Opinion
No. 1225
10-05-2017
DENNIS VAN DUSEN v. ALLA MALOVA
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 372931
UNREPORTED
Eyler, Deborah S., Graeff, Alpert, Paul E., (Senior judge, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J. *This is an unreported opinion and therefore may not be cited either as precedent or as persuasive authority in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland court. Md. Rule 1-104.
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alla Malova, the appellee, sued Dennis Van Dusen, the appellant, for invasion of privacy, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraudulent conveyance. Malova alleged that Van Dusen installed hidden cameras in a bedroom she rented from him in his house at 6910 Ridgewood Avenue, in Chevy Chase ("the Property"), and used the cameras to secretly record her most private moments while she lived there. She also alleged that Van Dusen conveyed the Property to himself and his estranged wife as tenants by the entireties shortly after she filed her suit, in order to render himself judgment-proof.
The case was tried to a jury. After Malova rested her case-in-chief, the court entered judgment against Van Dusen on liability for invasion of privacy, trespass, and fraudulent conveyance, and entered judgment in favor of Van Dusen for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case went to the jury on damages. It returned a verdict awarding Malova $456,288 in compensatory damages and $371,400 in punitive damages.
On appeal, Van Dusen presents four questions for review, which we have combined into one:
Did the trial court err by denying Van Dusen's motion to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claim, granting judgment in Malova's favor on that claim, denying Van Dusen's motions for new trial on that claim, and making various other rulings regarding that claim?We shall affirm the judgments.
Van Dusen words his questions presented as follows:
1. Did the trial court err by accepting the damage award of a trial where the jury heard evidence on an issue, a directed verdict of liability was issued, the jury was informed of the directed verdict, and the jury then awarded on a related dispute, must be rejected where that issue was not justiciable at the initiation of argument in the trial.
2. Did the trial court err in declining to dismiss appellee's declaratory judgment action for mootness?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to grant a new trial.
4. Did the court below err by directing a verdict for Fraudulent Conveyance, denying Appellant's Motion to Release Pre-judgment Encumbrance and to Quash Pre-judgment Attachment of 6910 Ridgewood Avenue; denying Appellant's Spouse's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint; granting Appellee's Request for Attachment Before Judgment; granting Appellee's Motion To Correct Date Of Attachment Before Judgment; failing to grant outright Defendant Irina Popova Van Dusen's Motion to Dismiss; striking and terminating Irina Popova Van Dusen's Notice of lis pendens; awarding Spouse's acquired marital property to Appellee; or setting aside the conveyance of 6910 Ridgewood Avenue as a fraudulent conveyance pursuant to either Md. Code (2000), §§ 15-206 and 15-207 of the Commercial Law Article, or Md. Code Ann., Family Law Article § 4-301(d)(2)(i) where the property was re-titled into Tenancy by The Entireties of the Family Home to the Appellant's Spouse who at that time was entitled to substantial marital property fairly equivalent to the value received, and the court was aware that grantee, Appellant's Spouse, had no foreknowledge of the transaction and was dismissed as a defendant after quit-claiming the property.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In September of 2009, Malova began renting a bedroom at the Property from Van Dusen. Several other young women rented bedrooms there as well. Van Dusen lived at the Property.
On the morning of October 13, 2012, while Malova was visiting her parents in Frederick, one of the other tenants called and told her that the night before Rebecca Prywes, another tenant, had discovered a camera hidden in the smoke detector in her bedroom. She had called the police and they were at the Property investigating.
The next day, Malova moved out of the Property. Shortly thereafter, Detective Marc Frazier, of the Montgomery County Police Department, contacted Malova and asked her to come to the police station to identify herself in videos retrieved from computer hard drives police officers had seized from Van Dusen's living quarters at the Property. The videos showed, among other things, Malova sleeping in her bed, trying on clothes, and engaging in sexual relations with her then-boyfriend.
On January 28, 2013, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Malova filed a complaint against Van Dusen for invasion of privacy, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. She later amended her complaint to add a count for fraudulent conveyance.
