Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 3:96CV-814-S
March 26, 1998
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendant, William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. This case involves the plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination and retaliation against his employer. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the defendant's motion to strike and the motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
The plaintiff was employed as an intermittent civil service employee with the Fort Knox Community Schools (FKCS) from 1989 until 1993. In this position, Williams substituted for custodial and maintenance workers in the school system. The plaintiff applied for full-time positions with FKCS on several occasions but was never selected. On June 2, 1993, Williams met with FKCS Superintendent, Robert Burrow, and Director of Administrative Services, Garry Doolittle. Williams told them that he felt that he had not been selected for full-time positions because of his race and gender. Burrow told Williams that he could not give him the job. Williams claims that the supervisors engaged in non-sexual harassment during the meeting. After June 2, 1993, Williams was not called by FKCS to perform any work.
Williams filed a formal administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on September 6, 1993, alleging: (1) nonselection for a full-time position based on racial and sexual discrimination; (2) harassment by supervisors during the June 2, 1993 meeting; and, (3) retaliation by FKCS in the form of reduced work hours. The Department of Defense (DoD) dismissed the nonselection allegation as untimely and this decision was affirmed by the EEOC. The DoD investigator, in a report dated March 17, 1995, found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. However, management's reasons for failing to call Williams back to work after June 2, 1993 were found to be pretextual.
The agency sought an advisory opinion from the Administrative Judge on the full relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled. The Administrative Judge remanded the case for the agency's implementation of full relief, which included backpay and an equal opportunity for Williams to receive work rotation assignments. The agency implemented this relief and the administrative complaint was dismissed by the agency on September 17, 1996. Since this time, Williams has refused all offers of work from FKCS.
In December 1996, Williams filed a complaint with this court under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation.
DISCUSSION
The defendant now seeks to strike part of the plaintiff's complaint and to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, to receive summary judgment. The court will address each issue separately.
I. REQUEST FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In his complaint, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages for the government's alleged discriminatory conduct. Punitive damages are not recoverable against the government in Title VII cases. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, " [a] complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). It is not disputed that the defendant, the Department of Defense, is a "government, government agency or political subdivision." Therefore, the court will strike the plaintiff's demand for punitive damages in this case.
The plaintiff never responded to the defendant's motion to strike or for summary judgment.
II. THE NONSELECTION CLAIM
In order to support a motion for summary judgment, a moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a judge's role is not to weigh the evidence or determine its truth, but to determine if a genuine question of fact exists. Id. at 249. "[W]hether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. In making these determinations, the court is to view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1990).
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105, a person claiming discrimination under Title VII must contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory. The DoD dismissed the plaintiff's nonselection claim because it was untimely. In affirming the agency's dismissal, the EEOC found that the nonselection occurred some time in 1992, while Williams did not contact an EEO counselor on this matter until June 3, 1993.
A person alleging a violation of Title VII must file a timely complaint with the EEOC in order to bring suit in federal court. E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 839 (6th Cir. 1994). While the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, it is in the nature of a statute of limitations, subject to equitable tolling. Smith v. Kaldor, 869 F.2d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)). Here, it is clear that the plaintiff did not file a timely charge with the EEOC by failing to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of the decision not to hire him for a full-time position. Williams has offered no reason why the time limit should be extended and, therefore, the nonselection claim will be dismissed.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF FULL RELIEF
On the remaining harassment and discrimination charges, the plaintiff seeks damages in this court for lost wages, emotional distress, humiliation, and other damages for violations of his rights under Title VII. In implementing full relief as certified by the Administrative Judge, the agency gave Williams his backpay for the lost work hours. The DoD posted a required notice of agency non-discrimination and non-retaliation policy. Further, the agency assured Williams that he would not be subject to any future discriminatory harassment or retaliatory conduct, including the implementation of a new work rotation schedule allowing Williams a full and equal opportunity for work assignments.
The EEOC informed Williams that he must respond to the agency's offer of full relief within fifteen days of the offer. Any failure to respond would be considered a rejection of the offer. The EEOC also informed him that if he rejected the offer, his complaint would be dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(h). Williams' response, which was undated but received December 12, 1995 by the EEOC, states:
I Thomas Williams, Jr. would like to request the hearing dated for Jan. 19, 1996 remain official so that I Thomas Williams, Jr. can exercise my Federally Protected Civil Rights. This offer is not full relief and I can provide the facts for justice.
