Summary
upholding contempt against defendant who said "if you're going to have a kangaroo court, go ahead on and have it."
Summary of this case from R. C. v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., Div. of LicensingOpinion
No. 1D18-3918
12-05-2019
Daniel J. WEST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Charles H. Williams, Williams Law, Panama City, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Charles H. Williams, Williams Law, Panama City, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
We agree with appointed counsel that the record contains no reversible error and affirm Daniel J. West's judgment and sentence. Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
After the trial court appointed a public defender to represent West on charges of aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault with a firearm, he moved for substitute counsel and requested a Nelson hearing. The Public Defender's Office moved for appointment of the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (OCCCRC). The trial court granted the motion and appointed Jan Miron as conflict counsel. West was soon dissatisfied with Miron's representation and moved for the appointment of another conflict counsel. The OCCCRC also moved for appointment of a new conflict attorney. The trial court granted the motion and appointed Edmund Quintana.
Nelson v. State , 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (providing procedure to follow when a defendant complains that his appointed counsel is incompetent).
But West was still not satisfied and moved to replace Quintana with private court-appointed counsel. Although West's complaints about his counsel were legally insufficient (because Quintana was experiencing health issues) the court appointed Charles Henry Williams to represent West.
Still, West was not satisfied. At a pre-trial hearing, Williams told the court that West did not want Williams to represent him. West asked the court to remove Williams and requested another Nelson hearing. As West explained why he wanted Williams removed, he became agitated. The court told West to "[t]ake it down about two notches. Chill out just a little bit for me. Okay?" West replied:
Seem like you got it in for me. I'd like a change of venue. You seem like you got it in for me. I don't know what's going on. I don't want him, and I'd really like to get out your courtroom. Now, you decide, whatever you decide. Now, if you leave me with him, I won't, I got nothing to do with him. I don't want nothing to do with him. Now, if you leave me with him, you and him decide what ya'll gonna do, because I'm having not having no parts of it.
The court then called Williams to testify about how he prepared West's defense and about his interactions with West. West was given a chance to respond, and the court reminded him, "[w]hat I want you to do is take it down two notches again."
West demanded that the court appoint another lawyer to represent him. West then criticized the trial court, saying, "[n]ow, if you're going to have a kangaroo court, go ahead on and have it."
The court reminded West once more to take his behavior "down a couple notches," warning that if he did not, the court would find him in direct contempt of court. The court told West not to refer to the court in a derogatory manner as he had just done.
The court then denied West's request to remove Williams. The court gave West the option of proceeding with Williams as his counsel or seeking approval from the court to represent himself. The following colloquy ensued:
WEST: I don't want no Ku Klux Klan representing me. I don't want him representing me. I do not. I would like to have a lawyer appointed to me.
THE COURT: I told you I will not do that.
WEST: End of conversation.
THE COURT: Do you want me to, do you want to represent yourself and be your own lawyer? Is that really what you want to do?
WEST: Do whatever you want. You say you going to do that anyway. Do whatever you want. Just do whatever you want.
THE COURT: All right. I'll take that as you want me to make the decision –
WEST: You take it any kind of way you want to.
THE COURT: Mr. West, look at me. You are in direct criminal contempt of this Court now. Do you understand me? And you will face the Court. And I am going to find that you are in direct criminal contempt, because of what you just said. You're impolite. Your behavior is angered. You've been derogatory to this Court now, and I've warned you at least three times to be polite, and you have not and you have violated that order. So I'd like you to tell me why I shouldn't place you in the Bay County Jail for up to 180 days because of your contemptuous conduct. Whatever you want to say or anything you want to offer at this time, this is your opportunity. If you have nothing to say—I'll take that as you don't. You're in contempt of Court. You'll be sentenced to the Bay County Jail up to 180 days. Take him into custody.
The court followed its oral pronouncement of direct criminal contempt with a written judgment. This timely appeal follows.
We review an order of direct criminal contempt for an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. State , 752 So. 2d 679, 685 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830 governs proceedings for direct criminal contempt. A court may punish criminal contempt if the court observed the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830. The trial court must (1) inform the defendant of the accusation and allow him to show why he should not be adjudicated guilty of contempt and sentenced; (2) give the defendant a chance to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances; and (3) orally pronounce the sentence in open court and render a signed written order that includes the facts on which the adjudication of guilty is based. Id.
After giving West multiple warnings, the trial court orally pronounced that it found him in contempt of court and explained the conduct supporting its contempt finding. The court gave West a chance to show why he should not be punished for his contemptuous behavior and to provide excusing or mitigating circumstances. West chose not to respond. The court then held West in contempt and pronounced the sentence in open court. The court rendered a written order reciting the factual basis for the adjudication. Because the trial court complied with each of the requirements of rule 3.830, it did not abuse its discretion in holding West in direct criminal contempt. West's judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
B.L. Thomas, Roberts, and Rowe, JJ., concur.