Opinion
A-13572
11-09-2022
MENES ALEXANDER WEIGHTMAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District Trial Court No. 3AN-18-11886 CR, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Menes Alexander Weightman was convicted of two counts of second-degree theft and one count of fraudulent use of an access device for stealing a backpack from the Alaska Club and using credit cards found in the backpack to purchase $875 worth of goods.
After the jury began deliberations, Weightman received discovery in a separate case suggesting that his fiancee (who was also his co-defendant in the separate case) had lied to police investigators about events relevant to that case. Weightman's fiancee was only tangentially involved in the underlying events in this case (i.e., the Alaska Club case) and did not testify at trial. But after learning that she lied to investigators in the separate case, Weightman filed a motion for a new trial in this case arguing that the State had violated its discovery obligations under Alaska Criminal Rule 16 by failing to disclose that information prior to trial. The superior court denied Weightman's motion, and Weightman now appeals that ruling.
The State did not assert that Weightman's fiancee was involved in the theft of the backpack. Rather, the backpack and some items that Weightman had purchased using the credit cards in the backpack were discovered in her car, which she had reported stolen, and she was present when the police executed a search warrant in this case.
In the separate case, Weightman and his fiancee were charged with stealing luggage from a Chinese tourist at the Alyeska Prince Hotel. To explain her possession of Chinese currency in her home, Weightman's fiancee told the police that she had traveled to China. The item that Weightman claims was improperly withheld was an e-mail exchange between a prosecutor and an agent for the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency where the federal agent stated that Weightman's fiancee had not traveled to China.
We reject Weightman's claim. Assuming arguendo that the State violated Rule 16, Weightman would still be required, at a minimum, to present a specific, facially plausible claim of prejudice. Weightman has failed to do so. He asserts that if this information had been discovered prior to trial, he may have changed his trial strategy, sought a plea deal, or even negotiated a global resolution in connection with the separate co-defendant case. But these arguments are little more than speculation and conjecture. We fail to see how impeachment evidence about a witness who was neither called to testify nor directly involved in the case could have affected Weightman's trial strategy or plea negotiations, or led to a global resolution of the various charges against him.
See Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 431-32 (Alaska 2016).
Weightman also argues that the State violated its constitutional discovery obligation under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. Those cases require the State to provide evidence to the defendant that is material to guilt or punishment.We conclude that evidence showing Weightman's fiancee lied to police in connection with a separate case was not material to his guilt or punishment in this case.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
See Stacy v. State, 500 P.3d 1023, 1034 (Alaska App. 2021) (discussing Brady and Giglio).
Finally, we note that at sentencing, the superior court stated, "The parties have agreed that [the counts] would all merge." But the judgment does not reflect that the counts have been merged. This error should be corrected on remand.
We REMAND for the limited purpose of correcting the error in the judgment. In all other respects, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.