Opinion
CA 3:01-CV-0514-R.
August 3, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ruth Maegan Williams ("Ms. Williams") asserts claims against Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA") for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, in violation of the Texas Labor Code, § 21.051. Now before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Initial Complaint Without Prejudice, filed April 18, 2001. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's claims are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Williams filed her initial petition in the 134th Judicial District of Dallas County, Texas on October 26, 2000, after receiving her right-to-sue letter from the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission on July 28, 2000. LCA promptly and properly removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity-of-citizenship between the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.See Def. Notice of Removal, p. 2. Although Ms. Williams has properly exhausted her administrative remedies at the federal level, her cause of action is solely based on the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), a "sister" state agency of the EEOC that entertains its own administrative review process for civil rights claims that occur within the state of Texas. Although Ms. Williams addressed her petition to both the EEOC and the Texas Commission on Human Rights, she did not check the box at the bottom of the EEOC form indicating that she wanted the charge filed with both the EEOC and the TCHR. The question now before the Court is whether or not Ms. Williams' right-to-sue letter from the EEOC extends to her state law claims under the TCHRA in this action, as she must sufficiently exhaust her state-based administrative remedies before this Court can properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Williams' claims.II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of ReviewWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the pleading party. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). The complaint will only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the pleading party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. See Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975; Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). The relevant question is not whether the pleading party will prevail, but whether it is entitled to offer evidence to support its claims.See Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Saginaw, 991 F. Supp. 563, 571 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
Motions for a voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff are adjudicated solely upon the discretion of the district court, upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems proper under the circumstances. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)2. The primary purpose of requiring court approval for a dismissal under Rule 41(a) is to protect the defendant from unfair treatment. See Ikospentakis v. Thalassic Steamship Agency, 528 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1990.)
B. Ms. Williams' Complaint Must be Dismissed Without Prejudice
On January 4 of this year, the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. Grinnell Corporation, 235 F.3d 972 explicitly decided as an issue of first impression that an EEOC right-to-sue letter is not interchangeable with a TCHR right-to-sue letter for the purposes of determining federal court jurisdiction. Instead, the Court reasoned that permitting such substitution "would upset the intricate interplay between the federal and state agencies . . . and would mean that a federal agency could determine a state court's jurisdiction to hear a purely state law claim."Id at 975. Although the Court declined to specify the instances in which an individual could successfully exhaust all available state remedies through the EEOC, it clearly held that addressing an EEOC complaint to the TCHR without checking the box indicating that the complainant wished the complaint to be forwarded to the TCHR was not sufficient to ensure that the TCHR has notice of any state-based causes of action. As this is the situation Ms. Williams now faces, her complaint must be dismissed without prejudice so she can fully satisfy all TCHR administrative prerequisites before pursuing her claims with the court system.
Several factors warrant this conclusion. First, a party may move to dismiss a federal action for want of subject matter jurisdiction at any point during the life of the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)3. As such, judicial economy and fairness mandate that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over an action when its authority is untimely or improper. In this particular type of action involving the dual participation of the EEOC and the TCHR, much confusion has existed over the proper avenue a plaintiff must follow in order to ensure the TCHRA administrative requirements have been fulfilled. See, e.g., Grinnell, 235 F.3d at 975, n. 3 (stating that "§ 21252(d) of the TCHRA can potentially cause confusion about the exhaustion requirement.") Given that cases often turn on the most technical of details Ms. Williams' confusion over this issue is not unreasonable.
See, e.g., Grinnell, 235 F.3d at 974, n. 2, (stating that "there is no clear precedent regarding whether the THRA requires the actual transmittal of the EEOC charge" and acknowledging that this question remains open.).
Moreover, Grinnell is the first case in this Circuit to clearly hold that the EEOC right-to-sue letter does not extend to the TCHRA, and this holding of January 4, 2001 was contemporaneous to Ms. Williams' filing of her amended claims in state court on February 19, 2001. In Grinnell, the Fifth Circuit first specified that a failure to check the box at the bottom of the EEOC form indicating that the complainant wished the charge forwarded to the TCHR was fatal error if the EEOC did not, in fact, forward the charge. Ms. Williams is now in the exact situation as the plaintiff in Grinnell, and three months is not an unreasonable amount of time for her attorney to have discovered the unfavorable ruling and file for a dismissal.
Nor does dismissal at this time prejudice the defendant beyond reason. Ms. Williams promptly filed a motion for dismissal, and no major motions have transpired between the parties. However, in order to ensure fair process to the defendant, Ms. Williams must refile any claims against LCA relating to this complaint that meet the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement in federal court, so LCA will not be faced with the expense of an additional removal petition.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Ruth Maegan Williams' complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated above. To ensure as little prejudice to the defendant as possible, Ms. Williams is instructed to refile her claim in the Northern District of Texas once she receives her right-to-sue letter from the TCHR, unless her amended complaint does not meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal court jurisdiction. As Ms. Williams' request was based upon evolving Fifth Circuit caselaw, costs to be taxed to the parties incurring same.