Summary
approving pre-filing injunction
Summary of this case from Summerville v. Local 77 American Fed. of StateOpinion
1:01CV00459
May 22, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. ("PPG") for a pre-filing injunction and attorneys' fees (Pleading No. 61) and a motion by PPG for Rule 11 sanctions (Pleading No. 68). Plaintiff Lynard G. Williams ("Williams") has filed (1) Plaintiff's Misrepresentation for Non Consent Letter" (Pleading No. 64); (2) "Plaintiff's Final Response to Defendant's Consent Form" (Pleading No. 65); (3) "Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal of Defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., [sic] Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees" (Pleading No. 67); and(4) "Memorandum of Law to Support Nonconsent of Sanctions for the Defefent [sic]" (Pleading No. 71). The Court will construe Williams' filings as responses to PPG's motions. The motions are thus ready for a ruling.
I. Procedural History
On May 7, 2001, Williams commenced this action alleging race discrimination by his employer. PPG, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. After a period of discovery, PPG moved for summary judgment on all of Williams' claims. On July 16, 2002, this Court granted PPG's motion for summary judgment. Williams appealed, and on November 7, 2002, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's grant of summary judgment to PPG. Williams v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 02-1882, 2002 WL 31478484 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2002) (unpublished opinion). The time allowed for Williams to petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari has expired, and thus, the decision of the Fourth Circuit stands as a final judgment on the merits.
II. Discussion
A. PPG's Motion for a Pre-Filing Injunction and Attorneys' Fees
PPG moves the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) and the Court's "inherent power to control its docket and protect its jurisdiction from abuse," for a pre-filing injunction. The injunction would enjoin Williams and anyone acting on his behalf from filing any further employment-related lawsuits against PPG or its agents without leave of court. In order to obtain leave of court, Williams would be required to submit to the Court a motion for leave to file a complaint. Along with his motion, Williams would be required to attach the proposed complaint and submit sufficient objective evidence supporting the allegations in his complaint to demonstrate that his proposed filing could survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is not presented for an improper purpose and is based in law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in the law. PPG contends that both this Court and the Fourth Circuit have previously approved prefiling injunctions similar to the one it proposes here, citing Armstrong v. Koury Corp., Nos. 99-2511, 99-2512, 2000 WL 364126 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 2000) (unpublished opinion), Tinsley v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., No. 93-2086, 1994 WL 249239 (4th Cir. June 9, 1994) (unpublished opinion) and Armstrong v. Koury Corp., 16 F. Supp.2d 616 (M.D.N.C. 1998), aff'd No. 98-2360, 1999 WL 11298 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
In addition, PPG moves the Court, pursuant to section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k), for an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party in this litigation. PPG contends that Williams' lawsuit was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation," and that Williams continued to press his case after the frivolity of his case should have been clear to him, citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
1. Pre-Filing Injunction
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a), provides that "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." This Court has previously recognized that this provision empowers federal courts to issue pre-filing injunctions "to restrict access to federal courts of parties who repeatedly file frivolous litigation." Armstrong, 16 F. Supp.2d at 620; see also Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1986) ("That the district court possessed the authority [under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)] to enjoin Safir from further vexatious litigation is beyond peradventure."). Where a plaintiff's lawsuits are (1) "duplicative and vexatious;" (2) such that "he cannot have a reasonable expectation of prevailing;" and (3) have "caused needless expense and burdens to other parties and the court. . . .", the entry of a pre-filing injunction is appropriate. Tinsley, 1994 WL 249239 at *1. There are no exceptions for pro se litigants. Armstrong, 16 F. Supp.2d at 620. However, pre-filing injunctions should be carefully "tailored to the specific circumstances presented." Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993); DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989).
