Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-cv-0908
11-15-2021
EDDIE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDANT, SCI Greene, Respondent.
Mariani, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Eddie Williams. After a jury trial, Williams was convicted on October 14, 2015 of first-degree murder, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and other related charges stemming from a shooting incident in March 2014 that left one man dead, and one man grievously wounded. Two others were charged in the incident - one pleaded guilty and the other was tried jointly with Williams. Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He now asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective, stating five specific grounds for relief.
After review of the record, we find that Williams' claims are unexhausted or without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will recommend that his petition be denied.
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The factual background of the instant case was summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in its decision affirming the denial of Williams' petition for post-conviction relief:
On March 10, 2014, Appellant and his two co-defendants, Rick Cannon (“Cannon”) and Akeita Harden (“Harden”), drove to an apartment complex in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. N.T., 10/9/15, at 779. Patrolman James Gross was dispatched around 9:55 a.m. to the apartment complex after gunshots were heard. N.T., 10/6/15, at 29. It is undisputed that one man was killed and another man was wounded.
After arriving at the apartment complex, Gross saw two men enter a car driven by a female. Id. at 32. The men were eventually identified as Cannon and Appellant. Id. at 42, 53. The female driver was later identified as Harden. N.T., 10/9/15, at 787-88. Gross told the men entering the vehicle to stop; they did not, and a car chase ensued. N.T., 10/6/15, at 32. Gross testified the car was moving at “very high speeds, weaving in and out of traffic, at oncoming traffic” and was “posing great risk.” Id. at 37. Appellant fled the car, and a police officer found a handgun and cocaine in the direction Appellant had run. Id. at 45. Appellant was eventually apprehended in Philadelphia on October 6, 2014. N.T., 10/8/15, at 634-37. …
Cannon pleaded guilty and was sentenced before Appellant's October 2015 trial began. N.T., 10/6/15, at 21. At trial, Appellant's co-defendant Harden incriminated Appellant while testifying about the events of March 10, 2014, and her relationship with Appellant. N.T. 10/9/15, at 753-95. Harden was also cross-examined by Appellant's counsel. Id. at 795-880. On October 14, 2015, Appellant was found guilty of all charges and was sentenced to life imprisonment on December 2, 2015. N.T., 10/14/15, at 1236-45; Trial Ct. Order, 12/2/15. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.(Doc. 18-27, at 3-5).
Following his conviction Williams filed a Notice of Appeal on December 3, 2015, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to sever this case from Akeita Harden's case and in failing to suppress their recorded telephone conversations originating from Lebanon County Prison. (Doc. 18-23, at 3). The petitioner's trial counsel subsequently filed a no merit Anders brief and Petition for Withdrawal, (Doc. 18-27, at 5 n.17), which the Superior Court granted. (Id., at 12). The court affirmed Williams' sentence on August 24, 2016. (Id.) Williams did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Williams then filed his PCRA petition on July 10, 2017. (Doc. 1). This petition alleged six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, four claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and argued that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. PCRA counsel was appointed, and counsel thereafter filed two amended petitions, (Docs. 18-30, 18-31), with the second amended petition alleging twelve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 18-34, at 3-4). A hearing was held on March 26, 2018. (Doc. 18-32). At the hearing, Williams testified on his own behalf, and trial counsel, Harry Fenton, Esq., was called by the Commonwealth. (Doc. 18-34, at 4). The PCRA court ultimately denied the petition. (Id., at 34). Williams, still represented by appointed PCRA counsel, filed an appeal to the Superior Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court, denying Williams relief. (Doc. 18-41). A Petition for Allowance of Appeal was filed on October 18, 2019, (Doc. 41), and denied by the Supreme Court on March 24, 2020. (Doc. 42).
The respondent alleges the PCRA petition was filed on July 14, 2017 and was thus untimely. This argument is addressed later in this Report and Recommendation. For purposes of the procedural history, we reference the date of filing listed in the Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1, at 3).
The Superior Court opinion was split 2-1. The dissenting judge would have granted a new trial on the issue of Williams' trial counsel introducing evidence of his prior arrests. This claim is raised in the instant habeas petition and is addressed in this Report and Recommendation.
Thereafter, Williams filed the instant habeas corpus petition on June 3, 2020. (Doc. 1). A brief followed, raising five grounds that Williams believes entitle him to relief. (Doc. 11) On this score, he alleges five instances of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, in that counsel allegedly made significant errors in the admission of William's prior police record, failed to call a potential alibi witness and object to testimony that no witness existed, acquiesced to a full reading of co-defendant Richard Cannon's trial information, failed to move to suppress custodial statements, and failed to disclose a conflict of interest. As he concedes that three of his claims are at least partially unexhausted, Williams also argues that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these claims. The respondent filed an answer to the petition with accompanying memorandum on June 26, 2021. (Doc. 18). The petitioner filed a brief in reply on July 29, 2021 and, with leave of the Court, an amendment to the petition on August 25, 2021. (Doc. 24). On October 12, 2021, the respondent filed a response to the amended petition. Thus, the petition is ripe for resolution.
To the extent that the respondent alleges the untimeliness of the amended petition, we reject such claims. The respondent lodged no objection to the motion to amend until its response filed on October 12, 2021, a full 48 days after the motion to amend was granted by this Court. The respondent's response filed October 12, 2021 shall be treated as a response to the amended petition, thus making this petition ripe for disposition.
After review of the petition and the underlying state court record, we find that this petition was timely filed. We further conclude that three of Williams' five claims have not been fully exhausted, and Williams has not established cause to excuse the procedural default of these claims under Martinez. Finally, we find that those claims that have been exhausted have been thoroughly considered by the state courts and denied on their merits. Thus, given the deferential standard of review that applies to habeas petitions like Williams', we will recommend that the court deny Williams' petition.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
III. Discussion
A. State Prisoner Habeas Relief-The Legal Standard. (1) Substantive Standards
In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
..........
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b).
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy rigorous substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct that violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, ” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
(2) Deference Owed to State Courts
These same principles which inform the standard of review in habeas petitions and limit habeas relief to errors of a constitutional dimension also call upon federal courts to give an appropriate degree of deference to the factual findings and legal rulings made by the state courts in the course of state criminal proceedings. There are two critical components to this deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
First, with respect to legal rulings by state courts, under § 2254(d), habeas relief is not available to a petitioner for any claim that has been adjudicated on its merits in the state courts unless it can be shown that the decision was either: (1) “contrary to” or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established case law; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) was “based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Applying this deferential standard of review, federal courts frequently decline invitations by habeas petitioners to substitute their legal judgments for the considered views of the state trial and appellate courts. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); see also Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2006); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2002).
In addition, § 2254(e) provides that the determination of a factual issue by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding was erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption in favor of the correctness of state court factual findings has been extended to a host of factual findings made in the course of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1990). This principle applies to state court factual findings made both by the trial court and state appellate courts. Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir.2006). Thus, we may not re-assess credibility determinations made by the state courts, and we must give equal deference to both the explicit and implicit factual findings made by the state courts. Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, in a case such as this, where a state court judgment rests upon factual findings, it is well-settled that:
A state court decision based on a factual determination, ..., will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). We must presume that the state court's determination of factual issues was correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir.2000).Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2003). Applying this standard of review, federal courts may only grant habeas relief whenever “[o]ur reading of the PCRA court records convinces us that the Superior Court made an unreasonable finding of fact.” Rolan, 445 F.3d at 681.
