Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1190 Section I/2.
March 23, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed on behalf of defendant, Hutco, Inc. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Rec. Doc. No. 39.
BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2002, Brian Webre, a payroll employee of defendant, Hutco, Inc. ("Hutco"), was operating the M/V 008 fleet boat, a vessel owned and operated by defendant, Azalea Fleet, Inc. ("Azalea"). At approximately 3:00 P.M., Webre and a co-worker brought the M/V 008 into dock at Azalea's facility. In preparation for mooring, Webre's co-worker proceeded to the bow of the vessel and he saw Webre leave the cabin of the vessel and proceed to the stern of the vessel without wearing a life jacket. Plaintiffs allege that as Webre was walking to the stern of the vessel, he tripped on an appurtenance of the vessel causing him to fall into the water. Shortly thereafter, when Webre's co-worker was unable to locate him, the co-worker reported to his supervisor that Webre was missing and a search commenced. Approximately twenty minutes later, while using a pole to plumb the water near the vessel, Webre's body was brought to the surface. Life saving efforts were unsuccessful and Mr. Webre was declared dead.On April 28, 2003, plaintiffs, Brandy, Scott, Ashley, and Brooks Webre filed this lawsuit in this Court alleging claims for wrongful death and survival damages against Azalea and Hutco pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 and the general maritime law and, alternatively, a claim pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Plaintiffs allege that Hutco was negligent by failing to provide the decedent with a safe place to work, failing to provide adequate life safety devices, and by failing to properly train the decedent to perform the work aboard the vessel.
See Rec. Doc. No. 41, plaintiffs' opposition to Hutco's motion for summary judgment, at 3; Rec. Doc. No. 1, Pl. Comp., ¶ VIII.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That burden is not satisfied by creating merely some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or by only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The materiality of facts is determined by "the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (internal quotation omitted).In order to demonstrate that summary judgment should not lie, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001). A court will resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. The Court will not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. See id. (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 307 (5th Cir. 2000) ("A complete failure of proof as to one element requires summary judgment against the entirety of the claim.") (citation omitted).
I. Breach of Warranty of Seaworthiness
In order to establish a claim for a breach of the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, an injured seaman must prove that the vessel owner has failed to provide a vessel, including her equipment and crew, which is reasonably fit and safe for the purposes for which it is used. Boudreaux v. United States of America, 280 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must also establish a causal connection between his injury and the breach of duty that rendered the vessel unseaworthy. Boudreaux, 280 F.3d at 468; Jackson, 245 F.3d at 527. "To be held liable for breach of the duty, the defendant `must be in the relationship of an owner or operator of a vessel.'" Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Daniels v. Florida Power Light Co., 317 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1963)).
Plaintiffs concede that Hutco did not own, operate or control the M/V 008, and, therefore, they cannot establish an unseaworthiness claim against Hutco. Accordingly, Hutco is entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' unseaworthiness claim against it.
See Rec. Doc. No. 41, at 1.
II. Jones Act Claim
Pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688, a seaman has a cause of action against his employer for negligence. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 688 (West 2003); Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 2003). The duty of care owed by an employer to a seaman pursuant to the Jones Act is that of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). While the Jones Act employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work is broad in scope, it is not a form of strict liability. Daigle v. L L Marine Trans. Co., 322 F.Supp.2d 717, 725 (E.D. La. 2004) (citations omitted). A Jones Act employer is not liable for a breach of its duty to provide a safe place to work unless the employer has notice and the opportunity to correct an unsafe condition. Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Perry v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 528 F.2d 1378, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976)); Daigle, 322 F.Supp.2d at 725. The standard of care is "not `what the employer subjectively knew, but rather what it objectively knew or should have known.'" Colburn, 883 F.2d at 374 (quoting Turner v. Inland Tugs Co., 689 F.Supp. 612, 619 (E.D. La. 1988)). Liability does not attach to a Jones Act employer for injuries suffered by its employees absent proof that the injury occurred during the course of employment, that there was negligence on the part of the employer, and that such negligence was the cause, in whole or in part, of the seaman's injury. Gautreaux, 107 F.3d at 335.
Plaintiffs sued Hutco pursuant to the Jones Act and, alternatively, pursuant to section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). "It is well-settled that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive compensation regimes." Becker, 335 F.3d at 386 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 553, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1539, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997)). The parties' only dispute pertains to plaintiffs' Jones Act claim. Because both parties have assumed that the Jones Act, rather than the LHWCA, is applicable in this case, this Court need not address plaintiffs' alternative claim pursuant to section 905(b) of the LHWCA.
"A seaman is obligated under the Jones Act to act with ordinary prudence under the circumstances." Gautreaux, 107 F.3d at 339 Such circumstances include not only the employee's reliance on his employer to provide a safe working environment, but also the seaman's experience, training or education. Id. There no duty to instruct an experienced seaman on matters within common sense, or to remind him of what he already knew or should have known. Cole v. Dolphin Towing, LLC, 2005 WL 195519, *7 (E.D. La. Jan 27, 2005) (slip copy) (citing Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La. 1999); Grover v. American President Lines, Inc., 1995 AMC 2105 (N.D. Ca. 1995)). If proper equipment is provided which would permit a seaman to safely perform a task, a seaman has a duty to use such equipment. Robinson v. Zapata Corp., 664 F.2d 45, 49 (5th Cir. 1981).
