Summary
In Waits v. Black Bayou Drainage District, 186 Miss. 270, 185 So. 577, 578, it was said: "The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time either by counsel or by the court of its own motion."
Summary of this case from Strickland v. Humble Oil Ref. Co.Opinion
No. 33557.
January 16, 1939.
1. AMICUS CURIAE.
Though question of jurisdiction was not raised in lower court nor in Supreme Court by employed counsel on either side, question could be raised in Supreme Court for the first time by the Attorney General as amicus curiae.
2. COURTS.
The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time by counsel or by court of its own motion.
3. DRAINS.
"Taxes" include special or local assessments on specific property benefited by improvements, and drainage taxes come within that definition.
4. ACTION.
The levy and collection of assessments for local improvements is statutory, and the remedy provided therefor is exclusive.
5. ACTION.
The statute prescribing the method for assessment and collection of drainage taxes provides the exclusive remedy for the collection of such taxes (Code 1930, sec. 4488).
6. DRAINS.
Drainage assessments and taxes are charges against the land only, and there is no personal liability on landowner's part (Code 1930, secs. 4448-4472, 4488).
7. ACTION.
Neither chancery nor circuit courts have jurisdiction of suits to recover drainage taxes, since the statutory method of assessment and collection of drainage taxes is exclusive (Code 1930, sec. 4488).
8. MANDAMUS.
Though neither chancery nor circuit courts have jurisdiction of suits to recover drainage taxes, that does not mean that where county tax collector fails or refuses to do his duty with reference to collection of drainage taxes he cannot be forced to do so by proper proceedings (Code 1930, sec. 4488).
9. DRAINS.
That neither chancery nor circuit courts have jurisdiction of suits to recover drainage taxes does not deprive landowner of a remedy, where tax collector improperly proposes to sell land for drainage taxes, but the same remedies that control the levy and collection of state and county taxes are available except that there is no personal liability for drainage taxes (Code 1930, sec. 4488).
APPEAL from the chancery court of Washington county; HON. J.L. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.
Ernest Kellner, of Greenville, for appellant.
The trial court erred in holding that a tax lien existed in favor of the appellee against the land owned by the appellant for drainage taxes or assessments for the years 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1935.
The lien asserted by the appellee is purely statutory and must have been created, if it exists, by a compliance with the provisions of the statute authorizing the creation of the lien asserted necessary to its creation. The appellee is a drainage district created under Chapter 195 of the Laws of 1912, and amendments, and was organized on September 4, 1916, so that it is controlled by Chapter 269 of the Laws of 1914, amending Chapter 195 of the Laws of 1912, the provisions of which are substantially unchanged in our present drainage laws. This court has held that a drainage district created under the foregoing laws is a public corporation created in invitum.
Stephens v. Beaver Dam Dr. Dist., 123 Miss. 884; Sevier Lake Dr. Dist. v. Kinney, 153 Miss. 440.
The general rule is that proceedings for special assessments, being in invitum, must, in order to charge the property of the owner, be based upon a strict compliance with the provisions of the statute authorizing the same.
25 R.C.L. 152; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U.S. 177, 9 S.Ct. 480.
The provisions of the statutes as to the form and mode of assessments, as to the tax lists, and the place where the tax lists are deposited, are designed for the benefit of the taxpayers and the protection of their property from sacrifice, and a failure to comply with those provisions is fatal to a valid assessment. As I understand this rule it is not that the failure to comply with those provisions of the statute must result in damage or injury to the taxpayers in order to invalidate the assessment but that the failure to comply with those provisions of the statute may result in damage or injury to the taxpayers and that, therefore, the failure so to do will invalidate the assessment even though damage or injury to the taxpayers does not result therefrom. That is, those provisions of the statute are for the benefit of the taxpayers and the protection of their property and unless complied with a valid assessment or lien is not created.
Reed v. Lbr. Co., 142 Miss. 756.
