Opinion
CR-20-0294
10-08-2021
Jason Lavon WILLIAMS v. STATE of Alabama
Lee F. Knowles, Geneva, for appellant. Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Laura Irby Cuthbert, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.
Lee F. Knowles, Geneva, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Laura Irby Cuthbert, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.
MINOR, Judge.
Jason Lavon Williams pleaded guilty during his trial for murder, see § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975, reserving for appeal the issue whether the circuit court should have charged the jury on the lesser-included offense of heat-of-passion manslaughter. We hold that the circuit court properly denied Williams's request for a jury charge on heat-of-passion manslaughter because there was no reasonable theory, based on the evidence at trial, to support the theory that Williams killed Steven Kelley out of heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law. Thus, we affirm.
Rule 18.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that a defendant may, during trial, withdraw his or her plea of not guilty and plead guilty, "in which event the court shall proceed as provided in Rule 14.4." Rule 18.1(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P. Under Rule 14.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., a defendant who pleads guilty may expressly reserve the right to appeal a particular issue, "in which event appellate review shall be limited to a determination of the issue or issues so reserved." Rule 14.4(a)(1)(viii), Ala. R. Crim. P.
A Geneva County grand jury indicted Williams for Kelley's murder. Williams pleaded not guilty, and in September 2020 Williams's trial began.
The State's evidence at trial revealed that, when Williams killed Kelley, Williams and Lisa Hataway had been in a "common-law" marriage for nearly 23 years and had two children together, including a son named Eli. Hataway said that she and Williams had known Kelley, whose nickname was "Quick," for several years.
Hataway testified that during the year before Kelley was killed she and Williams separated three times, the last time being a little over a week before Kelley died. During that week she and Williams communicated "[a] little bit off and on," mostly through text messaging. She said their relationship that week was "[n]ot that great." (R. 78.)
On November 22, 2018, a few days after Hataway and Williams separated, Hataway and Kelley had sex at a mobile home belonging to Hataway's friend, Lacy. The next day Williams went to Lacy's trailer to see Hataway. Eli was with Williams. When Williams arrived, Kelley left Lacy's trailer so that Hataway and Williams could "handle[ ] [their] business." (R. 80.) Hataway later learned that, when Williams left Lacy's trailer, he picked up Kelley on the side of the road and drove him home. During the ride to Kelley's house, Kelley told Williams that he and Hataway had sex the night before. That same day Williams sent several text messages to Hataway:
"The new bitchboy just as much a pussy as the last one, chickenshit motherfucker in love with a snitchin ass dopewhore."
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"U make sure u tell that mf to not get it twisted, when i see him n my kids arent around im gona tear him another secondary asshole ...... then u can stick."
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"[S]teal for a livin, maybe sumbody blow both you fukn heads off."
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"Will u tell me what it is that makes me so bad in bed that u make excuses not to sleep w me just to lay down for a nasty mf like quick? Am i that bad?"
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"U n urs? Ima leave u alone dont worry .....u fukd him so i wud leave u alone ...... how duz his stomach-butt taste? Like ricky's."
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"I aint never touched nikki so try again lisa, if all u gona do is make excuses ok ....... but dnt act like u just fukd him last nite, u been fukn him a whl."
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"Its his neck i wana break bitch but i want u to witness it."
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"I had kids n eli was scared .....u think im goin away? Only god can save him from me bitch count on it."
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"Im givin u fair warning, if u get between me n him im goin thru u so don't."
(C. 121; 123-28; 132-33 (emphasis added).) Hataway testified that she told Williams that it was over between her and Kelley and that there was nothing between them.
The next day, Williams telephoned Hataway and asked her to come over to "try to work stuff out." (R. 86.) Hataway met with Williams at the house they had shared before they separated. When Hataway tried to leave, Williams pushed the door shut and locked it to keep Hataway from leaving. Hataway testified that, after she tried to throw a chair out of a window, Williams slammed her to the floor and punched her in the face before making her drive him to Kelley's house nearby. On the ride to Kelley's house Williams sat in the backseat of Hataway's vehicle with a blanket over his head so that Kelley would not see him.