(3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
These general principles apply with particular force to habeas petitions that are grounded in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is undisputed that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of every criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel. Under federal law, a collateral attack of a sentence based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must meet a two-part test established by the Supreme Court in order to survive. Specifically, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the performance of counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the underlying proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92 (1984). A petitioner must satisfy both of the Strickland prongs in order to maintain a claim of ineffective counsel. George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001).
At the outset, Strickland requires a petitioner to “establish first that counsel's performance was deficient.” Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). This threshold showing requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel made errors “so serious” that counsel was not functioning as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Id. Additionally, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. However, in making this assessment “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption' that counsel's performance was reasonable.” Id. (quoting Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996)).
But a mere showing of deficiencies by counsel is not sufficient to secure habeas relief. Under the second Strickland prong, a petitioner also “must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors.” Id. This prejudice requirement compels the petitioner to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
Thus, as set forth in Strickland, a petitioner claiming that his criminal defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective must show that his lawyer's “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The petitioner must then prove prejudice arising from counsel's failings. “Furthermore, in considering whether a petitioner suffered prejudice, ‘[t]he effect of counsel's inadequate performance must be evaluated in light of the totality of the evidence at trial: a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.'” Rolan, 445 F.3d at 682 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696) (internal quotations omitted).
Although sometimes couched in different language, the standard for evaluating claims of ineffectiveness under Pennsylvania law is substantively consistent with the standard set forth in Strickland. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (Pa.1987); see also Werts v. Vaugh, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] state court decision that applied the Pennsylvania [ineffective assistance of counsel] test did not apply a rule of law that contradicted Strickland and thus was not ‘contrary to' established Supreme Court precedent”). Accordingly, a federal court reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel brought in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may grant federal habeas relief if the petitioner can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland. Billinger v. Cameron, 2010 WL 2632286, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2010). In order to prevail against this standard, a petitioner must show that the state court's decision “cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.” Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009) (where the state court's application of federal law is challenged, “the state court's decision must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
This additional hurdle is added to the petitioner's substantive burden under Strickland. As the Supreme Court has observed a “doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (noting that the review of ineffectiveness claims is “doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas”). This doubly deferential standard of review applies with particular force to strategic judgment like those thrust upon counsel in the instant case. In this regard, the Court has held that:
“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, ” and “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). The deference which is owed to these strategic choices by trial counsel is great.
Therefore, in evaluating the first prong of the Strickland test, courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.'” Id. The presumption can be rebutted by showing “that the conduct was not, in fact, part of a strategy or by showing that the strategy employed was unsound.”Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 113 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499-500 (3d Cir. 2005)) (footnote omitted).
(4) Procedural Benchmarks - Statute of Limitations
Furthermore, state prisoners seeking relief under Section 2254 must also satisfy specific, and precise, procedural standards. Among these procedural prerequisites is a requirement that petitioners timely file motions seeking habeas corpus relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, established a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners. In pertinent part, § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or,
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.See Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998).
The calculation of this limitations period is governed by a series of well-defined rules. At the outset, these rules are prescribed by statute. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) prescribes several forms of statutory tolling. First, with respect to tolling based upon a petitioner's direct appeal of his conviction: “The limitation period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The courts have construed this tolling provision in a forgiving fashion, and in a manner that enables petitioners to toll their filing deadlines for the time periods in which they could have sought further direct appellate review of their cases, even if they did not, in fact, elect to seek such review. Thus, with respect to direct appeals, the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which a petitioner could have sought discretionary appellate court review, by way of allocator or through a petition for writ of certiorari, even if no such petition is filed. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009). After this period of time passes, however, by statute the judgment of conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Section 2244(d)(2), in turn, prescribes a second period of statutory tolling requirements while state prisoners seek collateral review of these convictions in state court, and provides that:
The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).
In assessing § 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision, for purposes of tolling the federal habeas statute of limitations, a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” only includes applications which are filed in a timely fashion under state law. Therefore, if the petitioner is delinquent in seeking state collateral review of his conviction, that tardy state pleading will not be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and will not toll the limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-14 (2005); Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3d. Cir. 2004). Moreover, in contrast to the direct appeal tolling provisions, this post-conviction petition tolling provision does not allow for an additional period of tolling for the petitioner who does not seek further discretionary appellate court review of his conviction and sentence. Miller v. Dragovich, 311 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
Beyond this tolling period mandated by statute, it has also been held that AEDPA's one-year limitations period is not a jurisdictional bar to the filing of habeas petitions, Miller, 145 F.3d at 617-18, and, therefore, is subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 618-19. Yet, while equitable tolling is permitted in state habeas petitions under AEDPA, it is not favored. As the Third Circuit has observed: “[E]quitable tolling is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair.' Generally, this will occur when the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way ... been prevented from asserting his or her rights' The petitioner must show that he or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims' Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.” Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted). Indeed, it has been held that only:
[T]hree circumstances permit[ ] equitable tolling: if
(1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff,
(2) if the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or
(3) if the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)).
Applying this exacting standard, courts have held that: “In non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling. See Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no basis for equitable tolling where the statute of limitations was changed to shorten the time for filing a PCRA only four months prior to the filing of the petition); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding lawyer's inadequate research, which led to miscalculating the deadline, did not warrant equitable tolling).” Id. While courts apply exacting standards to equitable tolling claims, it is evident that complete abandonment of a petitioner by his counsel can constitute one of the extraordinary circumstances justifying such equitable tolling. In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the Supreme Court of the United States held that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d). Id., at 645. Further, the Court in Holland held that an attorney's actions or inactions, if egregious enough, can constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” that justifies equitable tolling of a habeas petition. Id., at 651-52; see also Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding a district court's determination of equitable tolling based on attorney misconduct).
(5) Procedural Benchmarks - Exhaustion and Procedural Default
a. Exhaustion of State Remedies
State prisoners seeking relief under section 2254 must also satisfy specific, additional procedural standards. Among these procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). In instances where a state prisoner has failed to exhaust the legal remedies available to him in the state courts, federal courts typically will refuse to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2002).
This statutory exhaustion requirement is rooted in principles of comity and reflects the fundamental idea that the state should be given the initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the petitioner's constitutional rights. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). The Supreme Court has explained that “a rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule” is necessary in our dual system of government to prevent a federal district court from upsetting a state court decision without first providing the state courts the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). Requiring exhaustion of claims in state court also promotes the important goal of ensuring that a complete factual record is created to aid a federal court in its review of § 2254 petitions. Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 (3d Cir. 1995). A petitioner seeking to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, therefore, bears the burden of showing that all of the claims alleged have been “fairly presented” to the state courts, and the claims brought in federal court must be the “substantial equivalent” of those presented to the state courts. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992); Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1982). A petitioner cannot avoid this responsibility merely by suggesting that he is unlikely to succeed in obtaining state relief, since it is well-settled that a claim of “likely futility on the merits does not excuse failure to exhaust a claim in state court.” Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2005).
