Opinion
No. 3-137 / 02-0843
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
The defendants appeal an adverse judgment awarding Terry Valline damages for gender discrimination. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie Burger and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.
Blake Parker of Blake Parker Law Office, Fort Dodge, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
The defendants appeal an adverse judgment awarding Terri Valline damages for gender discrimination in a combined action under state and federal civil rights acts. They claim: (1) Valline failed as a matter of law to prove she was the victim of intentional discrimination and (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by awarding Valline front pay damages. We reverse.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Valline is employed as a residential counselor at the Fort Dodge Residential Facility, a correctional institution operated by the Second Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. Linda Murken is the director of the department, Jeff Larson is the residential division manager, and Linda Hall was formerly the residential manager of the Fort Dodge facility.
In 2001 Valline applied for a promotion to residential supervisor at the Fort Dodge facility. Larson and Hall interviewed Valline and the other applicants. Don Sorensen, a residential officer at the Fort Dodge Facility, was ultimately hired instead of Valline.
Valline filed this lawsuit alleging Murken, Larson, Hall, and the department engaged in illegal gender discrimination in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994) (Title VII), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 216 (1999). Valline claimed she should have been promoted because she was better qualified than Sorensen. The defendants denied Valline's allegations, claiming Sorensen was hired for legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons. Valline claimed the defendants' stated reasons for hiring Sorensen were a pretext to conceal their discriminatory motives.
Valline first filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and was issued a right-to-sue letter.
Defendants' stated reasons for hiring Sorensen instead of Valline included Sorensen's support for implementing cognitive group facilitation at the Fort Dodge facility and Valline's reluctance to train in this area or to lead such groups. They also cited Sorensen's willingness to accept duties beyond those found in his job description, specifically noting Valline's reluctance to serve as acting manager in Hall's absence. Other factors cited included Sorensen's greater familiarity with security and maintenance issues, better interview, and human insight.
Cognitive behavior groups addressed thought patterns and attempted to change criminal thinking patterns. Facilitators were trained to lead cognitive behavior groups.
The trial judge denied the defendants' motions for directed verdict and submitted Valline's gender discrimination claims to the jury. The jury found Valline's gender was a determining factor in the defendants' decision not to promote her and that their stated reasons for not promoting Valline were a pretext to conceal their discriminatory motives. Valline was awarded $7792 for back pay and $4375 for mental pain and suffering.
The defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. The trial judge subsequently determined Valline was entitled to front pay to compensate her for the difference between compensation for her current position and that for which she applied. Judgment was entered accordingly resulting in this appeal. On appeal defendants argue: (1) Valline failed to prove as a matter of law she was the victim of intentional gender discrimination and (2) the district court abused its discretion in ordering front pay.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of rulings on motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. On both motions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( b); Midwest Home Distrib. v. Domco Indus. Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1998). We consider whether substantial evidence exists to support the plaintiff's claim, justifying submission of the case to the jury. Channon v. United Parcel Serv., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa 2001). Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence. Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa 2000).
III. The Merits
As noted earlier, Valline sued under both state and federal civil rights acts. The elements and methods of proof are basically the same under both acts. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999); Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1990); Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).
There are two methods by which a plaintiff can establish discrimination under state and federal law. Under the direct evidence mixed-motive standard, a plaintiff must produce "direct evidence" that an illegitimate criterion such as gender played a motivating part in the employment decision. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1795, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 293 (1989)). Direct evidence demonstrates a specific link between the challenged employment action and the alleged animus. Michaelson v. Waitt Broad., Inc., 187 F. Supp.2d 1059, 1068 (N.D.Iowa 2002). Once direct evidence has been presented, the employer has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of an improper motive. Vaughn v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 538-39 (Iowa 1996); Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Iowa 1994).
Direct evidence has been defined as conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that might be viewed as directly reflecting an allegedly discriminatory attitude, which could allow a fact finder to infer the attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2002).
Because discrimination is difficult to prove by direct evidence, state and federal courts have recognized an alternate method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed. 668, 677-79 (1973); Harman v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 479 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1991). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in employment under the McDonell Douglas method of proof, the plaintiff must initially prove (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the employment at issue; (3) the plaintiff suffered adverse employment action, and (4) it is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was based on an impermissible consideration, such as gender. Hamer v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 472 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1991) (citing Reeb v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 861. The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215 (1981).
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendants to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Board of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998). This burden involves producing evidence; it is enough if defendants raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they discriminated against the plaintiff. Hamilton v. First Baptist Elderly Housing Found., 436 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 1989). "The defendant is not required to persuade the court that the defendant was actually motivated by the proffered reason." Id. The plaintiff's prima facie case will be rebutted if the defendants offer admissible evidence "which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Id. at 339 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216).
Valline's gender discrimination was tried under the McDonnell Douglas method. We review the challenged trial court rulings accordingly to determine whether each was supported by substantial evidence.
As noted earlier, Valline's discrimination theory was premised on the fact that she was more qualified than Sorensen. Valline offered evidence of her seniority, that she was better educated than Sorensen, scored higher than he did on a written screening test administered to all applicants, and her history of better performance evaluations than Sorensen. Valline also offered evidence that Hall was present during conversations by other employees who expressed a preference for a male manager.