Hataway testified that when she got to his house, Kelley came outside and got in the vehicle with her. As Hataway drove down the road, Williams came from the backseat and began fighting with Kelley. Kelley eventually got out of the vehicle and went through the woods toward his house. That day Williams sent another text message to Hataway: "Tell shitbag if I see him in lacy yard where I know u at ima get him again ..... we see how bad he wants that pussy, I bet he just say fuck it, tell ya to." (C. 129.)
The next day Williams sent another text message to Hataway: "Tell ur bitch boy ima get him evrytime I see him." (C. 131.) He then texted: "U better get all the dick u can get bitch, bc wen I get my hands on him again ima feed it ti him." (C. 130.)
Hataway testified that on November 27, the day before Kelley was killed, she and Williams discussed getting back together, and she told Williams that she was not ready to come home.
That night, Hataway and Kelley went together to Lacy's trailer to check on Lacy, because Hataway had been unable to reach her by telephone. When they arrived at Lacy's trailer around midnight, they found Lacy and her son with no electricity, telephone, or transportation. Lacy would not leave because she was waiting on her boyfriend to return home, so Hataway and Kelley stayed at the trailer with Lacy and her son. Hataway said that it was cold in the trailer so she wore three layers of clothes to stay warm.
The next morning, Williams called Hataway on her cell phone and learned that Hataway was at Lacy's trailer. He did not ask if Kelley was with her. About 15 minutes later, Williams arrived at Lacy's trailer. Lacy and her son had left in Hataway's vehicle so only Hataway and Kelley were at the trailer.
Hataway testified that she had gone back to sleep after talking with Williams on the phone, and that she woke up when Williams knocked on the door of the trailer. Hataway answered the door wearing jogging pants and a jogging shirt. She walked outside and sat down on the steps leading up to the trailer. Hataway said she asked Williams what he was doing, and Williams asked her what she was doing. Williams began to walk toward Hataway. Hataway testified: "I'm sitting on the porch, I don't know what triggered but that's—he come up and said, ‘no, I don't think so,’ or something like that." (R. 100.) Hataway testified that something "just hit him the wrong way, and he said, ‘no,’ or ‘no, fuck this,’ or ‘no fucking way,’ something like that." Williams placed his foot behind Hataway on the steps and pushed her out of the way and went in the trailer. Hataway testified that she saw Williams with a knife as he entered the trailer.
Hataway went inside the trailer and positioned herself in front of Williams. She testified that she told him to leave and she tried to get him to stop. Williams shoved her against a wall. He entered a bedroom where Kelley was lying on a mattress on the floor, wearing jeans and covered in a blanket. Williams stepped on the mattress and stabbed Kelley in the neck with a knife. Hataway testified that, before Williams stabbed Kelley, he told him: "You better have made your peace with God." (R. 107.)
Michael Hughes, Williams's cellmate in jail while Williams was awaiting trial, testified that Williams told him that he initially intended to kill both Hataway and Kelley. Hughes said that Williams told him that, when he found out where Hataway and Kelley were, he "made up his mind what he was gonna do. And he went to do exactly what he was gonna do. He drove down there, confronted her." (R. 258.)
After the State rested and the circuit court ruled that it would not instruct the jury on the defense of adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, Williams pleaded guilty to murder, reserving for appeal the issue whether the circuit court should have charged the jury on the lesser-included offense of heat-of-passion manslaughter.
The circuit court sentenced Williams to 30 years in prison. Williams's motion for a new trial was denied by operation of law, and Williams appealed.
On appeal, Williams argues that whether he witnessed Hataway "in the act of adultery" so as to be moved by a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation was a jury question. Williams argues that the "act of adultery" that a defendant must witness to invoke this defense is not limited to a defendant "actually see[ing] penetration." He says that whether Hataway's actions at Lacy's trailer "amounted to the act of adultery is and was the ultimate issue of the defense" and should have been a question for the jury.
