Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-CV-73598-DT
July 22, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. INTRODUCTION
Pamela Vannoy ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner presently confined at the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder following a jury trial in the Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit in 1998 and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Petitioner raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions in her petition. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner's convictions arise from the larceny and murders of 57-year-old Mary Lou Drury and her mother, 75-year-old Dorothy Gilbert, in their home in Detroit, Michigan on December 23, 1997. Petitioner was tried with her boyfriend and co-defendant Charles Vaughn in a joint trial with separate juries.
At trial, Gerald Drury testified that he lived with his wife and mother-in-law in a four-family flat on Elm Street in Detroit in 1997. Petitioner and Charles Vaughn did odd jobs at their home and helped care for Mrs. Gilbert who was mostly bedridden and required constant oxygen. When the Drurys learned that Petitioner had stolen from them, they asked her to leave the house. Around 9:00 a.m. on December 23, 1997, Mr. Drury called Petitioner down to their flat and told her to move out that day because he was going to change the locks. Mr. Drury left the house at 10:00 a.m. to do some work. When he returned at 1:15 p.m., he noticed that the front door to the house was unlocked. He also noticed that the dining room table was pushed against a cabinet and saw a trail of blood leading from the dining room to the door. He did not see his wife or mother-in-law, so he left the house to ask neighbors if they knew what had happened. Upon returning home with the neighbors, Mr. Drury discovered the bodies of the two women in the basement. Bags were wrapped around their heads and they were hidden under some clothes. Mr. Drury called 911 and waited for the police on the porch. Mr. Drury later observed that a jewelry box was ransacked and that $400 in cash, credit cards, and two guns were missing from the house. Mr. Drury received a bill for $900 in charges on one of the missing cards following the murders.
Police testimony established that there was no forced entry to the flat. Officers found a used roll of duct tape, cut oxygen tubing, a bloody wad of tissue, a bloody wad of duct tape, a slipper, and a pool of blood in the dining room. They also found an open jewelry box with blood on it on the bed in the master bedroom. Officers observed a trail of blood leading from the dining room to the door, into the foyer, and down the basement steps. At the bottom of the steps, the trail parted with one path leading to where Mrs. Drury's body was found and the other leading to where Mrs. Gilbert's body was found. Duct tape and eyeglasses were found near Mrs. Gilbert's body and a slipper matching the one found in the dining room was found near Mrs. Drury's body. Police also found wadded up duct tape and bags of clothes in Petitioner's flat.
The medical examiner testified that Mrs. Drury's hands were bound behind her back at the wrist with duct tape and her feet were bound together at the ankles with duct tape. Her nose and mouth were covered with duct tape and a black plastic bag was placed over her head and tied. She suffered facial bruising and cuts, bruises to an arm and shoulder, abrasions consistent with being dragged on her knees, abdomen, and back, and blunt force trauma to her head. Mrs. Gilbert had her oxygen tube cut and a rag was in her mouth and covered with duct tape. Her head was covered with a plastic bag. She suffered drag marks and scrapes on her abdomen and lacerations to her face, arms, and hands consistent with pistol-whipping. The cause of death for both women was asphyxia.
Karen Salinas testified that Petitioner and Vaughn arrived at her house at approximately 11:30 a.m. carrying plastic bags. Vaughn went to the bathroom and Petitioner used the telephone. Vaughn left the house, but returned a few minutes later. Petitioner and Vaughn left a short time later after hearing a car horn. Petitioner asked Salinas if she would keep a bag of personal items for her. As Vaughn left the house, he pulled a gun from his waistband and said he was going to keep it. He also told Salinas that she had not seen them since yesterday.
Police arrested Petitioner and Vaughn at a Dearborn motel on December 24, 1997. Police searches of the room uncovered several credits cards and checks in Mrs. Drury's name, a $100 check made out to Charles Vaughn, credit card receipts, and the two guns taken from the Drury home. Testing revealed that one gun had Mrs. Drury's blood on it.
Petitioner did not testify at trial, but her police statement was admitted into evidence. In that statement, Petitioner stated that she and Charles Vaughn got into an argument the day before Thanksgiving in 1997. In response, he informed Mrs. Drury that Petitioner had been in prison and had been stealing money. The Drurys ordered Petitioner to vacate the premises. Petitioner called Vaughn and he offered to help her move. He suggested that they rob the Drurys, and Petitioner agreed.
After Mr. Drury left for work on December 23, 1997, Vaughn went downstairs and asked Mrs. Drury if there was anything he could do, and she responded, "no." Mrs. Gilbert was in the bedroom. Vaughn was just supposed to tie them up and rob them, but he said, "fuck it, they have used us long enough." He was going to shoot Mrs. Drury, but Petitioner grabbed him and said, "no." Vaughn turned the gun on her and said, "the bitch deserves it." He told Petitioner to get some plastic bags from the kitchen, which she did. He taped them onto Mrs. Drury. He then made Petitioner get Mrs. Gilbert. While he was taping her, Petitioner went into Mrs. Drury's room and took money and jewelry. Vaughn hit Mrs. Drury with her gun, which he got from a basket in the front room. Petitioner got the other gun from Mrs. Gilbert's room.
Mrs. Drury was still moving when Vaughn put the bags over her head and he kept hitting her. Petitioner did not see Vaughn hit Mrs. Gilbert, but she was struggling while he taped the bags over her head. Vaughn took the two women downstairs. Petitioner stated that Vaughn was not supposed to kill them, just rob them. Petitioner cleaned up the flat and they left the house around 11:00 a.m. and went to Karen Salinas' house where Vaughn washed blood from his pants and Petitioner left some bags. They went to a motel where they hid the guns in the radiator. They disposed of the jewelry and used the stolen money for the room, food, drugs, and cab fare.
