Opinion
March 13, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lama, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated November 2, 1987 is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated March 3, 1988; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated March 3, 1988 is reversed insofar as appealed from by the plaintiff and the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety; and it is further,
Ordered that the purported cross appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, for the failure to perfect the same in accordance with the rules of this court ( 22 NYCRR 670.8; see, Kapchan v. Kapchan, 104 A.D.2d 358, 359); and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
We agree with the contention of the plaintiff Stephen I. Widlitz that the court misapprehended his theory of recovery. Rather than attempting to "pierce the corporate veil", the plaintiff was merely seeking to hold the defendant Paul Scher personally liable for a personal tort, committed by him in the furtherance of his corporation's business. "An officer of a corporation * * * who participates in the commission of a tort by the corporation is personally liable therefor" (Bellinzoni v Seland, 128 A.D.2d 580; see also, Raymond Corp. v. Coopers Lybrand, 105 A.D.2d 926; Dupack v. Nationwide Leisure Corp., 70 A.D.2d 568; 15 N.Y. Jur 2d, Business Relationships, § 1079, at 352). Having demonstrated the existence of factual issues requiring a trial (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557), that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against the defendant Paul Scher in his individual capacity should have been denied. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Spatt and Balletta, JJ., concur.