" ‘ "A person accused of the greater offense has a right to have the court charge on lesser included offenses when there is a reasonable theory from the evidence supporting those lesser included offenses." MacEwan v. State, 701 So. 2d 66, 69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). An accused has the right to have the jury charged on " ‘any material hypothesis which the evidence in his favor tends to establish.’ " Ex parte Stork, 475 So. 2d 623, 624 (Ala. 1985). "[E]very accused is entitled to have charges given, which would not be misleading, which correctly state the law of his case, and which are supported by any evidence, however[ ] weak, insufficient, or doubtful in credibility," Ex parte Chavers, 361 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala. 1978), "even if the evidence supporting the charge is offered by the State." Ex parte Myers, 699 So. 2d 1285, 1290-91 (Ala. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1054, 118 S. Ct. 706, 139 L.Ed. 2d 648 (1998). However, "[t]he court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense." § 13A-1-9(b), Ala. Code 1975. "The basis of a charge on a lesser-included offense must be derived from the evidence presented at trial and cannot be based on speculation or conjecture." Broadnax v. State, 825 So. 2d 134, 200 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 825 So. 2d 233 (Ala. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 964, 122 S. Ct. 2675, 153 L.Ed. 2d 847 (2002). " ‘A court may properly refuse to charge on a lesser included offense only when (1) it is clear to the judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within the definition of the lesser offense, or (2) the requested charge would have a tendency to mislead or confuse the jury.’ " Williams v. State, 675 So. 2d 537, 540-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), quoting Anderson v. State, 507 So. 2d 580, 582 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).’
" Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584, 641 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (opinion on return to remand)."
Harbin v. State, 14 So. 3d 898, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
Under § 13A-6-2(a)(1), a person commits murder if, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of that person or of another person." Under subsection (b), though, "[a] person does not commit murder under subdivisions (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section if he or she was moved to act by a sudden heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law, and before there had been a reasonable time for the passion to cool and for reason to reassert itself." § 13A-6-2(b), Ala. Code 1975. A person commits manslaughter if he or she "causes the death of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder under § 13A-6-2 ; except, that he causes the death due to a sudden heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law, and before a reasonable time for the passion to cool and for reason to reassert itself." § 13A-6-3(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.
"[I]n order to reduce murder to manslaughter, the heat of passion must have been caused by a provocation recognized by law." Turner v. State, 708 So. 2d 232, 234 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
" ‘Alabama courts have, in fact, recognized three legal provocations sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter: (1) when the accused witnesses his or her
spouse in the act of adultery; (2) when the accused is assaulted or faced with an imminent assault on himself; and (3) when the accused witnesses an assault on a family member or close relative.’
" Rogers v. State, 819 So. 2d 643, 662 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)."
Spencer v. State, 201 So. 3d 573, 596-97 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). "[I]t is firmly established in Alabama that if one party finds his or her spouse in the act of adultery, the subsequent killing of either the offending spouse or the paramour is deemed, as a matter of law, to be caused by sufficient provocation." Biggs v. State, 441 So. 2d 989, 992 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
Alabama law is clear that a murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the defendant's sudden heat of passion was caused by the defendant witnessing his or her spouse "in the act of adultery." Traditionally, Alabama courts have viewed "actual sexual intercourse" as the only adulterous act on which sufficient provocation under § 13A-6-2(b) could exist. In Knight v. State, 907 So. 2d 470 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), this Court outlined the evolution of our law regarding what constitutes sufficient provocation when a defendant catches his or her spouse in the act of adultery.
"According to § 13A-6-2(b), Ala. Code 1975, a person is not guilty of murder if ‘he was moved to act by a sudden heat of passion caused by provocation required by law, and before there had been a reasonable time for the passion to cool and for reason to reassert itself.’
"The Alabama Supreme Court first recognized the legal princip[le] addressed in § 13A-6-2(b), Ala. Code 1975, in 1893:
" ‘Where one person detects another in the act of adultery with his wife, and he immediately slays the adulterer or his wife, as matter of law, the provocation is sufficient to reduce the killing to manslaughter. The law does not declare that any thing less than actual sexual intercourse is a sufficient provocation, as a matter of law, to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.’
" Hooks v. State, 99 Ala. 166, 168, 13 So. 767, 768 (1893). This principle was reaffirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court in Brunson v. State, 212 Ala. 571, 103 So. 664 (1925).
