Opinion
NO. 1:97CV380-B-A.
Filed Date: February 24, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the court is ready to rule.
FACTS
The plaintiff, a black female, began working for the defendant on April 22, 1996, in management training. In June of 1996, she began work as the second shift manager in the "break, pack, put" area. This area is responsible for breaking down distribution freight into smaller quantities and shipping it to various stores. When freight is not properly processed, billed or voided, the computer system records it as a "not put." Part of the plaintiff's job was to determine whether freight identified as "not put" was either lost or not put in the proper box and then correct the mistake.
While acting as the second shift manager, the plaintiff often had meetings with her supervisor, Rick Hughes, and other shift break, pack, put managers. In these meetings Hughes would voice his concerns about the plaintiff's, as well as other managers', performance. The plaintiff alleges that she was never informed that Hughes' comments during these meetings were formal reprimands; rather, she was under the impression that these concerns were nothing more than simple criticisms.
It is important to note that the defendant adheres to a specific method of dealing with associate performance problems called the "Performance Coaching Method." Pursuant to this method, if a manager is having a problem he or she is given a matrix to allow them to track opportunities to improve their performance. The matrix is divided into three "steps," and performance problems can lead to "steps," and subsequently, "performance coachings."
It appears from the exhibits that a matrix is simply a form which is used to keep track of steps/performance coachings.
Shortly after her training ended, the plaintiff was moved to first shift. While serving as first shift manager, the plaintiff's supervisor, Darrell Chrestman, felt her performance was below standard, especially with regard to reports, associate morale, productivity and attendance.
On January 13, 1997, the plaintiff was given a step and coached for what the defendant termed an attendance and ongoing tardiness problem. The plaintiff did not agree with the step and attempted to explain her absences. The plaintiff stated that while she had missed a few days the previous week she had a doctor's excuse for those days, and she contended that she called in to inform Chrestman that she was ill. The plaintiff further explained that she had been given two days off in December and one week in August to be with her son who was sick.
As a result of her disagreement with the step, the plaintiff exercised the defendant's "open-door" policy and went to see Paul Anderson, the General Manager of the center. During her conversation with Anderson, she again explained each absence. When the plaintiff explained that the reason she had taken time off in August was to care for her sick son, Anderson allegedly informed her that he knew she had an illegitimate child out of wedlock before she was hired and that her son was her fault. The plaintiff continued to oppose the step and coaching and met with Brad Johnson, the Center Manager, who tore up the step so that it would not remain a part of her file. The plaintiff was so upset by Paul Anderson's comments that she reported the incident to the defendant's headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas.
After the plaintiff's meeting with Brad Johnson, she felt that she was constantly being disciplined by the defendant. On January 29, the plaintiff received a step for pallets not scanned and "not puts" not being pulled. The plaintiff alleges this step was unwarranted in that she believes it was a computer error. On February 6, the plaintiff was coached for allegedly arriving late to work. The plaintiff contends that this coaching was unwarranted because she reported to work prior to the beginning of her shift. On February 7, the plaintiff was coached for not sending freight out in a proper and timely manner. This incident was later removed from the plaintiff's file when she pointed out that a mistake had been made. Within the next 2-3 days, the plaintiff was coached and stepped for unprofessional conduct toward an associate.
On February 10, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a result of what she alleged was harassment she received after her utilization of the defendant's open door policy regarding both the attendance coaching that was torn up by Brad Johnson and the alleged statements by Paul Anderson. Subsequent to the filing of the EEOC charge, the plaintiff was coached and stepped for unprofessional conduct on March 24 and received a below expectation evaluation on March 27. The plaintiff denies that her conduct was unprofessional.
The plaintiff was on medical leave from March 27 to May 4. On May 12 she was terminated for allegedly force billing two cases of freight and for conduct unbecoming a manager.
The plaintiff filed suit alleging racial and sexual discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. The plaintiff also asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
LAW
On a motion for summary judgement, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 552 (1986).
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, the plaintiff presents her initial prima facie case of race or sex discrimination by showing: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she is qualified for the job from which she was discharged; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) others who were not of the protected class remained in similar positions. Meinecke v. H. R. Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5 th Cir. 1995). Once the plaintiff has made the initial showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973). If the defendant offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-508, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 416 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 679. If the plaintiff fails to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the articulated reason is merely pretextual, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 657-658 (5 th Cir. 1996); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958-959 (5 th Cir. 1993).
The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination. The defendant concedes, for purposes of summary judgment, that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for the job from which she was discharged, and that she was discharged. However, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff cannot show that others who were not of the protected class remained in similar positions. In support of this argument, the defendant points out that the plaintiff could not identify any male employees who were treated any differently than she was, the plaintiff offered no documentation or witness who can verify her claims, the plaintiff did not know whether or not any black female managers were treated differently than white ones, and the plaintiff could not identify any white employees who received the same level of coaching as she did and were not terminated. Further, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is unable to prove that she was replaced by a male. In response, the plaintiff simply states that other managers who were not single black females with children were not terminated.
In considering the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination. The plaintiff claims that she was treated differently because of her race and her sex, however, she offers not one scintilla of evidence to support either claim. While the plaintiff does cite to page 155 of her own deposition as support for her contention that other managers who were not single black females were not treated similarly, page 155 was not included in the evidence submitted to this court and therefore was not considered; however, even if the unincluded statements were considered, a plaintiff's mere subjective belief that she was discriminated against because of her race and sex is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial or sexual discrimination. See Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93,96 (5 th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination under the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.
As for the plaintiff's claim for sexual harassment, the court finds that there is no evidence of such in the record. There are two scenarios by which a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII, one of which is hostile work environment. To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must present: (1) evidence of sexual harassment sufficiently pervasive so as to affect the plaintiff's employment; and (2) evidence that the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 403-404 (5 th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 724 (5 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1001 (1987). The other scenario by which a plaintiff may assert sexual harassment under Title VII is known as quid pro quo. To assert a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff must offer evidence that her supervisor or another superior requested sex as an express or implied condition to receipt of a job benefit. Ellert v. University of Texas, at Dallas, 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5 th Cir. 1995); Jones, 793 F.2d at 722. In the present action, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to support either a claim of hostile environment or quid pro quo sexual harassment.
The court further finds that the plaintiff is unable to support her claim for retaliatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and that (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Watts v. Kroger Co., 955 F. Supp. 674, 685 (N.D. Miss. 1997), aff'd, 147 F.3d 460 (5 th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff has failed to show the requisite causal connection between her filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and her subsequent discharge. While the plaintiff did receive a coaching/step and a below expectation evaluation after she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, these reprimands are insufficient to establish the required causal connection. Since the inception of the plaintiff's employment she has had work performance problems. Prior to the filing of the EEOC charge, the plaintiff received numerous coachings and steps, not to mention verbal warnings while working as second shift manager. In order to establish the nexus between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must provide more evidence than her merely subjective belief that she was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. In the absence of evidence of a causal connection, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.
Finally, the court finds that the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is without merit. While the plaintiff claims that she has suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant's alleged intentional conduct, she has offered no evidence to establish that the defendant's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Lawson v. Heidelberg Eastern, 872 F. Supp. 335, 338 (N.D. Miss. 1995), citing, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.