Opinion
CIVIL NO. 00-4057 (JBS)
May 14, 2001
Louis M. Barbone, Esquire, JACOBS BARBONE, P.A., 1125 Pacific Avenue, Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401, Counsel for Plaintiff
Gerald F. Spada, Esquire, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN, P.C., Two Gateway Center, 12th Center, Newark, New Jersey 07102-5401, Counsel for Defendant
OPINION
In this wrongful discharge case, plaintiff Robert Webster brings suit against his former employer, Heineken, U.S.A., Inc., alleging that his rights under the Federal Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (Count One), the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1, et seq. (Count Two), the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,et seq. (Count Three), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. ("NJLAD"), were violated when plaintiff was discharged from his employment with Heineken in September, 1999. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement of his position and benefits, and interest, fees, and costs related to this suit. Presently before the Court are defendant's motions to dismiss plaintiff's New Jersey Claims (Counts Two and Four) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and defendant's motion to transfer the action to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts, unless otherwise indicated, are undisputed. Plaintiff Robert Webster ("Webster") is a New Jersey resident, living at 324 Evergreen Avenue, Villas, Cape May County, New Jersey. (Compl. at 1.) Defendant Heineken, U.S.A., Inc. ("Heineken") is a producer and supplier of beer and is incorporated under the laws of the State of New York and has its principal place of business in White Plains, New York. (Compl., ¶ 2; Def.'s Br. at 3.) Heineken regularly does business in New Jersey and maintains offices in the state. In 1994, plaintiff Webster was hired to work as a level one District Manager for defendant in Heineken's Rutherford, New Jersey office. (Pl's Br. at 1, Ex. A Pl's Aff., ¶ 2.) While at the Rutherford office, plaintiff was promoted to the position of District Manager, Level Two. (Compl., ¶ 1; Def.'s Reply Br. at 2.) In 1997, plaintiff was promoted to Metro Off-Premise Division Manager, which required him to service customer wholesalers throughout metropolitan New York, and was transferred to Heineken's White Plains, New York office. (Def.'s Reply Br. at 2; Pl.'s Initial Disclosure Statement, ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff, a recovering alcoholic, advised Heineken of his affliction and ongoing treatment in 1994, upon his initial employment with the company. (Compl., ¶ 3.) No claims were made by either party that plaintiff's affliction caused any work- related problems, or any improper employer action, prior to 1997 while plaintiff worked in the defendant's New Jersey office. In the summer of 1998, after working for at least a year in defendant's White Plains, New York office, plaintiff suffered a relapse of his alcoholism, which he immediately reported to his supervisor, Theodore Muro ("Muro"). (Compl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleged that he did not abuse his personal or sick time during the recovery period following this initial relapse. (Compl., ¶ 4.) In September, 1999, while still working in New York, plaintiff suffered another relapse and immediately reported to his physician. (Compl., ¶ 5.) The physician ordered plaintiff to refrain from working and initiated a course of treatment and medication. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Muro, via a recorded voice-mail message, that he was ill and under the care of a doctor, and that he would be out of work for a week. (Id.)
Plaintiff, in his opposition brief, asserts that 50% of his employment life with Heineken, that is from 1994 to 1997, was in the New Jersey office, with the other half served in White Plains, New York. (Pl.'s Opp. at 2.) Later in the same brief, plaintiff argues "that [his] claim did begin in the State of New Jersey and continue in the State of New York," but offers no specific incidents of allegedly improper conduct until 1998. Furthermore, plaintiff makes no claim in his complaint or affidavit that his employment from 1994 to 1997 in the New Jersey office was anything but extremely successful. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-6; Pl.'s Opp. Br., Ex. A.)