"However, in Anderson v. State, 507 So. 2d 580 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), this Court, departing from long-established precedent, held that an accused was entitled to a jury instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter based on his testimony that before he killed his wife he had visualized her nude standing by the bed of another man. This Court stated, ‘There was ... evidence, if believed by the jury, to support a reasonable theory that the death was caused due to a sudden heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law and, hence, a charge under § 13A-6-3(a)(2) would have also been appropriate.’ 507 So. 2d at 583. Anderson contained no discussion of whether the facts in that case constituted sufficient legal provocation for the killing; indeed, it was a radical departure from prior Alabama caselaw.
"This Court acknowledged in Biggs v. State, 441 So. 2d 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), that there was little law in Alabama concerning what, other than catching a spouse in the act of adultery, constitutes sufficient legal provocation for a heat-of-passion killing. The Biggs Court held that admissions of infidelity by one spouse to another were not sufficient to constitute legal provocation. We stated:
" ‘Although it is firmly established in Alabama that if one party finds his or her spouse in the act of adultery,
the subsequent killing of either the offending spouse or the paramour is deemed, as a matter of law, to be caused by sufficient provocation. Hooks v. State, 99 Ala. 166, 13 So. 767 (1893). No reported Alabama case has been decided on the basis that a spouse's admission of infidelity may also constitute adequate provocation for a "heat of passion" killing. See Farr v. State, 54 Ala. App. 80, 304 So. 2d 898 [(1974)], McNeill v. State, 102 Ala. 121, 15 So. 352 [(1894)].
" ‘To constitute adequate legal provocation, it must be of a nature calculated to influence the passions of the ordinary, reasonable man. Other than discovered adultery, courts have reached different conclusions as to what factual situations are embraced within this doctrine. See Commentary, § 13A-6-3, Code of Alabama 1975. See also Annot., 370 Mass. 438, 348 N.E.2d 802, 93 A.L.R.3d 920 (1979).
" ‘The well established rule in Alabama is that mere words, no matter how insulting or abusive, cannot reduce a killing to manslaughter. Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455 (1886). Appellant argues, however, that his wife's admission of past adulterous affairs, along with other degrading statements, constituted sufficient provocation to support a manslaughter verdict. Some other jurisdictions which follow the traditional rule that offensive statements are insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of manslaughter do recognize that words conveying information may be sufficient provocation. People v. Rice, 351 Ill. 604, 184 N.E. 894 (1933) ; People v. Ahlberg, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1041-1042, 301 N.E.2d 608 (1973) ; People v. Poole, 159 Mich. 350, 353, 123 N.W. 1093 (1909) ; Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87, 85 So. 129 (1920) ; State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 48-62, 47 S.W. 1058 (1898) ; State v. Martin, 216 S.C. 129, 140, 57 S.E.2d 55 (1949).
" ‘However, in Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 370 Mass. 438, 348 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1976), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was confronted with a situation similar to the case at bar. In Bermudez the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for the killing of his wife. The defendant told the police that he had been separated from his wife for approximately three weeks; he went to see her; while there he went upstairs to see their baby; and, when he came downstairs, his wife, using an obscenity, told him, "I don't need you around here, I have got another man." After once more using an obscenity, she told him to get out. He then pulled a gun and shot her. The Massachusetts court held that the wife's intimation that she had committed adultery did not constitute sufficient provocation to support a manslaughter verdict. Citing Palmore v. State, 283 Ala. 501, 508, 218 So. 2d 830 (Ala.1969), that court stated:
" ‘ "Past adultery lacks the peculiarly immediate and intense offense to a spouse's sensitivities which has led courts to recognize present adultery as adequate provocation, and many courts have refused to recognize discovery of past adultery as sufficient provocation." [ 370 Mass. at 442,] 348 N.E.2d at 802.
" ‘In the case at bar, no adulterous affair was discovered at the time of the shooting nor was there any mention by deceased of any past specific act of adultery. Mere suspicion, belief or knowledge of past adulterous affairs will not change the character of a
homicide from murder to manslaughter. State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E.2d 407 (1974).’