Although this exhaustion requirement compels petitioners to have previously given the state courts a fair “opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [the petitioner's] constitutional claim, ” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971), this requirement is to be applied in a commonsense fashion. Thus, the exhaustion requirement is met when a petitioner submits the gist of his federal complaint to the state courts for consideration, without the necessity that the petitioner engage in some “talismanic” recitation of specific constitutional clams. Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230-33. Similarly, a petitioner meets his obligation by fairly presenting a claim to state courts, even if the state courts decline to address that claim. Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005) (per curiam); Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 2004).
b. Procedural Default
A necessary corollary of this exhaustion requirement is the procedural default doctrine, which applies in habeas corpus cases. Certain habeas claims, while not exhausted in state court, may also be incapable of exhaustion in the state legal system by the time a petitioner files a federal habeas petition because state procedural rules bar further review of the claim. In such instances:
In order for a claim to be exhausted, it must be “fairly presented” to the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). If a claim has not been fairly presented to the state courts and it is still possible for the claim to be raised in the state courts, the claim is unexhausted . . . . If a claim has not been fairly presented to the state courts but state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural default may come into play. A procedural default occurs when a prisoner's federal claim is barred from consideration in the state courts by an “independent and adequate” state procedural rule. Federal courts may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the default and actual “prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation of the federal law or unless the applicant demonstrates that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental “miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002).
“[A] federal court will ordinarily not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus ‘[o]ut of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice.' This is a reflection of the rule that ‘federal courts will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent state law procedural ground.'” Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Given these concerns of comity, the exceptions to the procedural default rule, while well-recognized, are narrowly defined. Thus, for purposes of excusing a procedural default of a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief, “[t]he Supreme Court has delineated what constitutes ‘cause' for the procedural default: the petitioner must ‘show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.'” Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Similarly, when examining the second component of this “cause and prejudice” exception to the procedural default rule, it is clear that:
With regard to the prejudice requirement, the habeas petitioner must prove “‘not merely that the errors at … trial created the possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.'” This standard essentially requires the petitioner to show he was denied “fundamental fairness” at trial. In the context of an ineffective assistance claim, we have stated that prejudice occurs where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
Likewise, the “miscarriage of justice” exception to this procedural bar rule is also narrowly tailored and requires a credible assertion of actual innocence to justify a petitioner's failure to comply with state procedural rules. Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 338.
Procedural bar claims typically arise in one of two factual contexts. First, in many instances, the procedural bar doctrine is asserted because an express state court ruling in prior litigation denying consideration of a habeas petitioner's state claims on some state procedural ground. In such a situation, courts have held that:
A habeas claim has been procedurally defaulted when “a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). For a federal habeas claim to be barred by procedural default, however, the state rule must have been announced prior to its application in the petitioner's case and must have been “firmly established and regularly followed.” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). Whether the rule was firmly established and regularly followed is determined as of the date the default occurred, not the date the state court relied on it, Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 684 (3d Cir. 1996), because a petitioner is entitled to notice of how to present a claim in state court.Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24).
In other instances, the procedural default arises, not because of an express state court ruling, but as a consequence of a tactical choice by a habeas petitioner, who elects to waive or forego a claim in the course of his state proceedings, and thus fails to fully exhaust the claim within the time limits prescribed by state statute or procedural rules. In such instances the petitioner's tactical choices in state court litigation also yield procedural defaults and waivers of claims federally. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 2004) (procedural default where petitioner failed to timely pursue state claim); Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). Accordingly, a petitioner's strategic choices in state court waiving or abandoning state claims may act as a procedural bar to federal consideration of his claims, unless the petitioner can show either “cause and prejudice” or demonstrate a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess Williams' petition.
B. This Petition is Timely.
At the outset, we find that the petition was timely filed under the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. The parties do not dispute the date the statute commenced, but rather disagree on the date it was tolled by the petitioner's PCRA petition.
Since the petitioner did not seek allocator with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, his conviction and sentence became final on September 23, 2016, thirty days after the Superior Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. The statute of limitations was then tolled by the filing of the petitioner's PCRA petition. As the petitioner notes, when assessing the timeliness of inmate filings, we are cautioned to apply a rule unique to inmates and assess the timeliness of their filings in accordance with what is commonly referred to as the “prison mailbox rule.” This rule, initially announced by the United States Supreme Court when assessing the timeliness of an inmate habeas petitioner's filing of a notice of appeal, acknowledges that an inmate's conditions of confinement may necessarily limit his ability to file pleadings. Taking this fact of incarceration into account, the court fashioned a rule which concluded that a pro se prisoner litigant “filed his notice within the requisite . . . period when, . . . before the deadline, he delivered the notice to prison authorities for forwarding to the District Court.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
The petitioner alleges, and has provided a receipt confirming, that his pro se PCRA petition was placed in the prison mail on July 10, 2017. (Doc. 23, at 3). Thus, we find that his petition was filed, and the statute tolled, on that date. The fact that the trial court noted the date of filing as July 14, 2017 is irrelevant; the timeliness of the petition was not at issue in the PCRA proceedings. Further, the respondent has provided no authority supporting the proposition that the petitioner must correct the record as to the filing date or waive his right to assert the correct date in his habeas petition. Since we recognize the date of filing as July 10, 2017, the statute was tolled from that date until March 24, 2020, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocator on the appeal of the Superior Court's denial of PCRA relief. Accordingly, Williams had until June 7, 2020 to file his habeas corpus petition. Williams filed the instant habeas petition on June 3, 2020, making his petition timely.
C. This Petition Should Be Denied.
What the petitioner presents in his brief as five distinct grounds for relief raises what essentially equates to seven separate errors of his trial counsel which he claims amounted to ineffective assistance, as well as a due process claim alleging the prosecution failed to correct false testimony. Although we find his petition was timely filed, two of his enumerated claims are wholly unexhausted and do not fall within the exception under Martinez, and the other three claims have been thoroughly considered by the state courts and found to be meritless. Accordingly, given the deference that must be afforded to the state courts' findings, we conclude that this petition should be denied.
Grounds I and II contain subclaims, some of which are raised for the first time in the petitioner's most recent brief. Because the petitioner has included each subclaim within a ground that has partially been considered by the state courts, we address each with the exhausted portion for efficiency purposes because much of the state's analysis applies to those subclaims that are now incorporated in the exhausted grounds.
(1) Some of Williams' Claims are Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted.
Federal courts typically require a full and complete round of appeals before a claim is deemed exhausted. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45 (1999) (finding that a petitioner properly exhausts claims in state court “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process”); Lines v. Larkin, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Petitioners who have not fairly presented their claims to the highest state court have failed to exhaust those claims”); Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230 (“A claim must be presented not only to the trial court but also the state's intermediate court as well as to its supreme court”); Blasi v. Atty. Gen. of Pa., 30 F.Supp.2d 481, 486 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (“The exhaustion doctrine requires the defendant to present the issue to any intermediate state appellate court, if applicable, and to the state's supreme court”). On this score, Williams has raised several different iterations of constitutional violations at different stages in his appeals process, only a few of which have remained asserted consistently through the requisite proceedings to be considered exhausted by the state court. In fact, Williams' brief in support of his petition contained a different set of complaints than the habeas petition itself.