The compliance with the forms of law required in the assessment and imposition of state and county taxes is well settled in numerous decisions of this court and unless complied with will result in a void or dead assessment.
Hunter v. Bennett, 149 Miss. 368; Stovall v. Conner, 58 Miss. 138; Mitchum v. McInnis, 60 Miss. 945; Fletcher v. Trewalla, 60 Miss. 965; Carlisle v. Chrestman, 69 Miss. 392; Pearce v. Perkins, 70 Miss. 276; Brothers v. Beck, 75 Miss. 486; McGuire v. Union Inv. Co., 76 Miss. 868; Bennett v. Maxwell, 82 Miss. 70; Seals v. Perkins, 96 Miss. 704; Jones v. Belzoni Dr. Dist., 102 Miss. 796.
In support of the lien asserted by the appellee in this case and as a compliance with the provisions of the statute, the appellee relies upon the order of the board of supervisors of June 18, 1917, and the order of the board of supervisors of September 5, 1921. An examination of these orders discloses that the board of supervisors did exactly what this court said in the case of Jones v. Belzoni Drainage District, suprs, is beyond the power of the board of supervisors, in that, it undertook to add to and subtract from the provisions of the statute.
The statute is utterly silent on the question of interest, and the rule is that special assessments do not bear interest unless expressly provided by the statute authorizing such assessments.
9 R.C.L. 660; 25 R.C.L. 185; I.C.R.R. Co. v. Adams, 78 Miss. 895; Clark v. Pearman, 126 Miss. 327; White v. Lake Cormorant Dr. Dist., 130 Miss. 351; Bank v. Lake Cormorant Dr. Dist., 167 Miss. 364; Anderson v. McKee, 179 So. 858.
nder the foregoing authorities it is inescapable that the provision in the orders of the board of supervisors, which orders are relied upon by the appellee for the creation of the tax lien asserted against the land owned by the appellant, that the deferred drainage assessments thereby levied should bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable annually, was an addition to the provisions of the statute authorizing the creation of the tax lien asserted which invalidated the orders.
It is equally as inescapable that the failure to provide in the orders of the board of supervisors for the payment of all or any part of the deferred drainage assessments thereby levied at any time before the issuance of bonds by the district was a subtraction from the provisions of the statute authorizing the creation of the tax lien asserted which invalidated the orders.
The trial court erred in holding that said tax lien, if it existed, was revived and enforceable against the land after and by reason of the sale of the land to the appellant by the State for the years 1930 to 1934.
Chap. 303, Laws of 1926, Sec. 4488, Code of 1930; Sec. 6044, Code of 1930; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387; Carrier Lbr. Mfg. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396.
I respectfully submit that the drainage assessments or taxes against the land now owned by the appellant for the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, were due and payable out of the purchase money paid for said land, and that the drainage assessments or taxes against said land for the years 1933 and 1934 did not accrue against the same.
The trial court erred in holding that said tax lien, if it existed and was revived and enforceable, bore interest as fixed by the decree of the trial court.
H.P. Farish and D.S. Strauss, both of Greenville, for appellee.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has had occasion to deal with the question of the liability of land sold to the state for taxes during the time the title to the land was in the state, the land having been subsequently patented by the state. The court has harmonized the conflicting provisions in the various statutes with reference to the predominancy of an ad valorem sale over a benefit assessment, and in every case in which the question has been presented the court has harmonized the seeming conflict by holding that the provisions relative to the ad valorem tax and the provisions relative to the benefit assessment were of equal dignity and that a sale under one or the other of these taxes does not displace the lien of the other.
Carrier Lbr. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396; Seward v. City of Jackson, 165 Miss. 478; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387; Covington v. Meletio, 168 Miss. 497; Turley v. St. Francis County, 287 S.W. 196; Wyatt v. Beard, 15 S.W.2d 990; Hopper v. Chandler, 36 S.W.2d 398; Miller v. Watkins, 110 S.W.2d 531; 111 S.W.2d 466.