Valline disputed the defendants' version of her experience as temporary manager citing union protocol as the true reason she declined to continue serving in that capacity. Valline also claimed the defendants' interest in cognitive groups was overstated, noting their failure to fully implement cognitive group therapy after Sorensen was promoted and that she in fact had been trained for cognitive group therapy and had conducted such groups.
Neither party seriously disputes, and the record abundantly supports, the trial judge's determination that both parties met their respective burdens to establish and rebut Valline's prima facie case of gender discrimination. The fighting issue is therefore whether Valline's evidence of pretext was sufficient as a matter of law to support the trial court's rulings on defendants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We, for the following reasons, conclude that Valline's evidence of pretext was insufficient as a matter of law and that the trial judge's contrary rulings were erroneous.
In addressing Valline's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge concluded the defendants' proffered reasons for promoting Sorensen were false and that gender discrimination was the true reason Valline was not promoted. The judge found "in fact, little or no evidence exists that cognitive group facilitation is of any great importance in the Fort Dodge Residential Facility." We disagree.
The record includes ample evidence that cognitive group facilitation was an important issue to the department. Murken testified all of the clients of the Second Judicial District Department of Corrections could benefit from the cognitive behavioral approach. Murken stated cognitive behavior groups had been started throughout the district and as many staff as possible had been trained in that approach. She testified that for staff, "it's really important if this is going to work that they understand the approach and that they reinforce that cognitive behavioral approach." Additionally, Larson testified:
So this whole cognitive way of — of — of conducting business was real important; and I felt that if we're going to lead the staff down that road, we needed a leader who believed in it, not somebody who did it just `cause they were forced to; and I — I don't know for sure; but my conclusions were that [Valline] did not believe in it nearly to the extent [Sorensen] did. So I thought he would be able to lead the staff in the direction that we wanted to go.
The undisputed record indicates Valline was initially unwilling to participate in cognitive training, and did so only after being specifically directed to do so by her supervisor. Valline testified, "I don't like to do groups and I don't want to do a group but I would."
On the other hand, the undisputed record indicates Sorensen had more experience as a cognitive group facilitator and was more receptive to implementing that practice at the Fort Dodge facility. In fact, he inquired during his interview if he would have more opportunities to lead such groups.
The trial judge's conclusion that defendants' claims concerning cognitive group facilitation were false conflicts with the undisputed record. Cognitive group therapy was a legitimate and substantial factor in the defendants' employment decision, and the trial judge erred as a matter of law by concluding otherwise.
The trial judge characterized the defendants' claims that Sorensen had a better interview as "a shallow explanation" and the interview process as "almost a waste of time." Our review of the record indicates these characterizations are similarly in conflict with otherwise undisputed evidence.
Larson testified the interview was important to show how the candidates thought on their feet, how articulate they were, and how well they could respond under pressure. Larson also testified:
I thought, over all, that [Sorensen's] was much more elaborate, much more insightful. He applied some conceptual things to actual job duties. [Valline's] was just very succinct and not in depth and not very abstract in her application of some ideas.
Hall testified Valline was very short with her answers, appearing to lack interest in the interview. The record also includes Valline's admission that hers was not the best interview. Contrary to the trial judge's conclusion, we find, as a matter of law, Valline's negative interview was a legitimate and substantial factor in the defendants' employment decision.
We likewise reject Valline's claims concerning the significance of conversations by other employees in which preferences for a male manager were expressed. Statements made by employees not involved in the decision-making process do not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination. McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Engstrand v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1390, 1399 (S.D.Iowa 1996) ("The Eighth Circuit distinguishes comments that show a `discriminatory animus in the decisional process' from `stray remarks in the workplace,' `statements by nondecisionmakers,' or `statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process.'"). The statements in question here do not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.
The trial judge also dismissed the defendants' remaining stated reasons for hiring Sorensen as false. We find it sufficient to note that the undisputed record indicates Sorensen's greater familiarity with security and maintenance issues and willingness to accept extra job duties were legitimate and substantial reasons for hiring him. The trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding otherwise.
Our disagreement with the trial judge's ruling stems from what we believe to be the limits of judicial authority in an employment discrimination case. These limitations have been expressed as follows:
Evidence that an employer hired a less qualified candidate for a position can support a finding that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring was pretextual. . . . Identifying those strengths that constitute the best qualified applicant is, however, a role best left to employers; as we have often noted, "the employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination."
Mower v. Westfall, 177 F. Supp.2d 940, 952 (S.D.Iowa 2001) (quoting Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Employers have wide latitude to make business decisions. McLaughlin, 50 F.3d at 511; see also Day v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 650, 657 (8th Cir. 1997) ("federal courts are not self-appointed personnel managers, and they may not second-guess the fairness or wisdom of an employer's nondiscriminatory employment decisions"). The fact that a court might think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose the employer to liability for gender discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d at 219. Employers are prohibited from intentionally discriminating based on certain, discreet classifications; they are not prohibited from making employment decisions based on other factors. Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1998).
Valline was required to do more than establish that she was comparatively more qualified than Sorensen. She was required to "persuade the jury, from all the facts and circumstances, that the employment decision was based upon intentional discrimination." Id. at 1108. Because Valline failed as a matter of law to show that the defendants' employment decision was based on intentional gender discrimination, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the trial judge. Our decision to reverse on this issue is dispositive, and we need not address the remaining issues raised on appeal.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in conformity with our opinion.