With the approval of his physician, plaintiff began intensive outpatient treatment and returned to work at the White Plains office later in September of 1999. (Compl. at ¶ 6.) At some time after his return to work after his second relapse, plaintiff left work and presented himself in an Emergency Room for treatment of unspecified physical symptoms related to his alcoholism. (Id.) Upon his return to the White Plains office later that same day, plaintiff was terminated and, according to him, given no reason for the termination. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motions
Defendant first moves to dismiss counts II and IV of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., because the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred in New York and, they argue, the New Jersey statutes do not apply. Plaintiff argues that because he resides in New Jersey, he is entitled to seek protection under New Jersey employment laws, and that he has adequately stated a claim for wrongful termination under New Jersey law.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A district court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint and any and all reasonable inferences derived from those allegations. Schanzer v. Rutgers Univ., 934 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987)); Unger v. National Residents Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1991). In addition to the Complaint, the court may also consider authenticated documents appended to the submissions of the parties. Schanzer, 934 F. Supp. at 671 n. 1 (citing 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357, at 299 (2d ed. 1990)). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead the facts that serve as the basis for the claim.Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Midlantic Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 758 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.J. 1990). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether he can prove any set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n. 3 (1984) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Therefore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court should look to the face of the complaint and decide whether, taking all of the allegations of fact as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, plaintiff's allegations state a cognizable legal claim.Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d at 103.
A. Choice of Law
Counts II and IV of Webster's complaint are based on New Jersey Statutory law, namely, the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1, et seq. ("NJFLA") and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. ("NJLAD"). Defendant argues that New York law applies and that these counts must be dismissed because plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff argues that New Jersey law should apply because New Jersey has an interest in protecting its citizens against discrimination.
As a federal court sitting in diversity on these counts, this Court must apply the law of the state in which it sits, including the choice of law rules of the forum state. See Ruccolo v. BDP, Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 735575, * 5, 3 Wage Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 941 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). This court must, therefore, look to the New Jersey choice of law rules to determine whether a New Jersey court would apply the law of New Jersey or New York to this employment relationship between a New York employer and a New Jersey resident, where all of the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred at defendant's headquarters in White Plains, New York.
New Jersey courts have adopted a flexible governmental interest analysis to determine choice of law issues. See Ruccolo, 1996 WL 735575, *5 (citing Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247-48 (1986); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967); Haggerty v. Cedeno, 267 N.J. Super. 114, 116 (Law Div. 1993), aff'd, 279 N.J. Super. 607 (App.Div. 1993),certification denied, 141 N.J. 98 (1995)). Under this analysis, a court must first decide whether there is a conflict in the laws of the interested states and, if so, the court must then consider the governmental policies underlying the laws and how the policies are affected by each state's contacts to the litigation. Id. at 248. As the Second Circuit has written, "[a]lthough New Jersey recognizes a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at- will employee, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), New York does not, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983)." Shamley v. ITT Corp., 869 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that New York, not New Jersey, law applies to a claim brought by a New Jersey resident against a New York employer); see also Buccilli v. Timby, Brown Timby, 283 N.J. Super. 6, 10 (App.Div. 1995) (citing Shamley with approval and holding that the damage claim of a New Jersey resident for her allegedly wrongful dismissal from out-of-state employment is governed by the law of the state in which she was employed). Plaintiff himself concedes that there is a conflict between New York and New Jersey law on the relevant issue, noting that the State of New York has no Family Leave Act. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 4.)
Plaintiff attempts to assert that unless the NJFMLA and the NJLAD are applied to his claims, he would be left with no remedy whatsoever for his alleged wrongful termination. As defendant notes, this is not the case, because plaintiff's federal claims under the FFMLA and the ADA are not subject to the instant motion to dismiss and may provide a remedy for his claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's reference to McDonnell v. Illinois , 319 N.J. Super. 324 (App.Div. 1999) is not compelling because that case involved a New Jersey resident working for the State of Illinois in New Jersey.