In the Carrier case, supra, our court held the statutes on taxation must be construed together and viewed as a whole, and that when land is sold together and viewed as a whole, and that when land is sold to the state for taxes the taxes of the subordinate agencies are in abeyance until the state disposes of the land, and it will be noted that the court states, while not passing upon the question, that any diminution or abatement of a tax theretofore levied would be in violation of Section 100 of the Constitution.
In levying the assessment of benefits and providing for a sale of the bonds against such benefits assessment provisions had to be made to secure the payment of the bonds issued under the drainage law. Security was effected through the use of the words that the drainage assessment should remain in effect against the land until the same had been paid. On the faith of this provision bonds were issued and sold, and on the faith of a proposed assessment to cover the payment of the bonds, the various land owners consented to the levy of the tax against their lands. Any diminution of the assessment would be a breach of faith with the purchasers of the bonds and would be a breach of faith with the other land owners in the district to the extent that the assessment against any particular land is abated or held unenforceable. It operates to cause the other lands in the district to pay a larger proportion of the tax in order to make up for the deficiency created by such abatement.
The statement was again made in the Howie case, 168 Miss. 387, that to abate an improvement lien might violate Section 100 of the Constitution. For this court to hold that the assessments maturing during the time title to the land was in the state is abated and cancelled would be to that extent a diminution of the tax and against the express provisions of the drainage act.
Carrier Lbr. Mfg. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396; Seward v. City of Jackson, 165 Miss. 478; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387.
In the case of Covington v. Meletio, 168 Miss. 497, the court holds that the drainage assessments are merely suspended and are not abated or cancelled against the land even though it was purchased by the state and subsequently patented by the state to an individual.
It will be noted that as the cases arose the Supreme Court of this state has in each and every instance sustained the validity of the benefit assessment as originally imposed, and where there has been a conflict between the statute covering the benefit assessments and some other statute with reference to the ad valorem taxes the provisions of the two sections were harmonized, each held to be all inclusive and all exclusive. But the court was particular in each case to hold that the lien and sale for the ad valorem tax would not displace the lien of the benefit assessment.
Jackson v. Howie, 179 Miss. 251; Biloxi v. Lowery, 179 Miss. 365.
The land remained subject to the lien of the drainage assessment, and a sale of the land to the state does not abate the tax, but merely suspends the enforcement of same while title is in the state
Conceding for the purpose of the argument that the total of the principal for the original bond issue plus the interest thereon to accrue in the future and plus 10% for unseen contingencies made the total calculations exceed the principal benefit assessment of $1,494,349.00, this did not render the bonds invalid but only made the excess of the issue unenforceable as a lien against the land. By reason of the validating statutes of Mississippi, to-wit: ch. 295, Laws of 1922; ch. 225, Laws of 1924; ch. 280, Laws of 1926; ch. 145, Laws of 1928, the bonds were a valid and legal obligation of the district.
Haley v. Dr. Comrs., Leflore County, 99 Miss. 555; Secs. 4437 and 4438 and 4526, Code of 1930; League v. Texas, 46 L.Ed. 478; Kersh Lake Dr. Dist. v. State Bank Trust Co., 92 Fed. 783
In addition to the indebtedness of the district being validated by the various acts of the Legislature enumerated above, the bond issue of 1932 was validated by a decree of the Chancery Court of Washington County, and the bond issue of 1934 was validated by a decree of the Chancery Court of said county. Having been so validated, the indebtedness is a valid subsisting debt of the district and by reason of the benefit conferred by Section 4438 of the Code is enforceable against the land in the district. Even though the indebtedness might have been in excess of the benefit, still having been validated they are valid obligations of the district.
Anderson v. McKee, 179 So. 585.
