Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-05-445355
Lambden, J.
On appeal, plaintiff Johnnie Mae Washington argues that three of the rulings contained in the trial court’s judgment, issued after a bench trial with the court sitting in equity, are in error. Plaintiff requests that we reverse these rulings and order the trial court to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Defendants Linda Harrington and Jonathan Ross (collectively, defendants) argued at the hearing for this appeal, but have not otherwise responded. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Procedural Background
In September 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants for cancellation of a deed regarding, and to quiet title in, certain residential real property in San Francisco. Shortly thereafter, she filed an amended complaint that added an unlawful detainer cause of action. Defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint denying most of the allegations, and asserting various affirmative defenses. An extensive bench trial followed.
Plaintiff also named her two children as defendants. She obtained a default judgment against them, apparently with their cooperation, and obtained title to their portion of the real property that is the subject in dispute.
The trial court and the parties’ counsel engaged in extended posttrial briefings and hearings. The parties’ counsel and the court discussed the issues of the case, questions posed by the court and the parties’ responses, the court’s tentative and proposed statements of decision and the parties’ objections to them, and the form of the court’s final judgment. In July 2007, the court filed a judgment and, in early August 2007, an order adopting its May 2007 proposed statement of decision with certain modifications.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. In her appellate brief, plaintiff does not directly challenge the trial court’s factual findings, but argues that some testimony relied upon by the court was not credible or sufficient. She does not provide a comprehensive summary of the court’s findings, instead mostly presenting her own view of the evidence. While we have reviewed her presentation, we summarize the facts from the trial court’s own findings and rulings in its statement of decision.
The Trial Court’s Statement of Decision
In its statement of decision, the trial court summarizes the case as “an action for quieting title and cancellation of a deed purporting to convey a one-third interest in property from [plaintiff] to the decedent Robert Ross (‘Ross’), whose estate is a defendant in this case. Plaintiff Washington claims she did not intend to convey a fee simple absolute to Ross. Ross died prior to this action. Defendant Linda Harrington, administrator of the estate of Ross, contends the deed should not be cancelled but should be given full effect.”
The court found that plaintiff did not receive a formal education beyond the second grade, and that she did not learn to read and write in school. Plaintiff “has significant difficulty with any reading activity and is functionally illiterate.” “She relies on others to explain the significance of documents.” She has three children, as well as a granddaughter named Marquez.
Plaintiff and the Page Street Property
Plaintiff was involved in a long-term relationship with a man who died in 1988. The man deeded the real property located at 769, 771, and 773 Page Street in San Francisco, California (Page Street Property), to plaintiff shortly before he died. Plaintiff lived in the bottom unit of the property for a time with Marquez, and one of her sons, Rickey, lived upstairs.
In 2001, plaintiff moved with Marquez to a residence she purchased in Stockton, California (Stockton Property). She still owned the Page Street Property, and wanted someone to reside in and maintain it. Her son Rickey, who continued to live at the property, could not maintain it because of his vocation.
Plaintiff’s Relationship With Robert Ross
Plaintiff met Ross, who was a handyman, in the early 1990’s, when he did some work on the Page Street Property. She hired him again in early 2000 to work on the property, and the two became closer friends. When she moved to Stockton, plaintiff formed an oral agreement with Ross “whereby Ross would maintain the Page Street Property and share payments equally with Rickey for taxes and other expenses for the Page Street Property’s maintenance, in return for the rent-free use [of one of the property’s units].” Ross moved to 773 Page Street in 2001 and started paying expenses no later than February 2002, which actions the court found constituted part performance of the oral agreement.
The court found that “[t]he relationship between [plaintiff] and Ross was far more than a mere business relationship. They were great friends and had many interactions. [Plaintiff] considered Ross to be like a son.” Their arrangement was “far more generous than a normal business arrangement. . . . [E]vidence shows [plaintiff] wanted Ross to have a place to stay even after she died.”
Ross died of cancer in February 2005. When he became ill, plaintiff showed real concern for him, and never tried to cancel their arrangement.
At the heart of the dispute between the parties was a 2002 grant deed transferring ownership interest in the Page Street Property from plaintiff to two of her children, and to Ross, each receiving a one-third title interest. The deed, along with a deed transferring ownership of the Stockton Property from plaintiff to Marquez and plaintiff’s daughter, Johnnie Faye Andrews, was prepared by an attorney named Linda Stockdale.