In light of the foregoing authority, and after careful consideration of the record, the Court concludes that PPG is entitled to the pre-filing injunction it seeks. The record demonstrates that the current lawsuit is the fifth lawsuit Williams has filed against his employer, PPG. (Pleading No. 61, Def.'s Motion for Pre-Filing Injunction, Exh. 1, Karin McGinnis Aff., Exhs. A-D.) In each of the five lawsuits, Williams alleged race discrimination of varying kinds in the terms and conditions of his employment. Id. The first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Erwin of this Court on PPG's motion for summary judgment. Id., Exh. A-2. The second lawsuit was again dismissed by Judge Erwin on PPG's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., Exh. B-2. The third lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Beaty of this Court on PPG's motion for summary judgment. Id., Exh. C-2. Williams voluntarily dismissed the fourth lawsuit without prejudice and asked the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to reconsider its "no probable cause" determination. Id., Exit D-2. After the EEOC reopened its investigation, Williams changed his mind and requested a right-to-sue letter. (Pleading No. 62, Def.'s Br. at 4.) Williams then instituted the instant and fifth lawsuit, which alleged claims virtually identical to those in his fourth lawsuit. A common theme among the Court's dismissals of Williams' lawsuits is a complete lack of evidence to support the claims alleged. In the face of this litigious history, the Court has little trouble finding that Williams' lawsuits against PPG are both "duplicative" and "vexatious." Tinsley, 1994 WL 249239 at *1.
Karin McGinnis is an attorney with Moore Van Allen, PLLC, who have represented PPG in all five lawsuits filed by Williams against PPG.
Despite the lack of evidence to support his claims, Williams filed cross-motions for summary judgment in each of the five lawsuits. In each instance, Williams' motion was summarily denied by the Court.
The Court is similarly convinced that Williams could not have had a reasonable expectation of prevailing in his lawsuits. Notably, during discovery in this matter, Williams was asked in his deposition what evidence he had to support his claims. Williams replied that he did not have any evidence, and that the allegations in his complaint were "just statements" or "just allegations." (Def.'s Motion for Pre-Filing Injunction, Exh. 2, Pl.'s Dep. at 74, 77, 87, 103, 120.) Furthermore, when asked if he had received proof that he had not passed the supervisor's test, would he have pursued this lawsuit, Williams unequivocally answered that he would not have sued PPG. Id. at 93, 101. However, when PPG's counsel offered to show Williams proof that he had in fact not passed the test, he was not willing to consider the evidence and refused to consider dismissing his case. Id. at 93-94. In fact, Williams continued to press his claims after PPG presented him with evidence that he did not pass the test. (Def.'s Br. at 7.)
Finally, the Court finds that Williams has frequently engaged in litigation tactics that have caused PPG and the Court unnecessary burden and expense. For example, Williams refused to give his consent for PPG's motions for extension of time, forcing PPG to seek Court approval of simple and routine extensions of time. (Def.'s Br. at 11.) Williams similarly refused to consent to a protective order for documents he sought in discovery, and then after PPG obtained Court approval of the protective order, did not even examine the documents. (McGinnis Aff. ¶ 5, Exhs. E, F.) In the current lawsuit, Williams served PPG with a motion for summary judgment, to which PPG filed and served a memorandum in opposition. Williams never disclosed to PPG that he had not actually filed his summary judgment motion with the Court. Id. ¶ 4. In addition, Williams filed a motion to compel production of documents that he had been repeatedly told by PPG did not exist. (Def.'s Br.at 11.)
As the conditions for a pre-filing injunction set out by Tinsley have been met in this case, the Court will grant PPG's motion insofar as it requests a pre-filing injunction against Williams.
2. Attorney's Fees
Section 706(k) of Title VII explicitly authorizes an award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party," stating in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k)(2003). While a prevailing plaintiff in Title VII litigation ordinarily should recover attorney's fees, see Lopez v. Aransas County Ind. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978), a prevailing defendant should recover attorney's fees only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 421. Thus, the standard under which prevailing defendants are awarded fees is much stricter than that applied when considering awards to prevailing plaintiffs. Bugg v. Int'l Union of Allied Indus. Workers of America, 674 F.2d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 1982).