We recognize that this is, in part, due to Williams' retaining the services of at least three different attorneys throughout this litigation, while also submitting his original PCRA petition pro se. On this score, we view the series of claims he presents in his most recent habeas brief liberally, not employing an exacting standard in ensuring his claims have been exhausted word-for-word, but rather viewing his claims holistically to determine whether the claims he brings in federal court are the “substantial equivalent” of those presented to the state courts. See Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992); Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1982).
Even so, the petitioner has acknowledged certain claims remain unexhausted and procedurally defaulted: Ground VI, alleging that trial counsel failed to move to suppress a custodial statement allegedly taken by police from the petitioner and failed to request a jury instruction regarding its voluntariness; and Ground VIII, alleging that trial counsel failed to alert the petitioner to a conflict of interest arising from counsel's prior representation of witness Michael Meagher. For each procedurally defaulted claim, the petitioner seeks de novo review under Martinez, arguing that these claims are substantial and should excuse his procedural default.
In his supporting brief, the petitioner withdrew five grounds raised in the original habeas petition, but used the same numbers assigned to the Grounds in the petition. Thus, the numbers used in the petitioner's brief are not all in sequential order.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
To the extent that the petitioner argues the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel to overcome the procedural default of his claims, we note that, as a general rule, Section 2254 states that “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). Further, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, ” and consequently “a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) and Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982)); see also Holman v. Gillis, 58 F.Supp.2d 587, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that “a claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition because the right to effective assistance of PCRA counsel exists pursuant to state law, and is not mandated by the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).
The Supreme Court in Martinez created an exception to the general rule prohibiting claims asserted against PCRA counsel, where it held:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17.
The Martinez exception is narrow in that it provides a petitioner with a method to establish “cause” for a procedural default on some legal claim. Id. It does not, however, allow a petitioner to rely on the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel as a ground for relief, as that is precluded by § 2254(i). Id. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner seeks relief on the ground that his PCRA counsel was ineffective, such relief should be denied.
To the extent the petitioner seeks to use PCRA counsel's alleged ineffectiveness as “cause” to excuse any procedural default of his unexhausted constitutional claims, under Martinez, the failure to raise a claim in a PCRA petition is excused only if counsel rendered ineffective assistance in developing, or failing to develop, the claim. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 21-22. Additionally, the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that was not raised must be a substantial one- that is, it must have some merit. Id. at 14. This is a very high standard, as counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
Against this backdrop, we address the petitioner's first unexhausted claim- that trial counsel failed to move to suppress an allegedly involuntary custodial statement by the petitioner. In a related subclaim, the petitioner also alleges that trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction related to the voluntariness of said statement. Williams never presented this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court, and thus this claim is not properly before us for our consideration; it is wholly unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted, as the time for bringing this claim has passed. Further, Williams has not provided “cause” or “prejudice” to excuse this procedural default as this new claim is meritless.
As previously stated, the petitioner's procedural default of this ground is only excused under Martinez if his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim has merit. We find that it does not. First, trial counsel's performance did not fall below and objective standard of reasonableness. The petitioner now, at this late stage of litigation, seems to assert for the first time that statements he made to police were not voluntary. However, the respondent has argued, and we agree, that the petitioner has not demonstrated that trial counsel was aware of any basis for suppression.
The petitioner's argument centers around the testimony of Chief Leahy, who testified that he administered Miranda warnings to the petitioner prior to a custodial interrogation, but provided no evidence showing such advice or waiver of rights. He points to Leahy's testimony where he was asked, “And after advising him of those rights did you and Corporal Achey interview Eddie Williams?” and he answered simply, “We did.” (Doc. 11, at 48). The petitioner's argument presumes that Leahy interviewed him without waiting for a waiver. Our reading of the testimony, however, is that Leahy was asked whether he followed the standard process of Miranda, and he indicated that he had. (Doc. 18-13, at 7-8). We decline to infer from this testimony that Leahy proceeded to interview Williams without a waiver of his rights, as it does not appear from the record that the petitioner ever contested the waiver or notified the court or to his trial counsel that his statements were involuntary.
On this score, the petitioner points us to three places in the record where he “steadfastly” denied having waived his Miranda rights. But the record indicates that, although he does deny waiving his Miranda rights, he also denies giving police a statement at all, saying that Chief Leahy either lied or made up his testimony. (Doc. 18-14, at 78). In fact, at one point, he states “[i]f they have a statement and they are saying they got it from me, I never talked to them about this case.” (Doc. 18-14, at 113-14). His position was that Leahy made up their conversation, not that he provided information to him involuntarily. Given Williams' insistence that the statement was never made, there is nothing in the record to indicate that trial counsel had even an arguable basis for filing a motion to suppress Williams' statements to Leahy. Therefore, it was reasonable for him to decline to do so. Similarly, trial counsel would have had no reason to request an instruction to the jury regarding the voluntariness of statements that Williams insisted were never made.
There is also no evidence that the inclusion of Leahy's testimony about Williams' statements changed the outcome of the proceeding. The petitioner argues that his trial attorney was ineffective when he failed to move to suppress Leahy's testimony because the alleged statements were “material to his client's guilt.” (Doc. 11, at 50). But it is unclear from the petitioner's brief exactly which of Williams' alleged statements from Leahy's testimony would be considered inculpatory. Besides one point in his testimony where Leahy says Williams asked “how did they know it was him” referring to a wanted poster he saw on social media, (Doc. 18-13, at 11), Leahy's testimony largely aligns with Williams' version of events at trial. Leahy testified that Williams continually maintained that Rick committed the murders and that he was outside when he heard the first shot. (Doc 18-13, at 12-22). Williams also maintained in his testimony that Rick committed the murders and that he was outside when he heard the first shots. (Doc. 18-14, at 61-62).
The brief submitted by the petitioner does not point to any part of Leahy's testimony that, had it been suppressed, would have made a difference in the outcome of Williams' trial. Chief Leahy's testimony, in our view, was far from the most inculpatory evidence leveled against the petitioner. Even if Leahy's testimony had been suppressed, Williams was still implicated by the testimony of Mr. Crawford, who identified Williams as being in the apartment and committing the shooting. Thus, the claim that Williams' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the statements William denied making to Leahy and failing to move for a jury statement as to the voluntariness of such statements is without merit. Since it is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Williams has not demonstrated cause to excuse the procedural default under Martinez, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.
We next address what the petitioner designates as Ground VIII, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to alert the petitioner to the conflict of interest that arose from counsel's prior representation of witness Michael Meagher. Williams failed to present this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court, and thus this claim is not properly before us for our consideration; it is wholly unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted, as the time for bringing this claim has passed. Further, Williams has not provided “cause” or “prejudice” to excuse this procedural default as this new claim is meritless.