The court summarized both Stockdale and plaintiff’s testimony about their interactions in one section of its statement of decision. Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with Stockdale’s in several respects, such as when she testified that she went to Stockdale to have a management agreement prepared for Ross, not a grant deed, and did not provide Stockdale with any documents. We do not further summarize plaintiff’s testimony in light of the court’s statement that the relevant section “contains a summary of the relevant testimony of [plaintiff] and Stockdale. The court finds Stockdale’s account of the relevant events as set forth in [the section] to be accurate,” as well as its factual finding that Stockdale’s testimony was credible and, conversely, that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible to the extent it conflicted with Stockdale’s.
Attorney Stockdale’s Testimony
Stockdale testified that plaintiff called her in 2002 and indicated that she wanted to take her name off, and put her children’s names on the deeds to her properties. Plaintiff indicated that a social worker or caseworker had advised her to get her assets out of her name in order to get medical benefits, and that she was concerned about tax consequences. Stockdale arranged to meet on a weekend with plaintiff, and instructed her to bring everything she had pertaining to the deeds to her two properties.
Plaintiff arrived at Stockdale’s office on a Saturday with Ross and a large manila envelope containing many documents, including an original deed for the Page Street Property. It seemed that time was of the essence in getting her name off the deeds for her two properties. Plaintiff introduced Ross as her “son” (Ross smiling when she did so), and Ross was present with plaintiff and Stockdale during the entire meeting. Stockdale did not know who plaintiff’s children were. Plaintiff “ ‘said “I have to take my name off” . . . kids on.’ ” Plaintiff told Stockdale that her son “Robert” lived on the first floor of the Page Street Property.
Plaintiff was concerned about a tax increase on the Page Street Property. There was no discussion about Ross having duties as far as the Page Street Property was concerned or regarding who would pay taxes or maintain the property. Stockdale said there was “[a]bsolutely no” discussion about preparing an agreement that would define Ross’s duties for maintaining the Page Street Property.
Stockdale printed out forms for a deed and for a claim for reassessment exclusion, using the documents plaintiff provided to fill them out. Plaintiff provided information regarding the relationships of the transferees. After preparing what she believed were drafts, Stockdale twice went over the documents with plaintiff. Plaintiff and Ross clearly understood that this property was being transferred, as plaintiff requested, by deed. Stockdale set up a follow-up appointment because plaintiff wanted to go back and review the documents. They were to come back with papers from Stockton and Stockdale would have a notary available if they wanted to go through with it. Stockdale did not know the deeds were later notarized elsewhere.
Notarization of the Page Street Property Deed
Ross arranged with Arthur Nelson, a notary public who was acquainted with both plaintiff and Ross, to have the deeds for the two properties notarized. Ross drove plaintiff to Nelson’s office on October 6, 2002, where Nelson notarized the deeds. Ross told plaintiff he would take the Page Street Property deed to be recorded, and did so. Plaintiff recorded the Stockton Property deed.
The court, relying on the testimony of a witness, Charles Brown, a realtor acquainted with both plaintiff and Ross, found that after Ross recorded the Page Street Property deed, he stated several times that he would return the property to plaintiff if she requested it. Also, Ross told both Nelson and a confidant of Ross’s, Ernest Blakley, that Ross went to Stockdale to draw up some papers in order to be sure that he would continue to have a place to stay should anything happen to plaintiff. Ross did not say anything about his ownership interest in the Page Street Property to plaintiff’s son Rickey.
A few days after notarizing the deed, Nelson mentioned the deed transfer to Ross to Brown. Brown told Nelson that it had not been plaintiff’s intention before seeing Stockdale to give any share of title in the Page Street Property to Ross.
Plaintiff’s Attempt to Sell the Page Street Property
After Ross’s death in February 2005, plaintiff asked Brown to list the Page Street Property for sale. Brown obtained a copy of the grant deed and told plaintiff she was not on title for the property, and that one-third of the property had been deeded to Ross. Plaintiff was surprised because she had never intended to deed to Ross a share of the title in the property. Subsequently, plaintiff’s two children deeded their interests in the Page Street Property back to plaintiff.
The Court’s Findings and Conclusions
The trial court found that plaintiff wanted to remove her name from the title of the Page Street Property because she was concerned about possible medical benefits. She deeded title of a one-third interest to Ross without understanding that it constituted a full transfer of title to the property that would permanently remove the property from her control if Ross died. She and Ross agreed that the one-third interest would be subject to Ross’s agreement to maintain the property and pay half of the taxes and other expenses. Plaintiff did not intend to fully transfer title of a one-third interest to Ross, however. At the time the deed was signed, she and Ross had an agreement that Ross would return the property to plaintiff upon her request. Therefore, the purported interest transferred was not what it purported to be. At the time she executed the grant deed, plaintiff believed she was giving Ross a much more limited property interest in the property.
