Opinion
98 CV 7984 (RCC)
March 19, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Williams ("Plaintiff" or "Williams") commenced this suit after she was allegedly demoted and ultimately terminated by Defendant Alliance National Incorporated ("Alliance"). She claims that she was discriminated against based on her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; New York's Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 298 et seq.; and the Administrative Code of the City of New York, § 8-107 et seq. Defendants Alliance National Inc., Dana Semkow ("Semkow") and Laura Kozelouzek ("Kozelouzek") (collectively "Defendants") now move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motion is granted and the case is dismissed.
I. Background
Defendant Alliance provides short and long term office space and support services through its business centers located throughout the United States. Its Lexington Avenue and 26 Broadway centers are located in New York City. Williams began her employment with Alliance in November 1993 as a Telephone Operator at Alliance's Lexington Avenue center. Subsequently, she received several promotions, first to Receptionist in March 1994, then to Telecommunications Supervisor in March 1995, and finally to Operations Coordinator in September 1996. Williams maintains that as the Operations Coordinator she was actually performing the job of Operations Manager, without the commensurate salary and title. Williams Aff. at ¶ 12. Williams reported to Defendant Semkow, Alliance's Area General Manager, who reported to Defendant Kozelouzek, Alliance's Vice President for the East Region.
In July 1997, Williams transferred to Alliance's Broadway location to serve as the Sales Coordinator. Williams now asserts that the transfer to the Broadway location was not a promotion, as she had initially believed. Williams Aff. at ¶ 18. Rather, in what she alleges is an example of its discriminatory practices, Alliance sent her, like other African Americans who had succeeded in other locations, to the troubled Broadway center in order to create an excuse for her ultimate termination. Id. Williams' responsibilities as Sales Coordinator included leasing office space, conducting client interviews, generating new business, providing tours of the facility, and performing other sales related functions. Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 14; Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 14. Defendants claim Williams did not perform her sales tasks well. Contrary to Defendants' contention that she had difficulty renting office space, Plaintiff argues that vacancies at the Broadway location preexisted her arrival and were due in part to actions by Semkow and Kozelouzek. Williams Aff. at ¶¶ 17, 24. Further, Williams claims that, as Sales Coordinator, unlike her white counterparts, she had to solicit business door-to-door in the Wall Street area. Id. at ¶ 28.
In support of her claim regarding Alliance's discriminatory practices, Williams alleges that Semkow asked her to motivate the staff at Broadway, which was predominantly African American. Williams believes Semkow did not know how to communicate with the staff. Williams Aff. at ¶ 38. Additionally, Williams includes allegations that Semkow discriminated against and sabotaged another black employee at Broadway, Ingrid Campbell, by accusing her of theft. Id. at ¶ 39. Further, Williams alleges that non-party Lisa Roeck, one of her supervisors, "made no secret of her dislike for the African American employees working for her." Id. at ¶ 41. None of these allegations are supported by admissible evidence.
In what Defendants represent as a promotion and Plaintiff considers a demotion with additional responsibilities, Plaintiff began serving as the Operations Manager at the Broadway location in November 1997. See Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 23. According to Defendants, Semkow offered Williams the Operations Manager position because Williams had extensive operations experience and she was not performing her sales duties satisfactorily. Additionally, Defendants insist that the position of Sales Coordinator was phased out and replaced with a General Manager.See id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff disagrees. First, she states she performed both the Sales Coordinator and Operations Manager positions at the same time, evidenced by printed Alliance business cards. See Eisenberger Decl. at Ex. 2; supra note 2. Therefore, Williams believes she was demoted when the Sales Coordinator element of her position was taken away from her. Additionally, Williams contends that a white woman, Suzanne Lazzari ("Lazzari"), was hired to replace her as Sales Coordinator while she was away on vacation. Williams Aff. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff concedes, however, that Lazzari may have had a title other than Sales Coordinator, i.e., Center or General Manager. Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 20.
At this point in her employment, Williams maintains that she was actually performing three functions, that of Billing Coordinator, Sales Coordinator and Operations Manager, and that Alliance had planned that she would "fail from the start." Williams Aff. at ¶ 25. It does appear that Williams did perform the Sales Coordinator and Operations Manager functions simultaneously for a time. It was only for a five week period, however, in what Williams characterized as an effort to help out during "the time of transition at this site." Eisenberger Decl. Ex. 17. Additionally, at the time of her employment, there were three Operations Managers in New York City — Williams, Michael Santeusanio and Karen Stagg. Both Santeusanio and Stagg testified during their depositions that the Billing Coordinator position in New York City was eliminated in 1997 and Operations Managers became responsible for the billing functions at their locations. Santeusanio Dep. at 32-34, Collins Aff. Ex. 5; Stagg Dep. at 35-36, 53-54, Collins Aff. Ex. 4. Thus, all three Operations Managers, of which only Williams was black, lacked the benefit of a Billing Coordinator at their locations. See Williams Dep. at 124-25; Collins Aff. Ex. 1 (stating the joint request by Santeusanio, Stagg and herself for a Billing Coordinator to be shared among the centers was denied).