The further question is presented, does the tax bear interest from the date when the same was due and payable? This question, while not free from doubt, seems to be in favor of the drainage district collecting the damage or interest on any unpaid installment, which includes the interest then due along with such installment, from the time such installment was due up to the present time. It has always been the policy of the Legislature of this state to add a penalty by way of damages, or to include interest on any tax unpaid, from the date of its non-payment up to the time it was paid.
Hem. Code 1927, sec. 8249; Sections 3263 and 4488, Code of 1930; Laws 1932, page 613.
The position taken by the appellee with reference to the maintenance tax is that under the plan governing drainage districts there are two forms of taxes, first the original assessment of benefits which is spread over a period of years, and annual levies which, incidentally, are surplus motions. As to this tax, the land owner has his hearing when the assessment is originally levied against the land. Bonds are issued and the improvements constructed. After this has been done, the law expressly declares that the district shall not cease but shall continue to operate for the purpose of maintaining the improvements, and for this purpose may levy an annual maintenance tax.
Sec. 13, ch. 269, Laws of 1914; Code of 1930, sec. 4487; Gillis v. Indian Creek Dr. Dist., 160 Miss. 528; Teoc-Sub. Dr. Dist. v. Halliwell, 180 Miss. 720; Laws 1938, ch. 254, sec. 1.
We insist that there was a compliance with the law relative to the method of dealing with the annual levies relating to the original bond issue.
Chesnut v. Elliott, 61 Miss. 569; Shelby v. Burns, 153 Miss. 392; 1 Cooley on Taxation 3d, page 479; State v. West Duluth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456.
The Chancery Court has full and complete jurisdiction of this cause.
Y. M V.R.R. Co. v. West, 78 Miss. 789.
The question of jurisdiction was waived.
Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 151 So. 154; Indianola Compress, etc., Co. v. Southern Ry., 70 So. 703.
An amicus curiae cannot raise new questions on appeal.
3 C.J.S., 1051-2; Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co., 149 So. 126.
Even if without jurisdiction, the decree will not be reversed or annulled on that question alone.
Sec. 147, Constitution; Sec. 3380, Code of 1930; Anderson v. Robins, 137 So. 476.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, and W.W. Pierce, both of Jackson, amicus curiae.
The method provided by the statutes governing the assessment of benefits and collection by revenue to pay and discharge the obligations of the district is complete and exclusive, and by reason of this complete and exclusive method the court is without jurisdiction to entertain an action to collect the benefit assessments.
The word "taxes" in its broad sense includes drainage benefit assessments.
McLain v. Meletio, 166 Miss. 1.
Therefore, the right to enforce payment of drainage benefit assessments is governed by the same general principles as that of state and county taxes, and if state and county taxes are not collectible by the drainage district while the title is in the state then by the same rule drainage districts have the right to reach back and proceed against the land for state and county taxes.
The levy and collection of benefit assessments is purely a statutory proceeding in derogation of the common law.
25 R.C.L. 172, sec. 86.
The collection of benefit assessments is therefore governed by the same principle as is the remedy for the collection of taxes levied by the state and county.
Sections 4448 and 4468, inclusive, Mississippi Code of 1930, provides how drainage districts may be created; how the benefit assessments may be ascertained; and imposes a lien on all of the land in the district for the payment of the benefits and also provides how the benefit assessments may be collected and enforced.
When the district is created and the benefits determined and the lien impressed on all of the land in the district, it then becomes the duty of the board of supervisors to make an annual levy on the land in an amount not exceeding the installment of assessments levied for that year to meet the obligations of the district.
Sec. 4470, Code of 1930.
Section 4472, in substance, provides that after the assessments to be paid shall have been made and become final, and for purposes of facilitating the collection of the assessments so levied, it shall be the duty of the board of commissioners to provide or cause to be provided a copy or copies of the assessment roll in which they shall inscribe the names of the land owners, the description of the tracts of land assessed, the total betterments assessed against each tract, the total damages assessed against each tract, the amount of the levy for the current year, which shall be the amount of taxes to be collected for that year by the tax collector. The statute then provides for a certification of the drainage assessment roll and provides that, "said roll shall constitute the authority and be the guide for the collection of said drainage taxes by the tax collector."
