fine plus court costs for the DUI Under 21 charge. On the RAR charge, Williams was sentenced to a $100 fine plus court costs, 30 days incarceration at Level V, suspended immediately for one year at Level I probation, and ordered to undergo a substance abuse evaluation within 28 days and complete a DUI program within five months. Williams was discharged from probation on January 17, 2013, at which time all fines had been paid and other conditions of Williams' sentence had been met.
On April 30, 2015, Williams filed a motion for a correction of sentence in the Court of Common Pleas. That motion was heard, and subsequently denied, on June 4, 2015.
Parties' Contentions
Below, and on this appeal, Williams argues that the RAR charge to which he pleaded guilty must be vacated because the DUI Under 21 and RAR charges merge. As such, Williams argues, convictions under both offenses violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The State argues that DUI Under 21 and RAR are separate and distinct offenses that do not implicate the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Standard of Review
A denial of a motion for correction of sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while questions of law are reviewed de novo. "The Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence." "Rule 35(a) permits relief when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous or inconsistent, or omits a required term."
Fountain v. State, 100 A.3d 1021 (Del. 2014).
Del. R. Com. Pl. Ct. RCRP R. 35(a).
Allison v. State, 105 A.3d 988 (Del. 2014) (citing Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998)).
Discussion
The Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." The court must determine if the "legislature intended that each violation be treated as a separate offense." To make this determination, "Delaware courts apply the statutory rule set forth in 11 Del. C. § 206(b), one part of which (subsection (b)(1)) parallels the well-known federal Blockberger test."
Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. 2003).
State v. Willis, 673 A.2d 1233, 1236 (Del. Super. 1995) (citing Hackett v. State, 569 A.2d 79 (Del. 1990)).
Id.; see also Blockberger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
A recently issued Delaware Supreme Court opinion is dispositive in this case. In Stevens v. State, the defendant asserted that Delaware's DUI law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because it provides for a harsher punishment than Delaware's Reckless Driving-Alcohol Related law even though both laws punish identical conduct. The Supreme Court held that RAR under 21 Del. C. §4175 is not a lesser included offense to DUI under 21 Del. C. § 4177(a). The Supreme Court held
2015 WL 7055375 (Nov. 12, 2015).
21 Del. C. §4175(b) (hereinafter "RAR" or "RDAR").
Stevens, 2015 WL 7055375 at 3.
But DUI and Reckless Driving—Alcohol Related ("RDAR") do not punish the same conduct. Each of the two statutes requires an element that the other does not. An element of RDAR is driving a vehicle in willful [sic] or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, an element not required for DUI. DUI requires proof that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs as described in 21 Del. C. § 4177(a)(1-6), an element not required for RDAR.Moreover, the Supreme Court held that, "because each statute contains an element that the other does not, one cannot be a lesser included offense of the other." A lesser included offense is one which is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts of a charged offense.
Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 5 A.3d 617, 620 (Del. 2010) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)) ("The Blockburger rule states that two distinct statutory provisions that condemn the same conduct constitute separate offenses when 'each provision requires proof of an additional fact, which the other does not.'")); see also 11 Del C. § 206 (codifying the Blockburger rule).
Importantly, the Supreme Court referenced several lower court decisions in recognizing that a number of trial courts have referred to RAR as a lesser included offense to DUI. The Supreme Court concluded by emphasizing that, despite prior opinions, RAR is not a lesser included offense to DUI. "The provisions of 21 Del. C. 4175(b) which give rise to the concept of [RAR] are penalty provisions which apply when a person who is charged with DUI is permitted to plead guilty to Reckless Driving. There is no offense of [RAR] separate from Reckless Driving."
Stevens, 2015 WL 7055375 at 3 (citing Wilkerson v. State, 1998 WL 472755, at *1 (Del. Super. Jun. 17, 1998); State v. Smallwood, 2012 WL 5869624, at *8 (Del. Com. Pl. Nov. 9, 2012); State v. Early, 2011 WL 6946970, at *5 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 2011); State v. Stonesfier, 2000 WL 33662346, at *3 n. 5 (Del. Com. Pl. Jun. 8, 2000)).
Stevens, 2015 WL 7055375 at 3.
Although the argument that Williams asserts in this case that his double jeopardy right was violated because the two offenses merge, the analysis of the offenses in Stevens is directly applicable, and dispositive, here. The Court finds, as the Stevens court did, that DUI Under 21 and RAR do not punish the same conduct. Each of the two statutes requires an element that the other does not. DUI Under 21 requires that the defendant must be under the age of 21, an element not required for RAR. An element of RDAR is driving a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, an element not required for DUI. Accordingly, Williams' claim that his plea to both offenses is illegal because DUI Under 21 and RAR do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not is meritless.
Id.
Moreover, because each statute contains an element that the other does not, one cannot be a lesser included offense to the other. In other words, DUI Under 21 and RAR cannot be a lesser included offense to either of the other. Furthermore, both offenses punish different conduct, as illustrated by the fact that each offense contains an element that the other does not. The DUI Under 21 statute is a strict liability offense that punishes the possession or consumption of alcohol while driving, by a person under the age of 21. The penalty for DUI Under 21 is either a fine or a suspension of licensing, imposition of which is determined by whether the defendant had a valid driver's license at the time of the offense. The RAR statute, on the other hand, punishes a defendant's reckless driving, with the added element that alcohol is involved. The penalties for RAR are a fine and/or incarceration, which is determined by whether the conviction is the defendant's first of that kind or a subsequent offense. Thus, DUI Under 21 and RAR do not involve varying degrees of the same risk or injury, and they are not intended to reach the same result.
See 11 Del C. § 206(b); Stevens, 2015 WL 7055375 at 3.
See Willis, 673 A.2d 1233. --------
Additionally, Williams was properly charged with RAR under 21 Del. C. §4175(a)(b). As Stevens clarified, DUI and RAR are separate and distinct offenses, and RAR is not a lesser included offense to RAR. Accordingly, there was no requirement that the State charge Williams with DUI under 21 Del. C. §4177(a), and then reduce the charge down to RAR, in order for Williams to be properly charged with RAR.
Conclusion
The Court of Common Pleas denied Williams' motion for correction of sentence, finding that there was no merger of the offenses, and therefore no double jeopardy issue, and that the case had been completely discharged. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds the Court of Common Pleas did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas' June 4, 2015 decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Calvin L . Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.