Opinion
No. 88 C 1405
February 7, 1989
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Linda Watson filed this five-count action against National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and her ex-supervisor Frank T. Blum, charging breach of an employment contract and various state law tort duties. In a June 6, 1988 memorandum opinion and order, we dismissed without prejudice all but the breach of contract count. Watson filed an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in her original complaint. Defendants again move to dismiss the four tort counts. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is granted.
Count II: Wrongful Discharge
We dismissed Count II of Watson's original complaint because she failed to adequately plead the actions for which she was discharged in retaliation and the public policy thereby contravened. In her amended complaint, Watson alleges that she was terminated because she refused to fraudulently state that she had thoroughly investigated another employee's Title VII complaint. In addition to challenging the adequacy of these new pleadings, defendants contend that we lack jurisdiction over this claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, § 1-101 et seq. Section 8-111(D) of the IHRA establishes the preemptive effect of the Act:
Defendants did not waive this challenge to Count II when they failed to raise it in their motion to dismiss the original complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act. ch. 68, § 8-111(D).
An individual must pursue any action that can be characterized as a civil rights claim through specified administrative mechanisms and cannot seek relief in the courts. For example, in Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill.2d 1, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a former employee must pursue the comprehensive procedures of the IHRA for a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against age discrimination.
Watson's retaliatory discharge claim falls within the reach of the IHRA and is accordingly preempted by its provisions. She alleges in effect that Amtrak discharged her as a result of her opposition to discrimination against another employee. It is a civil rights violation within the meaning of the IHRA when any employer "[r]etaliate[s] against a person because he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment in employment or sexual harassment in higher education." § 6-101(A). The best evidence supporting this characterization of Watson's claim is the fact that the Illinois Department of Human Rights has filed with the Human Rights Commission a complaint on Watson's behalf based on the very allegations raised here. The proceedings in the Commission constitute Watson's exclusive remedy, and we accordingly dismiss Count II with prejudice.
Count III: Tortious Interference
When an individual accused of interfering with a contract is an officer of a corporation alleged to have breached the contract, the plaintiff must allege "facts which, if true, establish that the officers induced the breach to further their personal goals or to injure the other party to the contract, and acted contrary to the best interest of the corporation." George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago Col. of Ost. Med., 719 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1983); Medina v. Spotnail, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 190, 196-97 (N.D.Ill. 1984).
This element of a tortious interference claim effectuates the privilege that corporate officers have as policymakers in the corporation to act on behalf of and in the interest of the corporation using their business judgment. "Since officers hold policymaking positions, `their freedom of action aimed toward corporate benefit should not be curtailed by fear of personal liability.'" 719 F.2d at 1333, quoting A. Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract, 43 Cornell L.Q. 55, 59 (1957). This justification for an officer's immunity does not exist when the corporate officer's motivation for a decision is not to benefit the corporation but to serve some personal goal. When a decision serves the corporate interest, it is presumed that the officer's motivation was to benefit the corporation.
In her original complaint, Watson failed to allege that Blum discharged her for personal reasons. Watson now alleges, in addition to her earlier allegation that Blum acted "with specific intent to do injury and damage to the plaintiff," that Blum discharged her "in an effort to consolidate and enhance his position with the corporate defendant, a position in which he clearly had a personal interest." Defendants characterize this allegation as nothing more than a statement that Blum acted to satisfactorily perform his job and thereby strengthen his position. Certainly a corporate officer's acting in what they consider the best interests of the corporation additionally serves the officer's professional aspirations, and that by itself should not provide a basis for liability. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count III is granted.
Count IV: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead that the defendants (1) intentionally engaged in (2) extreme and outrageous conduct (3) causing (4) severe emotional distress. Heying v. Simonaitis, 126 Ill. App.3d 157, 466 N.E.2d 1137, 1143 (1st Dist. 1984); Clay v. Quartet Mfg. Co., 644 F. Supp. 56, 61 (N.D. Ill. 1986). As to the second element of the cause of action, the plaintiff must allege conduct that is so extreme in degree and outrageous in character as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill.2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1976); Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 684 (N.D.Ill. 1987).
An employer cannot be held liable for the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct that is incidental to and expected in the employment setting. For example,
Personality conflicts, questioning of job performance and job transfer, whether for disciplinary or management purposes are unavoidable aspects of employment. Frequently they produce concern and distress for the affected employee. Yet, if the distress from such incidents was deemed so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it, nearly all employees would have a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Heying, 466 N.E.2d at 1144.
The employer's conduct must "go far beyond the ordinary indignities one can be expected to endure in the workplace" to be deemed extreme and outrageous. Clay, 644 F. Supp. at 62 (finding allegations of the unlawful denial of employment benefits, sexual coercion, offensive remarks and uninvited sexually-suggestive touchings sufficient to plead extreme and outrageous conduct). Cf., Harris v. First Federal Savings and Loan Asso., 129 m.App.3d 978, 473 N.E.2d 457 (1st Dist. 1984) (finding twenty-five separate allegations of mistreatment and humiliation, including a demotion, a threatened transfer, isolation from other employees, numerous unfair performance reviews and unjustified monitoring insufficient to state a claim).
Watson alleges the following conduct by Amtrak and Blum: giving her an unusually heavy workload, initiating an investigation into her work, sending investigators to question her on at least two occasions, demanding a handwriting sample, firing her and denying her access to her office. While Amtrak's actions may have been heavy-handed and beyond that necessary under the circumstances, they did not subject Watson to the kind of indignities that merit recovery for emotional distress. In Gibson v. Chemical Card Services Corp., 157 Ill. App.3d 211, 510 N.E.2d 37 (1st Dist. 1987), the court was faced with allegations of employer conduct similar to Amtrak's here. The employer accused the plaintiff and her husband of stealing company credit cards, repeatedly questioned her, demanded that she provide handwriting samples, threatened her with jail if she did not cooperate and finally fired her. The court found such conduct "not so outrageous in character or extreme in degree that it transcended all traditional bounds of decency." The court also noted that an allegation that the employer acted with tortious or criminal intent does not necessarily render the conduct extreme and outrageous. Id., 510 N.E.2d at 42. Even if done in retaliation for Watson's refusal to lie in a Title VII investigation, defendants' conduct cannot be deemed extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count IV is granted.
Count V: Punitive Damages
Having failed to satisfactorily plead a retaliatory discharge or tortious interference claim, Watson may not recover punitive damages. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count V is granted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Counts II through V of the first amended complaint are dismissed with prejudice. It is so ordered.