Section 4488, Miss. Code of 1930, the remedy and procedure for collecting drainage benefit assessments.
It clearly appears from the above statute that the tax collector is required to collect drainage taxes at the same time he collects state and county taxes. He is enjoined that he shall not accept any sum less than the aggregate amount of all state, county, and drainage taxes.
No other section of the statute undertakes to provide a remedy by suit or make any other provisions for the sale of land for failure to pay drainage taxes. No statute that we are able to find provides that drainage taxes may be collected by suit. Therefore, we think it fundamental that since there is no statute authorizing the enforcement of the collection of drainage taxes except by a sale by the tax collector, the remedy that the land shall be sold by tax collector is exclusive. Resort may never be had to a common law action at law or in equity unless specifically so provided by statute unless, of course, there is no statutory method at all provided. That is an exception, however, to the rule and does not apply here because Section 4488 of Mississippi Code of 1930 supplies the statutory method. This remedy is exclusive and our court has so recognized in principle.
Robins v. Donovan Creek Dist. No. 2, 152 Miss. 872.
Drainage benefit assessments are a charge against the land only. There is no liability of the owner for a failure to pay drainage taxes.
Nicky Bros. v. Miss., 167 Miss. 650; Enochs v. State, 128 Miss. 361; State v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34; George County Bridge Co. v Catlett, 161 Miss. 120; State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744.
In the collection of drainage benefit assessments the statute provides the remedy where the assessments are not paid and having so provided, the remedy laid down in the statute is exclusive. Drainage taxes are not debts but are positive acts of the government and are creatures of the statute and must be enforced in the manner provided by the statute. The Legislature, subject only to such rules, limitations and restrictions of the Constitution of the state may provide a method for collecting the taxes and name the agencies therefor.
City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 P. 640; Webster v. Morris, 129 Okla. 145, 264 P. 190; Perham v. Putnam, 82 Mont. 349, 267 P. 305; National Lbr. Creosoting Co. v. Burrows, 284 S.W 153; Bd. of Comrs. v. Hopper, 110 Kansas 501, 204 P. 536; McKeesport v. Fidler, 147 Pa. 532, 23 A. 799.
Drainage taxes do not accrue on land in a drainage district while the title, acquired by a tax sale, is vested in the state.
Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 143 Miss. 841; Meridian v. Phillips, 65 Miss. 362; Warren County v. Nall, 78 Miss. 726; Dees v. Kingman, 119 Miss. 199; Penick v. Willis Cotton Co., 119 Miss. 822; Alvis v. Hicks, 150 Miss. 306; Weems v. City of Laurel, 100 Miss. 335; Carrier Lbr. Co. v. Quitman Co., 156 Miss. 396.
Drainage districts are subordinate agencies of the state.
Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 143 Miss. 841; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387.
Taxes for general governmental purposes and for local improvements are alike in that the levy of each is in the exercise of the state's taxing power, and must be for a public purpose.
Cox v. Wallace, 100 Miss. 525; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387.
Can it be the law that a tax for one public purpose will accrue on real property while the title is in the state and at the same time will not accrue for another public purpose on the same land under the same circumstances? On what reasonable basis can such a rule be said to rest or have for its foundation? It would be just as reasonable and there would be just as much justification for the state to institute a proceeding against the land of the appellant to have the land now sold by the tax collector to enforce payment of state and county tax on this particular land during the time the title was in the state. The same agency that sold the land for nonpayment of state and county taxes sold it for failure to pay drainage taxes The lien imposed in favor of state and county by section 3120 is of equal dignity with the lien for drainage taxes. The title passed to the state just as effectively for failure to pay drainage taxes as for a failure to pay state and county taxes. The title in the state was indivisible, and just as effectively for one purpose as for the other. When the land was sold by the state the Land Commissioner was required by statute (Sections 4488 and 6044, Mississippi Code 1930, and Chapter 174, Laws 1936) to certify the amount of taxes due the county, and subordinate taxing units, including the drainage district, and it then becomes the duty of the auditor to issue his warrant in favor of the proper county and subordinate agencies. Therefore, when all the statutes are harmonized we are forced to the conclusion that drainage taxes like all other taxes do not accrue on land while the title is in the state.