On September 17, 1996, the EEOC found that the DoD had implemented full relief and dismissed the complaint pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(e). The implementation of relief included the check for backpay which Williams acknowledged receiving on July 26, 1996. As part of the relief, FKCS contacted the plaintiff on several occasions to offer him work, but he has refused all offers.
It is unclear to this court whether Williams accepted or rejected the November 22, 1995 offer of full relief from the agency. Williams responded to the offer (presumably within the relevant time period), but he did not state whether he was accepting or rejecting it. He stated that he did not feel that the offer constituted full relief. However, Williams did not appeal the Administrative Judge's certification of what constituted full relief, nor does he now ask this court to perform a de novo review of the relief certified. Instead, he accepted the check for his backpay, knowing that the agency was implementing the full relief considered by the Administrative Judge. Yet he refused all subsequent offers of work by FKCS.
If Williams accepted the agency's offer of full relief, he is limited to that remedy. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504, "[a]ny settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties." Even assuming that Williams had asked this court to engage in a de novo review of the relief, the court finds that the offer constitutes "full relief" in this case. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501, full relief includes: (1) notification to all agency employees of their right to be free from unlawful discrimination; (2) commitment to action or measures ensuring that similar violations will not recur; (3) payment to the employee for any loss of earnings the person may have suffered; and, (4) commitment that the agency will cease engaging in unlawful employment practice. The agency posted the required notice, paid Williams backpay for lost work hours, implemented a new rotation system for work assignments to those in Williams' position, and ensured the plaintiff that no further harassment or discrimination will occur. This constitutes full relief under the circumstances.
In his complaint in this court, Williams also asks for damages for emotional distress and humiliation. This relief was not included in the Administrative Judge's order because Williams never made a request for any compensatory damages in his administrative complaint, nor did he ever provide any factual allegation or supporting evidence entitling him to such damages. This is despite the fact that Williams had the opportunity to file a position paper with supporting evidence stating what he believed to be full relief in the case. Further, administrative agencies have the authority to offer compensatory damages to remedy emotional distress to federal employees claiming a violation of Title VII. Fitzgerald v. Secretary, United States Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, the agency's offer constituted full relief in this matter.
If Williams is deemed to have rejected the offer, his claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A federal employee must exhaust all administrative remedies in order to bring suit under Title VII in federal court. Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995). A claimant who has rejected an offer of full relief has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Wrenn v. Secretary, Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 918 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977, 111 S.Ct. 1625, 113 L.Ed.2d 721 (1991).
The purpose of the good faith participation requirement is to give the administrative process an opportunity to work and to enhance the chances of administrative resolution. It follows that a claimant who is offered full relief in the administrative process must either accept the relief offered or abandon the claim. To allow claimants . . . to continue to pursue claims that have been fully remedied during the administrative process would frustrate the congressional policy favoring administrative resolution of complaints for no discernible reason. Continued pursuit of such claims consumes judicial and other resources, resulting in a dead-weight social loss except for giving satisfaction to litigants who prefer court proceedings to administrative relief.Id. at 1078. See also, Fitzgerald v. Secretary, United States Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 206; Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1995); Frye v. Aspin, 997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, if Williams rejected the offer, his claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
While there exists a factual issue of whether the plaintiff accepted or rejected the agency's offer of full relief, this issue is not material. Whether or not he accepted, because the offer made by the DoD constituted full relief, Williams could only accept the relief or abandon his claim. If he accepted, he is limited to that remedy. If he rejected the offer, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and suit cannot proceed in federal court. Therefore, the plaintiff's harassment and discrimination claims will be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, the court will grant the defendant's motion to strike the portion of the complaint seeking punitive damages. The court will also grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the nonselection, harassment and discrimination claims. A separate order will be entered herein this date in accordance with this opinion.
This _____ day of ____________________, 1998.
ORDER
Motion having been made by the defendant, William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to strike part of the complaint and for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered herein this date, and the court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. The defendant's motion to strike the portion of the complaint requesting punitive damages is GRANTED.
2. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the nonselection claim is GRANTED.
3. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the harassment and discrimination claims is GRANTED.
The court having dismissed all claims in this case, this is a final and appealable order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of ____________________, 1998.