Michael Antonov, Malova's ex-boyfriend who was also recorded on the hidden cameras in her bedroom at the Property, joined as a plaintiff in Malova's suit, but voluntary dismissed his claims on the first day of trial.
A jury trial commenced on February 25, 2014. Malova, Detective Frazier, Detective William Heverly (also with the Montgomery County Police Department), and forensic psychologist Dr. Michael Sweda testified in Malova's case. Malova also called Van Dusen as a hostile witness and introduced portions of his videotaped pre-trial deposition.
The evidence showed the following. Sometime after Malova became a tenant and moved into the Property, Van Dusen placed two hidden cameras in the smoke detector and in a wall electrical socket in her bedroom. The cameras were motion-activated and recorded 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Both were positioned to record the bed in the room. Footage from the cameras was sent to a computer kept in Van Dusen's office in the Property, on which he watched, stored, and edited the footage from Malova's room with footage from hidden cameras in other tenants' rooms. At one point later during Malova's tenancy, Van Dusen re-entered her room and changed the angle of the camera hidden in the smoke detector so it faced a mirror hanging on one of the room's walls. He also re-entered the room on another occasion, also during the tenancy, and replaced that mirror with a larger one, so the camera in the smoke detector could capture a wider reflection.
As a result of learning of Van Dusen's actions, Malova suffered from an anxiety disorder and a host of other emotional problems, including difficulty with sexual intimacy, difficulty trusting others, paranoia, struggling to concentrate at work, and, ultimately, the demise of her relationship with her ex-boyfriend. Dr. Sweda opined that two years of weekly psychotherapy treatments were needed to resolve these symptoms. After moving out of the Property in 2012, Malova rented an apartment in Virginia that was more than twice the monthly cost of living at the Property.
At the close of her case, Malova moved for judgment on all counts. Van Dusen also moved for judgment on all counts except invasion of privacy. As noted, the trial court granted Malova's motion on liability on her claims of invasion of privacy, trespass, and fraudulent conveyance and granted Van Dusen's motion on intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Van Dusen did not put on any evidence.
The court advised the jurors that it had directed a finding of liability in favor of Malova "as to invasion of privacy and [as] to trespass[,]" and instructed them to deliberate on the amount of damages "only as to" those claims. It also instructed the jurors to determine whether Malova was entitled to punitive damages. Ultimately, the jurors returned a verdict awarding Malova $456,288 in compensatory damages and $371,400 in punitive damages, for a total damages award of $827,688. On March 7, 2014, the circuit court entered separate judgments against Van Dusen in those amounts.
The jury awarded Malova economic damages of $20,800 for future medical expenses, $20,800 for past rent, and $14,688 for extra cost of rent. It awarded her $400,000 in non-economic damages. After the jury returned the compensatory damages award and a special verdict finding Malova was entitled to punitive damages, the jurors immediately heard evidence on the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. They deliberated separately on that issue before returning the punitive damages award.
Meanwhile, also in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Van Dusen pled guilty on April 16, 2013, to three counts of criminal surveillance of another in a private place with prurient intent, stemming from his actions in secretly recording Malova, Prywes, and another tenant who resided at the Property. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, all suspended, five years' probation, and a $2,500 fine.
The Fraudulent Conveyance Count: Van Dusen Transfers the Property
On February 13, 2013, two weeks after Malova sued him, Van Dusen executed a deed conveying the Property to himself and his estranged wife, Irina Popova Van Dusen ("Popova"), as tenants by the entireties ("the February 13 deed" or "February 13 transfer"). The deed stated that the transfer was made "in consideration of the sum of $0.00[.]" On March 4, 2013, Malova, unaware of the February 13 transfer, filed a "Request for Attachment Before Judgment" of the Property. The court, also unaware that the Property had been transferred, granted Malova's motion the next day. On March 7, 2013, a writ of attachment was executed and Van Dusen was ordered to "hold" the Property "subject to further proceedings" in the case.