Argued orally by Ernest Kellner for appellant and by H.P. Farish and D.S. Strauss for appellee.
Appellee, the drainage district, filed its bill against appellant, Waits, a landowner in the district, to recover the drainage taxes assessed against his lands for the years 1931 to 1935, inclusive, and to enforce the lien given by the drainage statute for the payment of such taxes. The period involved covered the time the state had title to the land by virtue of a tax sale.
The district was organized in 1916 under Chapter 195, of the Laws of 1912, as amended by Chapter 269, of the Laws of 1914, now Chapter 107, section 4371 et seq., of the Code of 1930. The land owned by Waits was in the district when it was organized and has remained therein up to the present time. It was sold to the state on April 6, 1931, for a non-payment of state, county, and drainage taxes for the year 1930. The title matured in the state and was patented to Waits on September 6, 1934. Out of the purchase price, the state paid to the district the drainage taxes for the year 1930. The question is whether when the state parted with the title, the land again became charged with the drainage taxes for the years the state had title. The chancellor held with the drainage district. From that decree, Waits appeals.
We pass that question and go to the contention that the chancery court was without jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that that position is well founded. This Court, therefore, is without authority to decide anything else. Preliminary, however, can the question of jurisdiction be raised on appeal for the first time? It was not raised in the court below, nor in this Court by employed counsel on either side. For the first time, it is raised here by the attorney general as amicus curiae. The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time either by counsel or by the court of its own motion. City of Lumberton v. Frederick, 165 Miss. 456, 143 So. 488; State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 150 So. 760; Brasham v. State, 140 Miss. 712, 106 So. 280; Rodgers v. City of Hattiesburg, 99 Miss. 639, 55 So. 481; Ruff v. Montgomery, 83 Miss. 184, 35 So. 465; Ball v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 747, 35 So. 214; Gardner v. R.R. Co., 78 Miss. 640, 29 So. 469; McPhail v. Blaun, 95 Miss. 53, 48 So. 725; City of Greenwood v. Weaver, 96 Miss. 604, 50 So. 981; Allen v. State, 98 Miss. 192, 53 So. 498; Cawthon v. State, 100 Miss. 834, 57 So. 224.
Section 147 of the Constitution has no application. It provides that no cause shall be reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground alone of a mistake in the trial court as to whether it is of law or equity jurisdiction. The trouble here is that neither the chancery court nor the circuit court had jurisdiction of this cause, as we will undertake to demonstrate. In the case of Indianola Compress Storage Co. v. Southern R.R. Co., 110 Miss. 602, 70 So. 703, Section 147 of the Constitution applied for it was not a question of jurisdiction, but a mistake in jurisdiction.
The word "taxes" in its broad sense includes special or local assessments on specific property benefited by such improvements. McLain v. Meletio, 166 Miss. 1, 147 So. 878; Swayne v. City of Hattiesburg, 147 Miss. 244, 111 So. 818, 56 A.L.R. 926; City of Pascagoula v. Valverde, 138 Miss. 399, 103 So. 198. Drainage taxes come within that definition.