Because there is a conflict between the employment law of New Jersey and New York, this Court must next consider each state's contacts with the litigants, the governmental policies that underlie the laws at issue, and how each state's policies are affected by these contacts. Plaintiff argues that because he is a citizen of New Jersey, because he was employed at defendant's New Jersey office from 1994 to 1997 (prior to the allegedly wrongful acts), and because defendant Heineken is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, the laws of this state should apply. Defendant contends that New York has the greater governmental interest in this case because, at the time of the allegedly wrongful conduct, Webster's employment at Heineken was exclusively at the White Plains facility, Webster was responsible only for sales exclusively aimed at New York distributors and retail stores, the allegedly wrongful decision to terminate was made by executives in New York, and the notice of termination was given to Webster at the White Plains office. (Def.'s Br. at 1.) Although defendant concedes that plaintiff did begin his employment with Heineken in the New Jersey office, they assert that plaintiff has alleged no facts that could support a finding that any wrongful conduct occurring during plaintiff's employment at Heineken's New Jersey office.
The Court finds that New York's interests in this case are greater than those of New Jersey. As discussed in the Second Circuit's opinion inShamley, cited with approval by a New Jersey Appellate Court inBuccilli, where a plaintiff forges a lasting link between himself and his state of employment, that state has a greater interest in regulating the employment relationship at issue. See Shamley, 869 F.2d at 172. Plaintiff in this case traveled from his home in New Jersey to White Plains, New York every day from the time he was transferred out of the New Jersey office in 1997 to the date of his termination in September, 1999. Additionally, New York has a strong interest in uniformly applying its own law to employment disputes arising in New York because so many New York workers reside in neighboring states. See Shamley, 869 F.2d at 172. Heineken's relationship with its employees in the White Plains headquarters should not be subject to differing legal principles depending on the employee's domicile. Id.
Finally, New Jersey law is clear that claims of a New Jersey resident relating to employment in another state will usually be governed by the law of the state in which the New Jersey resident is employed. See Brunner v. Allied Signal, Inc., 2001 WL 40739 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2001) (citing Buccilli v. Timby, Brown Timby, 283 N.J. Super. 6 (App.Div. 1995)). Similar to the plaintiff in Buccilli, plaintiff Webster worked exclusively in New York during the time the alleged wrongful conduct took place and all of the allegedly unlawful conduct, such as the allegedly improper decision to terminate plaintiff, occurred at the headquarters in White Plains, New York.
For the purposes of the employment relationship at issue, it was only fortuitous that plaintiff resided in New Jersey and began his employment with Heineken in New Jersey a full five years prior to the allegedly wrongful termination. New York law, therefore, should govern this dispute. Plaintiff's claims in Count II and Count IV seek relief under New Jersey statutes. Plaintiff cannot, therefore, state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the NJFMLA or the NJLAD. Counts II and IV of plaintiff's complaint will therefore be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Motion to Transfer Webster's Remaining Claims
Defendant Heineken next moves to transfer plaintiff's remaining federal claims under the Federal Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617 ("FFMLA") (Count One) and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq ("ADA") (Count Three) to the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The governing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), provides:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
This case could have been brought in New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because all of the allegedly wrongful activities were conducted by executives in New York while plaintiff was employed at the White Plains office.
The goal of the transfer statute is to "prevent the waste of `time, energy and money' and `to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 809 (1964) (internal quotations omitted). There are thus three main things which courts must take into consideration: 1) the convenience of the parties; 2) the convenience of the witnesses; and 3) the interests of justice.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1970), the Supreme Court laid out several other factors, which fall into two broad categories. The first category is comprised of factors relating to the so-called "private interests" of the parties to the litigation. Those private interests include: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) availability of compulsory process of attendance over unwilling witnesses; (4) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (5) obstacles to a fair trial; and (6) the possibility of a jury view of the subject of the suit. See Sandvik, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508).
The second category consists of "public interest" considerations. These are: (1) court congestion and other administrative difficulties; (2) placing the burden of jury duty on those having the closest ties to the action; (3) local interests in having the case adjudicated at home; and (4) familiarity of the forum court with the law applicable to the action. Sandvik, 724 F. Supp. at 307 (citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09). The analysis courts apply in ruling on motions to transfer is a flexible one that turns on the specific facts of each individual case.Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981).
