Opinion
LLICV176014670S
05-01-2018
Timothy K. VENTRY et al. v. CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Bentivegna, J.
Before the court for consideration are the defendants,’ The Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, LLC and Karen O’Flynn, M.D., motion to strike and memorandum of law (# 121), dated February 6, 2018. The plaintiffs, Timothy K. Ventry (father) and Bryon Ventry as POA for Timothy K. Ventry (son), orally object to the motion to strike. The matter was heard at short calendar on April 9, 2018.
The operative complaint, the amended revised amended complaint (# 120), dated December 13, 2017, contains the plaintiffs’ allegations of medical malpractice and bystander emotional distress against the defendants. The medical malpractice claim alleges that the father, Timothy K. Ventry, was negligently discharged by the defendants from the hospital where he had sought treatment for mental health issues. After the father was discharged, he was arrested for firearms-related charges and incarcerated. The bystander emotional distress alleges that the son, Bryon Ventry, suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendants’ negligent discharge of his father, and the subsequent arrest and incarceration of his father.
The defendants move to strike count three of the operative complaint on the ground the plaintiffs fail to " sufficiently allege facts supporting a claim for bystander emotional distress." In addition, the defendants move to strike the request for punitive damages in the prayer for relief.
" [W]henever any party wishes to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39. " The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial." Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 81 (1993).
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ... and [it] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
" It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). " A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The plaintiffs allege bystander emotional distress against the defendants in count three of the operative complaint, and state: " Due to his close participation in the care of [father], the release of [father] by CHH and Dr. O’Flynn and the results which occurred therefrom, [son] had the contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct which caused the injuries to his father." ¶ 135. " As a result of the close relationship between [father] and [son], [son] has suffered, and will continue to suffer, emotional injury, including but not limited to sadness, grief, shock and emotional pain, from the events which occurred during and after the negligent care and treatment of [father] by CHH and Dr. O’Flynn." ¶ 136.
The plaintiffs do not allege in count three that the father suffered death or serious physical injury. Rather, the plaintiffs allege the following injuries suffered by the father: " [Father]’s emotional distress during his time at and following his discharge from CHH, [father]’s arrest, [father]’s horror as a retired law enforcement officer at what transpired after his discharge, [father]’s incarceration since July 25, 2015, and involvement in the criminal justice system, [father]’s incompetency from October 15, 2015, through January 20, 2016, the denial of dietary accommodations while in DOC custody, and the denial of proper medical care and mental health treatment while in the custody of the Connecticut State Department of Correction, including pain medication. The denial and tampering with [father]’s medication during his incarceration." ¶ 133a and b.
Our Supreme Court has " conclude[d] that a bystander may recover damages for emotional distress under the rule of reasonable foreseeability if the bystander satisfies the following conditions: (1) he or she is closely related to the injury victim, such as the parent or the sibling of the victim; (2) the emotional injury of the bystander is caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct that causes the injury, or by arriving on the scene soon thereafter and before substantial change has occurred in the victim’s condition or location; (3) the injury of the victim must be substantial, resulting in his or her death or serious physical injury; and (4) the bystander’s emotional injury must be serious, beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not the result of an abnormal response." Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 56, 675 A.2d 852 (1996) holding modified by Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n, 316 Conn. 558, 580-81, 113 A.3d 932 (2015). In Squeo, the Supreme Court held that " subject to the four conditions we established in Clohessy ... a bystander to medical malpractice may recover for the severe emotional distress that he or she suffers as a direct result of contemporaneously observing gross professional negligence such that the bystander is aware, at the time, not only that the defendant’s conduct is improper but also that it will likely result in the death of or serious injury to the primary victim." Id.
In count three of the operative complaint, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the second and third conditions for a bystander emotional distress claim in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiffs have failed to allege that the son’s emotional injury was caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the defendants’ alleged negligent discharge of the father and/or that the father’s injury was substantial, resulting in his death or serious physical injury. In addition, the plaintiffs have failed to allege that the son’s emotional distress was the direct result of him contemporaneously observing gross professional negligence by the defendants that he, as a bystander, was aware, at the time, not only that the defendants’ conduct was improper but also that it would likely result in the death of or serious injury to the father. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the pleader, the court finds that the plaintiffs have not pleaded a legally sufficient cause of action for bystander emotional distress. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion to strike count three of the operative complaint.
The defendants also move to strike the request for punitive damages in the prayer for relief. Practice Book § 10-39 provides in relevant part: " (a) A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest ... (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint ..." Practice Book § 10-39 " allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." (Footnote omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
In the operative complaint, the plaintiffs have failed to allege that the defendants engaged in recklessness or intentional and wanton misconduct to warrant punitive damages. See Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn.App. 719, 730, 916 A.2d 834 (2007) (" The rule in this state as to torts is that punitive damages are awarded when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights" ); Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58 (1958) (where the complaint does not specifically allege the conduct that is claimed as reckless, the plaintiff has not adequately stated a cause of action for recklessness). See also Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832-33, 836 A.2d 394 (2003) (" Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ... than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent ... More recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." [internal quotation marks omitted.] ) Since the plaintiffs’ claims in the operative complaint are solely grounded in negligence, the request for punitive damages must be stricken from the prayer for relief.
For the above-stated reasons, the court strikes count three of the operative complaint and the request for punitive damages in the prayer for relief.
SO ORDERED.