While Williams' case did ultimately lack merit, and many of Williams' actions during the litigation caused unnecessary delay and cost to PPG, the underlying lawsuit was not so frivolous as to warrant an award of attorney's fees to PPG. While not sufficient to establish a prima facie case, Williams proffered some evidence to support his allegations of race discrimination. See Johnson v. Resources for Human Dev., 888 F. Supp. 689, 691-92 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd sub nom Hicks v. Arthur, Nos. 95-1556, 95-1557, 95-1749, 91 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion) (even though employee presented virtually no evidence to rebut employer's ample evidence of legitimate reasons to terminate employee, no attorney's fees awarded to employer where evidence was insufficient to conclude that employee brought lawsuit with knowledge that his case had no basis). Furthermore, while pro se plaintiffs are not automatically exempt from being ordered to pay a prevailing defendant's attorney's fees, the Court should consider the widely differing financial resources of the parties in deciding whether to award attorney's fees. See Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 916-17 (11th Cir. 1982) (court should consider the plaintiffs financial resources in awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendant); Wooten v. New York Tel. Co., 485 F. Supp. 748, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (application of prevailing defendant for attorney's fees was subject to denial in view of "widely differing financial resources" of parties). Furthermore, the Court notes that the pre-filing injunction issued in this order will protect PPG from any further unfounded litigation by Williams. See Schramek v. Jones, 161 F.R.D. 119, 122 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (pre-filing injunction was better remedy than monetary sanctions against plaintiffs who filed numerous meritless lawsuits due to plaintiffs' lack of "deep pocket financial resources.") Accordingly, the Court will deny that portion of PPG's motion which seeks attorney's fees under section 706(k) of Title VII.
For example, in support of his claim that a test given to applicants for group leader positions had a disparate impact on African-American applicants, Williams submitted evidence that all 12 of the 125 applicants chosen to be group leaders were Caucasian. In support of his claim that he was not promoted to group leader because of his race, Williams offered evidence that his supervisor made an off-hand remark while his application was pending that he was not "going anywhere," and that after he did not receive a passing score, he was not permitted to view his test results. However, as discussed in this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order granting PPG's motion for summary judgment, this evidence fell short of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. See Pleading No. 49.
B. PPG's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
PPG moves the Court to assess "an appropriate sanction" against Williams pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Pleading No. 69, Def.'s Br. at 7-8.) PPG alleges that between September 11, 2002 and October 8, 2002, Williams and counsel for PPG engaged in several conversations regarding an award of attorney's fees to PPG pursuant to Local Rule 54.2. According to PPG, Williams agreed to pay PPG $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and to consent to a motion for a pre-filing injunction barring Williams from filing further lawsuits against PPG without leave of court. In exchange, PPG purportedly agreed that it would not seek any further attorney's fees or sanctions in this matter with the Court. PPG alleges that it sent several letters to Williams confirming their final agreement, to which Williams did not respond. In the meantime, PPG filed two motions for extension of time to file an application for attorney's fees, in the hopes that such an application would not be necessary due to the parties' pending agreement on fees. On October 17, 2002, Williams filed "Plaintiff [sic] Non-Consent to PPG's Motion for Time to File Motion for Attorney's Fees" in which he maintained that the parties had in fact not reached an oral agreement with respect to attorney's fees.
Local Rule 54.2 provides, "The court will not consider a motion to award statutory attorney's fees until moving counsel shall first advise the court in writing that after consultation the parties are unable to reach an agreement in regard to the fee award. The statement of consultation shall set forth the date of the consultation, the names of the participating attorneys, and the specific results achieved." The rule requires that the statement of consultation and motion for attorney's fees be filed within 60 days from entry of final judgment.