Hutco asserts that plaintiffs have no evidence that Hutco had any control over Webre's working conditions or that any of Hutco's alleged failures caused his accident. Hutco argues that the absence of any evidence that it exercised any control over Webre's work environment demonstrates that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition, that it did not have an opportunity to correct any alleged unsafe condition, and that any alleged failure on the part of Hutco caused plaintiffs' death. Additionally, Hutco points to the absence of record evidence with respect to how Webre's accident occurred and, therefore, Hutco argues that plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law.
In support of the motion, defendant points to deposition testimony demonstrating that Azalea provided all of the equipment used by Webre in his work aboard the M/V 008, including a life vest that Webre was required to wear while he was aboard the vessel pursuant to Azalea safety policy. Hutco also points to a deposition of decedent's co-worker showing that Azalea held safety meetings approximately twice a month in which employees informed Azalea of any safety issues. Finally, Hutco provides evidence that Azalea, rather than Hutco, was responsible for the safety rules and regulations applicable to Azalea's vessels, including rules pertaining to wearing life vests aboard an Azalea vessel. Hutco argues that because the record evidence does not indicate that Hutco had any responsibility for any circumstance giving rise to Webre's death, summary judgment is warranted.
See Rec. Doc. No. 39, Ex. A, deposition of John Tomlinson ("Dep. Tomlinson"), pp. 13-14; Ex.B., deposition of Virgul Goudia ("Dep. Goudia"), pp. 19-20.
Dep. Goudia, at p. 19:1-17.
Dep. Tomlinson, pp. 13-14.
In response to defendant's motion, plaintiffs have not provided any evidence demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Hutco's negligence. Instead, plaintiffs' sole argument is that they are under no burden to produce any evidence because Hutco has not satisfied its initial summary judgment burden. Plaintiffs argue that Hutco's motion amounts only to a conclusory statement that it was not negligent and, as such, it is insufficient to invoke their obligation to respond to the motion with any evidence. Plaintiffs argue that Hutco's motion fails because Hutco has not provided affidavit or deposition testimony providing clear evidence with respect to the safeguards it took with respect to training Webre for his work or clear evidence that it ascertained that Azalea provided Webre a safe working environment.
Plaintiffs' argument is unavailing. Plaintiffs have mischaracterized Hutco's motion and, in doing so, have misconstrued their burden of production in the context of summary judgment procedure. Addressing an argument identical to the one plaintiffs advance here, the Fifth Circuit stated:
While it is true that, even if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, "[s]imply filing a summary judgment motion does not immediately compel the party opposing the motion to come forward with evidence demonstrating material issues of fact as to every element of its case," Russ v. International Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1991), it is also true that, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial, "[e]ver since if not before Celotex, `[t]he moving party need not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.'" Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Latimer v. Smithkline French Laboratories, 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990)).
We have recently noted that
[t]he party that moves for summary judgment bears the burden to establish that its opponent has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent's claim or defense, or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the opponent's claim or defense. Id.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 939 F.2d 1293, 1299 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have confused Shell's burden with the burden which they would have had to shoulder had they moved for summary judgment.Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991).
Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, Hutco has done more than simply file a conclusory statement that it was not negligent. Hutco has properly supported its summary judgment motion by submitting record evidence to show that Hutco did not have any responsibility with respect to Webre's working environment aboard the vessel, that it had no knowledge of any unsafe condition, that Azalea provided life vests to its crews, and that Azalea had primary responsibility with respect to safety regulations, training, and procedures. Therefore, Hutco has demonstrated "that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports [the] essential element[s] of [plaintiffs'] claim." Id. Having properly supported its motion, plaintiffs had an obligation to provide evidence that demonstrates that a genuine issue exists for trial. Having failed to carry that burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Hutco breached a duty to provide Webre with a safe place to work.
Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the alleged claim that Hutco's alleged failure to properly train the decedent played any part in Webre's death. The evidence before the Court demonstrates that crew members aboard Azalea vessels were instructed by Azalea that life jackets should be worn at all times, signs at decedents workplace instructed employees to wear their life jackets, and required safety meetings emphasized that crew members should ensure that their life jackets were not damaged. Given this undisputed evidence, a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Hutco was negligent for failing to properly train Webre for his work aboard the M/V 008 or that any alleged failure to train played any part, however slight, in causing Webre's death.
The Court notes that plaintiffs have not identified the alleged aspect of Webre's employment they contend Webre was inadequately trained to perform. Plaintiffs' have also failed to advance any theory of how the alleged failure to train could have caused Webre's accident. This omission is particularly glaring in light of the fact that plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence demonstrating how Webre's accident actually occurred.
Dep. Tomlinson, p. 13.
Rec. Doc. No. 41, exhibit A, pg 16 In. 1-5.
Rec. Doc. No. 41, exhibit B, pg 19 In. 6-17.
In light of the undisputed evidence that Webre was supplied with a life jacket by Azalea, the fact that Webre was not explicitly instructed to wear a life jacket by Hutco does not support a claim of negligence against Hutco for its alleged failure to properly train Webre to work on the M/V 008. Courts have refused to find an employer liable for failing to trian a seaman when the training deals with common sense or that which a seaman knew or should have known. See Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 980 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to impose a general duty on vessel owners to teach crewmembers to swim or to require crewmembers to wear flotation devices at all times); Cole, 2005 WL 195519, at *7; Vendetto, 725 So.2d at 480 (La. 1999) (mere failure to instruct and supervise does not equate to Jones Act negligence when the seaman is fully knowledgeable of the available safe method).
In sum, plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden in accordance with established summary judgment procedure and Hutco has sufficiently demonstrated that the absence of record evidence to support plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, Hutco is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Hutco's motion for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED.