Opinion
No. 05-CV-206-DRH.
May 25, 2006
ORDER
Before the Court is a motion submitted by Plaintiff West American Insurance Company ("Plaintiff") to reconsider this Court's ruling denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 30). (Doc. 48.) Plaintiff argues that this Court's May 4, 2006 order was wrongly decided, asserting that this Court (1) "erred in finding [Plaintiff] obligated to defendant against allegations of intentional conduct," and (2) "erred in failing to enforce the exclusions for damage to property caused by [Defendant] Kamadulski's operations or work." (Doc. 49.) Defendants S.M. Wilson and District 11 Alton Community School Unit respond in opposition. (Docs. 50, 51.)
Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders "are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them," should be granted "as justice requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 advisory committee's notes, and must be "consonant with equity." John Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers, 258 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1922); s ee also 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60App.108[2] (3d ed. 2004). Such motions "serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc. , 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). "Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion." Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, 90 F.3d at 1270.
Plaintiff's current motion offers little fresh reasoning and presents no new factual issues or evidence. (Doc. 49.) Instead, Plaintiff largely recycles the same arguments it previously made it its motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( See Doc. 30.) As the Seventh Circuit has noted, reconsideration is "not an appropriate forum" for these arguments. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, 90 F.3d at 1270. To the extent, moreover, that Plaintiff raises new arguments in support of its position, such arguments are not based on new evidence and could have been made in the original motion for judgment on the pleadings. As such, these also are not appropriate matters for consideration by this Court. See id. at 1269-70.
Regardless, the Court's original reasoning stands. Plaintiff's first argument — that the conduct in question does not qualify as an "occurrence" under the Policy — is foreclosed by the logic of Lyons v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 811 N.E.2d 718 (Ill.App.Ct. 2004) (relying on Yates v. Bankers Life Cas. Co., 415 Ill. 16, 111 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. 1953)). Plaintiff second argument — that two of the Policy's business-risk exclusions apply here — is defeated because Kamdulski did not contract or intend to perform work on Defendants Hazelton's and Holyfield's properties, and, based on the pleadings and briefs and construing the relevant exclusions "most strongly against the insurer," it is not "clear and free from doubt" that it was "performing operations" on these properties within the meaning of the exclusion and the agreement between the parties, or that its work was "incorrectly performed" on these properties within the scope of the exclusion and the agreement. Continental Cas. Co. v. McDowell Colantoni, Ltd., 282 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 668 N.E.2d 59 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996).
Accordingly, for the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.