The trial court found that plaintiff did intend to give Ross a valuable interest in the property, one that was more valuable than the services and payments Ross was making. This interest was to be far more than the interest Ross would receive under a management agreement. Plaintiff wanted Ross to have a place to stay even if she died. She could request the return of the property, but only after Ross had occupied the Page Street Property for a “reasonable period of time” because the agreement required Ross to expend his own efforts and funds to maintain the property and to pay expenses. Ross died unexpectedly before the expiration of this reasonable period of time. The true intentions of plaintiff and Ross were not communicated to Stockdale, but both agreed to the arrangement at the time they met with Stockdale.
The trial court also found that plaintiff and Stockdale did not discuss the management agreement, that plaintiff told Stockdale that she wanted to get the property out of her name and that Ross was her son, and that Stockdale communicated to plaintiff that Stockdale expected plaintiff to return in order to finalize the documents.
However, the trial court found plaintiff credible “on her lack of intent to grant Ross a fee simple interest in the Page Street Property.” Plaintiff “did intend to transfer interest to Ross with the Page Street Property deed, however this interest intended to be transferred was a much more limited one. This is consistent with [plaintiff’s] testimony as well as that of others including Stockdale, Nelson, Brown, and Blakley.” The court also found Blakley’s, Nelson’s, and Brown’s testimony to be credible.
The trial court also found that “Ross improperly encouraged [plaintiff] to execute the Page Street Property deed promptly. Ross knew [plaintiff] could not read and that she had not read the deed. He knew that the deed accomplished a far more complete transfer of title than [plaintiff] intended. [Plaintiff] relied on Ross to help her with the transaction, and because of [plaintiff’s] inability to read and the trust and confidence she placed in him, Ross had a confidential and/or fiduciary duty to [plaintiff]. Ross breached this confidential/fiduciary duty by causing [plaintiff] to execute the deed. Such actions constitute constructive fraud. [Plaintiff] signed the Page Street Property deed in the presence of Ross and notary Arthur Nelson on October 6, 2002.”
The court concluded that “[t]he Page Street Property deed does not express the true intentions of the parties because the parties intended a transfer of a limited property interest.” Based on its findings, the court reformed the deed to conform to plaintiff’s and Ross’s intentions. It stated, “this court using its equitable power grants a limited property interest in the Page Street Property to Ross and his estate for a reasonable period of ten years beginning February 22, 2002, in the interests of promoting justice and the original intentions of the parties.” The court found this limited property interest “has a monetary value equal to the difference between the rental value of the unit Ross occupied and the services and payments he provided.” It awarded defendants the remaining monetary value of the limited property interest intended to be transferred, which the court ultimately calculated as totaling $77,478.24 based on several factors. The court stated that the monetary award was “to be paid by plaintiff in exchange for the value of the limited property interest for the remaining period given in the reformed deed. Upon payment the court will quiet title in favor of plaintiff. The court uses its equitable powers to enforce its judgment. This award and quieting title is ordered in order to prevent future litigation between the parties.”
The court found three alternative legal bases for reforming the deed, granting an award to defendants, and quieting title to the Page Street Property in favor of plaintiff. The “primary basis” was “that of mistake known or suspected by one of the parties, resulting in a deed not expressing the intentions of the parties,” namely that plaintiff did not intend to grant a fee simple interest to the Page Street Property to Ross; the second was that “the lack of intent by [plaintiff] led to the failure of delivery” of the deed, which the court could address using its powers in equity to reform the deed to conform to the parties’ intentions; and the third was the well-established law that equity will reform a voluntary conveyance where by mistake a larger estate was granted than intended.
The trial court as part of its reformation analysis stated as follows: “Following this reformation, the court awards the defendants $82,615 to be paid by plaintiff in exchange for the value of the limited property interest for the remaining period given in the reformed deed. Upon payment, the court will quiet title in favor of plaintiff. The court uses its equitable powers to enforce its judgment. This award and quieting title is ordered in order to prevent future litigation between the parties.”