The levy and collection of assessments for local improvements is a statutory proceeding, and the remedy provided therefor is exclusive. 25 R.C.L., page 172, Section 86. Sections 4448 to 4468, inclusive, Code of 1930, provide how drainage districts are created, how benefit assessments are ascertained, and imposes a lien on all lands in the district for the payment of the benefit taxes, and provides how such taxes shall be collected. Section 4469, Code of 1930, provides that the assessments shall be liens on the lands of the district from the time they are levied, and shall be entitled to preference over all other demands or liens (not meaning, of course, other taxes) until paid. Section 4470 provides that the board of supervisors of the county shall make an annual drainage tax levy at the same time the county levy is made, in an amount not exceeding the instalment assessments levied for that year, sufficient to meet the obligations of the district. Section 4471 provides that on failure of the board of supervisors to act in that respect, any landowner of the district may, by mandamus, compel compliance. Section 4472 requires the board of supervisors to provide copies of the assessments showing the names of the landowners in the district, the description of the lands, the total betterments assessed against each tract, the amount of levies for the current year, which shall constitute the amount of taxes to be collected for that year by the tax collector, and provides that such a roll shall constitute the authority and be the guide for the collection of the taxes. Section 4488 provides in substance that all drainage taxes shall be payable at the same time state and county taxes are payable, and the tax collecter shall place the same upon the tax receipts long with the state and county and other taxes, and shall collect all the taxes due on the land together, and shall not accept any sum less than the entire aggregate amount of all state, county, drainage, and other taxes, and, if the taxes, including the drainage taxes, are not paid when due, he shall sell the land for all the taxes, together with twenty-five percent damages thereon, at the time and in the manner provided for the sale of land for taxes due the state and county. Such sale is to be subject to the provisions of law for sale of land for state and county taxes, and the owner shall have the right to redeem from the sale as provided by law; and if no one bids the whole amount of taxes and costs, the land shall be struck off to the state in the same manner as provided for sales for state and county taxes; and if not redeemed, the land may be sold by the state land commissioner in the manner provided by law for the sale of tax lands, provided that in no event shall it be sold for an amount less than for which it was sold to the state. The statute further provides that in his monthly settlements with the state treasurer, the land commissioner shall specify the amount of the drainage taxes and damages thereon, and drainage taxes accrued subsequent to the sale for taxes shall be placed to the credit of the proper drainage district.
Section 4488 provides the exclusive remedy for the collection of drainage taxes. Robins v. Donovan Creek Drainage Dist. No. 2, 152 Miss. 872, 120 So. 184. In that case the Court said [page 187]: "The method thus provided for the assessment and collection of revenue to pay and discharge the obligations of the district is complete, and, therefore, exclusive."
Drainage assessments and taxes are charges against the land only. There is no personal liability on the part of the owner. Nickey et al. v. State ex rel., 167 Miss. 650, 145 So. 630, 146 So. 859, 147 So. 324. In that case the Court held that Section 3122 of the Code of 1930 making taxes a debt recoverable by action had no application to taxes of this character. The remedy is the same, however, in every respect for the collection of the two classes of taxes, except there is no personal liability for drainage taxes. Enochs v. State, 128 Miss. 361, 91 So. 20; State v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426, 6 So. 316; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 25 A.L.R. 748, although not in point on their facts are applicable on principle. The Enochs Case involved the collection of an inheritance tax. The Court held that the remedy laid down by the statute for its collection was exclusive. In the Piazza Case the Court held that where the statute creates a tax and provides a remedy for its collection, such remedy is exclusive. The Robertson Case involved the ascertainment of an income for taxation. The Court held that the method provided by the statute for such purpose was exclusive.
We see no escape from the conclusion that neither the chancery nor the circuit courts have jurisdiction of causes of this character. That does not mean, however, that where the tax collector of the county fails or refuses to do his duty with reference to the collection of drainage taxes, he cannot be forced to do so by the proper proceeding, nor that the landowner is without a remedy where the tax collector proposes to make sale of lands for drainage taxes when they are not liable therefor in whole or in part. The same remedies are at hand that control the levy and collection of state and county taxes, except, as stated, there is no personal liability for drainage taxes.
Reversed and bill dismissed.