In response to Williams' denial that the parties had reached agreement on attorney's fees, on October 30, 2002, PPG served Williams with a motion for Rule 11 sanctions and advised him that PPG would file the motion with the Court on November 26, 2002 unless Williams corrected his "misrepresentation" regarding their agreement. On November 21, 2002, Williams filed a document with the Court that PPG contends attempts to correct the "misrepresentation" regarding the oral agreement contained in his October 17, 2002 filing with the Court. On December 3, 2002, Williams filed a document with the Court indicating that he had discovered new evidence which justified his withdrawal from the oral agreement for attorney's fees and a pre-filing injunction. PPG contends that on December 13, 2002, Williams filed a third document with the Court in which he denied that the parties had reached agreement on the issue of fees and the injunction. PPG asserts that Williams' statements amount to "outright misrepresentations" warranting an award of sanctions under Rule 11(b).
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court . . . a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, —
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery . . .
Thus, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), a deliberate misstatement may not be presented as a statement of fact in a document filed with the Court. See Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 265 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Court finds that, given the non-written format of the parties' alleged agreement regarding a pre-filing injunction and attorney's fees and Williams' pro se status, this is not a compelling enough case to sanction Williams under Rule 11. The parties clearly disagree about the binding effect of their oral agreement regarding the injunction and fees. The Court is not in a position to find that Williams' beliefs that an agreement had not been reached and that he could withhold his consent to the agreement because of new evidence amount to "misrepresentations" to the Court about the status of the agreement. See Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 3 F.3d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Rule 11 neither penalizes overstatement nor authorizes an overly literal reading of each factual statement."); Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319, 323-24 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations when ruling on Rule 11 motions); Griggs v. BIC Corp., 844 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (while plaintiffs' arguments misconstrued the record in certain respects, there was no evidence that such confusion was deliberate); La Maina v. Brannon, 804 F. Supp. 607, 614 (D.N.J. 1992) (Rule 11 sanctions not appropriate where defendant appearing pro se and had good faith belief in validity of positions he asserted; court would not penalize him for his failure to comprehend nuances of federal jurisdiction). Thus, the Court denies PPG's motion for Rule 11 sanctions insofar as it seeks relief for Williams' assertions regarding the parties' alleged oral agreement for fees and a pre-filing injunction.
The Court notes that PPG also moves the Court to enter a Rule 11 sanction against Williams for his conduct during the pendency of the lawsuit, including bringing the lawsuit for an improper purpose, making assertions of fact with no evidentiary support, and engaging in bad faith conduct leading to delays and increased litigation costs. However, the Court notes that PPG's motion for Rule 11 sanctions on this basis is untimely. In Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit noted that the "safe harbor" provision contained in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) mandates that a Rule 11 motion not be filed after the conclusion of a lawsuit. Other circuits also follow this rule. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2000); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court will also deny PPG's motion for Rule 11 sanctions insofar as it seeks relief for conduct that occurred during the pendency of the lawsuit.
The "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 forbids filing a motion for sanctions with the court "unless, within 21 days after service of the motion . . ., the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, PPG's motion for a pre-filing injunction and attorneys' fees (Pleading No. 61) is GRANTED insofar as it seeks a pre-filing injunction and DENIED insofar as it seeks attorneys' fees. PPG's motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Pleading No. 68) is DENIED.
In accordance with the above, the Court issues the following injunction and order:
1. The Court ENJOINS Plaintiff Lynard G. Williams, and anyone acting on his behalf, from filing in this Court any complaint or papers in any employment-related matter against Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. or its agents without leave of court.
2. The Court ORDERS the Clerk of this Court to refuse to accept any submissions by Williams for filing which are in violation of this order, and in the event that Williams succeeds in filing papers in violation of this order, the Clerk shall immediately and summarily strike the filings in violation.
3. Leave of court shall be forthcoming upon Plaintiff Williams' demonstration, through a properly filed motion pursuant to Local Rule 7, that the proposed filing (1) can survive a challenge under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) is not barred by principles of res judicata, or issue or claim preclusion; (3) is not repetitive or violative of a court order; and (4) is in compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. This order does not apply to the filing of timely notices of appeal from this order to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and papers solely in furtherance of such an appeal.