Mr. Meager was a government witness who testified that he shared a cell with Williams for about two days, and during that time Williams asked him to convey a message to co-conspirator, Cannon, that he should “take the rap” for him. (Doc. 11, at 55). It was brought to the court's attention in a sidebar outside the presence of the jury that Williams' trial counsel had previously represented Meagher in an unrelated matter. (Doc. 18-11, at 521). The petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to alert him to this conflict rendered him ineffective.
We first note that, “the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). To demonstrate a violation of the Sixth Amendment in the case of a conflict of interest, “a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.” Id. Thus, for the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be meritorious, he must show that there was an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance.
Instead of demonstrating how this conflict adversely affected his representation at trial, the petitioner argues that, because the trial court knew of the conflict and failed to inquire further, we must presume that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance. The petitioner cites to the Supreme Court's analysis in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), to demonstrate that he is entitled to such a presumption. However, Mickens points to a narrow exception, “creat[ing] an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)) (emphasis added). Conflating this narrow holding to create a presumption in all circumstances where a court is aware of any conflict is expressly what the Mickens court declined to do. In fact, in Mickens, the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict did not relieve the petitioner of his burden of showing the conflict adversely affected his representation. (Id.) Thus, the petitioner is asking this court to apply a rule Mickens precisely declined to apply. We similarly decline to do so.
At the outset, Meager and the petitioner were not codefendants-Meagher was a witness for the prosecution-and the representation was not concurrent, but prior, in an unrelated matter. Further, there is no indication that trial counsel objected to the representation of the petitioner based on his former representation of the government's witness Mr. Meager. The ethical obligation to avoid conflicts of interest rests upon trial counsel, and “[a]bsent special circumstances . . . trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47. Trial counsel did not object to the representation, and thus the trial court's failure to inquire beyond the initial exchange cited by the petitioner does not entitle him to automatic reversal. The petitioner has not asserted an alternative argument demonstrating how the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance at trial. Thus, we cannot find that trial counsel was ineffective on this ground and the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a sufficiently meritorious claim to overcome the procedural default of this ground.
(2) Williams' Remaining Claims are Meritless.
Having disposed of the unexhausted claims raised in the petition, we next address Williams' three additional grounds of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, which the state courts found to be without merit. He claims trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to and opening the door to evidence of his prior police record that would have otherwise been inadmissible; for failing to call witness Matthew Snavely and failing to object to false testimony regarding the existence of this witness; and for acquiescing to a full reading of co-conspirator Cannon's trial information, including that he pleaded guilty to conspiracy. The Superior Court addressed these claims and affirmed the PCRA court's dismissal of Williams' petition, finding Williams' counsel did not render ineffective assistance. We agree.
Two of the three grounds addressed as exhausted include subclaims that had not previously been raised in the petitioner's PCRA proceedings. Although the petitioner has conceded that parts of these claims are unexhausted, he nonetheless requests review under the Martinez standard, which requires an analysis of their merits. As the petitioner has incorporated these grounds within claims that had already been decided on the merits by the state court, we consider the structure of his brief to be an invitation to consider his newly asserted subclaims against the backdrop of the decisions rendered in the state court. Thus, in the interest of efficiency and to avoid duplicitous analysis, we address each of these grounds as a whole.
Williams first alleges that trial counsel made three errors regarding Williams' prior police record: (1) failing to object to the introduction of numerous instances of false pedigree information provided by the petitioner; (2) failing to challenge the use of convictions older than ten years; and (3) asking on direct examination if the petitioner had ever been arrested. The petitioner argues that this evidence of his prior convictions and arrests would otherwise have been inadmissible, and thus he was prejudiced when his attorney allowed the evidence to come in at trial.
The state courts addressed the petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for asking him on direct examination if he had been previously arrested and declined to grant Williams relief as to this ground on both the trial and appellate levels. Both courts provided detailed analyses that will aid in our review of the issue. Williams has also included two subclaims in Ground I that are raised for the first time in his habeas brief. Counsel acknowledges that the subclaims were not raised by initial PCRA counsel and seeks de novo review of them under Martinez. However, counsel also invites the Court to consider these issues together, explaining:
These two claims together alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in the way in which he litigated, or failed to litigate, evidentiary issues that harmed Petitioner's credibility. Sub-ground C, was merely a third instance where counsel failed to make professionally appropriate decisions related to the looming attacks on his client's credibility.(Doc. 23, at 19). Although we acknowledge that the petitioner has not fully exhausted the entirety of Ground I in state court, we nevertheless consider this ground as a whole, as the state court's analysis of this ground applies with equal weight to the newly raised subclaims.
The PCRA court described that, “trial counsel had stated that the understood strategy was not to hide from Defendant's background, but to concede past crimes and an unsavory lifestyle, in hopes that the jury would recognize the admission and understand that such an admission does not necessarily implicate Defendant in the crimes being tried.” (Doc. 18-34, at 33). The court found that, since the defendant had not presented an alternative strategy that offered a greater potential for success, he had not shown trial counsel was ineffective. The Superior Court agreed. Although the court found eliciting testimony from an appellant about prior arrests had arguable merit, the deferential standard required denial of relief whenever counsel's decisions have any reasonable basis. (Doc. 18-41, at 7). The Superior Court found that “it was a reasonable defense strategy not to hide from Appellant's past but to confront it head-on.” (Id.)
Pennsylvania courts use an application of Strickland defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018), which requires the petitioner to prove three elements: 1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; 2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action; and 3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's action. Brown, 196 A.3d at 150.
The Superior Court then focused substantial attention on the prejudice prong of Strickland, explaining that the express references to Williams' prior arrest record were extremely limited in contrast to the abundance of evidence introduced by the Commonwealth that Williams had been involved in major criminal activity for decades. (Id., at 8). The Superior Court's analysis also emphasizes the voluminous compelling evidence unrelated to his prior police record which supported the guilty verdicts and characterized the evidence as follows:
The evidence establishes that Appellant and the victim, Keith Crawford, were partners in the drug-dealing business. They worked together for years but recently had a falling-out over drugs and money. On the morning of March 10, 2014, Appellant, his former girlfriend,
and co-defendant, Akeita Harden, and his cousin, Rick Cannon, traveled to Mr. Crawford's home in a red Cadillac SUV which was owned by Ms. Harden's friend. At some point that morning, Appellant, Ms. Harden and Mr. Cannon were inside Mr. Crawford's home with Mr. Crawford and the other victim, Marcus Ortiz. Mr. Crawford was “cooking” cocaine into crack cocaine. Ms. Harden returned to the SUV at which time she heard gunshots and saw Appellant and Mr. Cannon run from Mr. Crawford's apartment and return to the SUV. Appellant was carrying a paper bag and jumped into the front passenger seat. Mr. Cannon got in the back seat. Appellant was screaming at Ms. Harden, who was in the driver seat, to “get me the f**k out of here.” N.T., 10/9/15, at 864. Ms. Harden led the police through Lebanon, Pennsylvania on a high-speed chase while Appellant yelled directions to her, even as she ran into a yard, hit signs and ran over a fire hydrant. Appellant eventually ordered Ms. Harden to stop the SUV at an alley near 7th and Guilford Streets, which was only a short distance from Appellant's stash house. Appellant jumped out of the front passenger seat of the SUV and ran down the alley. Ms. Harden was stopped by police near the SUV. Mr. Cannon jumped from the passenger seat and ran in the opposite direction from Appellant where he was eventually apprehended. Appellant was successful in eluding police that day.