" 441 So. 2d at 992.
"Even later in Speake v. State, 610 So. 2d 1238 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), we acknowledged that the Alabama Supreme Court had never recognized any legal provocation sufficient to reduce a murder to heat-of-passion manslaughter unless the defendant actually caught his or her spouse in the act of adultery. We also noted that Alabama did not follow the modern trend. This Court stated:
" ‘In Brunson v. State, 212 Ala. 571, 103 So. 664 (1925), the defendant shot the deceased after accusing the deceased of having "just lain" with his (the defendant's) wife. The defendant requested the following jury charge:
" ‘ "If the jury believes from the evidence that immediately before the killing the defendant's wife and the deceased engaged in the act of sexual intercourse, and the circumstances then and there coming to the knowledge of the defendant apprised him of the fact, if it be a fact, then there was in the eyes of the law adequate provocation such as would reduce the crime to manslaughter, if the defendant acted in the heat of passion thereby aroused, and killed the deceased while under the influence of such passion."
" ‘ Brunson, 212 Ala. at 571, 103 So. at 665, 664. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the refusal of this requested charge was proper on the ground that " ‘[t]he law does not declare that any thing less than actual sexual intercourse is a sufficient provocation, as a matter of law, to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.’ " Brunson, 212 Ala. at 572, 103 So. at 665, quoting Hooks v. State, 99 Ala. 166, 168, 13 So. 767, 768 (1893).
" ‘We note that "[t]he modern tendency is to extend the rule of mitigation beyond the narrow situation where one spouse actually catches the other in the act of committing adultery." 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(b)(5) (1986).
" ‘ "The formerly well-established rule that words alone (or words plus gestures) will never do for reducing an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter has in many jurisdictions changed into a rule that words also will sometimes do, at least if the words are informational (conveying information of a fact which constitutes a reasonable provocation when that fact is observed) rather than merely insulting or abusive words. Thus a sudden confession of adultery by a wife, or information from a third person that a wife has been unfaithful, has sometimes been held to constitute a provocation to the husband of the same sort as if he had made an ‘ocular observation’ of his wife's adultery."
" ‘2 Substantive Criminal Law at § 7.10(b)(6) (footnotes omitted). See also Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 925 (1979). Despite this "modern tendency," this Court is bound by the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-16."
" 610 So. 2d at 1240-41.
"This Court's decision in Anderson was inconsistent with the law as previously announced by the Alabama Supreme Court. As we noted in Speake, we are bound by the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. See § 12-3-16, Ala. Code 1975. We now take this opportunity to correct our error in Anderson.
To the extent that our decision in Anderson conflicts with prior Alabama Supreme Court decisions that case is hereby overruled.
"Based on over 100 years of precedent we hold that no instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter was warranted in this case because Knight did not catch his wife in the act of adultery. See McGriff v. State, 908 So. 2d 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) ; Turner v. State, 708 So. 2d 232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). The circuit court committed no error in denying Knight's request for an instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter."
Knight, 907 So. 2d at 476-79.
The situation Williams found his wife in did not come close to what our courts have said is catching one's spouse in "in the act of adultery" or "actual sexual intercourse" for purposes of provocation recognized by law. Although Williams knew that his wife had, several days earlier, had sex with Kelley, when Williams arrived at Lacy's trailer Hataway answered the door fully clothed. Hataway sat down on the front steps, and she and Williams each asked what the other was doing. Williams then pushed past Hataway and went inside the trailer. Williams had his knife out as he entered the trailer, before confirming that Kelley was inside the trailer. When Williams found Kelley, Kelley was lying on a mattress, wearing jeans and covered in a blanket. Whatever suspicions Williams had about his wife, the only thing Williams knew when he entered the trailer with his knife was that his wife was sitting fully clothed on the steps of her friend's trailer and that Kelley might be inside. This evidence was insufficient to show adequate provocation recognized by law.
The circuit court properly refused Williams's requested jury charge on heat-of-passion manslaughter because there was no evidence tending to show that Williams caused Kelley's death due to a sudden heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Cole, JJ., concur.