The plaintiff's choice of forum may be overruled if the defendant demonstrates that there are countervailing considerations that strongly weigh in favor of transfer. For example, when the central facts of a lawsuit occur outside the forum state, the plaintiff's selection of that forum is entitled to less deference. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 481 (D.N.J. 1993). The plaintiff's choice, however, carries great weight. In the Third Circuit, the plaintiff's choice of forum is a "paramount consideration" in the determination of whether transfer is appropriate, and thus a plaintiff's decision to litigate in a particular district should not be disturbed lightly. Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970).
The moving party has the burden of persuasion on a motion to transfer.Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). The movant's choice of forum must be more appropriate than the plaintiff's chosen forum, in terms of convenience for the courts, the parties, the witnesses, and the public interest; it is not enough that a different district is more convenient for the defendants. Indeed, "unless the balance is strongly tipped in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed." Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508;Honeywell, 817 F. Supp. at 480 (quoting Hardaway Constr. Inc. v. Condesco Indus., Ltd., 583 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D.N.J. 1983)).
Here, plaintiff's chosen forum, the District of New Jersey, may be overruled only if the defendant meets its burden of demonstrating countervailing considerations that strongly weigh in favor of transfer. Defendant offers a number of factors which support their motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of New York, such as the fact that plaintiff worked exclusively in the White Plains office after his transfer in 1997, that plaintiff's employment records are kept in New York, that witnesses are located in New York, that Webster filed his initial complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in the New York office, and that New York, therefore, is the "center of gravity" of plaintiff's complaint.
Although plaintiff's choice of forum should be given paramount consideration, where, as here, the central incidents related to the plaintiff's claims allegedly occurred outside of the forum state, the plaintiff's selection is given less weight. Plaintiff offers nothing more that his residence in New Jersey and his former employment with Heineken in the New Jersey office as the basis for his choice of forum. Plaintiff's supplemental letter submission, dated December 22, 2000, which attempts to bolster his choice of the District of New Jersey forum, adds little to this Court's opinion. In the case cited in that submission, Calkins v. Dollarland, Inc., 117 F. Supp.2d 421 (D.N.J. 2000), the Honorable Judge Stanley S. Brotman denied defendants' motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where a substantial portion of the claims leading to the complaint allegedly occurred in New Jersey. Although plaintiff Webster argues in his opposition brief that the wrongful conduct began in New Jersey, he offers no support for such claims and the allegations in his complaint do not support that position. Instead, all of plaintiff's assertions relate to his termination after two relapses into alcoholism, which took place while he was working in New York. Unlike the plaintiff in Calkins, who endured harassment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, plaintiff Webster was subject to allegedly wrongful behavior only in New York and was extremely successful at Heineken during his tenure in New Jersey.
Based on the parties submissions to date, this Court finds that defendant has met its burden of showing that the private and public interests support a transfer of plaintiff's case to the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. All of the relevant employee files are located in White Plains and the allegedly wrongdoing supervisors operate out of Heineken's corporate headquarters in White Plains, New York. Although it is not inconceivable that the files and witnesses could be transported the approximate one hundred and twenty mile distance from White Plains to Camden, in light of the facts that plaintiff alleges that all the wrongful conduct occurred in New York and that New York has an extremely strong interest in regulating the employment practices in that State, this action should be transferred to the Southern District of New York.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss Counts II and IV of plaintiff's Complaint, and will also grant defendant's motion to transfer plaintiff's remaining claims under the FFMLA and the ADA to the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon the motion of defendant Heineken, U.S.A., Inc., to dismiss plaintiff's NJFMLA (Count II) and NJLAD (Count IV) claims; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons expressed in an Opinion of today's date;
IT IS this day of May, 2001 hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's New Jersey claims under the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1 et seq. (Count Two) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. ("NJLAD") (Count Four) of the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., be, and hereby are, GRANTED ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts II and IV of plaintiff's Complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's remaining federal claims under the Federal Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617 ("FFMLA") (Count One) and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,et seq ("ADA") (Count Three) be, and hereby are, TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Counts I and III of plaintiff's Complaint shall proceed to trial in that court.