In the alley where Appellant escaped, the police recovered a ring that belonged to Mr. Crawford and a bag of cocaine. Also found in the alley was a 9-millimeter Makarov which was determined to be the weapon used in the shootings of both Mr. Crawford and Mr. Ortiz. The Makarov had Appellant's DNA on the grip. When the SUV was searched, a watch belonging to Mr. Crawford (that contained drops of Mr. Crawford's blood) was located in the doorjamb between the front passenger seat and the door, and a key ring containing Mr. Crawford's house and car keys was found on the floor of the passenger seat.
Appellant was arrested several months later in Philadelphia. Appellant admitted during trial that he gave false names and identification and lied repeatedly when first questioned by police.
A former cellmate of Appellant's testified that he was being transferred to a different cell block in the jail where Mr. Cannon was located. Prior to his transfer, Appellant told the cellmate to tell Mr. Cannon that he should take the rap since Mr. Cannon had Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDs) and was going to die in jail anyway. Appellant also told his cellmate to tell Mr. Cannon that, if he took the blame, Appellant would take care of Mr. Cannon by providing him with drugs and commissary money. When Appellant learned that his cellmate was going to testify at Appellant's trial, Appellant threatened to kill him.
Most importantly, Mr. Crawford, the surviving victim of the shooting, identified Appellant during a photo lineup and testified during trial that Appellant stole his watch and ring and was the man that shot him.(Doc. 18-41, at 11-12).
In a footnote, the Superior Court added that Ms. Harden, the petitioner's co-defendant at trial, told police after being apprehended that the petitioner talked about robbing Mr. Crawford about one week prior to the incident, although she later recanted that statement at trial. (Id., at 11 n.3).
Based on the foregoing, in finding that the petitioner had not established that he suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions, the Superior Court noted, “[w]ith this vast amount of evidence, we cannot conclude that, had Appellant not been asked about his prior arrest record, there would be a reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different.” (Id. at 12).
Williams has now added that the failure of trial counsel to object to the testimony of Chief Leahy about his “numerous aliases, ” dates of birth, and social security numbers (false pedigree information), and his stipulation to the admission of crimen falsi prior convictions older than ten years were unreasonable trial strategies that further prejudiced his proceeding. Although the Superior Court did not directly address these two subclaims, they did note that “it was a reasonable defense strategy not to hide from appellant's past but to confront it head-on.” (Doc. 18-41, at 7). We find that these two alleged errors were supported by the same strategy that the state court found to be reasonable. Even considering them cumulatively, as the petitioner asks us to do under Strickland, we cannot find that, but for these alleged errors, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that the result of the proceeding would have been different had this evidence not been included. Under the doubly deferential standard we are to apply, especially in cases where the strategic judgment of trial counsel is at issue, the admission of the petitioner's police record, including previous convictions for robbery and 14 false aliases, were unlikely to have so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable finding of guilt could have taken place, particularly given the litany of evidence presented against defendant, including an in-court identification by the victim.
Accordingly, we find that the state court's dismissal of the petitioner's Ground I was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.
Williams also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate and call Matthew Snavely as a trial witness. The respondent argues that the petitioner failed to exhaust this claim because he did not raise it in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Although, as previously stated, federal courts typically require a full and complete round of appeals before a claim is deemed exhausted, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order No. 218, which expressly allows petitioners to forego state Supreme Court review of legal claims exhausted in the Superior Court, it has been held that “Order No. 218 renders review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ‘unavailable' for purposes of exhausting state court remedies under § 2254(c).” Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, acting out of an abundance of caution, we will treat this ineffective assistance of counsel claim as exhausted.
The petitioner also includes a related due process argument within Ground III-that the Commonwealth failed to correct false testimony regarding the existence of this witness. Although this ground was raised in the petitioners pro se PCRA petition, it was removed from the pleadings prior to the hearing and thus the state court did not rule on this portion of Ground III. Nevertheless, for reasons previously discussed, we address its merits along with the exhausted portion of this ground.
Matthew Snavely was a neighbor who, when interviewed by police, indicated that he saw Williams outside the apartment where the shooting occurred on the morning of the incident. Since Williams testified that he was present near the scene but was outside of the apartment when the shots were fired, he argues that the failure to include Mr. Snavely as a witness was a prejudicial error of trial counsel, rendering his assistance ineffective. Further, Chief Leahy, one of the investigators of the incident, denied in his testimony that any witness existed, despite the police records showing that Snavely was interviewed by police at least twice, and identified
Williams as the person he saw outside the apartment in a photo array organized by investigators. The petitioner contends that trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Leahy more vigorously about the existence of Snavely amounted to ineffective assistance.
The PCRA court addressed these claims and found that counsel did not render ineffective assistance. The PCRA court analyzed the issue as follows:
To establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, [a defendant] must demonstrate that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. Failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel, for such a decision implicates matters of trial strategy. It is [a defendant's] burden to demonstrate that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for declining to call [ ] a witness.” Com. v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 599 (Pa. 2007).
Defendant has demonstrated that Mr. Snevely existed as a possible witness and that Trial Counsel knew of Mr. Snevely. However, we note that Defendant failed to demonstrate that Mr. Snevely was available and willing to testify as a witness for the defense at trial. Defendant
failed to call Mr. Snevely to testify at the PCRA Hearing regarding what his testimony might have been at trial. Defendant's speculation that Mr. Snevely's testimony would have corroborated his alibi does not establish that the witness' absence at trial was so prejudicial as to deny his right to a fair trial. Consequently, we find no merit in Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance for failure to call Mr. Snevely as a witness at trial.
As for Trial Counsel's cross-examination of Chief Leahy, we again find that Defendant has failed to establish that an alternative strategy presented the opportunity for a substantially greater potential for success. Trial Counsel clearly brought forth the issue of Mr. Snevely to the jury during his cross-examination of Chief Leahy and even mentioned the fact that Mr. Snevely's name was on the list of witnesses. Nevertheless, as Trial Counsel expressed during the PCRA Hearing, the concern as to establishing the timeline in support of Defendant's alibi could undermine his defense altogether. Defendant fails to bridge the gap between attacking the credibility of Chief Leahy as to the witness and such inaction so affecting the outcome of his trial as to undermine the result thereof.(Doc. 18-34, at 11-12). The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim, though it did not elaborate on the PCRA court's analysis.
The witness' name is Snavely, though the PCRA court refers to him throughout its opinion as “Snevely.”