In its conclusion to its proposed statement of decision, the court stated that Ross had received a limited property interest, that the court would not give immediate possession of the property to plaintiff, or quiet title to the property as a result, and that it would “retain jurisdiction to order the possession to plaintiff or to defendant to effectuate the transfer of the limited property interest to the Ross estate. Specifically, [the court] will order immediate possession and will quiet title in plaintiff if plaintiff pay[s] the value of the interest . . . to the Ross estate.” The court also stated it would “retain jurisdiction of this case to consider an application by plaintiff or defendants to partition the Page Street Property and appoint a referee to sell 773 Page Street, or to sell the entire Page Street Property, and pay [the value of the interest] plus accrued interest to the estate of Ross and the balance to [plaintiff].”
The court had previously stated in its tentative statement of decision that 10 days after it issued the final statement of decision, it would enter a judgment awarding the Ross estate $82,615 and, if plaintiff applied to the court to pay it, would “consider and in the interest of justice issue” a modification of its judgment giving clear title for the property to plaintiff. The court also indicated it would retain jurisdiction to consider the estate’s application to partition the property.
After the court issued its proposed statement of decision, plaintiff contested the amount of money that the court should award (before accepting it), as well as the form of the judgment.
Judgment
The court issued a judgment giving plaintiff an outright ownership interest in the Page Street Property in fee simple absolute, and awarded her the restitution and possession of the unit on the property that had been previously occupied by Robert Ross and Jonathan Ross. The court granted in favor of defendant Harrington, as administrator of Ross’s estate, the sum of $77,438.24, secured by the Page Street Property, and determined that each party was to bear his or her own costs of suit. The court also reserved jurisdiction over the matter to make any further orders that might be necessary, and ruled that there was no unlawful detainer by Jonathan Ross.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. We subsequently requested, by order dated October 29, 2008, that plaintiff provide supplemental briefing regarding issues of waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel, and gave respondents the opportunity to brief these subjects as well. Plaintiff subsequently filed a supplemental brief, and a letter further discussing these issues after hearing.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it awarded defendant Linda Harrington, as the administrator for the estate of Ross, $77,438.24, when it denied plaintiff’s unlawful detainer claim against defendant Jonathan Ross, and when it failed to find that plaintiff was the prevailing party entitled to her costs of suit.
I. The Court’s Monetary Award to Defendant Harrington
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting the $77,438.24 award to Harrington because Harrington is not entitled to “affirmative relief”; the court’s award violated basic due process; there is no evidence that plaintiff ever intended to convey any property interest to Ross; Ross’s breach of his fiduciary duties and his constructive fraud bar equitable relief in favor of his estate; the court’s effort to reform the deed to effectuate the parties’ presumed intent must fail because, even under the court’s findings, there was not an enforceable agreement; and the trial court’s monetary award is inconsistent with its own findings.
A. “Affirmative Relief”
Plaintiff argues that Harrington, as administrator of the Ross estate, is not entitled to “affirmative relief” because she did not seek it in her answer or by means of a cross-complaint. We conclude the court has sufficiently broad powers in equity to order payment of a money award under the particular circumstances of this case.
In its statement of decision, the court also granted plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint “subject to the understanding that for the purposes of this decision, the court finds defendants have denied all allegations of the second amended complaint.” This second amended complaint is not contained in the appendix plaintiff has submitted to this court.
The court has broad power in equity because “the object of equity is to do right and justice” without being “confined by the rigid rules of law.” (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 770-771.) It has the power to create new interests unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. (Id. p. at 771.) “[E]quitable relief is flexible and expanding, and the theory that ‘for every wrong there is a remedy’ ([Civ. Code, §] 3523) may be invoked by equity courts to justify the invention of new methods of relief for new types of wrongs.” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Equity, § 3, p. 285.) Thus, “a court of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, will adjust all the differences between the parties arising from the cause of action in order to do complete justice and prevent further litigation, whether or not the particular relief was requested.” (Sears v. Rule (1945) 27 Cal.2d 131, 149 [affirming the award of money judgments based on issues that were not raised in the pleadings].) As one appellate court concluded in rejecting an appellant’s argument that money damages could not be awarded in the absence of proper pleadings praying for such relief: “The award of damages herein was purely incidental to the relief of reformation which respondent sought by his equitable action. Because equity does not look with favor upon litigation by piecemeal, it will, whenever possible, dispose of the entire controversy between the parties, will grant complete relief, and will, whenever possible, settle and determine all differences between the parties in the one action, thereby leaving nothing for further litigation between the same parties and upon the same subject matter.” (Tomas v. Vaughn (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 188, 192.)