Malova later filed a "Motion to Correct Date of Attachment Before Judgment" in which she requested the writ of attachment on the Property reflect the date the trial judge granted her motion for attachment, March 5, 2013. That motion was granted on October 4, 2013.
Discovery commenced, and the February 13 deed was disclosed. Upon discovering the transfer, Malova amended her complaint to add Popova as a defendant and to add a claim for fraudulent conveyance against Van Dusen and Popova. As relief, Malova sought a declaration that the February 13 deed was invalid, a ruling setting aside the conveyance, and an injunction preventing Van Dusen or Popova from conveying or encumbering the Property before any judgment entered in the case was satisfied.
Popova filed an answer in which she raised several affirmative defenses by which she maintained the validity of the February 13 deed. She also asserted counter- and cross-claims, which eventually were dismissed.
On January 17, 2014, about a month before trial, Popova executed a quitclaim deed conveying "all of her interest" in the Property back to Van Dusen, leaving the Property again titled in Van Dusen's name alone. Thereafter, Popova signed a written stipulation that she would not challenge Malova's attachment on the Property "in this or any other proceeding." Before the jury was empaneled on the first day of trial, Malova voluntarily dismissed Popova as a defendant.
At trial, when called as a hostile witness, Van Dusen testified that he purchased the Property before he married Popova. The Property remained titled in his name alone throughout the marriage, until he transferred it on February 13, 2013. By that time, he and Popova had been separated for over ten years. Popova did not know that Van Dusen was transferring the Property to the two of them as tenants by the entireties when he did so. Van Dusen told her about the transfer "several weeks" after it happened. A month before Malova sued him, Prywes, and her boyfriend, Keith Woodhams, sued him for invasion of privacy ("the Prywes lawsuit"). Prywes sought an attachment before judgment on the Property, which initially was denied. Van Dusen acknowledged that, when he executed the February 13 deed, he was aware of the Prywes lawsuit and of Prywes's failed attempt to levy an attachment on the Property. He maintained, however, that he conveyed the Property to Popova "because [he] loved her" and wanted to recognize the financial contributions she had made to the Property during their marriage. He testified that he did not convey the Property to protect it from future judgments in Malova's and Prywes's lawsuits against him. Other evidence admitted at trial showed that the Property, valued at nearly $1.1 million dollars at the time, was Van Dusen's only asset of significant value.
As noted, the trial court granted Malova's motion for judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim.
Van Dusen's Post-Judgment Motions and Appeals
On March 17, 2014, Van Dusen filed a "Motion for New Trial and in the Alternative Remittitur." He argued: 1) the trial court erred by granting Malova's motion for judgment on trespass, because he "did not forcibly enter [Malova's] leasehold to deprive her of [its] use"; 2) the trial court erred by granting Malova's motion for judgment on fraudulent conveyance, because Popova had conveyed the Property back to him before trial commenced and she thereafter was dismissed as a party; 3) the damages award improperly "commingled all causes of action against [him]" and was "contrary to the evidence"; 4) the punitive damages award was "erroneous," because it "bankrupted" him; 5) the trial court committed "errors" in allowing his deposition to be played to the jury and in making other, unidentified evidentiary rulings; and 6) "[f]or all of the reasons set forth in objections and motions of [Van Dusen] which were overruled or denied at trial, and in opposition to objections and motions of [Malova] which were sustained or granted at trial, as will appear in the transcript of record." Malova filed an opposition. On March 25, 2014, the court entered an order denying Van Dusen's motion.
Van Dusen filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed on March 27, 2014. The appeal proceeded, and he filed a brief in which he contended that the punitive damages award, various rulings by the trial court relating to the fraudulent conveyance count, and the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial all were in error. On September 10, 2015, we filed an opinion dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the trial court had not entered a final order fully adjudicating the fraudulent conveyance claim. Van Dusen v. Malova, No. 42, Sept. Term 2014 ("Van Dusen I").