Here, we cannot conclude that the state courts' determinations were contrary to law or a based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The portions of police reports included with the petitioner's pro se petition indicate that Snavely said he noticed Williams walking to the residence from the Cadillac parked outside when he took his dog out around 0845-0900 on the morning of the shooting. (Doc. 18-28, at 86; Exhibit L). He stated that he then returned to his apartment and was watching TV when he heard commotion and learned that a shooting had occurred. (Doc. 18- 28, at 70; Exhibit B). According to the record, gunshots were reported, and police were dispatched, at 0955 that morning. (Doc. 18-10, at 29). Although Snavely's testimony does not exactly contradict the testimony of Williams, as the respondent argues, neither does it confirm his alibi that he was outside during the shooting. On this score, the PCRA court determined that it was a reasonable trial strategy for counsel not to call Snavely because “Trial Counsel expressed during the PCRA Hearing, the concern as to establishing the timeline in support of Defendant's alibi could undermine his defense altogether.” (Doc. 18-34, at 12). Mr. Williams also testified at the PCRA hearing that, “[Trial Counsel] told me that he wasn't going to call him to testify at my trial because he was leery of his testimony.” (Doc. 18-32, at 60). We agree with the PCRA court's determination that trial counsel's strategy in not calling Snavely was reasonable.
We also agree with the PCRA court's finding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the failure to call Snavely as a witness. As the trial court noted, “Defendant's speculation that Mr. Snevely's testimony would have corroborated his alibi does not establish that the witness' absence at trial was so prejudicial as to deny his right to a fair trial.” (Doc. 18-34, at 11). In an apparent attempt to show the PCRA court's determination was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, the petitioner included in his brief a declaration from Snavely dated October 8, 2020, in which he essentially reiterated what was in the police report, leaving out approximately what time he was outside and stating that he would have testified at trial had he been subpoenaed. As previously noted, our view of ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be made with every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Varner, 428 F.3d at 499. Thus, Snavely's declaration, taken over three years after the PCRA hearing and seven years after the incident, does little to demonstrate that the PCRA court unreasonably applied the law or the facts at the time of the hearing. Moreover, this declaration still does not corroborate the petitioner's alibi that he was outside at the time of the shooting, further demonstrating that the absence of this testimony at trial was not so prejudicial as to deny the petitioner a fair trial.
In addition to his grievances about his trial counsel's failure to call Snavely, the petitioner also asks us to review Chief Leahy's trial testimony regarding the existence of Snavely as a witness. Throughout the course of his appeals, the petitioner has not always asserted a consistent claim regarding Leahy's testimony about Snavely; however, the essence of his argument has remained clear: he was prejudiced when Leahy testified that there was no witness who identified Williams outside of the apartment the day of the shooting. Although he still alleges this prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's failure to cross-examine, he now asserts a due process violation resulting from Leahy's testimony.
As to trial counsel's cross-examination of Leahy, the PCRA court found that trial counsel was not ineffective. The court determined that it was reasonable for trial counsel to bring up the issue of Snavely being on the witness list after Leahy denied the existence of witnesses, but decline to push the issue further, due to his concern about the discrepancy in the timeline undermining the petitioner's alibi altogether. Thus, we cannot conclude that the state courts' determinations were contrary to law or a based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
To the extent that the petitioner now asserts that the Commonwealth committed a due process violation when it failed to correct Leahy's testimony about the witness, we find his argument to be without merit. The state court did not rule on this precise issue in its consideration of the Snavely testimony, as the petitioner asserted this as a ground for relief in his PCRA petition, but later removed it from his brief. We nevertheless address this claim and find it to be meritless.
It appears from Williams' testimony at the PCRA hearing that he did take issue with the Commonwealth's failure to correct the testimony of Leahy, and even references the original petition, which included a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, in his testimony. However, it was not a ground asserted in his final brief, and the PCRA court did not address it. Applying exhaustion standards in a commonsense fashion and reiterating that “the exhaustion requirement is met when a petitioner submits the gist of his federal complaint to the state courts for consideration, ” Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230-33, and “a petitioner meets his obligation by fairly presenting a claim to state courts, even if the state courts decline to address that claim, ” Dye, 546 U.S. 1, we will consider the merits of this due process claim.
The petitioner alleges that the prosecution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it failed to correct false testimony of Leahy that there was no witness that saw Williams outside the apartment at the time of the shooting. The testimony is as follows:
[DIRECT]
Q. And he [the petitioner] also claimed that there were two witnesses that indicated he was outside when the shooting occurred, and South Lebanon Township Police Department actually canvassed the entire neighborhood there knocking on all the doors, correct?
A. That's correct, and no witness was found.
. . . .
[CROSS]
Q. And you made a comment that on one of the recordings Mr. Williams is heard to say something about a witness that saw him outside. You said there was no such witness. Do you remember that testimony?
A. We had no witness come forward, yes.
Q. Isn't there a fellow named Matthew Snavely who you interviewed or someone interviewed on your behalf?
A. I personally do not recall that individual.
Q. You don't remember the name Matthew Snavely, the name that's on the list of witnesses here?
A. I do not. I obviously did not interview him. [Counsel switches to another topic](Doc. 18-13, at 27, 31-32).
As the petitioner notes, a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process guarantee when it knowingly presents or fails to correct false testimony in a criminal proceeding. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). To establish a claim under this standard, the petitioner must show that (1) the witness committed perjury; (2) the proponent knew or should have known that the testimony was false; (3) the false testimony was not corrected; and (4) there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (citing Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (2004)).
At the outset, Leahy did not commit perjury. The question asked of him was whether the police found witnesses that indicated Williams was outside at the time the shooting occurred. He is correct that no such witness was found-Snavely allegedly saw Williams outside while he was walking his dogs between 0845 and 0900, and the gunshots were reportedly heard at 0955. Further, on cross-examination, the statement was corrected when trial counsel indicated that Mr. Snavely was on the witness list and Leahy indicated that he did not recall that witness and did not interview him. Again, there is no evidence this testimony was false. There were at least two investigators, and the portions of the police reports submitted by the petitioner did not include the name of the officer that interviewed Snavely. The other investigator who testified, Achey, was not questioned about the witness.
Finally, we cannot conclude that the failure to correct the statement was prejudicial. Snavely's account of the morning of the incident does not corroborate Williams' alibi that he was outside at the time of the shooting. In fact, it may well have further inculpated him by placing him at the location of the shooting the morning it occurred. Further, as previously mentioned, there is ample evidence placing the petitioner in the apartment at the time of the shooting, including the surviving victim who testified that Williams was in the apartment and shot him. The testimony of a witness placing the petitioner outside an hour before the incident occurred would not have changed the outcome of his trial, and trial counsel was justified in attempting to minimize the damage that Snavely's testimony could have done to the petitioner's alibi. For this reason, we find the petitioner's argument that the prosecutors violated due process by failing to correct Leahy's testimony is without merit.
Finally, we arrive at what the petitioner has presented as Ground IV, that trial counsel ineffectively acquiesced to the reading of co-defendant Cannon's Information to the jury and thus facilitated a Confrontation Clause violation. At the outset, we again note that we find this ground to be properly before us as it has been raised in the petitioner's PCRA proceedings and on appeal. The respondent's argument that this ground was not exhausted because the petitioner failed to raise it in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fails for the reasons previously discussed.
