Opinion
NO. 00-2209
May 25, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, has filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing for dismissal of some of plaintiffs claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for summary judgment on the remainder of plaintiffs claims. Henderson's motion is supported by a declaration under penalty of perjury and several certified exhibits. Record Doc. No. 38. Plaintiff, John J. Williams, Jr., who is proceeding pro se, filed a timely opposition memorandum, unsupported by citations to any law or facts, or by any exhibits or affidavits. Record Doc. No. 41. This matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) upon the written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 30.
Having considered the record; the complaint, as amended; the submissions of the parties and the applicable law; and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following undisputed facts are established by defendant's competent summary judgment evidence.
Williams was employed by defendant as a city letter carrier in New Orleans. On May 29, 1993, he submitted a light duty request, signed by Mary L. McCormick, M.D., requesting that he not be exposed to extreme temperatures. Because the papers submitted with the light duty request did not indicate an illness or diagnosis, plaintiff's supervisor requested additional information and a definition of "extreme temperatures." Government Exhs. A-1, A-8. On May 31, 1993, Williams submitted a second light duty request form, signed by Dr. McCormick, which indicated a diagnosis of monoclonal gammopathy autonomic neuropathy. Dr. McCormick restricted plaintiff from prolonged exposure to temperatures above 88 and below 40 degrees. Government Exhs. A-2, A-8.
Plaintiff became ill at work on June 2, 1993 and took 5 1/2 hours of approved sick leave that day, although he alleges that his request to do so was initially denied. Government Exh. A-3. The following day, Dr. McCormick certified that Williams could not return to work until June 14, 1993. Government Exh. A-6.
On June 4, 1993, Lee Arrambide, Manager of Customer Services Operations, denied plaintiffs light duty request. In his affidavit to the EEOC, Arrambide averred that maintaining the requested temperature restrictions in the building where plaintiff worked "would be virtually impossible" because Williams worked near the outside doors, which were frequently opened as employees entered and exited the building. Arrambide stated that such a temperature range could not be maintained, especially in the summer, without imposing undue hardship on the Postal Service in the form of higher energy consumption. Government Exhs. A-5. A-9.
On July 2, 1993, plaintiff submitted another light duty request, which contained his physician's restrictions that he could not perform street duty and must work indoors under air conditioning until October 1, 1993. Government Exhs. A-7, A-11. Plaintiff returned to work on July 3, 1993 and was given a light duty assignment until October 1, 1993. Record Doc. No. 20, Exh. 4 at p. 3.
Defendant filed an earlier motion to dismiss, Record Doc. No. 20, which was denied. Some of the exhibits cited in connection with the current motion were previously filed with Record Doc. No. 20.
In 1993, Williams filed charges of age and disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against the United States Postal Service. Record Doc. No. 20, Exhs. 1, 2, 3. After exhausting his appeal rights, he filed the instant lawsuit on September 28, 2000. In this lawsuit, plaintiff brings claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Record Doc. Nos. 5, 13.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant's entire motion is considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, not Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), because plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies on his Title VII claims is not jurisdictional.Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1999); Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1995); Ynclan v. Department of the Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1391, 1393 (5th Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but it is not required to negate elements of the nonmovmg party's case. Edwards v. Your Credit. Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
When a moving party alleges that there is an absence of evidence necessary to prove a specific element of a case, the nonmoving party bears the burden of presenting evidence that provides a genuine issue for trial. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nomnoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."Thomas v. Barton Lodge II. Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cu. 1999) (citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the action under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must come forward with evidence to support the essential elements of its claim. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994) (citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 321-23). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The Court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 40 F.3d at 71243. "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, however, will not prevent the award of summary judgment; `the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations . . . to get to a jury without any "significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint."'" Id. at 713 (quotingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
"Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists." Edwards, 148 F.3d at 432; accord Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). "We do not. however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. (emphasis in original). "Moreover, the nonmoving party's burden is not affected by the type of case; summary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nomnovant." Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination
The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C.S 623(a)(1). To survive summary judgment on this claim, Williams "must initially demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination. A prima facie case generally requires proof that the plaintiff is within the protected class, that he suffered an adverse employment decision, and some evidence that the employment decision was motivated by unlawful age discrimination." Ross v. University of Tex., 139 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
It is undisputed that plaintiff was within the protected class.
Williams alleges that he suffered adverse employment actions when his first light duty request was refused, his supervisor initially denied him sick leave on June 2, 1993 and he was compelled to take unwanted sick leave from June 14 to July 3, 1993. Government Exh. A-8. Assuming without deciding that these actions were "adverse employment decisions," Williams has failed to produce any evidence that the employment actions were motivated by unlawful age discrimination.
Williams's mere subjective belief that he has been the subject of age discrimination, unsupported by any specific factual evidence, cannot be the basis of judicial relief. Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 444 (5th Cir. 2000); Lawrence v. University of Tex., 163 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 1999); Ross v. University of Tex., 139 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1998); Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1998). Part of plaintiffs burden in responding to defendant's motion is to submit evidence of age discrimination. In the complete absence of any evidence of age discrimination, defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
C. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies on his Title VII Claims
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his race discrimination and retaliation claims before filing this suit under Title VII. "The scope of a Title VII complaint is limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Thomas v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Any charge not alleged in the EEOC complaint and reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC investigation is barred from judicial review. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995); Young 906 F.2d at 179-80 (5th Cir. 1990).
Williams's EEOC charge alleged only age and disability discrimination. Accordingly, his race discrimination and retaliation claims are barred from judicial review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of May, 2001.