Meanwhile, on April 16, 2014, Malova filed a "Request for Writ of Execution By Levy" of the Property to satisfy the money judgments she had obtained against Van Dusen. The writ was issued to the Montgomery County Sheriff on April 17, 2014, and the Property was levied on May 22, 2014. On October 8, 2014, Malova entered a "Line of Partial Satisfaction" of the judgments in the amount of $280,000, and released the Property from the judgment lien. According to the land records for Montgomery County, the Property was sold on October 14, 2014, for a purchase price of $960,000.
On December 23, 2015, in the circuit court, Van Dusen filed a second "Motion for New Trial" and supporting memorandum. He argued, without support, that he was entitled to a new trial because the fraudulent conveyance claim should have been dismissed, no evidence regarding that claim should have been admitted, and judgment should not have been granted on that claim in favor of Malova, because the claim was "improperly raised" and the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over it. He maintained that this Court's opinion in Van Dusen I supported those conclusions and that these errors "improperly influenced" the jury's verdict. Van Dusen also argued that the trial court's rulings "unconstitutionally affected the rights of [Popova]."
Five months later, on May 24, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying the motion:
The Court having considered the Defendant's Motion for New Trial (DE # 265), with no opposition thereto, and the Court having considered that the Defendant failed to timely file his Motion pursuant to Md. R[ule] 2-533, and the Court having already denied the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and in the Alternative Remittitur at DE # 238, it is...,(Emphasis in original.) At that time, the trial court had not entered a final order as to the fraudulent conveyance claim.
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.
On June 8, 2016, Van Dusen filed a "Motion for Reconsideration," in which he argued that his motion for new trial had not been untimely given the trial court had not entered a final order disposing of the fraudulent conveyance claim, and therefore the 10-day time period for filing a motion for new trial under Rule 2-533 had not yet run. Additionally, he renewed his motion for new trial on the ground that any evidence admitted, statements of the court, and rulings of the court on the fraudulent conveyance claim "improperly" influenced the verdict, because the evidence was insufficient to support that claim and was not "properly before the court[.]" Again, he further stated that he was entitled to a new trial "[f]or all of the reasons set forth" in his objections and motions and opposition to objections and motions at trial. The trial court did not rule on Van Dusen's motion for reconsideration and did not enter a final order on the fraudulent conveyance claim.
On July 7, 2016, Van Dusen noted a second appeal and filed a motion asking this Court to direct the trial court to enter a final order disposing of the fraudulent conveyance claim or, in the alternative, to accept his appeal and review the trial court's "post trial orders." On August 17, 2016, before we ruled on the motion, the trial court entered a final order on the fraudulent conveyance claim, memorializing its ruling at trial that Van Dusen's February 13, 2013 conveyance of the Property to Popova and himself as tenants by the entireties was invalid and denying any other relief as moot on the ground that the Property already had been sold. On August 23, 2016, Van Dusen filed another notice of appeal.
Van Dusen in fact asked this Court to instruct the circuit court to "take into consideration" our opinion in Van Dusen I "that the [circuit court] lacked subject matter jurisdiction and has failed to enter a valid final order in the matter below." He also appears to mischaracterize the holding of Van Dusen I in this manner in his second motion for new trial. Van Dusen is incorrect; we did not reach any conclusions as to the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court over any of the claims in the case.
Additional facts will be included as necessary throughout the discussion.
DISCUSSION
At the heart of Van Dusen's appeal is his contention that Malova's fraudulent conveyance claim became moot the moment Popova transferred her interest in the Property back to him, on January 17, 2014. This is the basis for his assertion that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claim and by granting judgment in Malova's favor on that claim. Similarly, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for new trial because the jurors were improperly influenced by hearing evidence about fraudulent conveyance when that claim had become moot and by being informed that the trial court had directed a finding of liability in Malova's favor on that moot claim. Van Dusen also argues that the circuit court erred by denying his second motion for new trial as untimely.