However, while this ground is properly exhausted, we find it does not entitle Williams to habeas relief. The basis of the complaint is the trial court's reading into the record the Information stating the counts to which Williams' co-defendant, Cannon, pleaded guilty (the Cannon Information) prior to Williams' trial. The court did so at the acquiescence of trial counsel, after the prosecutor took exception to his opening statement in which he asserted that Cannon had already admitted to committing the murder. (Doc. 11, at 42). Cannon's entire twenty-count Information was read to the jury, including counts for conspiracy which named Williams as a co-conspirator. (Doc. 18-15, at 74). The petitioner takes issue with this reading, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to redact it, and further alleging that the reading violated his right to confront his accuser under the Confrontation Clause.
The PCRA court found that trial counsel was not ineffective in acquiescing to the reading of the Cannon Information and did not violate his Confrontation Clause rights. The PCRA court dismissed these claims, first noting, in reference to his right to confrontation, that the Cannon Information never specifically or inferentially identified the petitioner in the role of principal or accessory. (Doc. 18-34, at 14). Also, the remaining living victim of the crime specifically identified the petitioner as the person who shot him. (Id.) Further, the charges read in the Cannon Information were the same charges on which the petitioner was being tried and it was not entered into evidence. (Id.)
As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the PCRA court determined that referencing Mr. Cannon's guilty plea was a reasonable strategy by trial counsel, noting that even Williams “admitted that based on the trial strategy and the physical evidence, that Trial Counsel's tactic of referring to Cannon's guilty plea to the murder was a logical choice.” (Doc. 18-34, at 13). Although it noted a motion in limine to limit the information to just the murder charge would have been entertained by the court, it elaborated that there is no certainty that it would have succeeded. (Id., at 14). Moreover, trial counsel had a reasonable basis to reference the guilty plea in bolstering Williams' alibi. (Id.) Since Williams failed to show an alternative that offered a substantially greater prospect for success, given the great weight of evidence against him, the PCRA court found counsel was not ineffective. (Id., at 15). The Superior Court did not directly address this claim in affirming the PCRA decision but stated, “[a]fter reviewing the petition, the parties' briefs and the thorough and cogent opinion of the learned PCRA court, we conclude that the PCRA court's opinion adequately and accurately dispose [sic] of [this issue].” (Doc. 18-41, at 18).
We do not find the state court's decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The petitioner argues that, although the Cannon Information never identified defendant in the role of principal or accessory, it did name him as a co-conspirator, and that alone was a Confrontation Clause violation. In his view, naming the petitioner as a co-conspirator in the same Information as the murder charge was equivalent to improperly redacting him as an accessory to the crime in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and its progeny. We do not find this argument persuasive.
Under Bruton, a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the non-testifying co-defendant's statement naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced in their joint trial, unless the confession is redacted to eliminate the defendant's name and any reference to his or her existence and the redaction is not obvious so as to notify the jury that a name has been deleted. Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2008) (referencing Bruton, 391 U.S. 123; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998)).
At the outset, we question whether the reading of the Cannon Information implicates the Confrontation Clause, as the charges to which Cannon pled guilty are not a testimonial statement. The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of, “testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). Other circuits have found that the admission of records such as guilty charges does not violate the Confrontation Clause because such records and are not testimonial. See U.S. v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating “The records of conviction and information contained therein . . . [and] public records, such as judgments, are not themselves testimonial in nature.”); Zuniga v. Felker, 458 Fed.Appx. 693, 694 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating the admission of clerk's records of co-defendant's guilty pleas did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights); U.S. v. Kuai Li, 280 Fed.Appx. 267 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating defendant's Confrontation Clause right was not violated when the district court took judicial notice of guilty plea entered by official who assisted defendant). In finding co-defendants' guilty pleas not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause, the Ninth Circuit explained the “core class” of testimonial statements as:
Affidavits or declarations “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” This is because such testimonial evidence is “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony.” Business and public records are generally nontestimonial because they were created for the internal administration of the entity rather than for trial evidentiary purposes.Zuniga, 458 Fed.Appx. at 694 (citations omitted).
The counts to which Mr. Cannon pleaded guilty did not describe the factual basis for the plea or serve a prosecutorial function. They were also not created for the purpose of being introduced at trial. Therefore, we do not find the reading of the Cannon Information violated the Confrontation Clause.
Further, even if there was a violation, it was harmless error and caused the petitioner no prejudice. As the PCRA court noted, the conspiracy charge was one upon which the petitioner was being tried, and thus the jury did not find out for the first time that Williams was implicated in a conspiracy by reading of the Cannon Information. Further, the crux of the argument is that the reading of the information violated his right to confront the charge of murder, not conspiracy. As these are two different charges in the information, we cannot agree with the petitioner that Williams name appearing in the conspiracy charge is the equivalent of an improper redaction which implicates him to the jury as an accessory to murder.
Finally, as the PCRA court noted, Williams was identified in court by the surviving victim Mr. Crawford, who said Williams shot him. Despite the petitioner's argument that his vigorous challenge to Crawford's testimony somehow negated the evidence his testimony presented, it cannot be said that Williams' name being read in the Cannon Information as a co-conspirator changed the outcome of his trial.
As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner argues that the PCRA court's determination that trial counsel had a sound strategy was based on an unreasonable finding of fact, and is therefore not entitled to deference, because trial counsel should have asked for a redaction of the petitioner's name before allowing the information to be read to the jury. However, when “evaluat[ing] the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time, ” Varner, 428 F.3d at 499, the petitioner's argument here fails. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that he thought reading the full information was an appropriate strategy at the time:
Q. In that information it acknowledged that Mr. Cannon had pled guilty to Criminal Homicide, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But also that he had pled guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Homicide with both Ms. Harden and Mr. Williams?
A. Yes. In retrospect, I should have tried to redact the information so to speak so as to have the homicide charge read but not the conspiracy charge read because the conspiracy charge obviously implicates people other than Mr. Cannon.
Q. But your client was also charged with that same conspiracy, right?
A. He was.
Q. And in terms of in that moment in that time did you think reading the full information was an appropriate thing?
A. I did, yes. I don't now but I did then.(Doc. 18-32, at 90-91).
Further, at the PCRA hearing, trial counsel indicated there was no other way to include the evidence of Cannon's guilty plea because his charges were on appeal and he could not be forced to testify. (Id., at 91). It was not unreasonable for the PCRA court to determine that trial counsel's strategy of notifying the jury that Cannon had pled guilty to the murder and providing evidence of that information the only way he could was within defendant's overall reasonable trial strategy. We thus agree with the PCRA court's determination that trial counsel was not ineffective and decline to grant relief on this ground.
In sum, we are mindful that the Supreme Court has observed that a “doubly deferential judicial review . . . applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (noting that the review of ineffectiveness claims is “doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas”). Given this deferential standard, and in consideration of the great weight of evidence supporting its conclusions, we cannot conclude that the state courts' decisions relating to these ineffective assistance of counsel claims were an unreasonable application of Strickland or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. To the contrary, the state courts' analyses of the petitioner's constitutional claims are thorough and well-supported by both the law and the facts of his case. Further, all claims not presented in state court are unexhausted, procedurally defaulted, and without merit. Accordingly, these claims do not warrant habeas relief.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 15th day of November 2021.