Opinion
Case No. C-87-20814-WAI.
April 22, 1991
ORDER
I. Introduction
Defendant FMC Corporation's motion for summary judgment came on regularly for hearing on December 17, 1990. Based upon the arguments of counsel and the papers filed on this motion, and for the reasons set out below, the court HEREBY GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.
II. Facts
Plaintiff Chen-Cheng (C.C.) Wang was an engineer with FMC from April, 1972 until December 11, 1986 when he was discharged. On December 10, 1987 Wang brought this suit claiming that FMC fired him in retaliation for his attempts to make his supervisors at FMC aware of the low quality of the work being performed on many of the company's biggest contracts, (including several with the U.S. Department of Defense for the manufacture of various weapons systems), and for his attempts to contact the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and Congressman Norm Mineta regarding these practices.FMC claims that the only reason that Wang was terminated was because he was unable to get along with customers and clients or with personnel in other divisions and therefore could not produce the work demanded by FMC.
FMC moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no dispute of material fact and that Wang has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of FMC's motives to permit an inference that they were improper and retaliatory.
Because jurisdiction in this court is based upon the federal question presented by Wang's False Claims Act allegations, and because the court finds FMC's arguments in favor of summary judgment on this claim to be meritorious, the court need only address the issues with regard to this particular allegation. The remaining state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Discussion
Wang claims that FMC violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., which prohibits a person from knowingly presenting the United States government with a fraudulent claim for payment. See § 3129(a)(1). He claims that in four separate contracts with the Defense Department FMC produced shoddy, "engineeringly" unsound, and generally deficient and worthless results for which the federal government paid billions of dollars.In support of this claim he offers newspaper accounts and other public documents which indicate that the various weapons systems were poorly designed and/or manufactured. These documents include internal, self-analyzing FMC memoranda regarding the progress and success of the projects. Wang also offers his own personal observations that certain facets of the design of these systems were deficient. These observations are based on his own expertise as an engineer.
FMC moves for summary judgment on this claim on the ground that a plaintiff may only bring a claim for violation of the False Claims Act if he is the "original source" of the evidence which shows that defendant violated the Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). Wang contends that he meets this requirement because he is the original source of his own observations and because he "is aware of no other persons who have ever pointed out the deficiencies mentioned above."
An "original source" is defined in the Act as "an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the government before filing an action under this section." § 3730(e)(4)(B).
In Houck on Behalf of U.S. v. Folding Carton Admin., 881 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 1471 (1990), the court found that "the information upon which [plaintiff's] claim was based was `direct' as a result of his involvement in assisting late claimants in recovering money out of the settlement order funds." Id. at 505. However, the court found that his "knowledge of the information upon which his claim is based is not `independent' . . . [because] there is no evidence to indicate that Houck would have learned of the claims to the funds absent public disclosure." Id. The district court inHouck correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See also U.S. ex rel. Stinson, et al. v. Prudential Ins., 736 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.N.J. 1990) ("public disclosure" includes information disclosed through civil discovery).
Most of the evidence offered by Wang was publicly disclosed information. Thus, under Houck, this evidence cannot be "direct and independent" and thus cannot serve as proof of a violation of the False Claims Act.
The remainder of Wang's evidence consists of his personal opinion that the weapons systems were poorly designed and engineered. While Wang is the original source of this specific evidence, all alone it is not sufficient to raise an inference that FMC violated the False Claims Act.
The court finds, with respect to most of the evidence offered by Wang, he is not an "original source" and thus has failed to satisfy the requirements of the False Claims Act as a matter of law. The evidence for which he is the original source is simply insufficient to support the claim that the Act was violated. Therefore summary judgment is granted to defendant on this issue.
III. Conclusion
Because plaintiff Wang has failed to establish a permissible inference that there was a violation of the False Claims Act, summary judgment is granted as to this claim and it will be dismissed with prejudice.
Because the sole federal claim is dismissed, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the remaining state law claims. These claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the accompanying order, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is DISMISSED. All claims other than the claim brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.IT IS SO ORDERED.