To the extent that Van Dusen challenges other rulings of the trial court on other grounds, we cannot discern what those arguments are from the brief he has filed. Md. Rule 8-504; Barnes v. State, 437 Md. 375, 387 (2014) ("Under [Rule 8-504(a)], [a]n appellant is required to articulate and adequately argue all issues the appellant desires the appellate court to consider in the appellant's initial brief.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552 (1999) ("[A]rguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity will not be considered on appeal.") (citation omitted). Van Dusen also challenges several rulings of the circuit court on motions filed by Popova and affecting Popova's marital property interests. Van Dusen does not have standing to assert any rights Popova may have; accordingly, we do not address these contentions. See Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 652 (2012) ("As a threshold issue, a litigant must have standing to invoke the judicial process in a particular instance. Standing rests on a legal interest such as one of property . . . contract . . . protected against tortious invasion . . . or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 571 (1984) ("As a general rule, a person may not assert the constitutional rights of others."). --------
We review de novo a trial court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 142 Md. App. 134, 139 (2002) ("[O]n appeal" of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss, "this Court must consider well-pleaded facts and allegations in the light most favorable to the appellant" and "determine whether the decision was legally correct.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406 (2012) ("We review, without deference, the trial court's grant of a motion for judgment in a civil case."). We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175 (2005).
"A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case comes before the [c]ourt or where there is no longer an effective remedy the [c]ourt could grant." Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219 (2007) (citations omitted). Because we conclude that the fraudulent conveyance claim was not moot when the trial court denied Van Dusen's motion to dismiss or when it granted Malova's motion for judgment, we hold that the rulings were not in error. For the same reason, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Van Dusen's motions for new trial. To the extent Van Dusen argues that the trial court erred on other grounds, we conclude any error was not prejudicial.
As noted, on March 5, 2013, the circuit court granted Malova's request for a writ of attachment before judgment on the Property. At that time, the Property was held by Van Dusen and Popova as tenants by the entireties, as a consequence of Van Dusen's February 13, 2013 transfer. One purpose of an attachment before judgment is to "'provid[e] the plaintiff with security for the payment of his [or her] claim once it is established as being due.'" Butler v. Tilghman, 350 Md. 259, 267 (1998) (quoting State v. Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 706-07 (1978)). Through the "doctrine of relation back[,]" a pre-judgment attachment creates "an inchoate lien . . . [that] continues and binds the property attached . . . . Consequently, claims or liens arising subsequent to the date of the [attachment] are subordinate to the judgment rendered in the attachment case." Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Overmyer v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 32 Md. App. 177, 184 (1976) ("[S]hould final judgment be obtained, the lien relates back to the time when the property was attached and eliminates subsequent claims and liens from priority."). In short, a pre-judgment attachment serves to preserve the priority of the plaintiff's future judgment as against the defendant's other creditors, as of the date of the attachment.
It is "well settled in this State that property held in a tenancy by the entireties cannot be taken to satisfy individual debts of a husband and wife." Diamond v. Diamond, 298 Md. 24, 29 (1983); see also O'Brien v. Bank of America, N.A., 214 Md. App. 51, 85 (2013) ("[A] creditor cannot offer a claim on property subject to a tenancy by the entirety."); Blenard v. Blenard, 185 Md. 548, 560 (1946) ("In Maryland a tenant by the entireties has no separate interest which can be seized and sold on execution and can therefore be subject to the lien of a judgment against him alone."). Thus, a pre-judgment writ of attachment in a suit against one tenant by the entireties is invalid against property held as tenancy by the entireties. Diamond, 298 Md. at 30; Eastern Shore Bldg. & Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 533 (1969) ("Neither tenant [by the entirety], alone, ever held any interest in severalty to which the lien of the judgment against one tenant could attach.").