At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and larceny, but refused defense counsel's request for an accessory after the fact instruction. The jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first-degree felony murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced her to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on those convictions.
Following sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting that: (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support her convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of accessory after the fact. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions. People v. Vannoy, No. 215189 (Mich.Ct.App. Jan. 26, 2001). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same issues, which was denied. People v. Vannoy, 465 Mich. 864, 634 N.W.2d 355 (2001).
Petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 10, 2002 raising the same claims presented to the Michigan appellate courts. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on March 11, 2003 asserting that it should be denied for lack of merit.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because Petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
B. Insufficient Evidence Claim
Petitioner first claims that she is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support her felony murder convictions. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of her intent to murder.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the United States Supreme Court established that a federal court's review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319; see also Warren, 161 F.3d at 360. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this Court must determine whether the state court's application of the Jackson standard was reasonable. In making this determination, the Court must presume that the state court's factual findings are correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Warren, 161 F.3d at 360-61.
Under Michigan law, a person who commits murder during the perpetration of a felony is guilty of first-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment. See MICH. COMP.L. § 750.316. The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the statute]. People v. Cannes, 460 Mich. 750, 759, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999) (citing People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 566, 540 N.W.2d 728 (1995)). The facts and circumstances of the killing may give rise to an inference of malice, including evidence that the defendant used a deadly weapon. Id. The elements of the predicate felony of larceny from a person are: (1) the taking and carrying away of personal property, (2) from the victim's presence or person, (3) with felonious intent, and (4) without the owner's consent. People v. Gimotty, 216 Mich. App. 254, 257-58, 549 N.W.2d 39 (1996). Michigan law also provides that one who aids and abets the commission of a crime may be convicted and punished as if he or she directly committed the crime. See MICH. COMP. L. § 767.39. To convict a defendant under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecution must establish that the crime was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement which aided or assisted in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant either intended to commit the crime or knew that the principal intended to commit the crime at the time he gave the aid or encouragement. People v. Jones (on reh'g), 201 Mich. App. 449, 451 (1993).
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish Petitioner's guilt of first-degree felony murder. See Vannoy, 2001 WL 765832 at *1-2. This Court agrees and finds that the court's decision is consistent with Jackson and constitutes a reasonable application thereof, as well as a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The testimony presented at trial, including Petitioner's own statement, revealed that she agreed to rob the victims and that she assisted co-defendant Vaughn in carrying out the larceny and the murders. Petitioner knew that Vaughn had obtained a gun and she herself obtained a gun during the incident. Petitioner provided Vaughn with the bags used to cover the women's heads, saw him beating Mrs. Drury, retrieved Mrs. Gilbert from the bedroom, and knew that Vaughn was covering their heads with plastic bags so as to cut off their air supply. Given the short time span in which the larceny and murders occurred, the amount of physical force used upon the victims, and the fact that the two victims were bound in different ways, a reasonable jury could have found from these facts that Petitioner acted as a principal in the killings. At the very least, the evidence indicates that Petitioner knew that Vaughn intended to kill the women and acted as an aider and abettor in the murders. Based upon the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find Petitioner guilty of felony murder based upon the underlying felony of larceny.
Petitioner's insufficient evidence claim essentially challenges the inferences the jury drew from the evidence at trial. However, it is well-settled that "[a] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1983). Given the evidence and testimony presented at trial, this Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of first-degree felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
C. Jury Instruction Claim
Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in failing to give an accessory after the fact instruction to the jury upon defense counsel's request. Under Michigan law, a defendant may request and receive instructions on necessarily included lesser offenses without regard to the evidence, and on cognate lesser included offenses if the evidence would support a conviction on the lesser included offense. People v. Beach, 429 Mich. 450, 462, 418 N.W.2d 861 (1988). The Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that accessory after the fact is not a lesser included offense of murder. People v. Perry, 460 Mich. 55, 62, 594 N.W.2d 477 (1999). Thus, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on accessory after the fact as a matter of due process under state law. Furthermore, a defendant cannot be convicted both as an aider and abetter and an accessory after the fact to the same offense. People v. Hartford, 159 Mich. App. 295, 300 (1987). An accessory after the fact is one who renders assistance to a felon to hinder that felon's detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. People v. Lucas, 402 Mich. 302, 304 (1978). A defendant who helps both before and after a crime (and shares the intent of the principal) is properly considered under an aider and abettor theory. See Hartford, 159 Mich. App. at 300.
Relying on Perry, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court was not required to give an accessory after the fact instruction because the offense is neither a necessarily included lesser offense of murder nor a cognate lesser offense of murder. See Vannoy, 2001 WL 765832 at *2. Even assuming that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred as a matter of state law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief from this Court. A question concerning a perceived error of state law rarely serves as a basis for federal habeas corpus relief; and does so only when the petitioner is denied fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions"). In Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a state court's failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense in a noncapital criminal case was not such a "fundamental defect as inherently results in a miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure."
The trial court's refusal to instruct Petitioner's jury on accessory after the fact did not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. However, even if the failure to given the requested instruction violated due process, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. For purposes of federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (habeas court should grant petition if it has "grave doubt" about whether trial error had substantial and injurious effect or influence upon jury's verdict). An improper jury instruction is subject to harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1999) (citing cases). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that any error in instructing the jury was harmless. Given the testimony presented at trial, discussed supra, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Petitioner guilty of first-degree felony murder either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. Petitioner's jury instruction claim is thus without merit and does not warrant habeas relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.