Williams took over the position of Operations Manager after Ingrid Campbell, an African American, was terminated. Campbell filed a similar lawsuit against the same defendants, and was represented by the same attorney as Williams. District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Campbell v. Alliance Nat'l Corp., 107 F. Supp.2d 234 (2000).
As Operations Manager, Plaintiff was responsible for maintaining the center's general operations, including supervising staff and financial management. Alliance Operations Manager Job Description, Collins Aff. Ex. 8. Again, Defendants allege Williams' performance was unsatisfactory. Plaintiff contends, however, that it was impossible to perform both operational and financial functions successfully and alleges, unlike those of her white colleagues, her repeated requests for support went unanswered. Williams Aff. at ¶ 23. Williams does admit, however, that she received training from Natalie Fee, the Alliance employee responsible for training employees in the billing function. Id.
The Court is not persuaded by Williams' argument on this point in light of her deposition testimony that all three Operations Managers in New York were denied the assistance of a Billing Coordinator. See supra note 2.
On February 6, 1998, Semkow wrote a "warning memorandum" to Williams detailing the problems with her performance as Operations Manager. According to Semkow, Williams had problems with billing, staying organized, keeping track of and disbursing petty cash and communicating with her staff and the management. Eisenberger Del. Ex. 35. Williams admits receiving the memorandum but contends Semkow's charges are false and that the memo was a pretext to create an excuse for her termination. Williams Aff. at ¶¶ 33-34. Williams received a second memorandum on March 27, 1998. This one placed her on probation and further detailed deficiencies in Williams' performance, including her inability to return client calls, her lack of timely responses to billing issues, and failure to adequately train and monitor the staff. Eisenberger Del. Ex. 20. Again, Williams argues her performance was exemplary and that the memorandum was pretextual. Williams Aff. at ¶ 36. Defendants fired Williams on April 10, 1998.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the parties' submissions demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (explaining when summary judgment is appropriate). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once such a showing is made, the opposing party must present "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). However, the non-moving "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scott v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998).
Where the employer's intent is at issue in an employment discrimination claim, the court must be especially cautious about granting summary judgment. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). However, "the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials-apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation.Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985).
B. Race Discrimination Claims
Williams challenges two employment decisions as unlawfully discriminatory-first, the job change from Sales Coordinator to Operations Manager, and second, her termination. The burden shifting analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), applies to Title VII racial discrimination claims. A plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer must produce evidence "that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, assuming the employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reasons offered by the employer were simply a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 803. While the burden of production shifts throughout the analysis, the burden of proving the employer's discriminatory intent remains with the plaintiff. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
The same burden-shifting analysis applies to the state and city claims. Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999).
To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated; (3) she was terminated, denied a promotion or suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 311-312 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the fourth prong as a showing that the position remained open and was ultimately filled by someone with the plaintiffs qualifications). At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiffs burden of proof of the prima facie case is de minimus. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp. 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994);Campbell v. Alliance Nat'l Corp., 107 F. Supp.2d 234, 243 (2000). However, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate admissible evidence sufficient to permit an inference of discriminatory motive. Campbell, 107 F. Supp.2d at 243. Conclusory statements of discriminatory motive are insufficient to survive summary judgment. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998; see also Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 1999 WL 717984, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) ("A Title VII plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by asserting conclusory allegations of discrimination unsupported by evidence.").
1. The Job Change from Sales Coordinator to Operations Manager
Plaintiff alleges that her job change from Sales Coordinator to Sales Coordinator/Operations Manager to Operations Manager was a demotion and an adverse employment action that satisfies the third element of her prima facie case. Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment with respect to this claim. First, Defendant Alliance's business records demonstrate that Operations Manager is a higher position than Sales Coordinator, reflected by its higher base salary. Collins Aff. at Ex. 8. The Supreme Court has described adverse employment actions as termination, a decrease in salary, a less distinguished title or significantly different responsibilities. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (citing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank Trust Co. of Ind, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). Here, as Operations Manager, Williams' salary did not decrease, her title improved according to the Alliance hierarchy and she received management responsibilities.
Further, Defendants had a legitimate business reason to promote Williams to Operations Manager. Her predecessor had just been fired, the Broadway Center needed an Operations Manager and Williams had experience in the operations area as she had previously served as an Operations Coordinator. Williams Dep. 102, 237-38, Collins Aff Ex. 1; Semkow Dep. 380-82, Collins Aff. Ex. 2. Finally, Williams' argument that she served simultaneously as Sales Coordinator, Operations Manager and Billing Coordinator does not raise the inference of discrimination. See supra note 2. As Judge Sheindlin found in Campbell, "these allegations merely reflect the demanding conditions of a tough work environment but do not demonstrate racial discrimination." Campbell, 107 F. Supp.2d at 248. Thus, as Williams cannot make out the prima facie case, this claim must fail.