As this recitation of the law makes plain, absent a finding that the February 13 deed and transfer was a fraudulent conveyance of the Property, and relief based on that finding setting aside the transfer as invalid, Malova's pre-judgment attachment of the Property would fail, and the priority of her eventual judgment would become subordinate to judgments of other creditors obtained against Van Dusen prior to the entry of judgment in her case. If Malova prevailed on her fraudulent conveyance claim, Van Dusen's transfer of the Property to Popova and himself as tenants by the entireties would be void and Malova's attachment on the Property (and the priority of her future judgment) would be resurrected. After Popova transferred her interest in the Property back to Van Dusen, on January 17, 2014, the trial court could still grant an effective remedy for the fraudulent conveyance claim by setting aside the February 13 deed. Accordingly, the fraudulent conveyance claim was not moot when Van Dusen filed his motion to dismiss or when Malova moved for judgment. The trial court did not err by denying Van Dusen's motions, made on the ground of mootness, and granting judgment on liability in favor of Malova on the fraudulent conveyance claim. Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by informing the jury of its ruling, so the jurors would know what was before them to decide, and by denying Van Dusen's first motion for new trial.
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Van Dusen's second motion for new trial. We agree with Van Dusen that this motion was not untimely. A motion for new trial must be filed "within ten days after entry of judgment." Md. Rule 2-533(a). When Van Dusen filed his second motion for new trial, on December 23, 2015, the trial court had yet to enter a separate order adjudicating the fraudulent conveyance claim. Therefore, no final judgment had been entered in the case, and the trial court would have abused its discretion in denying the motion on timeliness alone. That was not the sole basis for the court's ruling, however. In its May 24, 2016 order, the trial court stated that it was also denying Van Dusen's second motion for new trial after "having considered" the motion on its merits. In the motion, Van Dusen argued that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claim, by finding liability in Malova's favor as a matter of law on that claim, by admitting evidence on that claim, and by informing the jury that it had directed liability in Malova's favor on that claim. For the reasons we have already explained, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Van Dusen's motion for new trial on these grounds.
To the extent that Van Dusen contends the trial court otherwise erred in refusing to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claim, granting judgment in Malova's favor on that claim, or refusing to grant his motions for new trial, he has not shown how any error in those rulings resulted in prejudice to him. "'It has long been the policy in this State that [an appellate court] will not reverse a lower court judgment if the error is harmless.'" Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 657 (2011) (quoting Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33 (2007)). Therefore, "the burden . . . is on the appealing party to show that an error caused prejudice." Id. at 660. Van Dusen's contention that the jury's verdict "was influenced by the court's improper statements, discussion, and invalid directed verdict" on the fraudulent conveyance claim is without merit. The trial court specifically instructed the jurors that they were to deliberate and render a verdict only on the damages to be awarded on the claims of trespass and invasion of privacy. Maryland courts presume that juries follow the instructions given to them. Collins v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 417 Md. 217, 252 (2010) (noting that "'[o]ur legal system necessarily proceeds upon' that presumption") (quoting State v. Moulden, 292 Md. 666, 678 (1982)) (additional citation omitted).
Van Dusen offers no other argument as to how the rulings at issue prejudiced him, and we see none. The Property was levied upon and sold. From the proceeds of the sale, Malova partially satisfied her judgment and released the Property from any lien created by that judgment. If the trial court had dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claim and the February 13 deed had not been set aside, the same outcome would have resulted. As we have already explained, the jury verdict was not influenced by the circuit court's rulings and the admission of evidence on the fraudulent conveyance claim. Malova would still have obtained the judgments against Van Dusen and, because Popova reconveyed the Property to Van Dusen, the Property still would have been sold to satisfy the judgments. The trial court's order invalidating the February 13 deed only affected the validity of Malova's pre-judgment attachment; any error in that ruling would only prejudice creditors of Van Dusen's whose priority was subordinated to Malova's as a result of her attachment, not Van Dusen himself. Van Dusen may not assert the rights of others on appeal. See Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 571 (1984); Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 652 (2012).
Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claim, in granting Malova's motion for judgment on that claim, or in denying Van Dusen's motions for new trial on the ground that the issue of fraudulent conveyance was moot. Any other error in those rulings was harmless.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.