Not having the second amended complaint before us, we cannot determine whether plaintiff raised the issue of reformation in that complaint. In any event, plaintiff does not complain that the court could not reform the deed, at least so as to give plaintiff quiet title in the Page Street Property despite finding that plaintiff gave Ross a limited property interest in this same property.
In Hirshfield v. Schwartz, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749, plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s refusal to grant an injunction compelling defendants to remove certain encroachments on plaintiffs’ residential property. (Id. at p. 754.) The trial court, sitting in equity, awarded an interest to the defendant to protect the defendant’s use of the disputed land, which the trial court characterized as a “prescriptive easement.” (Id. at pp. 754-755, 764, 766.) The appellate court found that, although this “protective interest” “was created in equity and was not a prescriptive easement,” (id. at p. 755) the trial court was entitled to create it under its equity powers, and even to order the party receiving the interest to pay for it. (Id. at pp. 766-771.) The appellate court stated, “it matters not whether the . . . protective interest strictly comports with the law of prescriptive easements. Our task is to decide whether that interest—whatever its name—fell within the trial court's permissible range of options. We believe it did.” (Id. at p. 771.) It concluded that the “decision, fashioned on the evidence and equities presented, and narrowly tailored to promote justice, will not be disturbed.” (Id. at p. 772.)
Plaintiff’s characterization of the court’s monetary award as “affirmative relief” is not correct. The court simply reformed the agreement between plaintiff and Ross so as to reduce the Ross estate’s interest in the property to what the plaintiff and Ross had both intended, and ultimately converted this interest into a monetary award that was plainly incidental to the equitable relief ordered, tailored to what was necessary for plaintiff to receive quiet title, intended to resolve all issues in the parties’ dispute, to promote justice, and prevent further litigation. The court acted consistent with its broad equitable powers, and its actions are in keeping with those discussed in the case law we discuss herein. Therefore, plaintiff’s “affirmative relief” argument is without merit.
B. Due Process
Plaintiff also contends that her due process rights were violated because the court did not give her sufficient notice she might be held liable, or that it was going to make a monetary award. This argument also lacks merit.
First, plaintiff was on notice that the court was sitting in equity, and of its broad equitable powers to provide remedies where the parties extensively contested at trial whether or not plaintiff held a full and outright ownership interest in the Page Street Property. There was no due process violation here.
Second, to the extent that the trial court made any error, it was undoubtedly harmless in light of the trial court’s reliance on Stockdale’s and Nelson’s testimony (regarding plaintiff’s stated intentions and the notarization and recording of the deed respectively), which clearly indicate plaintiff intended to give Ross at least a limited property interest. Thus, any due process violation by the court in failing to give sufficient notice to plaintiff about the remedies it was considering was harmless, whether evaluated under federal or state standards for error. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state].)
Third, plaintiff waived this appellate due process claim by her failure to object to the lack of notice in the trial court below. “ ‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.’ ” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.) “It must appear from the record that the issue argued on appeal was raised in the trial court. If not, the issue is waived.” (Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1794.)
After the court issued its proposed statement of decision, it carefully considered the objections of the parties, and repeatedly indicated to the parties that it would conduct further evidentiary hearings if they so desired. Plaintiff filed objections to the court’s proposed statement of decision, but not regarding the lack of notice of the court’s findings of a limited property interest or money award. In its objections, plaintiff focused instead on the need for the court to discount the money award figure for present value, to “equitably factor the benefit to the estate and the loss to plaintiff resulting from the estate’s continued exclusive use and possession of Ross’s former apartment since his passing,” and to find plaintiff to be the prevailing party.
Plaintiff requested a hearing, and submitted additional briefing prior to it. She did assert certain lack of notice and due process issues. She stated in her reply hearing memorandum that “the failure to discount an award based on benefits that would only be obtained in the future constitutes reversible error. [Citation.] Furthermore, to make an award without affording plaintiff any notice that the matter was at issue or any opportunity to address what the discount rate should be would constitute a denial of her constitutional rights of due process.”
At the June 11, 2007 hearing, the trial court announced its tentative decision to discount the monetary award to defendants. The court stated: “Now, I want to make clear to you both and I'd like you to talk about this. If either side objects—this tentative is subject to a number of objections, and I'll be listening very carefully to your objections when we come back on the record.” The court also noted that plaintiff was entitled to have an economist appear to testify about discount factors, if plaintiff so chose.