2. The Termination
With respect to her wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case, i.e., that she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated. The Second Circuit has interpreted "qualified" to mean "the criteria the employer has specified for the position." Thornley v. Penton Publishers 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997). The second prong is analyzed in terms of "whether plaintiff shows `satisfactory job performance' at the time of the discharge." Id. "The rationale behind this criteria is that the employee must demonstrate that his performance warranted continued employment, `thereby raising an inference that some other factor was involved in the decision to discharge him. . . .'" Stein v. McGraw-Hill, 782 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir. 1978)). Satisfactory job performance "depends on the employer's criteria for the performance of the job-not the standards that may seem reasonable to the jury or judge." Thornley, 104 F.3d at 29. A plaintiffs "job performance cannot be assessed in a vacuum; the ultimate inquiry is whether [the] performance `meets his employer's legitimate expectations.'" Meiri, 759 F.2d. at 995. Thus, courts will rely on the evaluations the plaintiff received from his or her supervisors in determining satisfactory job performance. Id.
Here, Williams cannot demonstrate that she was qualified for the position of Operations Manager at the time she was terminated. Alliance has an eight-page overview of qualifications for and description of the Operations Manager position. Collins Aff. Ex. 8. For example, the job description requires the Operations Manager to return all client phone calls within twenty four hours, to manage the staff on a daily basis, to supervise the distribution and accounting of petty cash, to process all bills and enter the data accordingly and to have organizational, interpersonal and customer service skills. Id. The two warning memos Williams received during her tenure as Operations Manager highlight her deficiencies in performing these described responsibilities. First, on February 6, 1998, Semkow put Williams on notice that her organizational, client billing, staff management, petty cash disbursement and communication skills-all required for the job-needed improvement. Semkow gave Williams a week to remedy her shortcomings. Eisenberger Del. Ex. 35. On March 27, 1998, Semkow and Lazzari wrote to Williams, put her on a term of probation, and outlined the areas in which her job performance was unsatisfactory. Again, Williams' deficiencies centered around client communications, staff management and supervision, billing and organizational problems. Eisenberger Del. Ex. 20. Semkow and Lazzari informed Williams that she could be terminated during the probation period if she did not meet the required performance levels. Id.
Courts reviewing wrongful termination claims have found that where employees receive consistently poor evaluations or warnings regarding their performance, the second prong of the prima facie case is not satisfied. Taylor v. Polygram Records, 1999 WL 124456, at *9 (S.D.N Y Mar. 8, 1999); Dzaba v. Willcox, 1996 WL 39297, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1996) (holding plaintiff failed to satisfy the second element of the prima facie case where he produced no evidence to refute defendant's demonstration of his poor performance); Stein, 782 F. Supp. at 211 ("The plaintiff has not produced any evidence of positive reports indicating satisfaction on the part of some top management with respect to his performance, which could counterbalance the dissatisfaction of the other supervisors."). Here, the only evidence Williams provides to counter the warnings is the December 1997 letter she wrote to Semkow in which she describes her performance as "exemplary." Eisenberger Decl. Ex. 17. Self-evaluations, unlike a supervisors evaluation, do not demonstrate that an employee's performance is satisfactory, nor do they create an issue of fact. Taylor, 1999 WL 124456, at *10; Campbell, 107 F. Supp.2d at 244, n. 5 (finding "subjective disagreement cannot create a triable issue of fact.").
In support of her argument that she performed her Operations Manager job satisfactorily, Williams directs the Court to client commendations and certificates of recognition she received from Alliance. None of these pertain to the position from which she was terminated, however. See Eisenberger Decl. Ex. 8 (announcing Williams in Sales Coordinator position) Ex. 16 (certificates received in 1995 and July 1996, before Williams took the Operations Manager position).
Moreover, Williams' allegations that the warnings were pretextual and due to her race are simply baseless conclusions. Her opinions regarding Defendants' racial animus are based solely on hearsay and unsupported allegations. See supra note I. Thus, Williams' beliefs cannot replace the "admissible evidence" required to permit an inference of discrimination and survive summary judgment. Id. at 243. As Judge Haight stated inTaylor the plaintiffs "belief, based on no evidence other than gut instinct, that [plaintiffs supervisor] treated her with hostility because of her race, cannot justifiably support an inference of discrimination when nothing on the record remotely links [the supervisor's] treatment of her to her race." Taylor, 1999 WL 124456, at *16. Accordingly, as Plaintiff cannot establish the required showing that she was qualified for the Operations Manager position, her wrongful termination claim must fail.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
So Ordered.