Plaintiff’s counsel, rather than insist on the need to present further evidence, raised an issue about the form of judgment, and indicated that plaintiff wanted to draft it. The court, referring to its tentative ruling about the discounted monetary award to defendants, asked counsel to confer about what they would like to do “in terms of possible objections to it, further hearings with respect to it.” After the recess, plaintiff’s counsel stated: “[T]to add to this award, which we don't agree with—okay?—but to go that extra step, to kind of like—it's not fair, Your Honor. It's just not fair. So I would ask—you know, I'd like to get this done, resolve this fairly with them. But bend over backwards so far, no prevailing party, Ross, three percent, but get that $6,500 out of there and give us prevailing party as to the estate. It's the only right, equitable, and legal thing for the court to do.”
After hearing further argument, the court stated: “Okay. I listened to your objections and your arguments to the tentative decision. I did not hear either side argue that they wanted any further hearings on the matter. I didn't hear that. Any further evidence or hearings?”
Plaintiff’s counsel indicated it would determine if further evidence should be offered after hearing the court’s tentative ruling, and after hearing it, did not pursue the matter.
The court also held a hearing on July 17, 2007, apparently by telephone because it had questions about the parties’ proposed judgments and orders. The court stated its understanding that the parties had agreed that the court could reduce the monetary award without requiring additional factual proof regarding discount amounts. The court stated: “So that eliminated the necessity of me having further factual hearings in the case; otherwise, I would have to have further factual hearings. The way I understood it, you agreed to that procedure, so that we could get a final number here more quickly. [¶] Is that basically—are we on the same page here?”
Plaintiff’s counsel responded: “That's not my recollection, Your Honor. I think we were arguing that—in our papers, that the court could, you know, make findings as to what the interest amount was, that it had knowledge of what the interest amount was. We wanted to move this along. I think that's the point we made. [¶] Our findings, I think, when we were talking about the numbers, we had an objection to the number that was done or where that number came from. So—and I don't want to get bogged down in that. I'm not happy with the number that was chosen, do you know what—I think we're happy with it. We're not going to fight on the issue. You know, we want to move this thing along.” (Italics added.)
The court stated that it did not want to issue the judgment without further hearings if there was going to be an appeal on the issue later, to which plaintiff’s counsel responded, “I do not intend to appeal. I do not contemplate doing any appeal based on the discount number, Your Honor.” (Italics added.)
Thus, the court clearly was willing to hold further evidentiary hearings based on objections by the parties, and plaintiff indicated there was no need to do so in order to promptly receive a judgment quieting title of the Page Street Property in her name. Under these circumstances, we find plaintiff waived her due process claims on appeal.
C. Evidence That Plaintiff Intended to Convey a Property Interest to Ross
Plaintiff also argues on appeal that the court’s monetary award is in error because there was no evidence that plaintiff ever intended to convey any property interest to Ross. This argument also lacks merit.
“A challenge in an appellate court to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed under the substantial evidence rule. [Citations.] ‘ “Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the ‘elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.” ’ ” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)
Plaintiff argues there was insufficient evidence that she intended to give Ross anything other than a “place to stay” while he was still alive and performing his duties as caretaker for the property; that she intended to grant Ross a limited property interest or intended for him to reside in the premises for a “reasonable period of time,” or that this reasonable period of time was 10 years. We find substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that plaintiff gave Ross a limited property interest for a reasonable period of time. We find that plaintiff waived her appellate claim to dispute the court’s 10-year determination based on her acceptance of the court’s final money award figure.
1. Limited Property Interest
There is substantial evidence that plaintiff intended to give a limited property interest in the Page Street Property to Ross. The testimony by Stockdale, the attorney who prepared the transfer of title, makes clear that plaintiff sought to give Ross some kind of property interest. As we have already discussed, the trial court found that attorney Linda Stockdale’s testimony was accurate and credible, and that plaintiff was not credible on those issues in which her testimony conflicted with Stockdale’s. The court found that plaintiff told Stockdale she wanted to get her name off of title and put her children’s names on the deeds to her properties out of concern about medical benefits and tax consequences; brought the original deed to the Page Street Property when she met with Stockdale; introduced Ross as her son; and clearly understood, aided by Stockdale’s repeated explanations of the documents she prepared, that the Page Street Property was being transferred by deed as plaintiff requested.
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the court’s summary of Stockdale’s testimony. Instead, she summarizes her own testimony, stating that she called Stockdale and “told [her] that she wanted her to prepare a management agreement for Ross,” that “[d]uring the course of her meeting with [plaintiff], Stockdale prepared several documents, none of which conformed with [plaintiff’s] intentions,” that “[i]nstead of preparing a management agreement, Stockdale used the same computer-generated form that she had used to prepare the grant deed for the Stockton property to prepare a grant deed for the Page Street Property,” that she knew from past dealings with plaintiff the actual identities of her children, and had a preexisting relationship with Ross.
Plaintiff’s contentions ask us to reweigh the evidence, but our review “ ‘ “ ‘begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below.” ’ ” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) Her dismissal of Stockdale’s testimony and assertion of her own directly contradicts the court’s finding regarding Stockdale’s credibility. Generally, we do not question the trial court’s judgments regarding witness credibility. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505.) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1141, disapproved on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) We find no reason in the record to disagree with the court’s conclusions regarding Stockdale’s credibility.
The court also relied on substantial evidence for this limited property interest in other testimony. This includes the testimony of Nelson, a notary who plaintiff brought with her to Nelson’s office to notarize and record the grant deed; and the testimony of Blakley that Ross told him they had drawn up papers to be sure he had a place to stay after her death, indicating the transfer of an interest that ran with the property, rather than the formation of a contract for services that was personal to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s reference to other testimony, such as Brown’s that, after Ross’s death, plaintiff was under the belief that she had not granted Ross any interest, again asks that we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do under a substantial evidence standard of review.
2. Reasonable Period of Time
The trial court found that plaintiff intended to give Ross a property interest that was more valuable than the services and payments he provided, and that he would hold even after plaintiff died. The court found that while plaintiff could request the return of property, she could only do so after Ross had occupied the property for a “reasonable period of time,” which had not expired at the time of Ross’s death, “because the agreement required Ross to expend his own efforts and funds to maintain the property and to pay expenses,” including his agreement to pay one-half of the property taxes. Other court findings further support its “reasonable period of time finding,” including that plaintiff and Ross were “great friends,” that plaintiff considered him “like a son,” and that when Ross became ill, plaintiff showed real concern for him, and never tried to cancel their arrangement.
We conclude this evidence is not insufficient. The court endeavored to determine the intent of the parties at the time they made their agreement, when plaintiff was concerned about transferring title of the property out of her name. In this context, Ross’s assumption of significant payment responsibilities for the property, as well as the close nature of their relationship, and the course of conduct between them as Ross approached death, are substantial evidence to support the finding that if plaintiff requested Ross to return the property, he had a “reasonable period of time” to do so.
Furthermore, although not raised by the trial court, its determination that Ross had a “reasonable period of time” to return the property to plaintiff upon her request is consistent with statutory law in the absence of an express agreement about the time in which he was required to do so. Civil Code section 1657 provides that “[i]f no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done instantly—as, for example, if it consists in the payment of money only—it must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly ascertained.” There is no evidence that the parties had an express agreement about the time in which Ross was to return the property if plaintiff requested that he do so, or that the act in its nature was capable of being done instantly.
3. Ten Years
In both its tentative and proposed statements of decision, the trial court stated its conclusion that 10 years was “the reasonable minimum time period that was contemplated that Ross would be able to live in the property.” The court found that this 10-year period would begin on February 22, 2002, when Ross began his duties as manager, and end on February 22, 2012. In its proposed statement of decision, it calculated the difference between the monthly rental value of the unit Ross lived in and the value of the services and payments Ross provided each month accrued over this 10-year period. Based on its calculations, it at first concluded that the money award should be $82,615, but revised this amount to $77,438.24 after considering the parties’ objections to its calculations.
On appeal, plaintiff argues in a cursory fashion there was insufficient evidence for the court’s 10-year finding. While the court did not state evidentiary support for its 10-year finding in its statement of decision, it was not required to do so pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632. (E.g., Akins v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1, 35, fn. 30 [court only required to state ultimate facts].)
We will not determine whether or not substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination because we find plaintiff has waived this appellate argument based on her unequivocal acceptance of the court’s final money award figure. This includes her counsel’s statements to the court at the July 2007 hearing, shortly before the court issued its judgment, which we have already discussed. Plaintiff’s counsel’s remarks were directed at the court’s calculations of the final, discounted amount of the money award. Again, they indicate plaintiff accepted that amount, and her counsel specifically stated she would not appeal it, in order to promptly obtain a judgment. This necessarily includes the bases for calculating this number, which includes the court’s 10-year finding. Therefore, plaintiff waived her appellate claim regarding this 10-year finding under the waiver doctrine.
D. Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Constructive Fraud
Plaintiff also argues that defendants, as a result of Ross’s “unclean hands,” i.e., the breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud found by the trial court, cannot gain an advantage in a court of equity, i.e., a monetary award. This argument is based on the mischaracterization of the monetary award as some sort of gain by the Ross estate. It is not. Rather, the monetary award reflects the trial court’s equitable reduction of Ross’s interest in the property because he was not entitled to a full one-third title interest in the property, in part because of his breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.
E. Enforceable Agreement
Plaintiff also argues that the agreement between plaintiff and Ross found by the court cannot be enforceable because it is uncertain, and because it is barred by the requirements of Civil Code section 1624 for a written agreement. These arguments also lack merit.
First, plaintiff argues that the court’s finding that the agreement was intended to last for a “reasonable period of time” was not sufficiently certain, citing for support only the most general of legal authority regarding uncertain agreements. “An appellate court is not required to consider alleged errors where the appellant merely complains of them without pertinent argument” (Strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866, 873), including when “the relevance of the cited authority is not discussed or points are argued in conclusory form.” (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) Therefore, we do not consider this argument further.
Second, plaintiff argues that the limited property agreement found by the court, having not been memorialized in writing, violates the writing requirements of Civil Code section 1624, California’s statute of frauds. However, the trial court found that there had been part performance of the agreement, which is an exception to the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1972; Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.) Plaintiff does not address this finding in her appeal.
F. Inconsistent with the Court’s Findings
Plaintiff also argues that the court’s award to Harrington was inconsistent with its own findings, in that reformation of an agreement regarding a property interest could not result in a transfer of money. Plaintiff argues that reformation, while available to correct a fraud or mistake, “cannot create a new contract or transfer an interest that the rightful owner of the property did not intend to convey,” citing Bailard v. Marden (1951) 36 Cal.2d 703, 709-710.) However, the trial court found that plaintiff did intend to convey a limited property interest to Ross, and could not obtain quiet title in the Page Street Property without compensating Ross’s estate for that interest. As we have discussed, the court had sufficiently broad equitable powers to do so.
II. Unlawful Detainer
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly found that there was no unlawful detainer by defendants. According to plaintiff, the court’s conclusion was contrary to the uncontradicted evidence that Jonathan Ross and Ross’s estate continued to occupy 773 Page Street under claim of right after Ross’s death, as well as “the trial court’s own finding that [plaintiff] was at all relevant times the rightful owner of the Page Street Property.”
At the core of plaintiff’s argument is her contention that defendants’ right of occupancy was contingent on Ross’s status as plaintiff’s employee, which was extinguished when he died. This contention is not consistent with the trial court’s finding, however. The trial court, rather than find that Ross’s occupancy of the unit was contingent on his personal status, found that plaintiff had given him a limited property interest so that he could have “a place to stay,” and that he could “occup[y] the Page Street Property for a ‘reasonable period of time,’ ” which finding was supported by substantial evidence, as we have already discussed.
Plaintiff also is incorrect in contending that the trial court found her to be the “rightful owner” of the property at all relevant times. This too ignores the court’s finding that plaintiff had given Ross a limited interest. As for plaintiff’s contention that the court erred about the date of surrender of the premises, it is not relevant in light of the court’s finding that defendants’ possession of the premises was rooted in a limited property interest.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s arguments about trial court error with regard to their unlawful detainer claim is without merit.
III. Prevailing Party
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no prevailing party, and in requiring the parties to bear their own costs of suit.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), states: “ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. When any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.”
Thus, the court exercises its discretion in determining whether or not there is a prevailing party “[w]hen any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified” in the provision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) To the extent an award of costs is entrusted to the trial court's discretion, the abuse of discretion standard of review is applied. (Arias v. Katella Townhouse Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 847, 852.)
Plaintiff does not discuss our deferential standard of review. Instead, she contends that because she obtained the “primary relief” she sought in the case, the quieting of title and recovery of possession of the property, she was the prevailing party, particularly in light of the lack of affirmative relief sought by defendants and their denial of all allegations. We find the court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no prevailing party in light of its finding that plaintiff had given a limited property interest to Ross, and its denial of plaintiff’s unlawful detainer cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.